Computable General Equilibrium Modelling and the Evaluation of Agricultural Policy by Blake, Adam
Blake, Adam (1998) Computable General Equilibrium 
Modelling and the Evaluation of Agricultural Policy. PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/10336/1/A._Blake.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
Computable General Equilibrium 
Modelling and the Evaluation of 
Agricultural Policy 
by 
Adam Blake 
A Thesis Submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
September 1998 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with computable general equilibrium modelling and evaluation of 
agricultural policy in a global context. Particular emphasis has been given to the EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy, reform of which was an important element in the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round (UR), and which is to be subject to further reforms under 
Agenda 2000. Nevertheless, attention has also been given to modelling the effects of other 
Uruguay Round outcomes in manufactures and services, so that the reform of the CAP can 
be assessed within the liberalised global setting. 
Chapter 1 describes the UR agreement in general, and the Agricultural Agreement in 
detail. Chapter 2 discusses the construction of computable general equilibrium models. 
This informs the consideration given in Chapter 3 to the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model and to results from several papers that use the model for the analysis of the 
UR, as well as other UR CGE models. The GTAP version 2 database is examined in 
Chapter 4 (the latest version, released in June 1998, is covered in Chapter 7). Chapter 5 
gives attention to the finer detail of the standard GTAP model, and describes the 
modifications and extensions made to this model, such as the modelling of partially-
specific-factors and endogenous subsidy rates and a means of decomposing welfare 
changes in the GTAP model. Chapter 6 presents the resuUs from modelling the Uruguay 
Round with the aggregation and model developed in Chapters 4 and 5. The main resuUs for 
these simulations show that the global welfare gain and regional gains to the EU, the USA 
and Japan are comparable to studies discussed in Chapter 3. 
Chapters 7 and 8 use the most recent GTAP database, which gives wider coverage of 
regions, sectors and factors than the version used in earlier chapters. Chapter 7 augments 
the model of Chapter 5 with production quotas for milk and sugar, explicit modelling of 
compensation and headage payment, intervention prices and support buying, and detailed 
representation of the EU export subsidy commitments. Chapter 8 reports the resuUs of 
simulations using this in a model 'projected' to 2005. The main resuUs are that the UR 
leads to welfare losses in the EU, which are partially reduced through Agenda 2000, and 
that in all scenarios, the redistributional impacts of reforms are far greater than the overall 
welfare changes. Finally, Chapter 9 offers some conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE URUGUAY ROUND AND AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round (UR) multilateral trade negotiations are the most comprehensive 
and far-reaching negotiations in GATT history, with the final agreement of the 
Uruguay Round encompassing not only market access provisions for industrial goods, 
but also agreements on agriculture, textiles and clothing, services, investment, and 
intellectual property rights. In addition, the Uruguay Round provided for the 
formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a permanent international body to 
regulate the enforcement of Uruguay Round provisions, provide a dispute settlement 
mechanism, and to oversee future trade negotiations. 
This study examines the effects of the Uruguay Round on agriculture, with special 
emphasis on the consequences for agriculture in the EU. To this end, a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model will be developed to examine not only the effects of 
the agricultural reforms of the Uruguay Round, but additionally of liberalisation in 
manufacturing sectors, to assess the general equilibrium impact of the total impact of 
these reforms for each sector. 
The background to the model is covered in the first three chapters of this thesis. This 
chapter discusses the Uruguay Round reforms, and concludes with points of interest to 
the modelling of tUe effects of the reforms on agriculture. Chapter 2 discusses the use 
of CGE models, and chapter 3 examines the main CGE models that have been used to 
simulate the effects of the Uruguay Round and discusses the results of studies that 
use these and other models. 
Chapter 4 examines the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, in particular 
looking at how the structure of agriculture and tUe structure of agricultural protection 
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are represented in that database. Chapter 5 discusses the standard GTAP model, and 
makes additions to this model for the present study. Chapter 6 presents tUe main 
results of the simulations, and includes decompositions of these results to try to 
ascertain the impact of each major cause of the results, and the interaction between 
different reforms. 
Chapter 7 presents a different model to chapter 5, based on the recent version 4 of the 
GTAP database, and models the Common Agricultural Policy more accurately. The 
focus of this study, and the results in chapter 8, is the forthcoming Agenda 2000 
reform of the CAP. 
Chapter 9 concludes, drawing comparisons between the two models presented hare 
and with other studies. 
1.2 GATT HISTORY 
In the 1940s, the International Trade Organisation was proposed as the third Bretton 
Woods body alongside the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The 
negotiations for the creation of the ITO took place between the Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944 and the Geneva conference in 1947, with discussions in three 
areas: the constitution of the ITO charter, multilateral tariff reductions, and general 
rules relating to tariff commitments. The agreement on the ITO charter was never 
ratified by the US Congress, so the ITO never came into operation, but the Havana 
Treaty on rules relating to tariff commitments became known as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT)' with the multilateral tariff reductions 
coming into force as the first (Geneva) "Round" of the GATT. Subsequently, ftirther 
GATT Rounds were arranged, as shown in Table 1-1. Initially these Rounds were 
mainly concerned with the accession of new GATT members. The 1955-56 Geneva 
Round was for example, held to discuss the accession of Japan, and the 1960-62 
Dillon Round included negotiations for the inclusion of the EEC in GATT. 
' riic ( iATT treaty itself was never presented tor ratification to tiie US Congress, for I'ear tiiat it would not receive 
the ML-ccssary two-thirds majority in the Senate. The GATT therefore only e.xists provisionallx. 
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Table 1-1: GATT Rounds 
Geneva 
Annecy 
Torquay 
Geneva 
Dillon 
Kennedy 
Tokyo 
Uruguay 
1947 
1949 
1950 
1955-56 
1960-62 
1964-67 
1973-79 
1986-93 
Number 
of 
Countries 
23 
34 
22 
45 
48 
99 
117 
Value of trade 
covered 
($bn) 
10 
n/a 
n/a 
2.5 
4.9 
40 
155 
Average 
tariff cut 
(%) 
35 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
35 
34 
38 
n/a = no general tariff reduction negotiations. 
Successive Rounds have usually included more members, with LDCs participafing in 
the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, and have taken notably longer to conclude. The 
Kennedy. Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds centred around multilateral tariff reductions 
based on negotiated tariff-cutting formulae. 
GATT Principles 
The GATT rules, initially embodied in the Havana treaty but modified at later GATT 
Rounds, commits the Contracting Parties, or GATT members, to obey certain 
principles in their trade policies. 
• The principle of National Treatment means that governments have a general 
obligation to treat domestic and foreign suppliers equally. 
• Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment means that each GATT member must 
treat every other member on the same terms that it treats its most favoured trading 
partner. This means that any bilaterally agreed tariff reduction between two 
contracting parties must be applied to imports to those countries from ail other 
GATT members. 
• Open Markets is a principle laid down in the GATT, meaning that all forms of 
trade protection other than import tariffs are prohibited, and that import tariffs 
sUould be reduced. 
• The principle oi Fair Trade involves the GATT's prohibition on the use of export 
subsidies. 
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• Reciprocity means that whenever a country lowers its tariff on imports from a 
second country, that second country must reciprocate by making an equal tariff 
reduction. 
• Tariff Bindings are the key principle by which negotiated tariff reductions work, 
while allowing unilateral tariff reductions in excess of negotiated commitments. 
A tariff binding exists for each tariff line, and sets an upper limit on the applied 
tariff. Tariff bindings are reduced in each Round of negotiations, but where the 
applied tariff is much lower than the tariff binding, the former need not actually 
be reduced. Countries can apply lower tariffs than the binding, and if they do so 
they are then free to increase the applied tariff up to but not over the bound tariff. 
Tariff bindings can never be increased. 
Exceptions to the GATT Principles 
A number of exceptions have been made to these principles. The MFN principle has 
two exceptions: special and differential treatment for LDCs, and regional integration. 
Special and Differential Treatment for LDCs has been a principle of the GATT since 
developing countries began to join the GATT negotiations at the start of the Tokyo 
Round in 1973. This treatment centres on two issues: a right to protect (because of 
infant industries, and the revenue implications of tariff reform), and a right to access. 
The right to access to developed country markets has been enshrined in the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) by which, under the Tokyo Round 
agreement, developed countries may apply lower tariffs on imports from developing 
countries than the MFN tariffs applied to imports from developed countries. All 
developed GATT members have since given GSP preferences. 
The right to protect is a mildly contentious issue, because proponents of free-trade 
argue that developing countries would be better off if the GATT forced them to make 
large tariff reductions. Partly because developing countries have been slow to join the 
GATT, special and differential treatment led in both the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds 
to lower obligations for developing countries than for developed members. 
Specifically, the Uruguay Round commits LDCs to two-thirds of the reductions to 
which developed countries are committed. For reforms that developed countries are 
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allowed a six-year implementation period, LDCs have a ten-year implementation 
period. 
Rci^ional Integration has been a permitted exception to the MFN principle since the 
accession to the GATT of the EEC as a group in the Dillon Round. Article XXIV 
permits free trade areas and customs unions so long as the trade barriers following 
integration are not higher than they were before integration', and so long as the 
regional trade agreement covers trade in all goods. The rules set out to include the 
EEC have been used more recently for the US-Canada Free Trade Area, the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and other free trade areas. 
Agriculture has prior to the Uruguay Round been essentially exempt from all the 
GATT rules and principles. The US negotiated an exemption under article XI of the 
original General Agreement for agricultural import barriers, which are permitted 
under certain circumstances, such as if imports threaten the workings of domestic 
farm income support programmes. Export subsidies are exempt where they do not 
lead to the exporting country gaining more than an "equitable share" of world trade in 
that product. These rules have been used by the US and EEC, and other countries, to 
maintain agricultural protection. 
Emergency Action is an exception to the open markets principle, whereby a GATT 
member is allowed to temporarily increase import barriers if tariff commitments 
undertaken under the GATT have caused serious injury to domestic producers. 
Balance-of-Payments reasons can be used to increase import barriers. Where a country 
is experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties, quantitative import restrictions can 
be used so long as they are temporary in nature and are relaxed when the balance-of-
payments problems diminish. 
- If. for some commodities, tariffs after the formation of the customs union are higher than those applied 
previously, there must be compensation in terms of reductions in tariffs applied to other commodities It should be 
noted that the regional integration provisions do not exclude integration where trade diversion is high, so a free 
inidc area or customs union which lowers world welfare can be perfectly legal under the (iA IT. 
1 -5 
Anti-Dumping Duties are permitted under the GATT where an exporting firm is 
selling goods at below cost-price in the importing country. The importer may then 
apply a duty that is equal to the price difference in addition to normal tariffs. 
Countervailing Duties are permitted under the GATT where an exporting country is 
subsidising its exports to another country in violation of GATT rules on export 
subsidies. Such countervailing duties must only offset the export subsidy, so that the 
price of imports is the same with both the export subsidy and countervailing duty as it 
would have been without either instrument. 
Export Duties and Export Quotas have never (prior to the Uruguay Round) been 
subject to GATT rules, primarily because they are rarely used in developed countries. 
The profusion of bilateral Voluntary Export Restraints in textiles and clothing during 
the 1960s and 1970s was instigated by developed countries to "persuade" developing 
countries to restrict the volume of their exports of textiles and clothing on a bilateral 
and product-specific basis. 
1.3 THE TIMING AND POLITICS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT 
The Uruguay Round began in September 1986 in Uruguay with the Punta del Este 
Ministerial Declarafion. and concluded in December 1993, three years behind 
schedule. While other areas of negotiation, particularly services and intellectual 
property, were subject to disputes in the negotiation process, disagreements in the 
agricultural negotiations were primarily responsible for the delay in the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round. For this reason, and to detail the background of the contentious 
areas, this chapter gives a commentary on the agricuUural negotiations. 
The Initial Negotiating Positions 
Table 1-2 shows the main points of the inifial negotiating positions of the main 
participants in the agricultural negotiations, and these positions dominated the course 
of negotiations. The initial positions were submitted to the GATT in 1988. 
Table 1-2: Main positions at the start of the agricultural negotiations 
Export Subsidies 
Domestic 
Subsidies 
Import Barriers 
United States 
Elimination 
over ten years 
Elimination, 
except for 
decoupled 
payments 
Elimination 
Cairns Group 
Elimination 
Freeze, then 
reduce over 10-
year period, with 
subsequent 
elimination 
Elimination 
European 
Community 
Reductions where 
the EC is in 
surplus •  
Aggregate 
reductions 
Japan 
Elimination 
No need for 
reductions 
Reductions, but 
retain import 
quotas 
The US and the Cairns Group' both proposed dramatic reductions in agricultural 
protection. The US position was for the elimination of export subsidies and import 
barriers, embodying commodity-specific reductions in domestic support, with an 
aggregate measure of support, such as the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE), to 
monitor progress towards the eventual elimination of trade-distorting subsidies. Non 
trade-distorting subsidies (i.e. decoupled policies) could be retained. The Cairns 
Group had a similar agenda for the elimination of all trade-distorting domestic support 
and border protection, but with a ten-year phase-out period. The Cairns Group 
proposed the use of the aggregate measure of support (AMS) to monitor the 
reductions of domestic subsidies. 
The EC position was largely a defensive effort to retain as much of the Common 
Agricultural Policy as it could. The EC proposed to use the AMS to make small 
reductions to domestic support, without any change in border protection. It proposed 
that because of the EC's system of variable import levies and variable export refimds, 
the reduction in domestic support would itself entail reductions in border protection, 
so no further reduction was necessary. 
3 The Cairns Group is an independent negotiating group of agricultural exporting countries that tabled its 
proposals and offers in the agricultural negotiations collectively. Its members are: Argentina. Australia, Brazil, 
Canada. Chile. Colombia. Fiji. Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines. Thailand and 
IJruuuav. 
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The .lapanese position was also defensive, in that Japan's main concern was to retain 
import quotas for rice. Japan therefore tabled offers to eliminate export subsidies and 
reduce tariffs, but to retain import quotas and make no reductions to doinestic support. 
The Main Negotiating Areas 
In the area of export subsidies, the US, the Cairns Group and Japan all proposed 
elimination of export subsidies, but the EC, as the main user of export subsidies, 
proposed to keep them. 
Import tariff elimination was tabled by both the US and the Cairns Group, with Japan 
proposing partial tariff reduction using traditional GATT procedures. The EC 
proposed that there be no changes to border protection. 
Domestic support proved to be the key area of disagreement between the initial 
negotiating positions of the US and Cairns Group and the EC. While the US and 
Cairns Group envisaged total elimination of trade-distorting domestic support, the EC 
proposed partial liberalisation. The EC's domestic support proposals were also the 
ke\stone of its zero-reduction proposals on border protection, because of the way that 
doinestic reform would reduce the EC's variable border measures without any need 
for additional reform. 
.\ further point of disagreement on domestic support reform was whether the PSE or 
AMS measures should be used to monitor reductions. PSE is defined as the net 
assistance provided to agricultural producers through market price supports and 
government expenditures, and is calculated on a commodity-specific basis. AMS is 
the aggregate PSE support over all agricultural commodities. Reductions in PSEs 
therefore imply liberalisation in every sector, while reductions in AMS mean 
liberalisation of support to agriculture as a whole, giving leeway as to the sectors in 
which the reforms take place. Canada tabled a proposal separately from other Cairns 
Group members that the AMS should exclude sectors where subsidies account for less 
than five percent of output. 
The base year for reform also proved to be a source of disagreement. The period 1986-
88 was one of historically low worid prices for agricultural products, with high levels 
of agricultural protection. Any reductions from this base would imply lower actual 
changes in protection than a reduction from a base such as 1990 that had higher world 
prices, and lower levels of protection. While protection levels vary inversely to world 
prices in all protecting countries, the EC's system of variable import levies and 
variable export refunds makes EC protection more sensitive to the choice of base year 
than that in countries that use fixed tariffs. 
The Mid-Term Review, December 1988 
At the Montreal mid-term review of progress, it became evident that a key stumbling 
block to the successful completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations was the US 
insistence on the one hand to eliminate trade-distorting protection, and the European 
Community's determination on the other hand to keep the Common Agricultural 
Policy intact. 
The Geneva Accord, April 1989 
The Geneva Accord marked a minor breakthrough in the agricultural negotiations, and 
was in part initiated because neither the US or EC wanted to see the breakdown of 
talks in other areas because of the impasse over agricultural reform. The Geneva 
Accord had no reference either to the elimination of trade-distorting support, nor to 
continuation of it, but rather contained the general objective of "substantial 
progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed 
period of time'. The Geneva Accord, partly in realisation of how far away agreement 
might be, included a freeze on all forms of farm support from April 1989 to December 
1990. 
The Framework Agreement, 1990 
With the end of Uruguay Round negotiations timetabled for December 1990, the 
GATT negotiating group on agriculture released the framework agreement as a means 
of providing a basis for the final rounds of negotiations. The frainework agreement 
itself tended more to the US and Cairns Group position than that of the EC in terms of 
border protection and export subsidies, but followed the EC proposals for gradual 
reducfions of domestic support. 
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Breakdown of negotiations, December 1990 
The US and EC were unable to come to agreement in the agricultural negotiations in 
1990. and in December, at the scheduled conclusion of the Round, the US and other 
agricultural exporting countries withdrew from the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Some progress had been made in 1990 on domestic support, with the US and the 
Cairns Group tabling offers for 75% reductions in internal support and border 
protection, and 90% reductions in export subsidies over ten years. The EC had in turn 
made a specific offer to cut AMS by 30% over ten years from a 1986 base. 
The main stumbling block for negotiations at this point was, however, the EC's 
insistence that reform of border protection was unnecessary if domestic support 
reductions were already to take place. The US and Cairns Group also wanted much 
greater cuts in export subsidies than the EC was prepared to accept, and insisted that 
domestic reforms should use the commodity-specific PSE calculation, whereas the EC 
insisted on using the AMS. 
The MacSharry Reforms, January 1991 (revised July 1991) 
With negotiations in the Uruguay Round suspended, EC Agricultural Commissioner 
MacSharry announced widespread reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy that 
would prove to be the crucial move in reaching agreement in the Round. The 
MacSharry Plan lowered support prices in the EC while supplementing farmers' 
incomes with compensating payments. Cereals producers were to set-aside a 
proportion of their arable land, for which they would receive additional compensatory 
aid. 
The reductions of internal support prices were to bring internal prices closer to world 
price levels, reducing both import levies and export subsidies. While total domestic 
agricultural support was to increase, compensation payments and compensatory aid 
were eventually to be excluded from AMS calculations as non-trade-distorting 
policies. The MacSharry reforms therefore enabled the possible conclusion of the 
agricultural negotiations, and were to provide the means to complete the Uruguay 
Round. 
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The Dunkel draft agreement, December 1991 
G,\TT secretary-general Arthur Dunkel tabled a draft agreement in December 1991, 
the main points of which became the foundation of the eventual agricultural 
agreement. 
The Dunkel draft set out the principle of conversion of all non-tariff barriers to tariffs, 
and a 36% reduction in average tariffs, including those resulting from NTB 
conversion. Each tariff line would be subject to a minimum 15% cut, with addifional 
tariff reductions where imports failed to meet a minimum market access commitment 
of 3% rising to 5% at the end of the implementation period. The implementation 
period for all market access provisions would be six years (1993-9), and the base 
period for minimum market access provisions would be 1986-8. 
Domestic support reductions of 20% were envisaged by the Dunkel draft, on a 
uniform commodity-specific basis. "Green-box" policies that were not trade-distorting 
were exempted from reductions, and these included publicly financed R&D, early 
retirement schemes and land set-aside schemes (so long as land was withdrawn from 
production for at least three years). Additionally, "Amber-box" policies were exempt 
from reductions where subsidies were based on base period criteria rather than current 
prices and volumes. The "Amber-box" proposal was dropped by the time that the 
Agricultural Agreement was finalised, in part because they would enable support to 
farmers that had produced a certain commodity in a base period even if farmers no 
longer produced that commodity. 
The Dunkel draft proposed reductions of 36% on export subsidy expenditures by 
commodity, with a minimum reduction of subsidised export quantities (also 
commodity-specific) of 24%. 
While the Dunkel draft introduced many changes that would be included in the final 
Agricultural Agreement, there were several areas that still lead to disputes between 
negotiating countries. The EC was opposed to restrictions on the volume of subsidised 
exports and was unable to accept the domesfic support proposals, which did not 
exempt compensatory payments from reduction and therefore were at odds with the 
recent MacSharry reforms. The US also wanted deficiency payments to be excluded 
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from domestic reductions. The EC, Japan and Canada all wanted to retain the ability 
to impose quantitafive restrictions on imports. 
The Blair House Agreement, November 1992 
The Blair House agreement was a bilateral agreement between the US and EC. The 
most crucial agreement at Blair House was the creation of a "Blue-Box" category for 
exemption from AMS support reduction, to include all direct payments under 
production-limiting programmes. This exempted both US deficiency payments and 
EC compensatory payments. Additionally the commodity-specific PSE reductions 
entailed in the Dunkel draft were changed to a 20% reduction in the aggregate 
measure of support. These two issues effectively enabled EC agreement by making an 
Agricultural Agreement that could be fulfilled by the MacSharry reforms, because (a) 
although the MacSharry reforms increased the overall AMS. they reduced the AMS if 
compensatory payments were excluded, and (b) the MacSharry reforms did not reform 
some sectors (such as sugar and dairy), so that the specification of aggregate 
reductions was necessary. 
A Peace Clause was also agreed at Blair House, whereby countervailing actions were 
ruled out for agricultural commodities during the implementation period. This gave 
the EC even more leeway in how it implemented the Agricultural Agreement, as no 
action could be taken against them for non-compliance for a period of six years. 
The Final Agreement on Agriculture, December 1993 
While the Blair House agreement cleared up most of the remaining areas that were 
blocking negotiations after the Dunkel draft, there were also several other country-
specific concessions before the final agreement was reached, the most important of 
which was the allowance for Japan and South Korea to retain quotas on rice imports. 
1.4 COMPONENTS OF THE FINAL URUGUAY ROUND 
AGREEMENT 
The components of the final agreement are examined individually in this secfion. 
Section 1.4.1 examines Uruguay Round market access provisions for manufactured 
goods. Section 1.4.2 examines the Agricultural Agreement, secfion 1.4.3 the textiles 
and clothing component of the Uruguay Round agreement, and section 1.4.4 other 
I - 12 
issues. The grouping of services, investment, intellectual property, and other issues 
into the same group does not reflect the fact that these issues are less important than 
those examined individually, but rather that because market access, agriculture, and 
textiles and clothing reforms rely predominantly on reductions in tariffs, subsidies and 
export taxes, they lend themselves to quantitative modelling. This study, and most of 
the studies discussed in chapter 3, will simulate the effects of these reforms and ignore 
those that are in the "other' issues of section 1.4.4 
1.4.1 Uruguay Round Market Access Provisions For Manufactures 
Market access provisions can be considered to be the basis of GATT Rounds; in all 
Rounds before the Uruguay Round, market access provisions were the only major 
reforms initiated. Uruguay Round market access provisions are based on the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers (replaced by equivalent tariffs), and average tariff 
reductions of 38% (including the reduction of tariffs that were converted from non-
tariff barriers), with LDCs being allowed smaller reductions of 24%. A small number 
of products were excluded ('zero-rated') so the average reduction will be slightly 
lower than these rates. GATT signatory countries submitted new tariff schedules that 
complied with the provisions, and had some leeway in how the individual tariff cuts 
were implemented. The tariff schedule submissions total 22,000 pages. The tariff 
reductions must occur during a six year implementation period from 1994 (ten years 
for LDCs). 
Tariff Bindings and Applied Tariffs 
Tariff bindings are commitments that a country makes to not increase a tariff above 
the bound level, and these are administered under GATT/WTO as countries submit 
the tariff bindings in each successive GATT round; countries cannot of course 
increase the bindings "'in between" Rounds - the pre-UR binding must be equal to or 
lower than the binding after the Tokyo Round reductions. While tariff bindings were 
reduced as a resuU of the Uruguay Round, applied tariffs would not necessarily fall 
where the previously applied rate was lower than the pre-UR binding. While in 
industrial economies 94%"* of imports were subject to tariffs that were binding (i.e. the 
applied tariff was equal to the bound tariff) before the Uruguay Round, only \3% of 
tariffs were bound in developing countries, and 74% in transition economies. As a 
result of the Round, the percentage of imports that are subject to bound tariffs 
increased to 99% (developed), 61% (developing) and 96% (transition). For developing 
countries in particular a large part of the negotiated tariff binding reduction will lead 
to no reducfion in applied rates as the "slack" between bound and applied rates is 
reduced. 
Safeguards and exceptions 
The Uruguay Round Agreements included numerous exceptions, many of which were 
included in previous Rounds. Custom surcharges and fees (which are really tariffs, but 
often with different justification and implementation) are exempt from any reductions 
- and are substantial in LDCs - they are sometimes more than 50% of the tariff rate.^ 
LDCs can also apply non-tariff barriers under certain circumstances to avoid balance-
of-payments problems, but must provide justification as to why price-based measures 
are not an adequate instrument to deal with the balance of payments problem. 
Safeguards allowing the application of non-tariff barriers to protect a domestic 
industry from injury caused by a sudden increase in imports have been discontinued. 
Any currently operating safeguards under this clause must be terminated within five 
years, or within eight years of the date the safeguard action was originally taken, 
whichever is the sooner. 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
Contingent protection in the form of anti-dumping dufies and countervailing duties is 
permitted after the Uruguay Round, but only if a cause for the protection can be 
proved to the WTO. Anti-dumping duties entail countries imposing specific tariffs on 
products produced by a specific firm where it can be proved that that firm is 
deliberately attempting to undercut prices in the importing country. Historically it has 
** Tariff binding data from de Paiva Abreu (1995) and Francois et. al. (1995a). both taken from GATT sources. 
' rnincois et. al. (1995a) give this figure, referring to individual GATT Trade Policy Reviews. No comprehensive 
data exist on surcharges and fees. 
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been relatively easy to 'prove' that a country is being harmed by dumping actions 
because of the absence of any international standards. The creation of the WTO as an 
overseer of anti-dumping must therefore be seen as an improvement in the regulation 
of these actions. However, anti-dumping activities are predicted to increase. 
Countervailing duties are additional tariffs that can be applied to a product where the 
exporter of that product is providing an export subsidy higher than that permitted by 
the Uruguay Round Agreements. As such, countervailing duties are not only 
permitted by the Uruguay Round, but are included as a means of punishing export 
subsidisers who break Uruguay Round subsidy rules. The application of these duties 
is overseen by the WTO dispute mechanism. 
1.4.2 The Agricultural Agreement 
The Agricultural Agreement is based on the same principles of liberalisation as the 
market access agreement, but is particularly notable because agriculture was never 
included in GATT negotiations prior to the Uruguay Round, except for limited 
agreements on dairy products and bovine meat. The reason for the exclusion of 
agriculture in previous Rounds is mainly political: most of the developed countries 
that set up the GATT. and were the main participants of previous Rounds, had high 
levels of agricultural protection that they intended to keep. The inclusion of 
agricultural liberalisation in the Uruguay Round was the result of three main factors. 
Firstly, the USA. which had tended to be a proponent of agricultural protection in the 
pre-war period, has been in favour of liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s. Secondly, 
the European Union (then the European Economic Community), while still being in 
favour of agricultural protection, came under pressure for reform to prevent large 
visible surpluses and to make the CAP budget more controllable. The main reason for 
CAP reform, though was the need to make GATT agreement possible: 
"There were good internal reasons for reforming the CAP in the early 
I99()s. and some elements of the MacSharry reform ... have responded to 
these internal reasons. However, the major political force behind the 
MacSharry reform, as far as I can see, was the need to prepare the CAP 
for a GA TT agreement on agriculture. '' Tangermann (1998 p. 25) 
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Table 1-3: UR-AA Reductions in Agricultural Support and Protection (1995-
2000) 
Domestic 
Support 
Commitments 
20 per cent reduction in total 
Aggregate Measurement of Support 
(AMS) over 6 years from 1986-88 
base (price support measured against 
Fixed E.xternal Reference Prices 
(FERPS) 
Credit for reductions since 1986 
Oualifications/Exemptions 
Green Box Instruments exempt 
(e.g. R&D) 
Direct Payments under 
production limitation 
programmes (blue box 
instruments) exempt (e.g. EU 
compensation payments, US 
deficiency payments) 
Special provisions for 
developing countries 
Market 
Access 
All NTBs converted to tariffs. 
No new NTBs to be created 
All base period tariffs including NTB 
equivalents to be reduced by an 
unweighted average of 36 per cent over 
6 years from 1986-88 base (tariffs 
measured against FERPS) 
Minimum 15 per cent reduction in each 
tariff line 
All tariffs bound at end of 
implementation period 
Minimum access provision of 3 per 
cent rising to 5 per cent of base period 
consumption. Base period imports 
count toward access requirement. 
Minimuin access provision cannot be 
cut below actual base period import 
level. 
Country specific derogations 
(e.g. Japan and Korea to 
postpone tariffication of rice 
imports until 2000) 
EU 10 per cent Community 
Preference Margin 
Special safeguards 
Special provisions for 
developing countries 
Source : Ingersent. Rayner and Hine (1995) 
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The third reason for the inclusion of tlie Agricultural Agreement in the Round is that 
agricultural exporting countries were more prominent in the negotiations than in 
previous Rounds. This is partly due to increased numbers of LDC participants in the 
GATT. and partly because small agricultural exporting countries applied greater 
pressure on the agricultural protectionist countries by negotiating under the banner of 
the Cairns Group. 
The Agricultural Agreement included agreements on liberalisation in three main 
areas: market access for agricultural goods, agricultural export subsidies, and 
domestic producer subsidies of agriculture. Each area has its own set of exceptions. 
Agricultural Market Access 
Like iTiarket access in industrial products, agricultural market access was founded on 
the principles of tariffication. national treatment and tariff reduction. Tariffication is 
the elimination of non-tariff barriers and their replacement with equivalent tariffs. 
Tariff reductions require average 36% (24% for LDCs) tariff cuts (including reduction 
of converted non-tariff barrier tariffs) for agricultural goods over a six year (ten years 
for LDCs) implementation period. Least developed LDCs are exempt from these 
requirements. Each individual tariff line must have a 15%) (10%) for LDCs) reducfion 
in tariff binding. 
In addition, a minimum market access commitment of 5% (rising from 3% from the 
start of the implementation period) is applied to products that were previously subject 
to non-tariff barriers. If imports are below this level of total demand, further tariff cuts 
must be made to ensure the minimum market access coinmitment is met. No 
commitment exists for products where no non-tariff barriers existed prior to tUe 
Uruguay Round implementation period, however high tariff levels were. 
Dirty Tariffication 
Agricultural tariff reductions, like industrial tariff reductions, are reductions of tariff 
bindings, so that where an applied tariff is below Us tariff binding, the applied tariff 
reducfion may be lower than 36% (indeed, the applied tariff may not necessarily be 
reduced at all). Agricultural tariff reductions have been to some extent watered down 
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b\ "dirty tariffication". Because agriculture was never before subject to GATT 
disciplines, there was no necessity for countries to have tariff bindings for agricultural 
products prior to the Uruguay Round agreement (although a few countries did bind 
soine products voluntarily). Indeed, many agricultural products were subject to 
protection through non-tariff barriers, so tariff bindings would not have been enforced 
anyway. As part of the Agricultural Agreement, signatory countries therefore 
submitted their own tariff bindings, which were based on tariff levels (or in the case of 
NTBs, the estimated difference between internal and world prices) in the base period 
1986-88. Because this period was one of low world prices for agricultural products, 
the resulting tariff bindings were in many cases very high. For most agricultural 
products, the tariff binding after the 36% reduction is still much higher than applied 
tariffs after tariffication of non-tariff barriers. Hathaway and Ingco (1995) estimate 
that, for most countries, the Uruguay Round agricultural tariff reductions will lead to 
reductions in applied tariffs for only a few products (for the EU, wheat, rice, coarse 
grains, sugar, most meats, oilseeds, dairy and wool will have no reduction in applied 
tariffs)." 
Given the limitations imposed by dirty tariffication, it is unlikely that the agricultural 
tariff reforms in themselves will lead to much liberalisation. In the long run, the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers and the setting of bound rates to be reduced in future 
Rounds may prove to have a greater liberalising impact. The minimum mai-ket access 
commitments may also lead to greater tariff reduction than the tariff binding 
reductions. 
Exceptions to the Market Access Provisions 
A special safeguard of the Agricultural Agreement allows countries that previously 
applied non-tariff barriers to levy additional tariffs above the scheduled levels where a 
surge in imports or a dramatic fall in border prices threatens to undermine the position 
of domestic producers. 
" For import of cereals into the EU. the duty paid import price has got to be less than to or equal to the effective 
intervention price multiplied by 1.55. The .system is essentially similar to the traditional VEL/lhreshold price 
svstem. 
An additional exception to the tariffication provisions is designed specifically for 
.lapanese rice imports, but may be used by any country on a product that meets the 
criteria for 'special treatment'. Such products must have had non-tariff barriers before 
the implementation period, imports must have been less than three per cent of 
domestic consumption in the 1986-88 base period, the product must not have had 
export subsidies since 1986, and measures to restrict domestic production must be 
applied to the product. Where these conditions are met (this will probably only be for 
rice imports in Japan, and possibly Taiwan and South Korea), non-tariff barriers can 
be maintained (during and after the implementation period) subject to a minimum 
market access provision of 4%, rising to 8% by the end of the period. Although this 
'special treatment' contravenes the GATT principle of tariffication, it does ensure that 
liberalisation occurs in these products, as market access must be below 3% for special 
treatment to be allowed, and this inust rise to at least 8% by the end of the 
implementation period. 
Agricultural Export Subsidies 
Agreement on the treatment of agricultural export subsidies was one of the most 
difficuU issues of the Uruguay Round negotiations. While the USA originally wanted 
the complete elimination of export subsidies, the final agreement is less 
comprehensive. Direct export subsidy expenditure must be reduced to 36% below the 
expenditure in the base period of 1986-90 over a six-year implementation period. The 
quantity of subsidised exports must also be cut by 21 per cent (with the same base and 
implementation periods).' 
While the export subsidy commitments are product-specific, the agreement allows 
different product lines to be aggregated together when computing expenditures and 
quantities. Thus the EU included 40 different product lines as coarse grains, and some 
substitution will necessarily occur between these products. 
^ A front-loading provision applies particularh to EU wheat and beef, if the 1991/2 exports were higher than the 
ha.se level, and allows the quantity reductions to start from a higher point. This does not affect the Hnal export 
sllbsid^ commitments. 
Domestic Agricultural Support 
The Agricultural Agreement limits expenditure on domestic agricultural support; the 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) inust reduce by 20% over the six-year 
implementation period. The AMS is defined as the producer subsidy equivalent of 
support over all commodities. 
Exceptions to Domestic Agricultural Support Provisions 
Domestic support policies that are not trade-distorting can receive "Green box" 
exemptions from AMS reductions. These include publicly-funded R&D programmes, 
retirement programmes, and land withdrawal programmes where land is withdrawn 
from production for a minimum of three years. "Blue Box" policies are also exempt 
where subsidy payments are made as part of a production limitation programme. Both 
EC compensatory payments and US deficiency payments are covered by this 
provision. 
1.4.3 Textiles and Clothing in the Uruguay Round 
Trade in textiles and clothing, which since the 1960s has been dominated by the 
Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), is to undergo dramatic liberalisation after the Uruguay 
Round. The MFA regulates world trade in textiles by placing quantitative restrictions 
on exporting countries, by means of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints 
(VERs). While voluntary in name, these instruments force exporting countries to limit 
their exports of clothing and textiles to developed countries, with the threat of more 
stringent sanctions against the exporting country if it fails to restrict imports to within 
its allocated quota. The importing countries (the US. Canada, the EU. and EFTA 
countries) get protection for their domestic industries without having to break GATT 
rules by imposing import quotas or by illegally increasing tariffs. The exporting 
countries prefer VERs to import quotas or tariffs because the quota rent (or tariff 
revenue) that would occur with these policies is transferred to the exporter by means 
of higher prices. VER volumes increase each year by specific growth rates. 
The MFA ensures that the predominant exporters during the 1960s (Hong Kong and 
Singapore) receive protection from competition from newly emerging suppliers (such 
as India. Pakistan, and China), because the VER volumes are derived from the initial 
volumes set in the 1960s. The least developed countries of sub-Saharan Africa are 
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exempt from MFA restrictions, but constitute a very small proportion of world 
clothing and textile exports. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement includes a basic commitment to return textiles and 
clothing to full GATT disciplines over a ten year period. This means that the MFA 
system of VERs will be phased out over a ten year period between 1995-2005. The 
phase-out will occur in three stages: in stage 1, starting in January 1995. VER growth 
rates are increased by 16%. Stage 2 starts in January 1998, and during this stage 
growth rates are increased by a further 25%. In stage 3 (January 2002) growth rates 
are increased by a further 27%. 
In addition to VER growth acceleration, each importer must fully include \6% of 
products into GATT/WTO disciplines in stage 1. a further 17%) in stage 2, and a 
further 18% of products during stage 3. These products must then be completely free 
of VERs. As it is at the discretion of the importing country on which products to 
eliminate VERs, it is likely that they will include products with lower potential 
imports during the initial stages, and leave the products with larger potential imports 
to the end of the phase-out period. 
By 2005, 51% of those product categories'* subject to VERs in 1995 will therefore be 
free from MFA constraints, and the remaining 49%) of categories will have high levels 
of quota due to the accelerated growth rates. It is likely that for many of the categories 
still subject to the MFA the quota will not be binding, that is the exporter is exporting 
below the VER quota level. All VERs will be eliminated in 2005 whether or not they 
are binding at the time. 
Tariffs on textiles and clothing are subject to normal market access commitments, that 
is (a) any existing non-tariff barriers must be replaced by tariffs, and new NTBs 
cannot be introduced, and (b) tariff bindings must be reduced according to the 
schedules submitted as the annex to the Uruguay Round agreement, within the 38% 
reduction in average tariffs on industrial goods as a whole. However, a safeguard 
" This applies to different product categories for each importer-exporter pair. Note that the MFA is extremely 
pnidiict specific; typically men's light-blue long-sleeved shirts have different quotas than men's dark-blue long-
slccved shirts. 
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agreement appended to the textiles and clothing reforms permits the introduction of 
additional tariffs on textiles and clothing where damage occurs to the domestic 
industry, and that damage is directly attributable to the MFA phase-out. Safeguards 
are degressive (they come into effect 3 years after the damage occurs to the domestic 
industry), and they must not reduce imports below the level of imports that existed 
twelve inonths before the safeguard came into effect. There is soine uncertainty over 
how the MFA elimination will operate in 2005. Whalley (1995) argues that developed 
countries may resort to WTO safeguard and anti-dumping measures to continue to 
protect their clothing industries. 
Table 1-4: Examples of VER Growth Rates in the Phase-Out Period 
Stage of 
integration 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Year 
0 
1 
~> 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Growth 
Factor 
16°'o 
ZS^ 'o 
21% 
Established Growth 
rate of 3% 
Growth Quota 
Rate 
100 
3.48»,o 103.5 
3.48% 107.0 
3.48''o 110.8 
4.35''o 115.5 
4.35" 0 120.5 
4.35°o 125.7 
4.35% 131.2 
5.52°o 138.4 
5.52''b 146.1 
5.52° 0 154.1 
Established Growth 
rate of 5% 
Growth Quota 
Rate 
100 
5.80% 105.8 
5.80% 112.9 
5.80% 119.5 
7.25% 128.2 
7.25% 137.5 
7.25%o 147.4 
7.25% 158.1 
9.21% 172.7 
9.21% 188.6 
9.21% 205.9 
Established Growth 
rate of 6%> 
Growth Quota 
Rate 
100 
6.96% 107.0 
6.96% 114.4 
6.96% 122.4 
8.70''o 133.0 
8.70% 144.5 
8.70% 157.1 
8.70"o 170.8 
11.05% 189.7 
11.05% 210.6 
ll.05<'o 233.9 
source: Whalley( 1995) 
Table 1 -4 shows examples of how the VER phase-out effects VER quotas, and it is 
clear that the VER growth formula will disproportionately benefit those exporters that 
already have high VER growth rates. Despite the fact that it is the emerging textiles 
and clothing producers that have the higher growth rates, given that the quota levels 
for these exporters are relatively small, it is likely that newer exporters such as India, 
China, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia will still be quota-constrained on many 
lines of textile and clothing exports by 2005. 
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The Expected Effects of the MFA phase-out 
The MFA phase-out will liberalise trade in developed countries, and so should 
increase static long-term welfare there, but will probably lead to reductions in 
production of textiles and clothing in MFA importing countries. There will therefore 
be some welfare losses due to the transition as workers are displaced from these 
industries, but the size of the (discounted) static welfare gains appear to be large 
enough to outweigh these. 
The position for exporting countries is inixed. Traditional exporters such as Hong 
Kong. Singapore, and East European exporters have large quotas that protect them 
from competition from emerging producers. The large increase in world exports that 
should result from the MFA phase-out will reduce world prices and reduce the export 
earnings of these countries. These countries will not necessarily have welfare losses 
from the reforms, however, because the MFA phase-out will reduce domestic 
distortions within exporting countries: it will remove the export-bias that exists within 
textiles and clothing industries in exporting countries, leading to increased welfare 
from lower consumer prices. The phase-out will also reduce distortions due to the 
inefficiencies in production that inay occur through the process by which export 
quotas are allocated to exporting firms. 
The exporters that will clearly gain from the phase-out are those whose exports are 
heavily constrained by the MFA. Large Asian countries that are emerging as clothing 
producers will have welfare gains as they will be able to export a large proportion of 
world trade. 
The least-developed countries of sub-Saharan Africa that have previously exported 
textiles and clothing without quota restraints will lose from the agreement, as world 
prices will fall as competition is opened up from lower-cost suppliers. Because these 
countries did not have VERs in place, they will not have welfare gains from the 
removal of domestic and production distortions, so these countries will unequivocally 
suffer welfare losses. 
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1.4.4 Other Aspects of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
Several other areas were included in the Uruguay Round that were new to GATT trade 
negotiations. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) brings services 
trade within GATT/WTO disciplines by extending the most-favoured nation principle 
to such trade. The agreement also includes a general obligation to provide equal 
treatment for national and foreign service suppliers (the national treatment principle), 
and requires transparency in laws and regulations concerning services. GATT/WTO 
members are also required to develop national schedules of inarket access 
commitments for services, and may begin tabling offers for further negotiation 
immediately. This allows the next WTO negotiations to treat services liberalisation in 
a similar manner to market access for manufactures trade. 
Agreement in the area of trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIP) extends 
intellectual property rights on the same basis to all GATT/WTO member countries. 
This area was a key negotiating area for the US, which was keen to stop international 
fihn, music and computer software piracy. The basic principle of the TRtP agreement 
is most-favoured nation treatment of intellectual property, so if a country recognises 
legal copyright from one foreign country, it must recognise it from all GATT/WTO 
inembers. An important concession to developing countries, who opposed the TRIP 
agreement, is that they have a longer period of time before the agreement affects 
them: developed countries must bring domestic legislation into conformity with the 
agreement within one year, developing countries and economies in transition have a 
five-year transition period, and the least developed countries have an eleven-year 
transition period. 
The Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIM) agreement centred on the basic 
principle that rules governing international investment should be consistent with the 
GATT principles of national treatment and prohibition of quantitative restrictions. A 
list of TRIMs that violate these rules was included, and countries have a period of two 
years (developed countries), five years (developing countries) or seven years (least 
developed countries) to ensure that the listed TRIMs do not break these principles. 
Finally, the creation of the World Trade Organisation may prove to be the most 
important aspect of the Uruguay Round. The WTO is a permanent body, with the 
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tasks of administering the global trade system, administering the dispute mechanism 
procedures, administering the two-yearly trade policy review, and providing a forum 
for discussion and negotiation for future multilateral trade liberalisation. Importantly, 
a resumption of the agricultural negotiations is scheduled to begin at the end of 1999 
to realise the long term objective of "substantial and progressive reductions in support 
and protection resulting from fundamental reform" (article 20 of the Uruguay Round 
Agricultural Agreement). 
1.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Several issues for analysis are raised by the Uruguay Round. The more obvious ones 
that have been addressed by several authors are questions such as: how large are the 
welfare gains from the Uruguay Round? How are the welfare gains distributed 
between regions? How much of the welfare gains is contributed by different areas of 
the agreement? 
Other issues that are pertinent to EU agriculture are: what are the price, production 
and welfare effects for EU agriculture? Can the reformed CAP meet the Uruguay 
Round requirements? Which aspects of the Agricultural Agreement are the most 
important? 
These issues will be ftirther discussed in chapter 3 (results from other studies) and 
chapter 6 (results from this study). 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
MODELLING 
Although many of the principles of computable general equilibrium (CGE)' 
modelling have been known for a long time, the advances in computer power over 
recent years have dramatically increased the applicability of the CGE approach to 
economic modelling. Now, complex models can be run on most personal computers, 
and this capability has greatly expanded the volume of research employing CGE 
models. 
CGE modelling is a simulation-based approach to policy analysis, whereby a model is 
built and calibrated to data, and then simulated policy changes are enforced on the 
model. The results of these simulations are then given as levels or changes in 
quantities (output and demands) and relative prices. The numerical nature of 
simulations means that results can only be obtained for specific policy changes, and 
that no general proofs of results can be obtained. 
The attractions of the CGE approach lie in the fact that it can incorporate all the 
feedback effects in the economy. In terms of trade policy modelling, this means that 
the concept of effective protection is directly incorporated into the analysis, with 
feedback effects coming from uses of imports as intermediate goods, competition for 
factors, demand substitution (and complementarity) and government budget effects. 
Thus the effects of a trade policy issue can be examined directly in terms of resource 
flows between sectors without the need to take account of these effects in any 
additional calculations. Hertel (1993) uses a small model to show that a partial 
equilibrium model is inadequate for simulations where multi-sector reforms are taking 
place. Moreover, he shows that while a partial equilibrium model performs as well as 
a general equilibrium model when single-sector reforms are modelled, the effects of 
Some economists prefer the term "Applied General Equilibrium" (AGE) 
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the reforms on other sectors may be significant, and in such cases are necessarily 
missed by partial equilibrium modelling. 
CGE models also benefit from not being tied to direct functional relationships 
between policy instrument and target. Because no equations are solved in their 
general form to give a solution for the target as a function of the instruments, CGE 
models do not suffer from some of the constraints of other approaches, such as partial 
equilibrium and macroeconomic models. Where these models can usually only be 
applied to marginal changes, CGE models can be applied to discrete changes in many 
policy variables at the same time. CGE models can also incorporate a variety of 
constraints into the form of the model, thus being able to model quantitative 
restrictions with comparative ease. 
CGE modelling does however contain several disadvantages when compared to other 
inodelling approaches. The complexity of data requirements necessitates intensive 
data gathering and manipulation. Because the complexity of the data required 
generally prohibits their being available as time series, CGE models ace based on a 
data set for one year only, or in the best case on averages of a few observation 
periods. This constraint makes empirical testing of functional forms infeasible. and 
thus casts considerable doubt on the accuracy of CGE results. 
CGE models tend to be very weak in the area of macroeconomic closure: typically all 
markets are assumed to clear, and tUis assumption is imposed on the benchmark data 
set. Monetary sectors are at best primitive, and most CGE models do not try to 
determine the price level. Simple rules are applied to unemployment and savings; 
typically unemployment is assumed to be constant (the level of labour supply in the 
tnodel being the aggregate demand for labour), while savings tend to be purely 
supply-determined: tUat is, the level of savings is determined by how much 
houseUolds want to save without any reference to Uow much investors want to invest. 
This and other weaknesses stem from the primitive treatment of expectations in the 
models. Typically expectations are not explicit in a CGE model, although naive 
expectations are implicitly assumed, so that agents expect prices to remain at the 
present levels. Some CGE models do however try to overcome tUis weakness by 
incorporating rational expectations, but this multi-dimensional expansion of tUe model 
0-9 
size is generally prohibitive in terms of modelling effort and time and data 
requirements. 
The lack of time series input-output data has two consequences. It firstly means that 
functional forms for production functions and consumer preference functions must be 
assumed, witU there being no possibility of choosing between alternative forms on 
objective criteria. Secondly, it means that tUe assumed ftinctions are calculated 
deterministically by a process of calibration rather than being estimated 
econometrically, with the disadvantage that statistical measures cannot be given to the 
results: in particular, t-ratios and confidence intervals cannot be given. However, the 
commonly used functional forms (such as Cobb-Douglas, CES, LES) are usually 
those which have been found adequate in other economic analyses. The results 
obtained are tUe central values in the implicit distribution of expected values, but no 
confidence interval can be given, and thus tUe accuracy of the results cannot be 
determined. It is likely tUat since the CGE model is based on only one observation 
period, the implicit confidence interval is large, and thus the results should be treated 
with some caution. Model reliability is tested using sensitivity analysis, which 
involves examining the effects of changes in 'crucial' parameters such as elasticity 
values. If sensitivity tests indicate that the model is reasonably robust, then the results 
can be taken as being fairly reliable, although tUe value of the results still tends to be 
more qualitative than quantitative. 
CGE modelling is based on the assumption of rational (utility-maximising) consumers 
and (profit-maximising) producers. Utility functions and production functions are 
specified, and from them conventional demand and supply functions are derived. In 
addition, the government and external sectors can be included, and any quantitative 
restrictions (such as import quotas) can be placed on tUe model. The model then 
consists of a set of equations for demands, supplies and market clearing conditions. 
The model equates supply and demand for each good, using prices as the variables 
that adjust to ensure clearance. This is where the necessity of computable solutions 
enters into the model, since the demand and supply conditions for any good include 
terms that, even with relatively simple functional forms for utility and production, 
include the price variables raised to various (often non-integer) powers. Direct 
algebraic solution of these equations is thus not possible, and an iterative numerical 
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technique must be used to determine the solution. This technique is performed by a 
computer algorithm, and successively adjusts prices, calculates demands and supplies, 
works out excess supply/demand and readjusts prices. This iteration continues until a 
solution is found. This method allows relatively complex (but well-behaved) 
functional forms to be used in the specification of tUe model. TUe only constraint in 
regard to the production and utility functions is tUat they must be solvable for demand 
and supply. Similarly, the only constraint on tUe complexity of market specifications 
is that the markets must be modelled as matUematical constraints. 
2.1 FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
Standard functional forms are usually used in CGE modelling for production and 
utility functions: tUus demand and supply equations can be cUecked against published 
derivations (and are often included in tUe framework of CGE computer programmes). 
Common functional forms used are the Leontief function, the Cobb-Douglas function, 
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function and tUe Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) functions. 
2.1,1 The Leontief Function 
Leontief functional forms specify that a minimum level of each input is required to 
produce a unit of output (or utility) so that any increased use of any one input will not 
increase output unless tUe use of all otUer inputs increases accordingly. As a function 
this can be specified as: 
Qi = min A, ,, -U , , A. 1 i "• i.i 
« ! . , « : , / ^yj 
1 . / 
[L-l] 
where Q^ is output of good j, Xj ; is the use of input good i in the production of good 
j, and a-,., is the fixed coefficient for input i in the production of j. This specifies tUat 
output is set by the lowest level of X^ .. Diagrammatically, this can be 
represented by isoquants that are of the form shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1: Leontief Functional Form 
Capital 
Labour 
In the example shown in Figure 2-1. a good is produced using two inputs, capital and 
labour (altUougU the analysis is identical for intermediate input goods). In order to 
produce quantity Q, inputs of labour and capital must be at least L,and K. Any 
increase in one factor alone, for example an increase in tUe use of labour to L', will 
not increase production above Q. For a higher level of output to be attained. tUe use of 
both inputs must increase: using L' and K' will lead to an output of Q'. 
Rational profit-maximising producers will never employ more of one input than it 
needs to meet tUe production level Q. so input demand will be 
^.i=<^.,Qr [L-2] 
The assumption tUat firms do not make profits above normal returns to capital means 
that total revenue equals total costs, inclusive of payments to capital (wUicU is 
considered to be just one of the input goods): 
PiQ:-lLP,^,., [L-3] 
where P. is tUe price of the /th good. Substituting [L- 2] into [L- 3], cancelling terms 
in 0^, and rearranging gives a price condition: 
2-5 
P,=1L<^..A- (L-4I 
The simplicity of the Leontief function leads to an unrealistic representation of 
production in most cases, since it does not allow substitution between factors of 
production. TUis form is useful, Uowever, for the treatment of intermediate inputs in 
production wUere, particularly in tUe sUort-term, tUe scope for cUanging tUe ratios of 
goods used in production is limited. 
2.1.2 The Cobb-Douglas Function 
A Cobb-Douglas representation is more popular than Leontief for production and 
utility ftinction specification, because it allows substitution between inputs. TUis form 
specifies tUat output (or utility) is a function of inputs in tUe following way:-
0=AP,Yl^7 [CD- 1] 
where, for the function to display constant returns to scale, X ^^ ~ ^ • A is a sUift 
parameter. 
The specification of constant returns to scale gives tUe property tUat any input price 
ratio defines tUe ratio in wUicU the inputs are used, since along any ray R from tUe 
origin, all isoquants cross tUe ray at tUe same angle. In Figure 2-2, tUe gradient of all 
Figure 2-2: Cobb-Douglas Functional Form 
Capital 
K 
Q 
Pl/Pk 
Labour 
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isoquants as tUey pass R is Pi/Pi<- With the assumption of profit maximisation, Pareto 
efficiency will Uold if markets are perfectly competitive, so tUat tUe gradient of tUe 
isoquants is equal to tUe ratio of input costs. 
Although the Cobb-Douglas production function is more flexible and more realistic 
for most applications tUan tUe Leontief, it does Uave several drawbacks, tUe most 
serious of tUese being tUat the function displays unitary elasticity of substitution 
between inputs, unitary own-price elasticities, zero cross-price elasticities and, in 
utility function formulations, unitary income elasticity of demand. TUese points can 
be seen by deriving demand conditions from tUe above equations for a consumer U, 
where: 
f/,, is consumer h's level of utility, C,;, is consumption of good i by UouseUold U, and 
or, y, is a sUare parameters. 
TUe constraint tUat income ( T,,) equals expenditure is: 
^ , = Z Q , ^ . (CD-31 
^^„ u„ Differentiating to get marginal utility gives witU some manipulation, —— = a,,, — 
/( ^ / , / i 
and setting tUe result equal to the price of goods (tUe marginal cost), P, = a,,, 
A similar expression can be obtained for any otUer good j, P^ = a^,, — t//, 
^V/, 
These two expressions can be divided to give tUe ratio of marginal costs equal to tUe 
ratio of marginal utility: 
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V ^l.h'-i.h ^i.l,^ I 
This expression for C^,,can be substituted into the original expenditure constraint, so 
that 
Y„ = I P,C,, - I P^C,, ^ = C„ - ^ 2 ^ ^ , , 
where the a^,, parameters may be normalised sucU tUat X^ / / - -^- Consumption can 
then be derived: 
Y 
C,j. = «-./- f [CD- 5] 
This demand fiinction Uas an own price elasticity of -1 , all cross-price elasticities 
equal to zero, and an income elasticity of demand of 1. 
The equivalent function for production. Q- = A^V]-"^u' togetUer witU a zero-profits 
condition P.Q. = 2^, P,^i.i can be used to derive a similar input demand function for 
production inputs: 
^..=^.,Q,i: [CD-6] 
Substituting tUis input demand equation into tUe production function gives an 
equation for tUe unit cost (wUicU because zero-profits are assumed, equals price) of 
tUe output good: 
( P Y" 
, V r,. 
Q, = ^JQ,PI{["Y, 
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so that 
'p.' 
oc. I ' v " , , / y 
[CD- 7] 
which, as can be seen, is dependent only on the parameters A^ and or, , and input 
prices P,. TUus, because of tUe constant returns to scale properties of the Cobb-
Douglas function when 2^ a,^ = 1. price is independent of any quantity variables. 
/ 
Cobb-Dougias Elasticities 
The demand equation [CD- 5] can be differentiated with respect to P- to obtain tUe 
uncompensated own-price elasticity: 
cC, 
'./' Y/, 
rP ~ ""• " P' 
^u, P, 
cP C -a, i.ii "'•" Pr cc,.,X, 
As tUe differential of [CD- 5] witU respect to otUer prices is zero, all tUe 
uncompensated cross-price elasticities are zero. Similarly, income elasticity is: 
^,.1. y,, <^..i, \ 
dY, C„ P, a,JJP, •  
Uncompensated demand elasticities neglect tUe income effect tUat price cUanges Uave 
througU tUe output price. Compensated price elasticities can be calculated from 
equation [CD- 6], wUicU includes a term in tUe output price P^. 
dP = a Q 1.1^1 
1 ^ 
P ^ P 
wUere, from equation [CD- 7], 
dP "'• ' p 
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so tUat 
cc. pi n2 
^ : P. .. Q> P, p. a. .P 
dP X. ----,., ^ ^jW, - 1) = «,.,a ^ ^ ( « , . , - I) = -(1 - a,„) 
This means that tUe compensated own-price elasticity of demand is negative (as 
a. ^ must be less tUan one), but is smaller in absolute terms tUan -1. 
Compensated cross-price elasticities can also be calculated from equations [CD- 6] 
and [CD- 7]: 
<^.,Q, ^ P, 
dP, .r,, I p, dPjx,^^ 
Pk ^ 1 Pj 
• wUere —- = a,., -— 
dP, '• ' P, 
^p^ • "<.., 
<^..:Q, P, 
p, 
A. 
x. 
Q, P, 
Here, tUe elasticity of demand between price P^ and demand X • ^ depends only on tUe 
Cobb-Douglas parameter for tUe k good. TUis is because tUe uncompensated elasticity 
is zero, so tUe compensated elasticity depends only on tUe income effect tUat P^ . Uas 
on .V,^  tUrougU tUe aggregate price P^, wUicU depends only on a ,^^  . 
The elasticity of substitution for a Cobb-Douglas function can be derived fi-om 
equation [CD-4]: 
Pj _ (^LuCkj, 
Pk cc,j,Cu, 
^i.h ^i.li^k 
C a P 
so tUat 
JC^JC,,) (PJP) ^,, (PJP) _^ 
^P^IP) (c„„/Q,J «,,;,(q,/Q„) 
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The unitary elasticity of substitution means tUat a 1% cUange in relative prices will 
lead to a 1% cUange in relative quantities. TUus expenditure ratios C,;,/*,/Q ,^ P^  are 
invariant to cUanges in prices. TUis, as well as tUe unitary uncompensated own-price 
elasticities, zero uncompensated cross-price elasticities, and unitary income 
elasticities, make tUe Cobb-Douglas problematic for use in CGE modelling, wUen it is 
well known tUat tUese elasticities are not representative of real-world economic 
demand. 
2.1.3 The Constant Elasticity of Substitution Function 
Some of the problems inherent with Cobb-Douglas functions can be rectified by using 
a third functional form, the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function, 
defined as:-
Q, = A^ 1LS.X7 
-\al{a-\) 
VO- ICES- 1] 
Equal increases to each input (multiplication by X) will have tUe following output 
effect: 
Q] = A, Z^,,(^^-..) ((T-I) /(T 
a/((T-l) 
A^X z 4,-V,, (rx-D/tr 
CT/(CT-1) 
wUicU ensures constant returns to scale, regardless of tUe 5^ ^ parameters. Some 
assumption must Uowever be made on tUe sum of 4,/ - so it is usually assumed tUat 
these parameters sum to one: 
The derivation of demand and price equations for tUe CES follows tUe same steps as 
for the Cobb-Douglas case. For the CES production function. 
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differentiating output to obtain tUe marginal product gives: 
<iQ,__ . 
dX,, ' a-\ 
' cr - 1 
V k 
S.l'—^^,., 
-I/O-
Set tUe result equal to marginal cost (input price): 
er4,.^^:r=^-
Obtain an identical expression for any otUer input good k: 
QTSk.,K'r = Pk •  
Divide one expression by anotUer, and rearrange to obtain one input quantity in terms 
of tUe OtUer: 
^..A'.r p. 
S X~' P 
"k.r k.i ' k 
^k.l - '^ ,.J [CES- 2] 
Substitute tUis expression into tUe zero-profit equation and rearrange to get an 
expression for input demand: 
P>Q,=J:P,X,_, ^5 P^" 
\S,,PkJ 
^ p^^ 
P:Qi=Xu ^ I C ^ ; )l-CT 
y^i.iJ 
^. . = PM, '';,'i /sc^ '-^  [CES- 3] 
The equivalent consumer demand expression is: 
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c....-y,!{f] h'..r, 1 - <T [CES- 4] 
For the production function, average cost (equal to price) is derived by substituting for 
X into the original CES production function, and rearranging: 
a Z4., 
PO 
y P , j 
IC .^'"'^  
( c r - l ) / o ' <T/(cr-l) 
Q, = ^, 
\ (<T-l)/tT 
P,Q, 
Y.^LPl-" S4.. 
( g \(o--l) 
p,) 
al(a-\) 
Q, = A, 
( \ 
P.Q, 
lLs:.,pr j^s,yr 
-\a/(^-t) 
Therefore. 
Q,-AAQ> 
iL^rpr" 
^<T/{a- l )^ 
Zc/.'"^ 
Q, = A,P:Q: lLsr,,pr 
1/(CT-1) 
Rearranging gives: 
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''-1. Zc/; l-o-
l/( l-o) 
[CES- 5] 
CES Elasticities of Demand 
The CES function has a constant elasticity of substitution between inputs equal to <T. 
This can be verified from equation [CES- 2]: 
^k.i -^i.i 
(s, PY 
k,i I 
JZP^J 
X k.l 
X. 
Therefore 
A^.JK) (PJP.) KX{p,r [pjPk) 
APJPk) [x,,ix,,) ^U.J UJ [x,jx„) 
^W,i^.) = cr 
• .s.A) 
= a. 
CES uncompensated own-price elasticities can be derived from equation [CES-4]: 
C =Y 
(5 Y 
^ A z^M!dlLA_ n_..-).T-r- '^(^ -^ '/^ r P, 
dP c ~ y^" p'-'^  c ^'"^ii'^K f y I 
= - C 7 - ( 1 - C T ) 
on p\-<y 
^k.h^k 
Similarly, [CES- 4] can be used to derive tUe uncompensated cross-price elasticity of 
demand: 
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^P, (-\.„ " PJ 
{\-a)5Jj,PY P, 
-a) ZC/,^ . l - rr k 
If CT < 1 tUen tUe inputs into tUe function Uave negative cross-price elasticities, wUile if 
a > I tUen tUe inputs Uave positive cross-price elasticities. WUile CES functions will 
always Uave goods tUat are substitutes, tUe income effect will outweigU tUe 
substitution effect wUen CT < 1. Values of CT = 1 and <T = 0 carmot be used in tUe CES 
function, since tUis leads to division by zero (i.e. in equation [CES- 5]), but as a 
approacUes tUese two values. tUe CES fianction becomes equivalent to a Cobb-
Douglas (for cj ~ 1) or a Leontief function (for a ~ 0). Computer packages sucU as 
MPSGE tUat include buih-in CES functional forms treat tUese values for a as 
specifying Cobb-Douglas or Leontief functions. 
The CES income elasticity can be derived from equation [CES- 4]: 
C = V T^:.„P: 
The unitary income elasticity that botU tUe Cobb-Douglas and CES functions imply is 
one of tUe most restrictive points of botU tUese fimctions. 
2.1.4 Other Functions 
AlthougU tUe Leontief, Cobb-Douglas and CES fimctions are by far tUe most common 
functional forms used in CGE modelling, otUer functions are sometimes used, and 
these will be given a brief discussion Uere. 
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The Linear Expenditure System Function 
The LES or Stone-Greary function can modify either the Cobb-Douglas or CES 
function to have a non-unitary income elasticity. Furthermore, tUese income 
elasticities can be calibrated for each good. LES functions specify a minimum level of 
demand for each good. Because tUis violates tUe constant returns to scale property, 
LES functions are not well suited for production, but provide furtUer sopUistication in 
utility specification. TUe two types of LES function are: 
f^„=n(c„„-*,.„)"" (Cobb-Douglas type) 
U„ = Z^./-(c,./,-^./-) :a - i ) /<T 
<T/(<r-l| 
(CES type) 
A minimum demand (O,,,) for eacU good defines a minimum level of expenditure 
Z'^'/i '^'/ ' ^^ ^^  ^^  needed to meet tUe minimum requirements for consumption, and 
any income in excess of tUe minimum level is tUen allocated in tUe same way tUat a 
Cobb-Douglas or CES function would allocate expenditure. TUe derived demand 
functions are tUen: 
a 
C,,/,=^,./, + p 
i.h 
n-Z^,./-A (Cobb-Douglas type) 
C,i, = O , , + (^ujp.r Y,s:_„pr n-z^v."^/ (CES type) 
TUe inclusion of minimum requirements into a Cobb-Douglas function not only 
removes tUe umtary income elasticity, but also removes tUe unitary cross price 
elasticity for any good witU a non-zero minimum requirement, and removes tUe zero 
cross-price elasticity between any goods tUat do not botU Uave tUe same minimum 
requirement. TUe LES(CES) function also no longer Uas unitary income elasticities, 
and tUe elasticity of substitution between any two goods tUat Uave non-zero minimum 
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requirements is no longer equal to a. It is tUus possible to specify some goods as 
income-inelastic and otUers as income-elastic. However, tUe LES function Uas tUe 
unfortunate property tUat as income increases all income elasticities converge towards 
unity. TUis makes it unsuitable for experiments likely to result in very large income 
changes. 
The Constant Elasticity of Transformation Function 
Constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions Uave identical algebra to tUe 
CES functions, but wUereas tUe CES function specifies an output quantity as a 
function of a number of inputs, tUe CET function specifies tUat an input quantity is a 
function of a number of output quantities. TUerefore tUe equivalent to tUe CES price 
elasticity of demand is tUe CET price elasticity of supply, witU identical algebra. TUe 
CET function takes tUe form: 
Q, - A, T^..,Kr' 
r/(r-l) 
where tUe quantities Xj are tUe output goods produced using Qj of tUe input good, 
with an elasticity of transformation r . 
CET functions may also be used in (low-dimension) CGE models to specify tUe 
production frontier for an economy, in wUicU case Q^ is constant, fixing tUe 
production possibilities frontier. TUen increased output of one good X^ can only be 
achieved by reducing tUe output of anotUer good X^. TUe elasticity of transformation 
is a corollary to tUe elasticity of substitution; it defines tUe degree to wUicU relative 
price cUanges will effect relative quantity cUanges. 
The Constant Difference of Elasticities (CDE) function 
TUe CDE function defines a minimum expenditure function G() tUat is Uomogeneous 
of degree one in prices: 
G(z,u) = f^By''"z':'^\ 
/=i 
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where z is tUe vector of normalised prices Zj and u is utility. B;, ei and bj are tUe CDE 
parameters: Bi are scale parameters, ei are expansion parameters tUat allow non-unity 
income elasticities, and bi determine tUe substitution possibilities among commodities 
in consumption. TUese parameters must conform to tUe following conditions: B-,>0, 
ei>0 and b,<l witU eitUer 0<bi<l or bi<0 for all i. 
Hertel (1997, p. 135) sUows tUat tUe Allen partial elasticity of substitution between two 
goods. CTj.j is: 
cy.. = -/:,, -b^-2^s,[\-h,) 
k • ,^ 
where Sj is the expenditure sUare of good i, and 5ij is a dummy parameter witU b\\ = 1 
and 6i.j=0 for i^'j. TUe function's name. Constant Differences of Elasticities, comes 
from tUe fact tUat subtracting cTii, from Oi\ gives tUe same result irrespective of good i: 
<^,.i - CT , . ; , = ^ i , - ^ i =(^k., -(^k it •  
The expressions for income elasticities of demand r|j and compensated own-price 
elasticities of demand Vj are: 
n, = ^^ + ( I - ^ , ) - Z ^ ' AO - ^ , ) 
V , = - . V , 2{l-h,)-Y^s,{l-b,)-^-^ 
CES and Cobb-Douglas as special cases of the CDE function 
By setting Cj = 1 for all i, a set of special cases of tUe CDE function is derived witU tUe 
following properties: 
ri,= ^^ ^ + ( l - ^ ) -Z^*0 -^ ' ) 
Z^s, k 
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=b,+Z• Sk{^-^)^{^-^)-T• h{^-)^ 
= 1 
V. = - .y , 2 ( 1 - ^ , ) - Z - ^ A ( 1 - ^ . ) -
1-6, 
Thus, bi = 1 gives Vi = 0, and aij,! = 0 (Leontief), 
bi = 0 gives Vi =1-Si, and Cj.jii = 1 (Cobb-Douglas), 
bi = b gives vi = (l-Si)(l-b), and Qij^ i = b-1 (CES). 
2.1.5 Nested Functions 
Functional forms can also be combined by nesting, a process whicU allows multiple 
stages of functions, witU tUe top level function using as its inputs the outputs of tUe 
second stage functions or nests. Figure 2-3 sUows two common forms of nesting. On 
the left a production function is defined as a Leontief, or linear, combination of two 
nests, one for composite value-added and tUe dtUer for composite intermediate goods. 
The value-added nest is defined as a Cobb-Douglas combination of factor inputs, 
while the intermediate goods nest comprises a linear combination of two intermediate 
goods X and Y. TUe utility function on tUe rigUt is a Cobb-Douglas function of 
savings and goods (tUerefore tUe budget sUare on goods is constant, and tUe marginal 
propensity to save is fixed). Consumption of goods is a CES function of two goods X 
andY. 
Figure 2-3: Examples of nesting functions 
Output 
a=0 
Value-added Intermediate Intermediate 
Good X Good Y 
Labour Capital 
Savin us 
Utility 
Consumption 
Goods 
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The advantage of nesting is tUat it provides more parameters in tUe model, tUus 
allowing a greater cUoice of elasticities so tUat tUe elasticities of substitution need not 
be the same for all pairs of goods/factors. Nesting can include any function tUat can 
normally be used in CGE models, and in tUeory any number of nests can be used, 
aithougU in practice it is rarely necessary to use more tUan a few levels of nesting at 
the most. Nesting can be impractical botU in terms of modelling effort and 
accessibility of results, since intuitive understanding of complex nesting structures 
can be difficuU, leading to confusion as to wUetUer or not model results are plausible, 
and to how tUey Uave been acUieved. 
2.2 PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND MARKET 
CLEARING 
At a basic level, all CGE models Uave at tUeir core a system of equations tUat define 
production and consumption functions, witU tUe point of simulation being to find 
prices and quantities tUat meet tUe specified market clearing equations given certain 
changes to taxation or otUer policy instruments. 
This section describes Uow tUis core part of a CGE model is built, and Uow it operates, 
using a simple closed-economy model witU no government. 
2.2.1 Production 
Production functions can take many forms, but Uere a nested function witU 
intermediate inputs and a value-added nest will be examined, firstly witU Cobb-
Douglas substitution in tUe value-added nest, and tUen witU CES substitution. 
Cobb-Douglas production with Leontief intermediates 
If a top-level nest is defined where output is a Leontief function of value added and 
intermediate inputs, tUen tUe quantity of value added VAj is related to output Qj as 
follows: 
VA^=0^O.,d^>O [CDP-1] 
where 0^ is tUe value-added per unit of output of tUe final good. Intermediate uses Xi j 
are 
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; r ,^=/^ , ,g , ,y9, ,>0 [CDP-21 
where yS, ^ is tUe quantity of intermediate good i per unit of output of tUe final good j. 
Value added is produced using factor services according to tUe Cobb-Douglas 
function 
VA ,= A^Yl^ "I'.i' where Z «/ , / = 1 [CDP- 3] 
at a cost Zu^i^i.i ' wUere Wr is tUe reward paid to factor f and E^ ^ is tUe 
employment of factor fin industry j. 
The standard first-order conditions for efficient (cost-minimising) factor employment 
imply that for any pair of factors 
cVAjdE^J^ 
cTA,ldE^_, W^ •  
Since for CDP-1 we may sUow tUat 
dVA^ VA. 
^ ^^'• '~E 
It follows tUat for cost minimisation we require 
«..v^/ E =E, " . [CDP-4] 
Zero profits in tUe long-run equilibrium requires tUat 
^.e.=Z^^,.,+Z^/^/.. lCDP-5] 
' f 
and substituting for use of factors g {g^f) from [CDP- 4]gives us an expression for tUe 
demand for factor f 
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PiQi = I.P^.+ll^. W, 
/. / « 
from which we may obtain, since Z^x./ ~ ^' 
W. Et=^\P>Q,-I.P,X, 
But the Leontief demands for intermediates are given in [CDP- 2], so we may rewrite 
this as 
Et.>-^Q\P,-I./^,.,P, [CDP- 6] 
Since 
Q,=ivA^=^nEr:; 0. 
^, f' 
we may then derive the following equation 
e,=^n a 1.1 0, Y[ w, -' P,-I:P..:P, n 
This expression can be rearranged to give tUe zero profit (price = average cost) 
condition. Because Z '^ / / ~ ^' "^ terms witUin tUe product expression tUat are not 
indexed over f can be placed before tUe product sign: 
A. ( „ \^{a, ^"' 
Q.=J-Q{P,-1:A.A.JU v./ 
v ^ / y 
and tUus 
0. 
i ^ "^1 I 
fw.^"" 
y^iJ 
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or 
P,'I./i..,P.*Y^ 
r py \"' 
I I \ ^ i . i J 
[CDP- 7] 
In long-run equilibrium, tUe price of tUe final good must be equal to tUe cost of 
purchased intermediates (the first term) plus tUe cost of factors used in adding value to 
those intermediates. 
CES production with Leontief intermediates 
The steps taken to derive price and input equations for CES production are the same 
as for Cobb-Douglas production. Define the same equations [CDP- 1] and [CDP- 2] 
for the top-level Leontief nest. The CES value-added function is 
tT/(a-l) 
y^ = 4Y.<^i.^V" [CESP- 1] 
Cost minimisation for the CES function requires tUat 
^ . . , - ^ t . , 
/ NO 
[CESP- 2] 
The zero profit condition is tUe same as in tUe Cobb-Douglas case, [CDP- 5]. 
Substituting for use of factors g (g?^ f) gives 
p,Qi-Y.p,xjiy, 
^'• 'Ut.F.j ) 
= J,P,X,+E, (w,^ 
\'^t.tJ « 
| - < T 
Rearranging tUis equation gives employment: 
Ef = 
!f) (^ '^ '-i^ ^ 
IL^K" 
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As witU tUe Cobb-Douglas nest, tUe intermediate inputs are a linear function of output 
[CDP- 2], So tUat 
E,.,-Q\P,-Y.P,.,P, [CESP- 3] 
We may tUen derive tUe following expression in a similar manner as for tUe Cobb-
Douglas case: 
Qi = 0. Y.(^i., 4^,-EA,„.)fei («/. /^/)^ Y.K.K" 
cr-l/o- -1 ajcT- I 
All terms in tUe summation expression tUat are not dependent on tUe summation index 
f can be placed outside tUe summation sign. 
A^ V 
Q = — 
Qi Pi-l.P..,P. 
0. 
Z< . C ^ 
Z«/.v(«/.7^/) (T- l 
CT/CT-I 
Rearranging tUe last term allows some simplification: 
Qi-^Q{p,-I.P,.,Pi 
-^e, (^ . -ZA.^ , 
- lo/ tT- l 
1.^1.iK" 
Z<,^, t-CT 
J 
I/CT-I 
As witU tUe Cobb-Douglas case, 0^ can be cancelled from botU sides of tUe 
expression, witU the resulting equation solved for tUe output price: 
Pi-YPi.iP, 
5 
A. 
l/l-o-
ILciX, \-a 
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p=yB p +^ ,<.iK 
l/l-o-
[CESP- 4] 
2.2.2 Consumption 
A UouseUold can receive income from factors of production. If UouseUold U holds 
endowments of factors Fu, tUen an income equation can be derived: 
n-Z^/./,^/ [CON- IJ 
If all income is spent on goods, tUen 
where C,,, is consumption of good i by UouseUold U. 
Derivation of equations for consumer demand uses standard functions. If consumption 
is Cobb-Douglas tUen equation [CD-5] from section 2.1.1 can be used: 
Alternatively, if consumption is CES. tUen equation [CES-4] is used: 
C =Y 
(d Y 
^P,J 
'Y.K„pr-
Consumption with explicit Utility 
An alternative way of modelling consumption is to "bundle" all consumption into a 
single good, "Utility", for each UouseUold. A quantity U|, of utility is "produced' using 
inputs of goods only (not factors of production), and uses goods in tUe exact quantities 
tUat tUey are consumed. HouseUolds tUen only directly consume tUis single Utility 
good, wUicU Uas an implied price Pi'. TUis price Uas varying interpretations: for a 
private UouseUold, it is tUe cost of living index for tUat UouseUold; for a government 
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houseUold, U is tUe government price index. If tUere is only one private UouseUold, 
then P/," is tUe Consumer Price Index, and if tUis UouseUold also includes all 
government activity, PJ,' is tUe GDP deflator. WUile including tUis price in tUe model 
will not alter tUe model results, it often proves wortUwUile as a price index. 
WitU all expenditure on utility. 
Y = P II 
^ii ^ii ^ ii 
Production of tUe utility good can use any of tUe standard functional forms. For Cobb-
Douglas utility, demand can be derived as: 
X,.i.=<^uMi, 
and tUe price index as: 
' P^ 
4,, u,.j 
For CES preferences. 
x,.i.-p,:^i, 
(5.,Y 
• ^i.li 
V ^, ^ / A-
'T^k^Pk \-a 
P" = s^jfr" 
I/II-0-) 
2.2.3 Market Clearing 
Finally, production and consumption must be brougUt togetUer by market clearing 
equations. TUere must be one market clearing equation for eacU good or factor. In a 
simple closed economy model witUout government, tUere are two sets of sucU 
equations: one for goods, and anotUer for factors of production (Uere we use tUe first 
consumption fiinction witUout explicit Utility). 
The market clearing equation for goods must equate output witU the sum of all uses of 
the good. Here goods are used as intermediates, and in final consumption: 
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a=Z^^ .. + Zc..-
Similarly, a market clearing equation for factors of production must equate supply 
witU demand. In tUis case, supply is ensured by UouseUolds Uolding endowments of 
factors, and demand is for primary factor services in employment: 
Z^/.. = Z^/.,-
2.2.4 Walras' Law and the numeraire 
The equations needed for this model are summarised in Figure 2-4. AltUough tUese 
equations could be used directly to solve tUe CGE model. tUere is one problem witU 
them: tUe full set of equations is linearly Uomogeneous in prices, so that any absolute 
level of prices is possible: tUus. it is only relative prices tUat are important in all tUese 
equations. SucU a model will usually solve, but any absolute level of prices is 
feasible. In order to fix tUe absolute level of prices it is normal practice to define one 
price as tUe numeraire, but any nominal variable (sucU as consumer income) could be 
used. WUicUever nominal variable is cUosen as tUe numeraire is fixed, and all other 
nominal variables are tUen defined relative to tUe numeraire. 
A strict definition of Walras' law states tUat: 
'TUe first part of tUe Law says tUat in an economic system of n distinct 
markets, equilibrium in any (n-1) of tUese markets guarantees equilibrium 
in tUe last one. TUe second part of tUe Law states tUat if an overall 
equilibrium in all markets is found at a set of prices pi,p2,...,p„ tUen a 
set of prices Xp^, Xp2..... Xp„, witU /I > 0 , will also define tUe same 
equilibrium; in otUer words, absolute prices are not required for tUe 
equilibrium of tUe economy." 
Baldry p. 61. 
The need to specify a numeraire is, of course, a consequence of Walras' law, wUicU 
dictates tUat for a closed system of n markets, if n-l markets clear, tUen tUe n"' market 
must also clear. TUus we must remove one equation from tUe model, leaving n-l 
equations in n-l variables. Any single equation could be omitted, and tUe equation 
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Figure 2-4: A simple closed economy model without government 
Leontief intermediate input demand: 
Cobb-Douglas Production 
E,,, = '^Q\Pri:PuP, 
CES Production 
Factor Employment 
W, -v Et..-Q, P,-l.P.iP. 
[<^i.iF,J 
i:<iK' 
Output Price 
^ . 
p, = lPA^-rn 
(w, "^' 
\^l.i) 
p,=ZAiP.^j- l^.iK" 
l/I-(T 
Consumer Income 
>;,=Z /^./-^ / 
Cobb-Douglas Demand 
C, = K i.li ~ l<\ 
.P. J 
CES Demand 
'ILs^.pr 
Market Clearing for Goods 
a=Z^'./+Z^'./' 
/ /' 
Market Clearing for Factors 
Z^A./,=Z^/,. 
that is removed need not include tUe numeraire in any way. In the set of equations in 
Figure 2-A, tUe factor market equation could be removed, but only for one member of 
the set f: 
Z .^./,=Z /^.v / e { L . . « - l } 
Another commonly used alternative is to introduce a new variable WALRAS tUat can 
be positive or negative, 
- 00 < WALRAS < +00. 
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This Walrasian "slack" variable can tUen be added to any one single equation. 
I .e . 
/, / ./ e ( l . . . « - l j 
Y.P,.i,=llEi.i+^A^P^S f = n. 
If every otUer equation in tUe model is satisfied, tUen tUe closed system of equations 
must result in WALRAS equal to zero, but tUe inclusion of tUis variable means tUat 
the model's consistency can be cUecked. 
2.3 MODEL CLOSURE 
Model closure is a term tUat refers to Uow tUe economy is modelled outside tUe core 
part of tUe CGE model. Model closure is usually cUaracterised by a set of closure 
rules tUat are not derived from any otUer part of tUe model. 
2.3.1 External Closure 
In a closed economy model, tUere is no need to consider Uow tUe domestic economy 
interacts witU tUe international economy, but in an open economy CGE model tUere 
must be extemal closure to determine how imports and exports are determined. 
A small open economy model would assume that tUe domestic economy Uas no power 
to influence world prices. TUerefore, international prices of imports and exports 
sUould be fixed. witU tUe economy able to import/export any quantity at tUis price. 
Thus the domestic price of any good would be set by tUe world price and excUange 
rate: 
p/' = e.p;r 
TUe excUange rate e is a new price in tUe model, wUicU must adjust to ensure balance 
of payments equilibrium: 
Zr^, = ZrM, 
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where .V, and Af, are exports and imports of good i. Large country external closure 
can also be implemented by tUe use of a constant elasticity of demand for tUe 
country's exports (or supply of its imports): 
p;' =e. 
(M. \ " 
Q > 0 
M,J 
where M, is tUe initial level of imports of good i.^  
Multi-region CGE models are tUe exception wUere extemal closure is not necessary; 
consumption of imports in one region is sourced ultimately from production in otUer 
regions, so tUere is no need to make additional closure rules to determine trade 
quantities and prices. The basic structure of tUese models is tUe same as tUe single 
country closed economy model, with (at least) one household in each region holding 
internationally-immobile endowments of factors in that region, purchasing goods 
from that region's suppliers and imports from otUer regions' suppliers. 
Government Closure 
There are many government closure rules that are adopted in CGE models, and tUe 
choice is largely dependent on the purpose for whicU a CGE model is built. TUe 
simplest form of government closure is to treat tUe government in mucU tUe same way 
as private UouseUolds, witU a utility function determining government demands for 
goods, and an income equation wUere tUe government gains its income from tax 
receipts. If tUere is only one private UouseUold, and taxation issues are not a concern 
of the analysis, tUen tUe government and private UouseUold could be treated as a 
single consumer. 
Alternatively, some government demands could be fixed. If government revenue is 
allowed to vary, tUere must be at least one expenditure item tUat will adjust to ensure 
that government income equals expenditure, but it is possible for savings to be tUe 
item tUat makes tUis adjustment if aggregate government consumption of goods and 
services needs to be fixed. 
See Shoven and Whalley (1992). ch.9. lor a discussion of alternatives to this approach. 
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If tax-incidence analysis is to be performed (i.e. assessing tUe welfare impacts of 
different forms of taxation), then it should be done with government expenditure 
constant by allowing one tax (usually income tax) to adjust to meet any sUortfall of 
government revenues. In a common experiment, all consumption is fixed, and one 
indirect tax is removed, witU income tax increasing to ensure government income-
expenditure balance. A positive utility gain from sucU an experiment would imply tUat 
income tax is a more efficient tax tUan tUe tax being removed. 
In long-term analyses it migUt be preferable to use government closure rules wUere 
taxes adjust to ensure tUat government expenditure is constant as a proportion of 
GDP. TUis assumes tUat tUe government Uas a preferred level of involvement in tUe 
economy tUat is set by political factors. 
Savings Closure 
Savings closure (sometimes termed "macroeconomic closure") refers to tUe means by 
which savings and investment are determined. Typically saving is performed by 
household, with eacU UouseUold gaining utility from tUe consumption of a real savings 
good, wUicU is 'produced' by investing in goods and services. TUis is a purely 
demand-driven savings rule, by which expected cUanges in future earnings of 
investment do not Uave any effect on tUe rate of savings. Alternative savings rules 
might allow expected rates of return to effect savings. 
The weakness of savings closure rules comes as a direct result of using a static model 
without any expectations, so some models introduce dynamics into the core of tUe 
model to enable more sopUisticated savings closure. 
Multi-region CGE models Uave an additional savings closure problem, wUicU is tUat 
the distribution of investment between regions must be decided in addition to tUe 
aggregate level of savings and investment. TUe simplest possible closure Uere is to 
assume tUat net investment in eacU region is fixed (by balance of payments identity, 
this fixes tUe trade balance). 
2.4 COMMODITY DIFFERENTIATION 
One important stage in tUe formulation of a CGE trade model is tUe treatment of 
domestic and traded goods. 
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2.4.1 Homogeneity 
A simple neo-classical trade model would treat all domestic goods as being 
homogeneous with the same tradable good. TUis neo-classical model is sUown in 
Figure 2-5 in an example using two goods, X and Y. 
In this example, the production possibilities curve (PPC) XO-YO is defined by 
production tecUnologies and factors. At tUe world prices Px and Py, tUe quantities 
produced of tUe two goods are Xp and Yp, wUile tUe indifference curve (1) for tUe 
single consumer in tUe model leads to preferred consumption at tUe levels Xc and Yc. 
The excess of production over consumption gives the net trade in each good, so tUat 
(Yp-Yc) is exported from tUe economy and (Xc-Xp) is imported. 
While tUis form of model is tUeoretically convenient, it does not take into account 
various factors tUat are important in observed market conditions. In particular, tUe 
model does not allow any good to be botU imported and exported - tUe situation of 
cross-hauling of goods that is common at the level of aggregation used in CGE 
models. Because of tUese features, multi-sector CGE models based on tUe neo-
classical trade paradigm can produce large swings in trade volumes, and relatively 
small policy cUanges can lead to import goods becoming export goods, and exports 
becoming imports. 
Figure 2-5: General Equilibrium with Homogeneous goods 
Y 
Px/Py 
XO Xc X 
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2.4.2 Salter-Swan Non-Traded Goods 
These problems can be solved by using a Salter-Swan form of model, where goods 
are classified as eitUer non-traded or traded, but the form of model originally 
envisaged by Salter and Swan does not lead to an entirely satisfactory solution to 
these problems. AlthougU Salter and Swan recognised tUe importance of non-traded 
goods as being distinct from traded goods. tUey classified only tliose goods that were 
totally non-traded as non-tradable. TUus a good witU a small percentage of total output 
exported would be classified as a traded good in tUis model, leading to a situation 
where the domestic price for such goods is set by world markets, and where very few 
goods are classified as non-traded. 
2.4.3 Differentiated Goods 
The problems outlined above are usually handled in CGE models by treating tUe 
goods in any sector tUat are non-traded, exported and imported as qualitatively 
different goods. TUis specification can tUus allow for cross-Uauling of goods, and for 
the dependence of goods with small trade shares on world markets to be specified by 
the substitution elasticities chosen and the volumes of traded and non-traded goods in 
any category. For each sector in the economy, output and consumption are broken 
into three parts: an import good, an export good and a non-traded good. An 
aggregation function creates one composite consumer good from the domestically 
produced non-traded good and tUe import good. TUe production good comprises two 
output goods - tUe non-traded good and tUe export good. TUe tUree different goods in 
each sector can tUen Uave different prices, allowing domestic market conditions to be 
reflected in tUe price of tUe non-traded good, and at tUe same time retaining some 
direct dependence between tUe tUree goods in eacU sector. 
In the example sUown in Figure 2-6, CES and constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) functions are used, so tUat: 
C. = ,^. 
(T-l , \ <T--[ 
a "'' [CES] a.,GfT +[\-a)M, 
where C, is aggregate consumption of imported and domestic good, 
G, is tUe quantity consumed of tUe domestic good. 
Figure i 1-6: Differentiated Goods 
Armington Aggregation 
Consumption 
of good i Ci 
A D> 
r\ / \ 
Imports Composite Exports 
Production 
of good 1 
Qi 
M, is consumption of imports. 
and A^, or, and crare CES parameters. 
a = B, p,Grr+(\-f3)xrT r-l [CET] 
where Q^ is aggregate output quantity. 
G, is tUe quantity produced of tUe domestic good, equal to tUe quantity 
consumed, 
X^ is tUe quantity of exports, 
Bi, PI and v are CET parameters. 
2.4.4 Armington Aggregation 
An extension on tUis model of differentiated goods is generally necessary for CGE 
modelling, and is common for multi-country modelling. Armington (1969) defined a 
model of differentiation wUere imports are differentiated according to tUeir region of 
source, and domestic goods are differentiated from imports. Figure 2-7 gives a 
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diagrammatic representation. wUere CTD is tUe elasticity of substitution between 
domestic goods and imports, and CTM is tUe elasticity of substitution between imports 
from different source regions. It is usually assumed tUat GD < CTM-
"True" or "double-sided" Armington aggregation includes a similar function on tUe 
export side, wUere exports are also differentiated from domestic products (as in tUe 
differentiated goods of Figure 2-6), but tUis form is rarely used because "single-sided" 
Armington. defined only for imports, accomplisUes everytUing tUat tUe Armington 
function is intended to do: it differentiates goods from different regions, allowing 
cross-hauling and preventing large trade shifts from small price cUanges. TUe 
"double-sided" Armington does not add anytUing to tUis, but increases tUe size and 
computational difficulty of tUe model. In practice, single- and double- Armington 
structures are mixed witU differentiated goods tUat are not differentiated according to 
region of source (or destination). TUe GTAP model, for example, uses single-sided 
Armington on tUe import side, witU no differentiation on tUe export side. Harrison 
(1997) uses tUis model, witU a variant tUat Uas exports differentiated from domestic 
goods, but not differentiated according to region of destination. 
2.5 CALIBRATION 
2.5.1 Calibration Techniques 
Time-series data are generally not available in the detail necessary for CGE 
modelling, but even if time-series data on production, consumption, input-output data, 
trade and taxation are available, tUe task of estimating functional forms tUat botU fit 
the data as far as possible, and produce a balanced general equilibrium dataset, is not 
feasible. CGE models tend to Uave a single set of data for one base year, altUougU 
Figure 2-7: Armington Aggregation 
Consumption 
Domestic 
Imports from different regions 
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even tlien some data may be taken from other years. 
Calibration remains tUe only possible way to ensure tUat tUe parameters of a CGE 
model botU reflect tUe data and lead to a balanced general equilibrium bencUmark. 
The problems of producing balanced data to start witU are not inconsiderable, but 
even witU balanced data, it is imperative tUat tUe model sUould be able to reproduce 
the data in a "bencUmark" simulation. 
Not all parameters in tUe CES (and CET) functions can be calibrated from sucU a data 
set. and it is necessary to impose elasticities of substitution on tUe model. TUese 
elasticities will ideally be from empirical econometric estimates from tUe same time 
period as the data base year. Often. Uowever, elasticity estimates simply do not exist, 
so values are 'borrowed' for different countries, regions and years. 
Calibrating a Cobb-Douglas Function 
When calibrating a Cobb-Douglas fianction, tUe following standard equations can be 
used for output, input demand and price: 
=^^ .n^ "' x,.i = <^,.iQi -p ' P' I < y^i.iJ 
WUen base values (denoted wUU a bar over tUe variable name) are used. 
Q=A,x\x: 
p, 
X,.,=a,,Q,^ P'=^n 
f-p\-
simple rearrangements give expressions for a, ^ and A-
«.,/ = 
QiP_^ 
X,., P, 
[CAL-l] 
A. = Q 
' YYxr 
lCAL-2] 
Calibration for consumption functions is identical, witU tUe resuUing value for a,,,: 
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Yj^ 
X,M~P. 
«,./, = - - ICAL-3] 
CES Calibration 
Calibration of a CES function follows similar principles, but is not so straigUt-
forward. Firstly, tUe elasticity of substitution must be imposed on tUe calibration 
procedure. Then, because tUe CES demand function includes terms in S^ ^ for all k, it 
cannot be used to calculate values for <5, :^ 
A jc N<^ 
X,.:=P,Q, m iv'^^' 
It is normally assumed tUat 2l^^i i ~ ' • TUen, using equation [CES-2] for base values, 
X. k.l — Ji I.I 
S k . i - ^ 
^..iP^iXk.i 
V ( I / < T ) 
PI I Xi.i 
-7, fT' \ 
k k -< ' 
X_k, 
Kx,.i) 
i i /<^) 
"• • i V P I F * ' / " ' - I 
I:P^X': 
[CAL-4] 
The output equation can tUen be rearranged to obtain A^ 
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' - ^ i ^ 
Qi 
„ — (T -D / t T 
-lcr/irr-\) 
S*;,^ '" 
[CAL-5] 
Calibration of CES utility equations involves an identical procedure to calibrate S^ . 
Utility equations do not need tUe sUift parameter Aj as tUey are ordinal. 
2.5.2 Pre-Calibrated Functions 
Later cUapters will use pre-calibrated functions, wUicU are pUrased in sucU a way tUat 
calibration of parameters is unnecessary except for an expenditure sUare parameter. 
Pre-calibrated functions Uave several advantages over tUe traditional means of 
calibration outlined above. Pre-calibrated CES equations use tUe elasticity value 
X P X P 
cr and tUe sUare of expenditure on eacU good. 0. ^ = —''— ' = .^-^—'—=—, or for Q^Pi Y^X,,P, 
utility equations, 0^,, = 
Xiji P, .\ i.ii PI 
Yii / , Xk.il Pk 
Although pre-calibrated functions will result in exactly tUe same model structure, and 
results, calibration of tUe CES S, ^ and A. parameters is replaced witU tUis simple 
expenditure calibration. FurtUermore (and tUe most useful property of tUese 
functions), tUey do not need to be recalibrated wUen tUe elasticity of substitution is 
changed. 
Firstly, obtain an expression for A^ that does not contain (J, . by substituting [CAL-4] 
into [CAL-5]: 
A.= Qi 
Z PlX,,/ — ( f T - l ) / l T 
i / ."k ^ k.l 
a/(<T-l) 
As x^j X Dy'"'"=xr!r=x,.i, 
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Then. 
^i = 
Qi 
Z_jPkXk.i 
O-/(CT-I) - QI 
z?.x"r 
( T / ( ( T - I ) 
Y.P.X,, 
<TI(<T-\) 
\ 
\ICT Z-p.x'::. 
a/((T-l) 
Qi = Qi 
niPiX,, 
\ 
ZP.^''' 
r r / lo - l ) 
a/(<T-l) 
171/'^ 
1/<T ^ S . / 
<T/(a-\ 
Qi = Qi T 
I^ ,x;:rAtr"^ '' 
<T/(a-l) 
A tT/((T-l) 
Z^,:^.. \yj>j('i] 
CT/(<T-I) 
— 1/(7 - ^ ' . / 
whereas X,,i = --(^_i)/„ 
,^ = c?. 
Z^-X,; rx,^  A^,; 
(CT -D /CT a/(CT-l) 
\ 
Z^-^''./ 
a/(o-l) 
Qi = QI 
v ^ PiXil 
( Y ~\|( ' '-I)/CT 
rY.p^Xk.i\Xi,i. 
- | ( T / ( C T - I ) 
a/(CT-l) 
S „^ 
'^  X *^'^ ""/'^  
X.J 
Substituting lower case variable names for ratios of bencUmark values, i.e. q ^  = 
and X = = -
X,,, 
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^/ = 
mia-w 
0 X 
I " l . l ^ l . l 
a-\)/a [CES-6] 
Now, substituting for parameters in tUe price equation [CES-5]: 
1 
P=^ 
l^P^Xi, 
(T/(<T-I) 
~'\Y~P'X\': YTp^'xti 
j | - ( T 
l/( l-rr) 
-T}^l<y Yjxi: \YJ-XT, 
CTK l - c r ) 
Cancelling out equivalent terms and dividing botU sides by P, = '^^P-fXi.i gives: 
Tr[^~'~'-
\ l/((T-l) f 
^"'• Mij 
\ I 
. , -^^l/( l-<T) 
N l/(l-ff) 
.= Z^-,.i | - t 7 [CES-7] 
Equation [CES-3] gives input demand: 
(s.,\ 
x^,-P,Q{^) ILKA )I-(T 
Replacing values of J, ^ witU equation [CAL-4], 
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Cancelling tUe Z^A'^A'!^ terms on botU tUe top and bottom of tUis expression and 
k 
dividing botU top and bottom by base revenue PjQ , 
X. . = 
P,Q, P,' 
^'^'ij.J 
Using equation [CES-7], tUe bottom of tUis expression is equal to p] ", so: 
X,.i P,<]iP-
XiJ PI 
^^'./=9v 
Pj-
~Pi) 
\ " 
[CES-8] 
These pre-calibrated equations can be used in a CGE model, and as stated above, tUey 
are easier to use tUan tUe more "normal" equations, partly because tUey do not need to 
be recalibrated wUen cUanging elasticity values. MPSGE^, tUe programming system 
that will be used later in tUis tUesis, Uas tUese equations specified internally. Results 
from MPSGE are tUus 'multiples' variables, wUicU must be multiplied by tUe 
bencUmark quantity to find tUe actual quantity; MPSGE never needs to recalibrate 
functions when elasticity values are cUanged. 
Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium, a programming system by Tom Rutherford, GAMS 
Corporation and University of Boulder, Colorado. 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This cUapter Uas outlined tUe process of computable general equilibrium modelling, 
from a general discussion about tUe nature of CGE modelling, tUrougU tUe specifics of 
functional forms (section 2.1) to linking tUe beUavioural equations and accounting 
relationsUips togetUer in a simle model (section 2.2). Section 2.5 discussed model 
closure, a necessary part of any CGE model, and section 2.6 discussed tUe treatment 
of traded goods. Finally, section 2.7 discussed calibration of CGE models, and 
derived pre-calibrated functions. 
TUe following cUapters will refer to all of tUese issues, firstly to examine various CGE 
models of global trade and tUe Uruguay Round (CUapter 3), and tUen to build and 
extend a model (CUapters 5 and 7) for furtUer analysis of tUe Uruguay Round. 
Discussion of results (CUapters 6 and 8) draw on an understanding of tUe 
fundamentals presented Uere. In particular, pre-calibrated functions will be used 
further in CUapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CGE MODELS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
3.1 IMODELLING ISSUES 
This cUapter examines various studies of tUe Uruguay Round tUat use CGE models to 
assess various questions tUat are raised by tUe Round. TUe most obvious question to 
ask is: does tUe Uruguay Round bring overall net welfare benefits to tUe worid as a 
wUole? TUis may not be a pointiess question, for in a world wUere many policy 
distortions exist, tUe partial liberalisation of some of tUose distortions could lead to 
welfare losses. However, in all of tUe CGE studies presented Uere, tUe Uruguay Round 
is welfare improving for tUe world as a wUole. 
Other questions arise from tUis first question, sucU as: Uow large are tUe welfare 
benefits to tUe world, and to eacU individual region? Are tUere any regions tUat suffer 
welfare losses as tUe result of tUe Uruguay Round? How do tUe different elements of 
the Uruguay Round contribute to tUese welfare results, botU in terms of tUe overall 
world welfare gain and in terms of gains and losses to individual regions? Some 
papers attempt to answer all of tUese questions but otUers, for reasons discussed in tUe 
following sections, focus on a particular subset of tUe Uruguay Round reforms or on 
particular countries. 
The remainder of section 3.1 discusses differences tUat exist in tUe way tUat different 
authors model tUe Uruguay Round, and explains Uow tUese differences will lead to 
different results. Section 3.2 examines one of tUe more commonly used models, tUe 
GTAP model, in detail, and discusses some studies tUat use tUis model. Section 3.3 
discusses otUer CGE models, and tUe papers based on tUem, section 3.4 examines tUe 
tariff reductions tUat autUors use to cUaracterise tUe Uruguay Round, and section 3.5 
concludes by comparing tUe results of different models. 
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Base year and numeraire 
Studies tUat use different base years will necessarily Uave different welfare results in 
dollar values, simply because tUe study witU tUe later base year will Uave larger dollar 
values in tUe data. In a model using data denominated in 1995 dollars eacU dollar Uas a 
lower value tUan in a model tUat uses data denominated in 1990 dollars simply 
because tUe inflation between tUe base years erodes tUe real value of tUe dollar. 
Although some commentators often look for dollar value results, the simple means of 
correcting for this difference between models is to ignore tUe dollar value of welfare 
changes and look only at welfare change as a percentage of GDP. Results from 
different models are tUen directly comparable, but may still differ for tUe reasons 
outlined below. 
Two iTiodels may also use different numeraires, in wUicU case tUe comparison of any 
nominal values between tUe models must take account of tUis. It is not unusual for 
models to give results for certain price cUanges, or for nominal trade balances, and in 
these cases tUe results are only in terms of tUe numeraire. To compare price results 
only relative prices sUould be examined, so tUat for two models witU agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors, tUe relative price of agriculture to manufacturing can be 
calculated from tUe results of botU models, regardless of tUe numeraire used in eacU. 
Data 
Models tUat rely on different databases will necessarily Uave different results, 
althougU tUe qualitative conclusions from those resuUs may not differ. In many cases 
the largest differences between databases will be tUat tUey are calculated for different 
years. wUen tUe structure of protection, trade and output in tUe global economy was 
different. In otUer cases, differences occur because different databases contain 
information on different policy instruments: for example, one database may include 
factor taxation wUile in anotUer tUese are subsumed in tUe output tax for tUe industry 
that uses tUose factors. Obtaining data in itself leads to differences; if two teams of 
researcUers botU try to obtain tUe same set of data for a large database, tUere will be 
different data sources, leading to likely differences in tUe data gatUered. WUere data 
are unavailable or incomplete, tUere is often no "standard" means of proxying data, so 
two teams of researcUers will use different metUods. TUis last point is very important 
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in global CGE databases, wUere input-output tables do not exist for every country in 
the world, and where the reconciliation of bilateral trade data is very important. 
Policy experiments 
The Uruguay Round Agreement contained policy cUanges in many areas, and tUe way 
in whicU tUese cUanges are modelled can Uave as large an effect on (tUe differences in) 
model results as any otUer factor. TUese policies can be considered in five groups: 
Agriculture, MFA, Tariffs, Services, and OtUers. TUis section identifies "standard" 
forms of cUaracterising tUe Uruguay Round package. Unless otUerwise noted, tUe 
studies examined later in tUis cUapter use tUese standard cUaracterisations. 
Agriculture 
The Agricultural Agreement set out a series of reforms of agriculture, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. TUese reforms cover agricultural tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic 
support. TUe rules for tUe required liberalisation in tUese sectors are often complex. 
while CGE models tend to treat all tUese policies as ad valorem price wedges. TUe 
standard cUaracterisation of subsidy reform is to reduce tUe ad valorem' price wedge 
by 36% (24% for LDCs) for export subsidies, and 20% (137, for LDCs) for domestic 
support. 
TUe extent of reform required in tUe area of agricultural tariffs is a major source of 
differences between models. Two of tUe major CGE models of tUe Uruguay Round 
that are discussed in section 3.2, Harrison et al. (1995) and Francois et al. (1995a), 
model agricultural tariff reductions in entirely different ways: Harrison et al. account 
for dirty tariffication, witU tUe result tUat little liberalisation occurs in some tariffs, 
notably for EU imports. Francois et al. use 36% reductions in eacU agricultural tariff 
(24% for LDCs). Reductions in export subsidies and production subsidies are usually 
treated as corresponding reductions in ad valorem subsidy rates. altUougU tUis 
treatment differs in some models. TUe production subsidy reduction for tUe US and 
the EU is given different rates by different autUors depending on wUetUer, and to wUat 
extent, AMS exceptions are treated in tUose countries. 
) - j 
The MFA 
The reform of textiles and clothing policies in tUe MFA is perUaps tUe easiest to treat 
in a CGE model. Because tUe MFA is to be abolisUed after tUe ten-year pUase-out 
period, models usually simply remove tUe export tax ad valorem equivalent of tUe 
MFA quota. TUis is tUe "standard" treatment, altUougU wUen not removing tUe MFA 
(to look only at tUe effects of otUer reforms), most autUors retain tUe export quota as 
an ad valorem tax. 
There are some papers tUat treat tUe MFA reforms differently, Uowever. Hertel et al. 
(1995) model tUe world economy in 2005 after tUe acceleration of MFA quotas (witU 
the price wedge endogenous) between 1995-2005. and (a separate simulation) tUe 
abolition of quotas in 2005. 
Tariffs 
Tariff liberalisation on non-agricultural goods (including textiles and clotUing) 
follows a deceptively simple formula, wUerein regions must liberalise tariffs by an 
average 38%. Not accounting for the numerous exceptions to tUese market access 
provisions, as detailed in CUapter 1, there is the additional problem of discerning in 
which product categories countries will actually make tariff reductions, and tUe value 
of those tariff reductions in each tariff line. Some autUors ignore tUis problem and 
assume across tUe board tariff reductions of 38%, wUile otUers examine tUe GATT 
country submissions and compare tUe new tariff bindings witU applied rates to 
ascertain wUere tUere will be tariff reductions. Probably because of tUe complexity of 
such a task, autUors tUat do tUe latter find different tariff reductions are necessary, as 
will be discussed in later sections. 
Services 
Most models do not include tUe effects of liberalising trade in services, but some do. 
The GATS does not specify reduction rates, but ratUer sets out certain rules tliat must 
be adUered to in respect to services, and points to certain instances wUere particular 
changes to tUe rules governing services trade sUould be reformed. SucU reforms are 
impossible to model accurately in a CGE model, so wUere services trade liberalisation 
is included in a model of tUe Uruguay Round, tUe means by wUicU tUe reform is 
operationalised witUin tUe model will differ. Brown e. al. (1995) for example model 
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the service commitments of tUe Uruguay Round as 25% reductions in service tariffs. 
Nguyen et al. (1995) assume 20% reductions. 
Others 
Other areas of the Uruguay Round agreement, sucU as agreement in tUe areas of 
investment and property rigUts, and tUe founding of tUe WTO and development of 
dispute settlement procedures Uave all been treated in tUe same way by CGE 
modellers - tUey are ignored. 
Data Aggregation 
Two models tUat use tUe same database and model tUe Uruguay Round in exactly tUe 
same way will Uave different results if tUey aggregate tUe database differently. TUe 
GTAP database discussed in section 3.2 (and more fully in cUapter 4) allows (and 
because of tUe size of tUe full database, requires) tUe modeller to aggregate tUe 
database into regional and commodity groupings. OtUer databases. sucU as tUe Rural-
Urban NortU-SoutU (RUNS) database, are not as large, so tUat tlie wUole database is 
normally used. In tUese cases tUe issue of data aggregation sUouId be considered in 
terms of tUe database being a particular aggregate of tUe commodities and regions tUat 
exist in tUe world economy. 
Francois et al. (1996) compare tUe coverage of a model witU a fisUing net. in tUat a 
CGE model tends by nature of its aggregation to cast a narrow-mesUed net on some 
areas and a wide-mesUed net on otUers. TUe RUNS model for example, contains 15 
agricultural sectors, 3 sectors producing important agricultural inputs, one 
manufacturing and one service sector. TUis model tUerefore casts a narrow-mesUed net 
over agriculture, and can be expected to be very good at capturing tUe effects of 
agricultural reforms, but is not so efficient at capturing reforms in manufacturing, 
services and least of all textiles - wUicU is included as part of tUe manufacturing 
sector. 
The aggregation of regions is also an important factor in tUe net cast over tlie Uruguay 
Round reforms. A model tUat attempts to examine tUe effects of tUe MFA removal 
should for instance include tUe main MFA importers (Canada, tUe EU, tUe US and 
EFTA countries) separately, as well as tUe traditional textile and clotUing exporters 
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(Hong Kong, Singapore), and tUe many developing countries tUat are capable of 
producing large volumes of textiles and clotUing (i.e. CUina and India). TUe RUNS 
inodel is intended to be used to analyse developing country agricultural issues, so tUe 
14 developing regions in tUe total 22 regions gives tUe model some detail. Even tUen, 
an issue sucU as agriculture in East Asia is poorly covered by RUNS because RUNS 
has just six Asian regions -Japan, CUina, India, Indonesia. .[otUer] low income Asia, 
and [otUer] UigU income Asia. TUerefore tUe model gives no differentiation between 
countries witU UigU Japanese-style levels of protection (Taiwan and SoutU Korea) and 
agricultural importers witU little or no protection (Singapore and Hong Kong). OtUer 
East Asian countries (TUailand, Malaysia. tUe PUilippines) Uave low levels of 
agricultural protection but are large net exporters of some agricultural goods. 
The only answer to the problem of data aggregation tUerefore seems to be tUat as 
inany commodities and regions as possible sUould be included in tUe model, but tUis is 
generally not possible. TUe RUNS model size of 22 regions and 20 sectors is around 
the maximum size that can be solved, and even witU models of tUis size solution time 
is high and the model results become difficult to interpret. 
Model Structure 
Different model structures will evidently give different results, and tUe aim of many 
studies is to demonstrate wUat difference a particular cUange in model structure 
inakes. TUere are several dimensions to tUe tUeoretical model structure: 
Product Differentiation 
The treatment of product differentiation in a model is one of tUe core differences 
between some of tUe major modelling groups: tUe GTAP model is based on tUe 
Armington treatment of domestic and foreign goods, wUile tUe RUNS and MicUigan 
models use tUe specification of Uomogeneous goods. In general, tUe Armington 
aggregation dampens tUe response of trade volumes to policy cUanges, so tUat tUe 
result of any policy sUock Uas smaller real effects witU Armington tUan witU 
homogeneity. Welfare effects of trade reforms will be correspondingly smaller. 
Results from Armington models tend to Uave larger terms-of-trade swings, as larger 
price cUanges are needed to induce quantity cUanges. 
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Industrial Structure 
Industrial structure Uas been of keen interest to CGE modellers since Cox and Harris 
(1986) demonstrated tUat tUe gains from tUe US-Canada Free Trade Agreement were 
much Uiglier in tUe presence of monopolistic competUion and increasing returns to 
scale tUan witU perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Several of tUe CGE 
models studied later employ some combination of imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale eitUer in tUeir "base" (or tUeir only) model or as an 
alternative model specification. SucU models tend to increase tUe welfare benefits of 
trade liberalisation, altUougU Uow great tUe increase is depends on wUicU form of 
imperfect competition is modelled. 
Projections 
Many CGE models use tUe comparative static experiment of comparing tUe present 
world economy to Uow tUe world economy would be today if certain policy cUanges 
had been in place for a period of time, and tUis form of simulation Uas become a 
standard in CGE modelling. TUe Uruguay Round is a set of reforms over a definite 
period of time in tUe future, so some modellers prefer to project tUeir model forward 
by making factor endowment and technological cUanges and tUen make tUe 
comparative static experiment between the future economy without reform (tUe "base 
case") and tUe future economy witU reform. 
In general tUere is no reason to expect tUat projected models will give eitUer UigUer or 
lower welfare results', but tUere are specific cases wUere tUis may be tUe case. If a 
relatively capital-intensive sector Uas been afforded UigU levels of protection via an ad 
valorem production subsidy, and if capital is projected to grow faster tUan otUer 
factors, tUen tUe dead-weigUt welfare loss of tUe subsidy Will probably be increased by 
the projection, as output of tUat sector may increase. TUe removal of tUe subsidy 
should tUen bring UigUer welfare gains in tUe projected model tUan in tUe current-year 
model. 
This is the case when comparing percentage changes in welfare, but the projected models would be expected to 
give higher dollar-value equivalent variations merely because income in their base projection is higher than 
current income. 
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Quantitative restrictions will necessarily Uave mucU different effects in a projected 
model, so tUat modelling of tUe MFA pUase-out sUould for instance use projections. 
General economic growtU will increase the demand for all goods, so that quotas 
become more restrictive. Hertel et al. (1995) find that the effect of the increased MFA 
quota growth rates is not enough to prevent MFA quotas being more restrictive in 
2005 (prior to tUeir complete removal at tUe end of tUe MFA pUase-out) tUan tUey are 
in 1992. 
Macroeconomic Closure 
Treatment of savings-investment linkages is a particular weakness of CGE models, as 
the behavioural relationsUips tUat govern savings and investment are clearly not 
simple static functions, but are usually modelled as sucU in a CGE model. Section 3.2 
will discuss macroeconomic closure for tUe GTAP model, but it is possible to say tUat 
closure rules may Uave significant effects on results. 
Capital Accumulation 
One feature of savings and investment in most CGE models is tUat savings adjust to a 
new equilibrium level as tUe result of reforms, and tUerefore investment also increases 
(in other words investment is demand-driven), but capital stocks never change to 
reflect the new level of investment. Some models (e.g. Harrison et al. 1995) include 
alternative specifications where capital adjusts endogenously when investment 
changes to meet a steady-state. TUe capital accumulation effects may be significant, 
and may significantly increase welfare gains from liberalisation. 
Unemployment 
Most CGE models assume full employment of all factors of production, but some 
models (or in some cases, special variants of tUe base model) relax tUis assumption, 
usually by assuming tUat real labour wages are fixed and total employment can take 
any value (tUis means tUat tUe unemployment rate in tUe data is irrelevant). SucU 
models will predict larger increases in welfare from trade policy reform, as any reform 
that increases demand for labour (by increasing demand for goods, and particularly for 
labour-intensive goods) will be able to use factors tUat were previously unemployed 
and tUerefore not contributing to welfare. TUe reverse is also true: wUere welfare 
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losses are predicted, a model wUU unemployment will usually predict UigUer losses as 
more labour becomes unemployed. 
3.2 THE GLOBAL TRADE ANALYSIS PROJECT MODEL 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) is tUe braincUild of TUomas W. Hertel, 
who during a sabbatical period at the IMPACT project in Australia, recognised tUe 
potential to expand IMPACT to be a truly global framework for CGE modelling. 
GTAP comprises four main components: 
• A global database witU the input-output and bilateral trade flow data 
needed in CGE modelling. TUe (version 2) database covers 37 
commodities in 18 countries and 6 composite regions. 
• A standard modelling framework tUat can be used by all modellers as a 
starting point. TUis allows quick implementation of tUe model and also 
gives a bencUmark to allow replication. 
• Standard computer programs and files for manipulating tUe database and 
rurming tUe standard GTAP model. 
• A global network of researcUers using and contributing to tUe GTAP 
database and model. 
The GTAP model is probably the most popular model for multi-regional CGE 
modelling, its popularity deriving mainly from tUe fact tUat tUe GTAP database and 
model are publicly available for a fee; otUer models and databases are not publicly 
available. 
The following two sections (3.2.1 and 3.2.2) discuss tUe GTAP database and model, 
which will be furtUer studied in cUapters 4 and 5. Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 discuss 
applications based on tUe GTAP database and model. 
3.2.1 The GTAP Database 
The main attraction of GTAP to CGE modellers is the database, wUicU includes all tUe 
global data necessary for a muUi-region CGE model. TUe current (released July 1998) 
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Table 3-1: Versions of the GTAP Database 
Version 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Released 
1992 
1995 
1996 
1998 
Base Year 
1990 
1992 
1992 
1995 
Regions 
24 
24 
30 
40 
Commodities 
37 
37 
37 
50 
version 4 of this database Uas data on 40 regions and 50 commodities. Table 3-1 
shows details on tUe versions of tUe database. Most GTAP applications reviewed Uere 
use version 2 or 3 of tUe database. 
3.2.2 Overview of the main relationships in the GTAP model. 
At the heart of tUe GTAP database and model are accounting equations tUat describe 
market clearing conditions, and beUavioural equations tUat define production and 
utility functions. 
Income and Expenditure 
In eacU region, all income accrues to a single regional UouseUold wUicU spends all its 
income on tUree goods: a composite private consumption good, a composite 
government consumption good, and a composite savings good, as sUown in Figure 3-
1. Income includes factor payments minus depreciation of capital, and net tax income, 
which includes tUe tax income (minus subsidy expenditure) for all forms of taxation 
covered in tUe model - production taxes/subsidies, import tariffs/subsidies, export 
taxes/subsidies, and consumption taxes/subsidies. Consumption taxes/subsidies 
include VAT, excise duties, and all otUer commodity taxation. 
The regional disbursement of regional UouseUold income is a Cobb-Douglas nest, so 
that eacU item of expenditure - private, government, and savings, is a constant 
proportion of regional income. 
National income and GDP are equal to regional income wUen tUe region comprises a 
single country. GDP at factor prices is calculated from net factor returns plus net 
indirect taxation payments, wUile GDP at market prices is calculated as private and 
government expenditure plus savings. 
3-10 
Figure 3-1: The Composite regional household 
Net Tax and Tariff Income Net Factor Income 
i 
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The utility level of the regional UouseUold is equivalent to regional welfare, and is 
equal to botU real income (net factor income plus net tax income) and real expenditure 
(the Cobb-Douglas function of private and government expenditure and savings). 
Figure 3-2 shows the structure of private demand in a tUree sector model, tUe sectors 
being Agriculture. Manufactures and Services. Private expenditure is a constant 
differences of elasticities (CDE) function of tUe tUree goods, altUougU in some 
applications tUis is treated as a CES or as a Cobb-Douglas nest. TUe CDE function is 
discussed in chapter 2. and allows some flexibility in tUe number of parameters tUat 
can be specified into tUe model. Typically, targets for own-price and income 
elasticities are used in tUe GTAP model, but altUougU tUe calibrated CDE function 
usually produces elasticities close to tUese targets tUis cannot be guaranteed. 
Figure 3-2: Structure of private demand in a three sector model 
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The lower part of Figure 3-2 shows that consumption of each good is a CES 
composite of domestic goods and imports, this being part of the Armington structure 
of the GTAP model. For each good, the domestic and imported goods Uave a constant 
elasticity of substitution between tUem of SIGD|, wUicU is tUe same for every region 
but varies between goods. 
Government expenditure is structured in tUe same way as private expenditure, except 
that the top level of government demand is modelled using a Cobb-Douglas function 
rather than CDE. 
Production Structures in the GTAP model 
GTAP production structures use multi-level nests and tUe Armington assumption in 
much the same way as private and government demand. Figure 3-3 shows tUe 
production structure, wUere output at producers' prices is equal to output at market 
Figure 3-3: Structure of production in a three sector model 
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Figure 3—4: Demand for imports 
Private demand for 
imports of good i 
Government demand 
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prices minus the net output tax. Output is derived from value-added and intermediate 
inputs, modelled as a Leontief function so tUat for an n% increase in output, value-
added use must increase by n% and tUe use of intermediate inputs must increase by 
n%. TUe value-added nest is modelled as a CES function, witU an elasticity of 
substitution SIGVAj. TUe intermediate nest is modelled using a Leontief function. 
Each input is composed of domestic and imported goods, tUe Armington aggregation 
of which is modelled in the same way as for private and government demand. 
The creation of capital goods is treated as a special production sector in tUe GTAP 
model, witU no factor use. A capital composition matrix determines wUicU goods are 
purcUased wUen a new unit of capital is required. As botU domestic and imported 
goods may be used to form capital, tUe capital composition matrix determines tUe 
parameters in tUe production function for capital, witU tUe same treatment of domestic 
and foreign goods as in any otUer production sector. 
Trade and trade taxes 
Figure 3-4 sUows tUe demand for imports of eacU good in eacU region. Total import 
demand is tUe sum of final import demand from private and government expenditure, 
and intermediate demand from firms, including capital formation. TUe Armington 
structure means tUat not only are domestic goods and imports treated as Ueterogeneous 
goods, but also tUat imports from different regions of origin are treated as imperfect 
substitutes. A CES function is used to determine tUe aggregation of imports from 
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Figure 3-5: Trade flows, trade taxes and margins 
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different regions into a single composite import good, witU an elasticity of substitution 
SIGM, between any pair of import sources. Lack of data means tUat values of SIGM, 
are not available, so SIGM^ is equal to twice SIGDj, altUougU witUin tUe control of tUe 
modeller. 
Figure 3-5 demonstrates tUe price linkage between export prices and iiUport prices. 
On each bilateral trade route for exports of every commodity, exports are exported at 
the domestic market price for tUat commodity in tUe source region. An export tax 
(minus subsidy) is added to tUe market price to get tUe free-on-board (fob) price. 
Transport margins are added to tUe fob price to obtain tUe cost, insurance and freigUt 
Figure 3-6: Sourcing of transport costs 
Transport margins on each bilateral trade route 
for each traded commodity 
* I s * 
Global demand for 
transport services 
Demand for individual goods in 
each region 
Leontief: elasticity of 
substitution = 0 
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(cif) price. Finally, tUe price tUat tUe good is sold at in tUe importing region is 
calculated by adding import tariffs (minus subsidy) to tUe cif price. 
In a closed system, tUe payments to transport margins must be accounted for. Figure 
3-6 shows a representation of the GTAP global transport sector, wUere global 
transport service demand is calculated by summing tUe demand for transport services 
from eacU commodity and bilateral trade route combination. Transport is a single real 
good/service witUin tUe model, witU a price reflecting tUe costs of transport. TUis good 
is composed by a Leontief structure, wUerein tUe production of global transport 
services uses goods from eacU region witU fixed coefficients for eacU region and 
commodity. Most of tUese coefficients are zero, as global transport services uses only 
the "trade and transport services" good, one of tUe goods in tUe GTAP database 
(usually aggregated witU otUer service sectors), but uses tUe output of tUis good in 
each region. 
The market for goods 
There are several different sources of demand for goods tUat are evident from tUe 
preceding sections, and tUese are summarised in Figure 3-7. Demand can first be 
considered as domestic demand and export demand. 
Export demand is tUe demand firstly from consumption of imports in otUer regions. 
Figure 3-7: Demand for goods 
Sales to transport 
services 
Exports on each 
bilateral route 
Private demand for 
domestic goods 
Total demand for exports 
Government 
demand for 
domestic goods 
Intermediate demand 
for domestic goods in 
each industry 
Total domestic demand 
Total Demand for good i 
in region r 
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and secondly from tUe use of transport services in tUe global transport sector. Sales to 
global transport are derived from tUe sourcing of transport costs illustrated in Figure 
3-6. Demands for exports on bilateral routes are derived from Figure 3-5, linking 
exports along eacU bilateral route to tUe corresponding imports in tUe destination 
region. Import quantities are derived from tUe Armington structure, tUe "lower level" 
of which is sUown in Figure 3-4. 
Domestic demand for goods is the sum of private demand derived from the private 
expenditure fianction outlined in Figure 3-2, government demand derived from the 
government expenditure function similar to tUat in Figure 3-2, and intermediate 
demands derived from tUe intermediate inputs of domestic goods in tUe production 
function sUown in Figure 3-3. 
Savings and Investment: Macroeconomic closure in the GTAP model 
The GTAP model uses a "Global Bank" to model the way in wUicU regional savings 
are disbursed to regional investment. TUe two main reasons tUat tUis is done are, 
firstly, tUat bilateral ownersUip of capital data (wUicU country owns Uov^  mucU of tUe 
capital stock in eacU otUer country) is not included in tUe database and, secondly, tUis 
form of modelling allows many different savings closure rules to be adopted by tUe 
user. 
By modelling global investment in tUe way sUown, international capital flows are 
included. Because of tUe national accounting identity 
S-I = X -M 
the way in wUicU savings and investment are modelled Uas implications for trade 
flows. 
The standard GTAP model closure assumes tUat regional savings are a fixed 
proportion of regional income, and tUat a global investment "good" (as sUown in 
Figure 3-8) is a Cobb-Douglas function of investment in eacU region. TUis closure 
means tUat: 
Regional savings, S,., is a fixed proportion a, of (nominal) regional income Y,: 
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S, = a,,Y, 
Global savings S^ is tUe sum of regional savings: 
S*' = 2:,S, = I , a , Y , 
Regional investment I^  is a fixed proportion 5,. of global savings: 
I, = 5,S^ = 6 , S , a ,Y , 
Trade balances are equal to net savings, wUicU is determined by a region's income 
compared witU otUer regions' incomes: 
X,-M, = S,-I, = a , Y , - 6 , I , a , Y , 
The change in the trade balance is governed by income cUanges: 
A (X, - M,) = a, AY, - 6, S, a, AY, 
This has various implications, not least of wUicU being tUat tUe region witU tUe UigUest 
(nominal) cUange in income must necessarily experience an increase in its trade 
balance, witU tUe opposite Uolding for tUe region witU tUe lowest income growtU (or 
largest decline). 
An alternative investment closure rule is tUat investment is not a fixed proportion of 
global savings, but takes wUatever value is necessary to keep trade balances constant. 
Figure 3-8: International Savings and Investment in a three region model 
Savings in the US Savings in the EU Savings in the ROW 
Global savings 
^4-
Investment in the US 
Cobb-Douglas function 
Investment in the EU Investment in the ROW 
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Then 
X, - M, = a, Y, - 1 , 
A(X, - M,) - 0 = a, AY, - Al, 
Al, = a, AY, 
Figure 3-9 uses a flow chart to outline all tUe relationsUips in tUe GTAP model. TUe 
arrows indicate tUe direction of payments, witU corresponding goods and services 
being excUanged in tUe opposite direction. 
At tUe top of Figure 3-9, tUe composite regional UouseUold for region r receives factor 
incomes and tax and tariff incomes. Figure 3-9 does not sUow wUere tax and tariff 
incomes come from. TUe composite regional UouseUold spends its income on private 
expenditure, savings, and government expenditure. TUis part of tUe diagram is tUe 
same as Figure 3-1. 
Private expenditure is allocated to eacU of i composite tradable commodities, eacU of 
which is in turn an aggregate of a domestic and an imported good. This part of Figure 
3-9 is analogous to Figure 3-3, and is repeated for government expenditure. 
Regional savings are collected in a global savings good, wUicU as sUown in Figure 3-
8, is then disbursed among tUe various regions. 
Figure 3-3 outlined tUe structure of production, and tUe relevant part of Figure 3-9 for 
this is around tUe Domestic Production box. Payments to value-added are sUown as 
payments to factor demand for tUe f factors. Payments to intermediate inputs are 
shown separately for imported and domestic intermediates. TUe sources of sales of 
domestic production are sUown to be private domestic demand, government domestic 
demand, exports, domestic intermediates, and transport services. 
Trade is sUown in tUe bottom rigUt quarter of Figure 3-9, wUere imports of good i (for 
three categories of use- private, government and intermediate) in region r are bougUt 
from s regions. An implicit balance of payments constraint means tUat regional 
investment minus regional savings must equal exports minus imports, and tUese 
exports lead to spending on domestic production, and on transport services. 
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Figure 3-9: Value Flows in the GTAP model 
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3.2.3 Selected GTAP Applications 
Hertel, Martin, Yanagishima, and Dimaranan (1995). Liberalising Manufactures 
Trade in a Changing World Economy 
Hertel et al. use a 15-region, 10-commodity projected GTAP model to analyse the 
effects of the Uruguay Round. TUe particular focus of tUe study is tUe elimination of 
the MFA along witU tUe market access reforms for manufactured goods. Of tUe ten 
commodities, five are manufactured goods (including textiles and clotUing as separate 
sectors), witU two service sectors, one primary agriculture sector, one processed food 
sector, and one natural resource based sector. TUe regional classification includes 
three developed regions, eleven developing regions, and one rest-of-the-world region 
that contains both developed and developing regions. The developing country 
coverage of tUe study is focused on East Asia, witU eigUt East and SoutU East Asian 
LDCs modelled as sepeirate countries. 
Five scenarios are performed. A base case scenario projects tUe world economy 
forward from 1992 to 2005 witU growtU in factor endowments, and productivity. In 
this scenario the MFA quota growtU rates are increased using pre-UR growtU rates. 
This base case is tUen contrasted with the four policy experiments: (i) acceleration of 
MFA growtU rates, (ii) Uruguay Round tariff reductions, witUout any MFA growtU 
rate acceleration, (iii) scenarios (i) and (ii) combined, and (iv) elimination of MFA 
quotas witU tUe tariff reductions in place. Table 3-2 reports tUe welfare results from 
scenario (iv), witU tUe percentage contribution by eacU component calculated from 
welfare in tUe otUer scenarios. Equivalent variation is tUe cUange in welfare moving 
from tUe base case to tUe final scenario. Because tUe base case already Uas a 
considerably UigUer GDP tUan tUe 1992 data, tUe dollar value of tUe gains will be 
overstated compared to otUer estimates, and tUus comparisons of percentage welfare 
changes are necessary wUen comparing a projected model witU a model tUat is not 
projected. 
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Table 3-2: Hertel et al. (1995) Welfare Results 
United States and Canada 
European Union 
Japan 
Newly Industrialised Countries^ 
China 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
the Philippines 
Thailand 
Latin America 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Asia 
Rest of the World 
Total 
Welfare Gain from All 
Reforms 
Equivalent Percentage 
Variation of GDP 
($bn) 
32.130 0.40 
56.650 0.72 
43.009 1.04 
39.002 3.82 
19.993 1.46 
7.101 2.94 
34.187 21.38 
10.531 6.63 
10.531 4.54 
-1.258 -0.08 
-1.233 -0.51 
11.101 1.93 
1,147 0.03 
257.758 0.89^ 
Percentage of overall gain attributable to 
individual components 
Tariff 
Cuts 
9 
51' 
97 
116 
73 
51 
102 
97 
85 
-195 
45 
73 
998 
81 
MFA MFA 
Quota Abolition' 
Growth 
18 73 
5 44 
1 2 
0 -16 
-3 29 
14 35 
1 -3 
6 -3 
8 7 
-46 341 
6 48 
10 18 
35 -933 
5 14 
' Excluding those gains from quota growth. 
- Three NIC regions (South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) are modelled separately but welfare results are 
reported as a group. 
' The global results were reported incorrectly in the original paper; correction from Francois et al. (1996). 
Hertel et al. argue that tUeir projected cUanges are conservative estimates, and it is true 
that OtUer model specifications (monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, 
endogenous capital growtU) would probably give greater gains overall. 
The largest welfare gains accrue to the EU, Japan, the Newly Industrialising Countries 
and Malaysia, wUicU is a surprisingly large beneficiary witU gains equivalent to 21% 
of GDP, for wUicU tUe autUors point to large output increases in processed food and 
heavy manufacturing stimulated by tariff cuts, presumably in Japan and tUe NICs. 
Malaysia, the PUilippines, TUailand and the NICs Uave most of tUeir gains from tariff 
cuts, wUereas China and Indonesia make considerable gains from tUe MFA abolition -
Indonesia's gains are some 3% of GDP, of wUicU almost Ualf comes from tUe reform 
and subsequent eliminafion of tUe MFA. 
The tUree developed regions all gain significantly from tUe Round, and as a group tUey 
gain significantly in eacU component. Japan makes most of its gains from tariff 
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reform, as it is not directly affected by tUe MFA. TUe developed regions account for 
51% of total worid EV from tUe full Uruguay Round, 35% of world EV from tariff 
cuts only, and 116% of world EV from tUe combined reform and elimination of tUe 
MFA. MeanwUile developing regions as a wUole lose from tUe MFA abolifion 
(althougU tUey gain from tUe quota growtU rate acceleration), witU tUe largest losses in 
the Newly Industrialising Countries, Latin America, and the .Rest of the World. 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa both lose from the Uruguay Round 
projections, altUougU tUe loss in Latin America is a very small percentage of GDP. 
Both of tUese regions undertake very little tariff liberalisation in tUe Uruguay Round, 
and neitUer are directly affected by tUe MFA. TUe position of Sub-Saliaran African 
LDCs in tUe MFA is tUat tUey are exempt from tUe voluntary export levies and can 
export witUout restraint to developed countries, so the loss incurred when the MFA is 
removed is that tUey lose tUe privileges tUat tUe MFA Uad previously given tUem. 
The MFA pUase-out can be seen to be Ueavily back-loaded (most of tUe liberalisation 
occurs at tUe end of tUe pUase-out period) as only one quarter of tUe total gains from 
MFA liberalisafion come from tUe quota growtU between 1992 and 2005; most of tUe 
gains from MFA liberalisation come from tUe elimination of quotas in 2005. 
Hertel, BacU, Dimaranan and Martin (1996) uses an identical model to Hertel et al. 
(1995), performing tUe Uruguay Round reforms (and two separate simulations witU 
UR tariffs and MFA reform) in a static model and a projected model to compare tUe 
results. TUey find tUat tUe projections make little difference to tUe results of tariff 
reform, but increase tUe welfare gains from MFA abolition. TUis is because tUe MFA 
quotas (at pre-UR quota growtU rates) become more restrictive in tUe 2005 base case 
than they are in 1992, so tUe effect of removing tUem is greater. 
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Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1995) Quantifying The Uruguay Round 
Harrison. Rutherford and Tarr use a large GTAP-based model to quantify the effects 
of the Uruguay Round. The specific aims tUat tUe autUors set out are to: 
quantify tUe global welfare benefits of tUe UR 
discover tUe quantitatively most important aspects of tUe Round 
assess tUe impacts of tUe Round on developing countries 
discover if any countries or regions lose from tUe Round 
assess tUe robustness of tUe estimates. 
The quantitative effects of the Uruguay Round are assessed via a 24 region, 22 
commodity GTAP model (using tUe version 2 database), modified to include 
imperfect competition. TUe Uruguay Round policy cUanges tUat are modelled are: (i) 
tariff reductions in manufactured products, (ii) tariffication of non-tariff barriers in 
agriculture and reductions in tUe level of agricultural tariff protection, (iii) reduction 
of agricultural export and producfion subsidies, and (iv) tUe elimination of tUe 
Multifibre Arrangement. 
While other papers use models to gain an overall effect of tUe Round in tUe same way, 
Harrison et al. Uas two key advantages over most models: firstly, the model is more 
disaggregated tUan any otUer GTAP-based model, and secondly tUe paper includes 
detailed sensitivity analysis. The large model aggregation increases tUe detail of tUe 
model, and captures tUe effects of more tariff variation tUan in smaller models. TUey 
include systematic sensitivity analysis witU respect to parameter values and alternative 
model specificafions, including tUose used in otUer papers. 
The model used also Uas disadvantages: tUe treatment of agricultural distortions as 
price wedges, and tUe few agricultural goods included, raises doubts over tUe 
applicability of tUe model to tUe agricultural reform component of tUe Round, and 
CES ratUer tUan CDE functions are used for private preferences. 
Table 3-3 sUows tUe commodity classification used by Harrison et al.. TUe regional 
classification is tUe same as tUe full GTAP database witU tUe exception tUat tUe GTAP 
ROW (rest of tUe world) region is renamed EFTA. AltUough the largest countries by 
GDP in tUis region are European Free Trade Area (1992 pre-EU enlargement), tUe 
region also contains SoutU Africa, Turkey and numerous small nations. Most 
commodities in Table 3-3 are also full GTAP database commodities, but wUere a 
commodity is an aggregate of different full database commodities, tUose commodities 
are listed in tUe tUird column. 
Policy Instruments 
Table 3-3: Commodity classification in the Harrison et al. model 
Code Description notes/GTAP commodities 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
FOR 
PCR 
MIL 
TEX 
WAP 
CRP 
LS 
NFM 
FMP 
TRN 
T T 
MEA 
ENR 
MIN 
POO 
MAC 
SER 
Paddy rice 
Wheat 
Other grains 
Non grain crops 
Forestry, fishing, lumber, wood, 
paper and wool 
Processed rice 
Milk products 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Chemicals, rubber & plastics 
Primary iron and steel 
Non ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Transport industry 
Trade and transport 
Meat products and livestock 
Energy and energy products 
Minerals and mineral products 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Machinery, equipment & other 
manufacturing 
Services and utilities 
FRS,FSH,LUM,PPP.^ 
(transport equipment) 
(transport services) 
METOLP 
COL,OIL,GAS,P_C 
OMN.NMM 
OFP,B_T 
OME,OMF 
EGW,CNS,OSP,OSG 
CGD Investment good 
other than transport) 
(not usually counted as a commodity, 
CGD is a composition matrix for 
investment) 
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Table 3-4: Harrison et al. Tariff Reductions for Agricultural and Food Products 
in developed countries 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
PCR 
MIL 
MEA 
FOO 
AUS 
91% 
100% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
63% 
91% 
0% 
NZL 
91% 
100% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
63% 
87% 
0% 
CAN 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
USA 
0% 
69% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
69% 
0% 
JPN 
1 1% 
37% 
46% 
8% 
0% 
0% 
37% 
0% 
E_U 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
9% 
0% 
The model is rebased^ using tariffs from the GATT Integrated Database (IDB), details 
or wUicU are included in cUapter 6. Tariff cuts are implemented according to tUe tariff 
schedules included in tUe IDB. Agricultural tariffs are based on unpublisUed World 
Bank estimates by Ingco and. as can be seen in Table 3 ^ , contain many entries tUat 
have no tariff reducfion (particularly in Canada and tUe EU) because tUe new tariff 
binding is above tUe previous applied tariff rate. 
Agricultural output subsidies are treated as ad valorem price wedges, witU reductions 
of 20%, witU a 16.8% reduction for tUe EU and a 13% reduction for LDCs. Export 
subsidies are also treated as ad valorem price wedges, witU 36% (24% for LDCs) cuts 
in the subsidy rates. 
The elimination of tUe Multi-Fibre Arrangement is modelled by removing tUe export 
tax equivalents of tUe VERs. WUere tUe MFA is not dismantled, sucU as in tUe 
'agricultural reforms only' simulation. tUe VERs exist as ad valorem export taxes. 
Base Model Results 
Table 3-5 sUows tUe base model welfare results, using a static constant returns to 
scale perfect compefition model. TUe world as a wUole gains $93 billion annually, 
with the dollar gains being concentrated in the USA, EU and Japan. Several East 
New data (tariffs) is entered for the base year, so some procedure is needed to ensure that the data balances. 
Harrison et al. do this by simulation. 
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Table 3-5: Harrison etal. base model results (USSbn) 
AGR Agricultural Reform 
MFA MFA Reform 
MFRS Market access reforms in manufacturing sectors 
FULL Complete UR 
FULL % Complete UR as a percentage of base GDP 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
TWN 
ARC 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
SAS 
EFTA 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Canada 
United States 
Japan 
South Korea 
European Union 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
The Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
China 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Other Latin America 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Middle East and North Africa 
Economies in Transition 
South Asia 
European Free Trade Area 
Developed total 
LDC total 
includir 
NICs 
LLDCs 
'g: 
Newly industrialised 
Least developed 
World total 
AGR 
0.717 
0.298 
0.238 
1.659 
15.232 
4.604 
28.539 
0.170 
1.225 
0.618 
0.623 
0.747 
-0.561 
0.598 
O.Oli 
0.376 
0.272 
-0.015 
1.437 
-0.292 
-0.448 
-0.246 
0.097 
2.412 
49.095 
9.216 
5.836 
-0.586 
58.311 
MFA 
0.024 
0.002 
0.939 
10.136 
-0.531 
-0.469 
7.624 
0.617 
0.082 
-0.002 
-0.149 
0.065 
0.876 
-1.698 
-0.450 
0.028 
-0.027 
-0.081 
-0.498 
-0.112 
-0.499 
-0.627 
0.629 
0.071 
18.265 
-2.315 
-2.766 
2.010 
15.950 
MFRS 
0.391 
0.083 
-0.045 
0.772 
1.978 
0.518 
2.311 
0.559 
0.696 
0.363 
0.450 
1.732 
0.915 
-0.188 
0.825 
0.236 
1.076 
0.262 
0.283 
-0.005 
0.624 
0.526 
2.730 
1.663 
7.153 
11.602 
1.605 
4.199 
18.755 
FULL 
1.135 
0.381 
1.160 
12.842 
16.692 
4.574 
38.845 
1.301 
1.864 
0.890 
0.918 
2.435 
1.174 
-1.267 
0.404 
0.645 
1.310 
0.145 
1.198 
-0.418 
-0.388 
-0.421 
3.286 
4.154 
75.209 
17.650 
4.629 
5.343 
92.859 
FULL % 
0.383 
0.964 
0.204 
0.216 
0.469 
1.532 
0.578 
1.059 
3.254 
1.631 
2.135 
2.108 
0.265 
-1.358 
0.203 
0.278 
0.343 
0.042 
0.439 
-0.241 
-0.065 
-0.050 
0.991 
0.345 
0.410 
0.383 
0.730 
0.499 
0.405 
Note: NICs is the aggregate KOR+SGP+HKG+TWN. 
LLDCs is the aggregate IDN+CHM+SSA+SAS 
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Asian middle income LDCs make substantial gains as a proportion of income - most 
notably Malaysia (MYS), Singapore (SGP) and TUailand (THA). 
Agricultural Reforms 
Harrison et al. decompose tUe agricultural reforms into tUree elements: export subsidy 
reducfions. output subsidy reductions, and import tariff reductions. A selection of tUe 
results is shown in Table 3-6. 
Reform of export subsidies (column AGRl) brings large benefits to tUe EU, witU 
smaller gains to otUer agricultural exporters. Agricultural importers suffer welfare 
losses, as tUey pay UigUer prices for imports. Reform of production subsidies (column 
AGR2) brings welfare gains to most countries, as most countries maintain at least 
some form of agricultural subsidies, but tUe resulting increase in food prices does lead 
to welfare losses for some food importers. Import tariff reforms (column AGR3) lead 
to a large welfare gain for Japan, but a welfare loss for tUe EU. TUis is a curious result 
of this study, and occurs because the EU undertakes very little tariff liberalisation 
hself (Table 3-4) wUile otUer countries do. EU exports are tUerefore stimulated by 
Table 3-6: Harrison et al. selected agricultural results (USSbn) 
AGR Agricultural Reform 
AGRl Reduced agricultural export subsidies 
AGR2 Reduced agricultural production subsidies 
AGR3 Reduced agricultural import tariffs 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
E_U 
SSA 
AGR 
0.717 
0.298 
0.238 
1.659 
15.232 
28.539 
-0.292 
AGRl 
0.142 
0.141 
0.038 
-0.015 
-2.223 
11.529 
-0.397 
AGR2 
0.129 
0.076 
0.293 
1.549 
-0.456 
17.844 
-0.121 
AGR3 
0.385 
0.082 
-0.118 
-0.085 
17.714 
-1.186 
0.254 
Developed 49.095 9.043 21.490 17.269 
LDCs 9.216 -2.302 2.432 8.823 
including: 
NICs 5.836 -0.144 -0.02 5.785 
LLDCs -0.586 -0.595 -0.052 0.094 
World 58.311 6.741 23.922 26.092 
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foreign tariff cuts, and because export subsidies are modelled as ad valorem subsidies, 
the EU subsidises all extra exports at high levels. TUe EU tUen makes a welfare loss 
because of large expenditure increases. 
The investigation of tUe role tUat model structure takes in determining tUe model 
results leads to a number of scenarios. Table 3-7 sUows, in tUe CRTS/PC column, tUe 
main results of Table 3-5. A model variant witU increasing returns to scale and 
monopolisfic competifion (IRTS/MC) sUows that tUis specification leads to sligUtiy 
higher welfare results. Two versions compare tUe GTAP model structure witU tUe 
RUNS model. TUe "RUNS-like Static" simulafion is comparable witU tUe CRTS/PC 
column, witU tUe exception tUat the RUNS-like model uses Uomogeneous goods 
instead of Armington aggregation for agricultural products, tUe use of CET functions 
to differentiate domestic output from exports, and various elasticity cUanges. TUe 
RUNS-like Static model does not lead to large differences in overall welfare levels, 
but does alter tUe distribution of welfare gains. TUe Uomogeneity of agricultural 
products increases tUe gains from agricultural reforms, so it is tUe large beneficiaries 
of those reforms (Japan and the EU) tUat Uave increased gains in tUe RUNS-like 
variant. RUNS elasticities for manufactured goods are lower tUan tUe standard GTAP 
elasticities, so tUe conversion to RUNS elasticities lowers tUe gains from market 
Table 3-7: Harrison et al. selected results (% GDP) for alternative model 
specifications 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
E_U 
SSA 
Developed 
LDCs 
World 
CRTS/PC 
0.383 
0.964 
0.204 
0.216 
0.469 
0.578 
-0.241 
0.410 
0.384 
0.405 
IRTS/MC 
0.407 
1.011 
0.228 
0.224 
0.474 
0.585 
-0.194 
0.419 
0.421 
0.418 
RUNS-like 
Static 
-
-
-
0.126 
0.701 
0.621 
0.019 
0.431 
0.313 
0.407 
RUNS-like 
Steady 
State 
-
-
-
0.394 
0.902 
0.776 
0.248 
0.656 
0.873 
0.699 
Long-Run 
Model 
IRTS/MC 
1.101 
3.621 
0.459 
0.449 
0.638 
0.743 
-0.399 
0.631 
1.199 
0.745 
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access reforms in the manufacturing sectors. 
The final two columns of Table 3-7 show results using steady-state dynamic 
specifications, where capital stocks are allowed to cUange as investment cUanges, tUus 
allowing for tUe fact tUat trade liberalisation increases incomes and tUerefore savings, 
and that the resulting increase in investment will eventually lead to a UigUer capital 
stock. TUe final column applies tUis modelling cUange to tUe IRTS/MC model, witU 
double tUe normal GTAP Armington elasticity values to reflect long-term cUanges. 
The ''RUNS-like Steady State" scenario compares tUis to a RUNS model specificafion 
with steady state. It is clear tUat in botU cases tUe addition of steady-state capital 
specifications leads to substantially UigUer welfare gains from Uruguay Round 
reforms. Because Sub-SaUaran Africa (SSA) makes a welfare loss from tUe full 
reforms in tUe static models, tUe addition of tUe steady-state capital specification leads 
to reducfions in tUe capital stock because savings fall, and lead to a UigUer welfare 
loss. 
Harrison et al. note tUat tUe IRTS/MC steady state model is tUeir "preferred" model 
because it includes imperfect competition, wUicU althougU it makes little difference to 
the model results is undoubtedly a feature of tUe world economy, and because it 
includes long-run effects botU tlirougU capital accumulation and tUrougU UigUer long-
run Armington elasticities. 
Francois, McDonald and Nordsrom (1994). The Uruguay Round: a Global 
General Equilibrium Assessment 
Francois et al. use a static'' GTAP-based model to estimate the effects of tUe final 
Uruguay Round agreement, and was one of tUe first studies to assess tUe effects of tUe 
full agreement. Table 3-8 sUows tUe regional and commodity classifications used in 
the model, and it can be seen tUat tUe model aggregation is mainly developed country 
and manufactures focused. 
^ The model is a static model, but the authors also "update" the welfare changes to 2005 simply by multiplying 
the .static results by GDP growth projections from other sources. While this allows some comparisons with 
piDJected models, it has been criticised by Harrison ci al. (1995, endnote 37) as "arithmetic balistics". 
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Table 3-8: Regional and commodity classifications 
Regional classiflcation 
Canada 
United States 
EFTA 
European Union 
Australia and New Zealand 
China 
Taiwan 
Developing and transition economies 
Commodity classincation 
Grains 
Other agricultural products 
Fishery products 
Forestry products 
Mining 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Primary steel 
Primary non-ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Chemicals and rubber 
Transport equipment 
Other manufactures 
Trade and transport services 
Other services 
Francois et al. perform six simulations, all modelling tUe full Uruguay Round 
agreement, but using different model specifications. TUe model structures used in tUe 
simulations differ in two dimensions: tUe market structure, and tUe incorporation of 
dynamics. A constant returns to scale, perfect competition (CRTS/PC) simulation uses 
a model very similar to tUe standard GTAP model, and an increasing returns to scale, 
monopolistic competifion (IRTS/MC) model modifies tUis by incorporating 
Chamberlinian large-group monopolistic competition. A tUird form of market 
structure, increasing returns to scale and perfect competition (IRTS/PC) is used 
primarily as a means of decomposing tUe differences between tUe CRTS/PC and 
IRTS/MC structures. 
Three simulations use tUese tUree market structures in a standard static setting, and 
three simulations use tUe tUree market structures in a dynamic framework, wUere 
capital stocks adjust as a result of cUanges in savings and investment so that a long-
run steady-state is reacUed. Table 3-9 sUows tUe results as percentages of GDP. TUe 
original paper reports dollar-value equivalent variations for eacU simulation, and 
percentage cUanges for only tUe dynamic specifications - tUe static specification 
percentages Uave been calculated from tUese. Francois et al. also "update" tUe dollar-
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Table 3-9: Francois et al. results (EV as % of GDP) 
Canada 
United States 
EFTA 
European Union 
Australia and New Zealand 
Japan 
China 
Taiwan 
Developing and transition 
World 
Static specifications 
CRTS 
PC 
0.24 
0.34 
0.71 
0.50 
0.27 
0.25 
0.45 
0.74 
-0.02 
0.31 
IRTS IRTS 
MC MC 
0.33 0.85 
0.39 0.83 
0.94 1.63 
0.62 1.09 
0.35 0.56 
0.32 0.36 
0.97 1.12 
1.41 1.34 
0.05 0.82 
0.41 0.87 
Dynamic specifications 
CRTS 
PC 
0.40 
0.54 
1.24 
0.83 
0.44 
0.45 
0.75 
1.49 
-0.01 
0.52 
IRTS IRTS 
MC MC 
0.54 1.32 
0.65 1.35 
1.26 2.37 
0.92 1.73 
0.65 1.07 
0.41 0.57 
1.56 2.03 
2.48 2.99 
0.03 1.29 
0.62 1.36 
value EV results (in a separate table) to 2005 values, wUicU are of course mucU UigUer 
than their otUer (1990) values. 
Results for static specificafions and CRTS/PC are of tUe same order of magnitude as 
the results from otUer CGE studies. Welfare results are UigUer (over twice as UigU) 
with IRTS/MC. Dynamic specifications increase tUe order of magnitude of results by 
around 50% witU CRTS/PC, but it is tUe combination of dynamic and IRTS/MC 
specificafions tUat produces mucU UigUer welfare resuUs. 
Most regions make modest gains witU every model specificafion, but tlie results for 
developing countries deserve special attention. TUe developing and transifion 
economies group make a small welfare loss witU CRTS/PC in botU static and dynamic 
specifications, but large gains witU IRTS/MC market structures. Table 3-10 sUows 
welfare decompositions for tUe tUree main elements of reform (no services 
liberalisafion is modelled), for dynamic CRTS/PC and IRTS/MC specifications. 
Developing countries (including CUina and Taiwan) lose from MFA liberalisafion 
with CRTS/PC, but make large gains witU tUe IRTS/MC specificafions. TUis is a 
result of tUe trade-off tUat occurs witU MFA reform for (textile/clotUing exporting) 
developing countries, as tUey can export larger quantifies but at lower prices. In tUe 
CRTS/PC specificafion tUe price fall dominates, but witU IRTS/MC tUe increase in 
imports to developed countries leads to an increase in tUe varieties available. wUicU 
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further stimulates demand for tUese products. TUis increases LDC exports to tUe extent 
that they are able to (more than) offset tUe direct effects of losing the quota rents from 
the MFA. 
Table 3-10: Decomposition of results (for dynamic specifications) 
Canada 
United States 
EFTA 
European Union 
Australia and New Zealand 
Japan 
China 
Taiwan 
Developing and transition 
World 
Tariffs 
-0.05 
0.08 
0.39 
0.18 
0.08 
0.21 
1.04 
1.71 
0.00 
0.14 
CRTS, PC 
MFA 
0.29 
0.42 
0.30 
0.46 
0.05 
-0.01 
-0.38 
-0.37 
-0.14 
0.22 
Dynamic 
Agric-
ulture 
0.17 
0.04 
0.55 
0.20 
0.31 
0.24 
0.09 
0.16 
0.12 
0.16 
Total 
0.40 
0.54 
1.24 
0.83 
0.44 
0.45 
0.75 
1.49 
-0.01 
0.52 
Tariffs 
0.08 
0.15 
0.70 
0.36 
0.57 
0.38 
1.26 
2.26 
0.37 
0.34 
IRTS, MC 
MFA 
1.09 
1.13 
1.25 
1,22 
0.11 
0.05 
0.58 
0.61 
0.76 
0.88 
Dynamic 
Agric-
ulture 
0.16 
0.07 
0.42 
0.16 
0.38 
0.14 
0.19 
0.12 
0.16 
0.14 
Total 
1.32 
1.35 
2.37 
1.73 
1.07 
0.57 
2.03 
2.99 
1.29 
1.36 
Francois, McDonald and Nordsrom (1995a). Assessing the Uruguay Round 
Francois et al. (1995a) and in two other papers (1995c and 1995d) employ a common 
base model, using GTAP version 2, with tUe aggregation of tUe GTAP database 
presented in Table 3-11. TUis aggregation is UigUly manufactures-intensive, but 
contains many LDC regions pertinent to tUe Uruguay Round. TUe main cUaracteristics 
of tUe MFA. for example, are tUat East Asian NICs (tUe East Asia region) are tUe 
establisUed exporters, wUile in CUina and SoutU Asia tUere is great potential for 
increased exports of MFA-controlled goods. Francois et al. calculate Uruguay Round 
tariff reductions based on countries" GATT submissions, but Uave no data on 
agricultural tariff reducfions. 
In contrast to Francois et al. (1994) wliere tUe assumption was made tUat minimum 
market access provisions would force 36% (24%) for LDCs) reducfions in eacU 
agricultural tariff line, Francois et al. (1995) assume tUat no agricultural tariff 
reductions will take place unless tUey are necessary to increase imports to tUe 
minimum level. Export subsidies are modelled as 36% (24% for LDCs) reducfions in 
ad valorem rates in botU studies, but wUile domestic protection subsidy rates are 
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Table 3-11: Model Aggregation 
ANZ 
JPN 
CAN 
US 
EU 
EFTA 
SSA 
CHN 
EA 
SA 
LA 
EIT 
ROW 
Regional classification 
Australia and New 
Zealand 
Japan 
Canada 
USA 
EU 
EFTA 
Africa 
China 
East Asia 
South Asia 
Latin America 
Transition Economies 
Rest of the World 
FRS 
FSH 
Commodity classification 
Grains 
Other crops 
Livestock 
Forestry 
Fishing 
Mining 
Processed food 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Lumber and wood products, pulp paper & printing 
Petroleum and petroleum products 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 
Iron and steel basic industries 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 
Fabricated metal products 
Transport equipment 
Other machinery and equipment 
Other manufactures 
Services 
reduced by standard percentages in the former paper, Uere no domestic subsidy 
liberalisation takes place because tUe 1992 AMS levels are mucU lower tUan tUe 
maximum levels set out by tUe Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement. 
Table 3-12 sUows tUe results of tUis model under constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition in a static framework. TUe world as a wUole, and most individual regions, 
make modest gains from tUe total Uruguay Round agreement, but tUe transition 
economies Uave a small welfare loss. TUe MFA removal leads to large gains for SoutU 
Asia, CUina and tUe Rest of tUe World regions, and losses for East Asia (tUe main 
establisUed exporter tUreatened by tUe removal), Africa (wUicU already has MFA-
exempt status), Latin America and the transition economies. 
The main global welfare gains accrue from MFA and industrial tariff reforms, witU 
small gains overall (and some regional losses) from agricultural reforms. TUis reflects 
the model's poor coverage of agriculture and empUasis on industrial sectors, as well as 
the MFA-friendly regional aggregation wUicU mixes LDC agricultural exporters and 
Table 3-12: Francois et al. (1995a) welfare decomposition (% GDP), CRTS/PC, 
static 
Australia and New Zealand 
Japan 
Canada 
USA 
EU 
EFTA 
Africa 
China 
East Asia 
South Asia 
Latin America 
Transition Economies 
Rest of the World 
World 
MFA 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.06 
0.12 
0.09 
0.07 
-0.01 
0.74 
-0.01 
0.44 
-0.01 
-0.05 
0.36 
0.08 
Industrial 
Tariffs 
-0.12 
0.07 
-0.07 
0.04 
0.05 
0.03 
0.24 
0.05 
0.37 
-0.01 
-0.00 
0.10 
0.51 
0.07 
Non-
Agriculture 
Primary 
Tariffs 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.07 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.10 
0.00 
Agriculture 
0.18 
-0.01 
0.13 
0.00 
0.07 
-0.07 
-0.05 
0.03 
0.00 
-0.07 
0.02 
-0.09 
0.20 
0.02 
Total 
0.09 
0.04 
0.13 
0.17 
0.22 
0.03 
0.24 
0.84 
0.35 
0.37 
0.01 
-0.04 
0.98 
0.17 
importers, protectionists and free-traders because tUey fall into tUe same category for 
textiles. 
Table 3-13 sUows tUe results for scenarios tUat incorporate different assumptions 
about market structure and dynamics. TUe first column corresponds to tUe Total 
column of Table 3-12, and sUows tUe welfare gain to eacU region from a constant 
returns to scale, perfect competition model witU no endogenous capital or savings 
behaviour; tUis is tUe standard GTAP model. 
The first three columns present results for constant returns to scale, perfect 
competition models, tUat differ in tUeir treatment of dynamics. TUe last tUree columns 
present results witU increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition, witU tUe 
same tUree versions of dynamic beUaviour. WUile not truly dynamic, tUese 
specifications attempt to include steady-state conditions into a static model. Columns 
2 and 5 present tUe results for scenarios wUere capital adjusts as investment adjusts, 
with a fixed savings rate (idenfical to tUe treatment in Harrison et al. 1995 and 
Francois et al. 1994). Columns 3 and 6 add to this by allowing savings to adjust to 
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Table 3-13: Percentage welfare gains from the Uruguay Round under alternative 
assumptions 
Market Structure 
Endogenous 
Endogenous 
Australia ani 
Zealand 
Japan 
Canada 
USA 
EU 
EFTA 
Africa 
China 
East Asia 
South Asia 
Capital 
Savings 
d New 
Latin America 
Transition Economies 
Rest of the World 
Worid 
CRTS/PC 
NO 
NO 
0.09 
0.04 
0.13 
0.17 
0.22 
0.03 
0.24 
0.84 
0.35 
0.37 
0.01 
-0.04 
0.98 
0.17 
CRTS/PC 
YES 
NO 
0.15 
0.07 
0.23 
0.26 
0.34 
0.06 
0.48 
1.44 
0.66 
0.56 
0.02 
-0.05 
1.54 
0.29 
CRTS/PC 
YES 
YES 
0.53 
0.14 
0.57 
0.38 
0.31 
0.32 
0.78 
1.73 
1.13 
0.88 
0,92 
0.24 
2.34 
0.45 
IRTS/MC 
NO 
NO 
0.03 
0.16 
0.12 
0.28 
0.26 
0.04 
0.81 
2.79 
2.00 
2.77 
0.33 
0.21 
2.28 
0.44 
IRTS/MC 
YES 
NO 
0.06 
0.28 
0.23 
0.45 
0.42 
0.07 
1.55 
5.66 
4.28 
4.53 
0.74 
0.33 
7.89 
0.85 
IRTS/MC 
YES 
YES 
0.43 
0.40 
0.67 
0.62 
0.48 
0.18 
1.41 
3.97 
3.15 
3.07 
1.68 
0.42 
12.34 
0.94 
maintain the original real capital rental price. TUis assumes tUat tUe data represent an 
equilibrium situation, and tUat tUe demand for savings is perfectly elastic. 
Overall, welfare cUanges are considerably lower tUan Francois et al. (1994) predicted, 
in part because tUat paper took a mucU more optimistic view on tUe amount of 
agricultural liberalisation tUat was produced by tUe Uruguay Round. In common witU 
that paper, as Table 3-13 sUows, tUe monopolistic competition and endogenous 
capital assumptions botU increase welfare gains compared to tUe static perfect 
competifion model, and tUe increase is mucU greater witU botU IRTS/PC and 
endogenous capital. TUe introduction of endogenous savings also increases tUe EV 
estimates, but to a lesser extent tUan tUe former assumptions. TUe welfare effects on 
the transifion economies is similar to Francois et al. (1994), in tUat a welfare loss 
accrues from tUe Uruguay Round witU CRTS/PC and stafic capital assumptions, but 
with tUe imperfect competition and steady-state assumptions, tUe region gains. 
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3.3 OTHER CGE MODELS 
This section outlines the modelling approacUes and results of tUree separate modelling 
groups: RUNS, MicUigan, and Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle. AltUougU many otUer 
CGE models exist, tUese are cUosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, tUey model tUe 
final Uruguay Round agreement, wUile otUer CGE models of tUe Uruguay Round use 
various tariff- and subsidy- cutting formulae tUat were being negotiated at some stage 
of tUe Round but do not represent tUe final agreement. Secondly, tUey are ongoing 
modelling efforts from before tUe Round, and Uave benefited from experience in a 
number of ways (tUe MicUigan model, for example, was first used in tUe early 1980s 
for analysis of tUe Tokyo Round). Finally, tUey represent modelling efforts tUat, like 
the GTAP papers reviewed in section 3.2.3, use tUe "current tecUnology" of CGE 
modelling - projections, dynamics, imperfect competition, and the ability to run large 
models. Nguyen et al. is an exception to tUis last point, but an additional reason for 
the inclusion of this model is the ligUt it casts on tUe stages of tUe Uruguay Round 
negotiation process. 
3.3.1 The Rural-Urban North-South (RUNS) Model 
The RUNS model differs from GTAP in several important aspects: 
• TUe database is compiled to be used primarily for tUe analysis of issues affecting 
agriculture in LDCs. TUe regional and commodity classificafion is sUown in 
Table 3-14. TUe inclusion of coffee, cocoa and tea as separate products greatiy 
enUances tUe model's applicability to low income LDCs, and the regional 
classification includes greater disaggregation of Africa tUan does GTAP, but 
Asian LDCs are mucU more aggregated. 
• Agricultural goods are treated as Uomogeneous between regions, but tUe 
Armington assumption is employed for non-agricultural goods. 
• AltUougU tUere are 20 commodities, RUNS distinguisUes just seven production 
sectors. EacU non-agricultural good is produced by a distinct production sector, 
but agricultural production takes place in two sectors (Crops and Livestock) tiiat 
eacU produce several goods (11 and 4 respectively). Fixed coefficients dictate tUe 
inputs tUat must be used in eacU output good, but factors are used by tUe sectors 
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Table 3-14: Regions and commodities in the RUNS database 
Regional classification Commodity classification 
Low Income Asia 
China 
India 
Upper Income Asia 
Indonesia 
Other Africa 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Maghreb 
Mediterranean 
Gulf Region 
Other Latin America 
Brazil 
Mexico 
United States 
Canada 
Australia and New Zealand 
Japan 
EEC 
EFTA 
Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Agricultural: Crops 
Wheat 
Paddy rice 
Coarse grains 
Sugar (refined) 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Tea 
Vegetable oils 
Other food 
Cotton 
Other non-food 
Agricultural: Livestock 
Beef, veal and sheep 
Other meats 
Dairy and dairy products 
Wool 
Non-Agriculture 
Other manufacturing 
Energy 
Services 
Equipment goods 
Fertilisers 
as a whole in CES nesting structures as sUown in Figure 3-10. Non-agricultural 
production uses labour and capital in a single CES nest (i.e. capital/labour ratios 
are always tUe same in eacU non-agricultural sector). 
• The RUNS model includes two UouseUolds in eacU region. Rural and Urban, witU 
LES preferences enabling income elasticities to be calibrated. 
• Policy instruments included are: income taxes, agricultural input subsidies, 
agricultural production taxes and subsidies, import tariffs and subsidies, export 
taxes and subsidies, agricultural stocks, and income transfers. 
• RUNS uses a series of static models to capture tUe effects of factor accumulation. 
The base year for the data is 1985, and tUe model is solved for tUe years 1986, 
1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999. 2002. Factor growtU occurs, and capital 
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»ure 3-10: RUNS Factor CES Nesting Structures 
Factor Nesting in the Crop 
Sector 
Factor Nesting in the 
Livestock Sector 
Labour + 
Land + 
raught Cattle 
Fertilisers Land + 
Tractors 
Wheat 
(feed) 
Coarse 
Grains 
(feed) 
Oils 
(feed) 
Labour Draught 
Cattle 
Land Tractors 
accumulation relies on savings in tUe previous period. TUe periods 1986-1993 are 
used to validate tUe model to observable data, and policy cUanges are made in tUe 
last tUree time periods. 
Goldin, and van der Mensbrugghe (1995). The Uruguay Round: An Assessment of 
Economywide and Agricultural Reforms 
Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe use the RUNS model and cUaracterise tUe Uruguay 
Round as reductions in tariffs of agricultural and non-agricultural goods, wUicU are 
calculated from country submissions to GATT/WTO and input subsidy reductions. 
Export subsidy reductions, domestic support reductions, and tUe elimination of tUe 
MFA are not modelled. Simulation results are referenced against a base case 
projection wUere some small tariff and subsidy cUanges occur in tUe absence of 
Uruguay Round liberalisation. Table 3-15 reports tUe percentage welfare resuUs for 
three experiments: one witU tariff reforms, one witU tariff and input subsidy reforms 
(the "full" Uruguay Round) and one witU tUe Draft Final Act (DFA) tariff reforms. 
Tariff reform is welfare-improving for most regions and for tUe world as a wUole, but 
some regions suffer losses. CUina makes no liberalisation as it is not a WTO member. 
The OtUer losers are predominantly food-importing LDCs. TUe inclusion of input 
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Table 3-15: Percentage change in real income, RUNS model 
Tariffs Tariffs + Input 
Subsidies 
DFA 
Low Income Asia 
China 
India 
Upper Income Asia 
Indonesia 
Other Africa 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Maghreb 
Mediterranean 
Gulf Region 
Other Latin America 
Brazil 
Mexico 
United States 
Canada 
Australia and New Zealand 
Japan 
EEC 
EFTA 
Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
billions of 1992 US$ 
Africa 
Low Income 
Latin America 
Other Developing 
OECD 
Other 
World Total 
0.1 
-0.1 
0.5 
1.3 
0.1 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.4 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.3 
0.4 
-0.4 
0.0 
-0.2 
0.0 
0.4 
0.3 
1.0 
O.I 
0.1 
-1.8 
1.3 
0.3 
14.9 
32.4 
0.8 
48.0 
0.0 
-0.2 
0.7 
1-3 
0.1 
-0.3 
-O.I 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.2 
0.0 
0.3 
-0.5 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
1.2 
0.0 
0.1 
-2.5 
0.9 
0.6 
13.2 
54.7 
1.5 
68.4 
0.4 
-0.2 
0.8 
2.0 
0.3 
-0.5 
0.1 
-0.4 
-0.9 
-0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
-0.6 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.9 
0.9 
r.6 
-0.2 
0.7 
-3.1 
3.4 
3.1 
24.2 
103.6 
5.5 
136.6 
subsidies increases global welfare gain, entirely througU gains in tUe OECD 
economies. Africa suffers furtUer losses under tUis scenario. 
The DFA would Uave lead to considerably UigUer welfare gains overall, altUougU 
greater losses for Africa would occur. Low and Upper Income Asia, and OtUer Latin 
America are tUe LDCs that would Uave gained tUe most from tUe DFA compared witU 
the Uruguay Round final agreement, but these additional gains are small compared to 
the additional gains made by OECD countries. 
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3.3.2 The Michigan Model 
The Michigan model, first used for analysis of the US-Canada free trade area (Brown 
and Stern 1989), has a database of 34 regions and 29 sectors. TUe coverage of tUe 
database and tUe structure of the model are both focused on industrial and service 
sectors. TUe single agricultural sector is characterised as being perfectly competifive, 
with products differentiated according to tUeir region of origin. All other sectors are 
modelled as imperfectly competitive, with firm-level monopolistic compefition and 
free entry and exit. 
Simulations witU tUe MicUigan model are static, and assume full employment witU a 
fixed supply of labour. Factors are fully mobile domestically, witU no international 
mobility. All tariff rents and revenues are redistributed to tUe single UouseUold in eacU 
region, and all policy instruments are ad valorem price wedges. Macroeconomic 
closure assumes tUat trade balances in eacU region are fixed. 
The advantages of the MicUigan model are tUat it has more detail than otUer models in 
the manufacturing and services sectors, includes monopolistic competiiion, and Uas 
estimated data on trade barriers in the service sectors. Disadvantages include tUe poor 
treatment of agriculture, tUe static nature of tUe model, and tUe treatment of all policy 
instruments as ad valorem taxes and subsidies. 
Brown, Deardorff, Fox, and Stern (1995). Computational Analysis of Goods and 
Services Liberalisation in the Uruguay Round 
Brown et al. use the MicUigan model to cUaracterise tUe Uruguay Round by inarket 
access reforms for industrial products. witU pre-UR and post-UR tariff rates from tUe 
GATT integrated database, and services liberalisafion, witU 25% reductions in tUe ad 
valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers in tUe services sectors. 
The 34 regions in tUe MicUigan database are aggregated into 9 regions (including a 
"Rest of tUe World" for wUicU results are not given. All 29 sectors in tUe database are 
used. 
Table 3-16 sbows tUe equivalent variation results for eacU of tUe tUree scenarios 
performed: industrial product market access, services liberalisation, and tUe 
combination of the two. Europe ($60.1 bn), tUe United States ($50.6 bn) and Japan 
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Table 3-16: Equivalent Variation (percentage of GDP) 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Europe 
Japan 
Asian NICs 
Australia-New Zealand 
Other Trading Nations 
Industrial Pr oducts 
Trade Liberalisation 
0.3 
0.4 
0.1 
0.3 
0.6 
2.4 
1.2 
0.0 
Services Trade 
Liberalisation 
0.7 
1.6 
2.7 
0.6 
0.8 
I.I 
2.8 
1.0 
Industrial Products and 
Services Trade 
Liberalisation 
0.9 
2.0 
2.8 
0.9 
1.4 
3.6 
3.6 
1.0 
($40.4 bn) Uave tUe largest EV figures for tUe combined reforms, but tUe Asian NICs 
and Australia-New Zealand Uave tUe UigUest welfare gains as percentages of GDP. 
Welfare gains from services liberalisation are more significant tUan from industrial 
product liberalisation in every region except Asian NICs. 
3.3.3 Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle (1991,1993,1994, 1995) 
The Nguyen et al. studies are unique in that tUey were performed at different stages of 
the Uruguay Round completion. These studies tUerefore give a good opportunity to 
compare and contrast tUe potential effects of reform (Nguyen et al. (1991)), tUe Draft 
Final Act (Nguyen et al. (1993)) and tUe final agreement (Nguyen et al. (1995)). EacU 
study uses an identical model (wUicU will Uere be labelled tUe NPW model). 
The NPW model is a fairiy standard model. witU constant returns to scale tecUnology 
and perfect competition. TUree factors of land (labour, capital and land) provide 
Table 3-17: Commodity and regional classification 
Ten trading countries/blocs: 9 sectors/product groups 
Middle income agricultural exporters (AGX) 
Middle income agricultural importers (AGM) 
Centrally planned economies (CNP) 
Other West European (OWE) 
United States (USA) 
Canada (CAN) 
European Community (EEC) 
Japan (JAP) 
Australia/New Zealand (ANZ) 
Rest of World (ROW) 
Agriculture/food (AGR) 
Basic/intermediate (BSD 
Mining/extraction (MIN) 
Light industries (LIN) 
Forestry/fishing (FRF) 
Finished capital goods (FCG) 
High-tech manufacturing (HTC) 
Intermediate manufacturing (INM) 
Non-factor services (SVC) 
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income for one UouseUold in eacU region, in addition to net tax income. TUe 
Armington assumption is used to differentiate goods from different countries. 
The commodity and regional classification of the model is sUown in Table 3-17. 
While some effort has been taken to disaggregate LDC regions into agricultural 
importers and exporters, it is clear tUat tUe regional classification is more useful for 
evaluating developed country effects of reform. TUe commodity classification is 
manufactures-based: agriculture and food are treated as a single commodity, and tUere 
is 110 textile and clotUing commodity. 
One of tUe strengtU of tUe NPW model is tUat tUe autUors calibrate levels of service 
protection to reflect non-tariff barriers to trade in services, and use estimates of service 
liberalisation at eacU stage of tUe Uruguay Round. Few otUer studies include 
liberalisation of services trade. 
Note tUat textiles are not included as a separate sector, but are part of "LigUt 
industries". MFA liberalisation is treated as tUe appropriate reduction in export taxes 
for tUis sector. 
4 policy scenarios 
• from 1991 paper (ex ante), 'CompreUensive outcome' = progress in agriculture, 
MFA abolition, services. NPW(1995) note tUat tUis scenario is fairly close to tUe 
Dunkel Draft. 
• from 1991 paper {ex ante), 'Face-saving outcome' = modest cUanges in 
agriculture, MFA continues, no progress in services, 
• from 1993 paper {ex post), 'Draft Final Act' = reducfion in support and border 
measures in agriculture, complete pUasing-out of MFA, tariffs and NTBs cut in 
manufactures, reducfion in NTBs in services (see paper for details). 
• from 1995 paper {ex post), 'Final Agreement' = tarifficafion of NTBs and 
reduction in domestic support and export subsidies in agriculture; complete 
phasing-out of MFA; tariffs and NTBs cut in manufactures - 50% on 
basic/intermediates and higU-tecU except by ROW & CNP, ROW cut tariffs by 
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Table 3-19: Welfare outcomes (Hicksian equivalent variation) from the NPW 
model 
Region 
AGX 
AGM 
CNP 
OWE 
USA 
CAN 
EEC 
JPN 
ANZ 
ROW 
Worid 
Comprehensive 
(o/o)' ($bn) 
2.3 
2.9 
0.6 
1.6 
1.7 
2.5 
1.7 
2.5 
1.6 
0.7 
1.5 
12.1 
7.6 
23.6 
9.3 
73.7 
9.3 
60.4 
50.1 
3.2 
13.3 
262.5 
Face-
(%) 
0.5 
1.6 
0.2 
0.7 
0.8 
1.2 
0.8 
1.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.7 
• saving 
($bn) 
2.5 
4.2 
6.6 
4.0 
4.4 
27.5 
27.6 
0.9 
5.6 
118.7 
Draft Final Act 
(%) (Sbn) 
0.9 
1.9 
0.9 
2.1 
0.8 
0.9 
1.8 
2.0 
1.1 
0.6 
I.l 
12.2 
7.1 
37.4 
8.1 
36.4 
3.7 
61.3 
27.0 
2.4 
16.4 
212.1 
Final Aj 
(%) 
0,2 
0.6 
0.3 
0.8 
0.2 
0.3 
0.5 
1.3 
0.3 
0.1 
0.4 
jreement 
(Sbn) 
2.8 
2.3 
10.9 
3.0 
9,6 
1.2 
19.0 
17.8 
0,6 
2.7 
69.9 
I; As percentage of GNP 
30%, NTBs by 40%, and 30% cut in tariffs, 40% cut in NTBs on other goods 
(except by CNP); 20% reduction in NTBs in services. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from a simple comparison of welfare results at 
various stages of the Uruguay Round. TUe final agreement obviously falls far sUort of 
the potential welfare gains available from compreUensive reform, but tUe DFA would 
have captured most of tUe welfare gains available. It is clear tUat tUe low welfare gains 
from the final agreement come from the watering-down of reforms after the DFA. It is 
interesting to note tUat NPW's "face-saving" scenario was at tUe time (1991) 
Table 3-18: Breakdown of welfare impacts (Sbn) from final agreement 
Region 
AGX 
AGM 
CNP 
OWE 
USA 
CAN 
EEC 
JPN 
ANZ 
ROW 
World 
Overall 
2.8 
2.3 
10.9 
3.0 
9.6 
1.2 
19.0 
17.8 
0.6 
2.7 
69.9 
Agriculture 
1.2 
1.5 
0.9 
1.8 
4.1 
0,6 
12.7 
14.5 
0.4 
-0.6 
36.9 
Textiles and 
Clothing 
0.9 
0.4 
2.4 
0.3 
3.0 
0.2 
1.8 
-0.2 
0.1 
I.l 
lO.I 
Services 
0.3 
0.2 
2.7 
0.2 
0.5 
0.1 
1.5 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
5.9 
Tariffs 
0.4 
0.2 
4,9 
0.7 
2.0 
0.3 
3.0 
J . J 
0.0 
2.1 
17.0 
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considered to be tUe absolute minimum level of liberalisation tUat would occur in tUe 
Uruguay Round, but welfare gains from tUe final agreement are 40% lower tUan tUe 
face-saving scenario. 
Table 3-18 sbows tUe breakdown of welfare gains from tUe final agreement (1995 
paper), and sliows tUat tUe agricultural components of tUe Round have the largest 
overall effect. Agricultural importing LDCs (AGM) gain from agricultural 
liberalisation. BotU textiles and clotUing and tariff reforms Uave a more significant 
impact tUan service liberalisation, whicU may be due to tUe fact that the extent of 
service liberalisation (20% reductions in ad valorem equivalent tariffs) is low. 
3.4 TARIFF REDUCTIONS 
As a result of the Uruguay Round agreement, tariff rates (including converted non-
tariff barriers) must on average be reduced by 36% over tUe implementation period, 
with LDCs being allowed a '/, lower reduction (24%). TUese average tariff reductions 
apply to all goods, including agricultural and food goods. WitUin tUis simple 
formulaic agreement exist mucU more complicated aspects of tUe agreement. TUe 
actual tariff cUanges tUat will be implemented are tUose tUat GATT signatory 
countries submitted to GATT as part of tUe Uruguay Round Agreements. TUese tariff 
changes must comply witU tUe principles agreed upon, but countries Uave a large 
degree of leeway in making tariff cUanges wUere tUe averages must add up to 36% 
(24%) reductions. Because of tUis, using tariff reductions derived from GATT 
submissions is a more detailed modelling approacU tUan using across-tUe-board 36% 
(24%) reducfions. 
Apart from needing to add up to certain averages, tUe Uruguay Round Agreement set 
a maximum tariff rate of 75%, wUicU put an additional constraint on countries as tUey 
drew up tUeir submissions to GATT. Minimum access provisions for agricultural 
goods tUat were previously subject to non-tariff bartiers (imports must be at least 5% 
of sales in eacU good) provide a furtUer constraint, altUougU tUis constraint is only 
binding after tUe implementation; countries need not reduce tariffs in tUe submissions 
to guarantee minimum access, but must bear tUis constraint in mind because if tUe 
provision is not met, tariffs will Uave to be furtUer reduced at a latter date. 
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Agriculture and food present furtUer problems for tUe construction of tariff reduction 
data. Some countries gained exemptions for certain commodities (i.e. Japan for 
grains), but tUese exceptions present a minor difficulty wUen compared to tUe issues 
resulting from tUe fact tUat because agriculture Uad never before been subject to 
GATT disciplines, tUere were no existing tariff bindings for agricultural goods. TUis 
means tUat countries Uad to declare a pre-Uruguay Round binding (which must be 
equal or above existing tariffs) and a post-Uruguay Round binding, which must be on 
average 36% (24%) lower, with a minimum 15% (10%) cut on each tariff line. It 
would be possible for a country to declare pre-Uruguay Round bindings tUat were 
mucU larger tUan existing tariffs, and tUen reduce tUe bindings so tUat applied tariffs 
could rise substantially. 
Harrison et al. (1995) use GATT data on pre-UR MFN tariff rates and tUe new tariff 
bindings submitted by countries as part of tUe Uruguay Round annex. Table 3-20 
shows tUe percentage reduction in tariff rates, calculated from tables in Harrison et al. 
The fact tUat tUese use MFN rates ignores special and differential treatment for LDCs, 
and in some cases, ignores free trade areas. 
Francois et al. (1995a) derive botU pre-Uruguay Round and post-Uruguay Round 
tariffs from GATT's Integrated Database. Table 3-21 gives tUe derived percentage 
reductions in tariff rates. Francois et al. (1994) use tUe same tariff data as tUe 1995a 
paper, but for a more aggregate classification of commodities and regions, and witU 
the exception of agricultural goods. TUe 1994 paper assumes 36% (24% for LDCs) 
reductions in tUe applied tariff rates for all agricultural products in every region. witU 
additional minimum market access provisions meaning tUat tariffs will fall even more 
if necessary. TUe 1995a paper assumes tUat no tariff reductions will be made for 
agricultural products in any region, except wUere minimum market access provisions 
require tariffs to fall. 
Francois et (2/.(1995a) uses tUe GTAP version 2 database, and gives tariffs for tUe 
whole (37 good) commodity aggregafion. TUe regional aggregation is different, 
however, as sUown in Table 3-11. Francois et al. does not include service 
liberalisation - protection in tUe service sectors is zero (as in tUe GTAP database), and 
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all agricultural and food tariffs are reduced by 36% (24% in LDCs) except in CUina, whicU is 
excluded from all reforms. 
The derived tariff cUanges from Francois et al. (Table 3-21) sUow great variability across 
product groups and regions. Some sectors, sucU as coal (col) and transport goods (trn) are 
subject to small tariff reductions, wUile otUer sectors sucU as pulp paper products (ppp) and 
ferrous metals (i_s) Uave very large reductions. 
Because the Harrison et al. (1995) and Francois et al. (1995) papers use different regional 
and commodity classificafions, a full comparison of the tariff reducfions is impossible. It is 
possible, however, to compare tUe tariff reductions in tUe few cases tUat regional and 
commodity classificafions matcU. Table 3-22 sbows tUis comparison, for tUe six regions and 
seven sectors tUat are identically defined in botU models. 
Table 3-21: Derived tariff reductions from Francois et al. (1995a)* 
FRS 
FSH 
COL 
OIL 
GAS 
OMN 
TEX 
WAP 
LUM 
PPP 
PC 
CRP 
IJ 
NFM 
FMP 
TRN 
OME 
LEA 
NMM 
OMF 
ANZ 
0% 
29% 
0% 
0% 
60% 
30% 
41% 
31% 
.^1% 
51% 
44% 
37% 
84% 
43% 
23% 
25% 
32% 
10% 
30% 
33% 
JPN 
0% 
28% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
47% 
19% 
22% 
33% 
100% 
89% 
61% 
85% 
41% 
74% 
100% 
89% 
10% 
37% 
62% 
CAN 
0% 
34% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
50% 
37% 
28% 
41% 
100% 
32% 
49% 
95% 
45% 
38% 
33% 
52% 
37% 
62% 
54% 
US 
100% 
25% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
46% 
29% 
9% 
41% 
100% 
29% 
40% 
96% 
7% 
40% 
4% 
56% 
13% 
33% 
68% 
EU 
0% 
17% 
100% 
0% 
0% 
22% 
24% 
13% 
48% 
100% 
38% 
45% 
91% 
18% 
46% 
9% 
51% 
30% 
28% 
47% 
EFTA 
50% 
18% 
100% 
17% 
44% 
18% 
34% 
33% 
43% 
76% 
29% 
48% 
85% 
28% 
42% 
17% 
43% 
27% 
33% 
52% 
LA 
43% 
35% 
0% 
19% 
0% 
23% 
29% 
21% 
34% 
17% 
23% 
32% 
7% 
21% 
29% 
29% 
26% 
25% 
16% 
30% 
SA 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
36% 
11% 
0% 
8% 
52% 
28% 
38% 
47% 
4% 
16% 
31% 
32% 
1% 
18% 
27% 
EA 
13% 
77% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
41% 
33% 
20% 
22% 
39% 
34% 
28% 
47% 
26% 
19% 
15% 
25% 
38% 
17% 
33% 
SSA 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
EIT 
10% 
4% 
8% 
0% 
0% 
17% 
29% 
17% 
22% 
23% 
29% 
27% 
9% 
21% 
19% 
6% 
17% 
24% 
23% 
20% 
ROW 
22% 
6% 
0% 
76% 
0% 
17% 
50% 
31% 
22% 
23% 
9% 
32% 
2% 
38% 
6% 
28% 
17% 
2% 
58% 
20% 
*: For region codes, see Table 3-11. Francois et al. give tariff reducfions for eacU non-
agricultural sector in tUe GTAP database; see CUapter 4, Table 4-1 for tUese commodity 
codes. 
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Both Harrison et al. and Francois et al. calculate their tariff reductions in the same way, 
using the GATT Integrated Database (IDB). and comparing pre-UR applied tariffs witU post-
UR tariff bindings, and assuming tUat tUe appropriate tariff reduction will take place wUere 
the new binding is below tUe pre-UR applied tariff and that wUere tUe new binding is above 
the pre-UR applied tariff, tUere will be no change in the applied tariff TUis is conducted at a 
disaggregate level and tUen aggregated to tUe level of tUe database.'* Table 3-22 sUows tUat 
while there are many sectors where the tariff reductions are very close, there are a few 
discrepancies: Non-fertous metals (NFM) in tUe USA (25%,7%) and Japan (63%,41%) are 
perhaps the largest. 
Table 3-23 shows tUe pre-UR and post-UR tariff rates, and the percentage reduction tUat are 
reported in Hertel et al. Unlike Harrison et al. and Francois et al., tUis paper does not report 
tariffs at the level tUat tUey are used, but presents tUis summary table. Table 3-24 sUows a 
similar table from Brown et al. {1995). 
Examination of tUese tables sUow tUat tUere is some degree of uncertainty over wUat level of 
tariff reducfions will take place as a result of tUe Uruguay Round agreement. TUe point wUere 
authors have tUe most dissimilar tariff reduction data.is EU agriculture, wUere Francois et al. 
(1994) use 36% reductions for all goods, Francois et al. (1995a) use no reducfions but 
enforce minimum market access provisions, Harrison et al. use 0% reductions except for 
meat (9%), Hertel et al. report an average 2% reduction, and Brown et al. report an average 
Table 3-22: Comparison of Tariff Reductions 
TEX 
WAP 
CRP 
IJ 
NFM 
FMP 
TRN 
JPN 
HRT 
32% 
33% 
55% 
89% 
63% 
82% 
100% 
FMN 
19% 
22% 
61% 
85% 
41% 
74% 
100% 
CAN 
HRT 
36% 
27% 
50% 
89% 
38% 
39% 
36% 
FMN 
37% 
28% 
49% 
95% 
45% 
38% 
33% 
USA 
HRT 
29% 
10% 
42% 
92% 
25% 
39% 
4% 
FMN 
29% 
9% 
40% 
96% 
7% 
40% 
4% 
EU 
HRT 
26% 
13% 
38% 
86% 
19% 
46% 
14% 
FMN 
24% 
13% 
45% 
91% 
18% 
46% 
9% 
EFTA 
HRT 
34% 
33% 
42% 
85% 
35% 
40% 
14% 
FMN 
34% 
33% 
48% 
85% 
28% 
42% 
17% 
SSA 
HRT 
6% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
10% 
0% 
0% 
FMN 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
HRT: Tariff reductions calculated from Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1995) 
FMN: Tariff reductions calculated from Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom (1995a) 
In tact, Hanisoii et al. use a World Bank database that contains the IDB data aggregated to the GTAP classifications, 
* lie l-rancciis el al. use the IDB data. There should, however be no difference in tariff rates calculated these ways. 
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1% reduction. 
Without any a priori reason to prefer one set of tariff reduction estimates over any otUer set 
of estimates, tUe data in Table 3-25 will be used in chapter 6 to simulate tUe Uruguay Round. 
Table 3-23: Average Pre-UR, Post-UR tariffs and import price changes from Hertel et 
al. (1995) 
US and Canada 
European Union 
Japan 
Korea 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Latin America 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Asia 
Rest of World 
Food 
Pre-UR 
% 
11.7 
26.5 
87.8 
99.5 
0 
21.9 
87.9 
86.9 
59.8 
2.3 
15.6 
-3.5 
15.7 
Post-UR 
% 
11.0 
26.0 
56.1 
41.1 
0 
15.5 
34.3 
33.4 
34.5 
1.5 
12.4 
-4.3 
14.1 
Reduction 
% 
6% 
2% 
36% 
59% 
0 
29% 
6 1% 
62% 
42% 
35% 
21% 
-23% 
10% 
Manufactures 
Pre-UR 
% 
4.3 
6.5 
4.9 
16.1 
0 
14.2 
11.0 
23.9 
36.2 
17.1 
9.5 
51.9 
10.6 
Post-UR 
% 
2.8 
3.9 
2.1 
8.2 
0 
13.5 
7.7 
21.5 
27,6 
14.9 
9.4 
37.1 
9.1 
Reduction 
% 
35% 
40% 
57% 
49% 
0 
5% 
30% 
10% 
24% 
13% 
' 1% 
29% 
15% 
Table 3-24: Average Pre-UR, Post-UR tariffs and import price changes from Brown et 
al. (1995) 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Europe 
Japan 
Asian NICs 
Australia and New Zealand 
..2!!lf|Jj;^'ng Nations 
Agricultural Products 
Pre-UR 
% 
14.9 
2.6 
35.3 
13.2 
60.9 
12.7 
0.8 
18.6 
Post-UR Change 
% % 
14.0 6.0 
2.3 14.9 
35.3 0.0 
11.7 11.1 
35.1 42.4 
7.9 37.3 
0.4 44.8 
17.6 5.3 
Industrial Products 
Pre-UR 
% 
4.9 
7.7 
11.9 
6.9 
6.0 
0.9 
13.8 
28.9 
Post-
UR 
% 
3.4 
4.5 
11.9 
4.8 
3.9 
0.7 
9.1 
21.0 
Change 
% 
30.3 
42.2 
0.1 
30.4 
36.2 
17.2 
34.3 
27.2 
Services 
Post-UR 
% 
67.5 
57.2 
76.9 
79.2 
61.2 
46.0 
105.9 
107.4 
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Table 3-25: Tariff reductions from Harrison(1995) 
' 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Mining 
Textiles 
Wearing Apparel 
Primary Iron and Steel 
Non ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 
Transport machinery 
Other machinery 
Other manufacturing 
USA 
36% 
2 1% 
36% 
29% 
9% 
95% 
7% 
4 1% 
40% 
5% 
57% 
30% 
EU 
36% 
17% 
27% 
25% 
13% 
91% 
18% 
46% 
45% 
13% 
55% 
40% 
Japan 
36% 
29% 
56% 
20% 
22% 
85% 
42% 
74% 
61% 
100% 
52% 
38% 
Other 
OECD 
36% 
34% 
49% 
37% 
28% 
95% 
44% 
38% 
48% 
34% 
34% 
40% 
LDCs 
24% 
56% 
18% 
33% 
26% 
31% 
2 1% 
19% 
31% 
37% 
26% 
27% 
China 
0% 
0% 
0% 
.0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
3.5 COMPARISON OF STUDIES 
Table 3-26 and Table 3-27 sUow some comparisons between tUe model structures and 
results of CGE models of tUe final Uruguay Round agreement. Studies tUat simulate 
hypothetical trade liberalisation, or tUat simulate tUe reforms proposed at a certain stage of 
the Round are excluded from tUis table. 
Table 3-26 gives some (limited) information on tUe models: tUe model and database, base 
year and evaluation year, and sector and region classification levels. Most of tUese papers are 
GTAP-based, using various versions of tUe database. Five of tUe models use projections - for 
these models tUe base year and evaluation year are different, wUereas tUey are tUe same for 
static models. 
Noticeably, few models disaggregate tUe agricultural sectors to a great extent, except for tUe 
RUNS model. Harrison et al (HRT) Uas tUe next UigUest level of agricultural detail. witU four 
agricultural and four food processing sectors. TUis paper uses more sectors tUan any otUer 
GTAP-based model, so tUat it Uas more agricultural sectors does not particularly reflect a 
special agricultural focus. 
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[^ any of the papers Uave a particular focus that is not shown in tUese tables; HMYD, HBDM 
and YMY are particular models of tUe MFA, while HME examines the effects of the 
Uruguay Round on Africa. 
Table 3-27 shows a comparison of the main results of tUese papers. TUe first four columns 
report global EV as a percentage of GDP for different market structures, where those inarket 
structures are modelled. The middle four columns give tUe proportion of global EV gains tUat 
originate from eacU of tUe four main categories of reform. Blanks in all of tUese columns 
indicates that the autUors did not report results for simulations of tUe components of tUe 
Uruguay Round, and a dasU (-) indicates tUat tUat component is not included in the paper's 
characterisation of the Uruguay Round. BDRS, for example, model industrial and service 
reforms, but do not model agricultural or MFA reforms. TUe final four columns report tUe 
percentage welfare gain to tUree regions - tUe EU, Japan and tUe USA (in some cases tUe 
USA column is taken from results for USA & Canada or NAFTA regions) and for LDCs as a 
whole. The LDC column is rarely given in papers; in most cases it is estimated Uere. 
A simple arithmetic average is given in the final row for the first four and last four columns. 
The average global EV for constant returns to scale (CRTS) models with perfect competition 
(PC) is a good indication of the global welfare gains that CGE models predict for the 
Uruguay Round, and is an average of ten estimates, wUicU range from 0.17 to 0.89. TUe 
averages show that the inclusion of increasing returns to scale (IRTS) and monopolistic 
competition (MC) leads to UigUer welfare implications. TUis is particularly evident from 
FMN94 and F]VIN95a, wUicU use a version of monopolistic competition witU Uigh elasticities 
and varietal scaling effects. wUile HRT, using lower elasticities and witUout varietal scaling, 
find that IRTS/MC makes only sligUt differences to tUeir results. HRT find tUat steady state 
dynamics are more important, wUile FMN95a find tUat tUis affects tUeir results very little. 
Note that the average for tUe steady state column in Table 3-27 vary widely over tUe 
spectrum of commodity and regional aggregation, and in tUeir cUaracterisation of tUe 
Uruguay Round FMN94 Uas a very optimistic interpretation of tUe agricultural agreement, 
while FMN95a adopts a 'de minimis^ scenario. BRR uses a similar representation of tUe 
Round as FMN94, and tUe percentage contributions of components from tUese papers are 
very similar, altUougU tUe overall welfare resuUs vary because of otUer modelling 
differences. 
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The regional gains from tUe Uruguay Round sUow tUat tUe welfare gains from tUe Round for 
both the EU and USA will be approximately tUe same percentage of GDP as tUe global gains, 
with the EU gains sligUtly UigUer tUan tUe USA gains (note tUat in no paper do tUe USA 
gains exceed tUe EU gains). TUe gains to Japan are significantly UigUer tUan tUe world 
average. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter Uas reviewed tUe main global CGE models and tUe most important papers based 
on these models tUat look at tUe Uruguay Round reforms. TUe GTAP model is tUe most 
widely used of tUese models, as is indicated by tUe predominance of GTAP-based 
applications in Table 3-26. Alternatives to GTAP do exist, tUougU, witU different strengtUs 
and weaknesses: RUNS Uas tUe best treatment for agriculture in LDCs, tUe MicUigan model 
has the best treatment of industrial goods in developed countries, and witU Nguyen et al. 
have the advantage of including barriers to trade in tUe service sectors. TUe strengtUs of 
GTAP over all of tUese is tUe database size and tUe detail of bilateral trade flows tUat it 
includes. 
It is therefore impossible to cUoose one model as being 'best' for a study of tUe Uruguay 
Round without first making a judgement on wUicU set of countries and sectors are tUe most 
important in tUe Round. In many cases tUe cUoice of data, model and aggregation will 
predetermine tUe relative importance of different parts of tUe Round, and tUe relative welfare 
effects, explaining many of tUe different results in tUe papers reviewed Uere. OtUer issues of 
how to implement tUe Uruguay Round reforms in a CGE model and of market structure will 
also have effects on resuUs. 
The next chapter will examine tUe GTAP database, used Uere in preference to otUers in part 
because of its public availability but also because of its larger size and bilateral trade detail, 
and will determine an aggregation to be used in CUapter 6. drawing on tUe points developed 
here. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE GLOBAL TRADE ANALYSIS PROJECT 
DATABASE 
Chapter 4 discusses tUe GTAP database in detail. Section 4.1 covers tUe regional and 
sectoral coverage of tUe database and section 4.2 examines tUe accounting 
relationsUips tUat tUe database uses. Section 4.3 outlines tUe limitations of tUe 
database while section 4.4 details tUe particular advantages tUat tUe database brings to 
users. Section 4.5 examines tUe values of key data, firstly for regional aggregate data, 
and then for detailed data for each region. Section 4.6 discusses the aggregation of tUis 
database, and section 4.7 is of a metUodological nature, detailing Uow tUe database is 
transformed for use witU tUe model presented in CUapter 5. 
4.1 THE GTAP DATABASE 
4.1.1 The GTAP Regions and Commodities 
Table 4-1 sUows tUe 24 regions and 37 commodities detailed in version 2 of tUe 
GTAP database. Of tUe 37 commodities, six are agricultural (pdr to olp). Paddy Rice, 
Wheat and OtUer Grains are all cereals products, but it is useful to have tUem defined 
separately - particularly as tUe global patterns of production, trade, consumption and 
protection of tUese products are very different. TUe presence of Wool as a separate 
product is probably due to GTAP's origins in tUe Australian SALTER database, as 
many otUer sectors tUat are larger globally are not defined, yet Wool is very important 
to Australia. All otUer agricultural products are grouped into two sectors - Non-Grain 
Crops and OtUer Livestock Products, wUicU are botU very diverse groups of goods. 
Non-Grain Crops includes sugar, oil seeds, vegetables, fruU, plant-based fibres and 
cash-crops sucU as coffee, tea and cocoa. OtUer Livestock Products includes milk, all 
meat, and otUer animal products (sucU as skins). For all tUese agricultural goods, tUe 
commodities are tUe 'raw" unprocessed forms, wUicU are tUen purcUased as 
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intermediate inputs by tUe Food processing industries. These agricultural sectors are 
the only sectors to use land as a primary factor input. 
Si.x other primary products are defined (frs to omn), covering Forestry (which is used 
extensively as an intermediate input to Lumber and Pulp Paper Products), Fisheries 
(used in Other Food Products), three fuel extraction sectors. Coal, Oil and Gas (used 
mainly in Petroleum and Coal and Chemicals Rubbers and Plastics), and Other 
Minerals - which covers the mining and quarrying of all non-fuel minerals. 
Five food product commodities (per to b_t) are defined as Paddy Rice, Meat Products, 
Milk Products, Other Food Products and Beverages and Tobacco. While these sectors 
are not "agriculture" (and do not use land) tUey purcUase agricultural goods as 
intermediates, and a considerable degree of agricultural protection operates tlirougU 
these industries. 
Fourteen manufacturing goods (tex to omf) are defined, and tUese are best considered 
as three sub-groupings; textiles and clothing, resource products and final 
manufactures. Textile and clothing consists of two sectors: Textiles and Wearing 
Apparel. These two sectors are unique because of the MFA protection that is present 
on exports from developing countries to developed countries. Textiles purchases 
inputs froin Non-Grain Crops in particular, while Wearing Apparel purchases its 
intermediates mainly from Textiles. 
Eight resource products can be identified, each being dependant on the use of certain 
primary products. Leather Products uses mainly Other Livestock inputs. Lumber and 
Pulp Paper Products use Forestry, Petroleum and Coal and CUemicals, Rubbers and 
Plastics use Coal, Oil and Gas inputs. Non-Metallic Minerals. Primary Ferrous Metals 
and Non-Ferrous Metals use inputs from tUe OtUer Minerals sector. 
The bulk of manufacturing activities in developed economies falls into four final 
manufacturing sectors: Fabricated Metal Products, Transport Industries, OtUer 
Machinery and Equipment, and Other Manufactures. Each of these sells goods to final 
consumers, while Transport Industries (cars, sUips, planes) also sells products to Trade 
and Transport services and all otUer sectors as plant (sucU as tractors). OtUer 
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Table 4-1: Commodity and country coverage of the full GTAP database' 
colVI^ 
pilr 
win 
i:ni 
ngc 
uol 
olp 
frs 
fsh 
col 
oil 
gas 
omn 
per 
met 
mil 
olp 
h_l 
tc.\ 
wap 
lea 
iiini 
PPP 
P_^  
crp 
nmm 
i s 
nt'm 
t'liip 
trn 
omc 
omf 
cuu 
ens 
t_l 
osp 
osg 
dwe 
lODITIES 
Paddy Rice 
Wheal 
Other (irains 
Non-Grain Crops 
Wool 
Other Livestock Products 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Other Minerals 
Processed Rice 
Meat Products 
Milk and Milk Products 
Other Food Products 
Beverages and Tobacco 
Textiles 
Wearing Apparel 
Leather Products 
Lumber 
Pulp Paper Products etc. 
Petroleum and Coal 
Chemicals Rubbers and Plastics 
Non-Metallic Minerals 
Primary Ferrous Metals 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Transport Industries 
Other Machiner>' and Equipment 
Other Manufacturing 
Electricity. Water and Gas 
Construction 
Trade and Transport 
Other Services (Private) 
Other Services (Government) 
Ownership of Dwellings 
COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
.(PN 
KOR 
E_U 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
TWN 
ARC 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
SAS 
ROW 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Canada 
United States of America 
,lapan 
Republic of Korea 
European Union (EU-12) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
China 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Rest of Latin America 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Middle East and North Africa 
Economies In Transition 
South Asia 
Rest of World 
: version 2. All data is for 1992. 
Machinery and Equipment sells products mainly as intermediates and capUal goods, 
but much machinery is also sold to final consumers. 
The six service sectors (egw to dwe) are unique in that the GTAP database provides 
no data on protection for tUese products, but trade volumes are included (except for 
Construction and OwnersUip of Dwellings, whicU are defined to be non-traded). 
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Of the 24 regions, six are 'developed" - Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United 
States. .lapan and the European Union. The EU is always considered to be a single 
country (as opposed to a composite region) in the database because, with the minor 
exception that some member states give preferences to former colonies, trade 
protection and trade policy is uniform across the union. All EU data are calculated for 
the individual members and aggregated, except for input-output tables, where data for 
smaller member states are not included. 
Of the remaining 18 regions, four are East-Asian Newly Industrialised Countries 
(Korea. Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and six are middle-income developing 
countries (Malaysia, the PUilippines, TUailand, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). CUina 
and Indonesia are tUe only low income developing countries identified individually in 
the database. 
The other six regions are composite regions. Other Latin America includes those 
Caribbean and SoutU American countries not included separately. Sub-SaUaran Africa 
excludes SoutU Africa. Middle East and NortU Africa excludes Israel. Economies in 
Transition includes tUe former Soviet Union countries and Eastern Europe (note tUat 
East Germany is included in tUe EU as part of Germany). SoutU Asia is India, 
Pakistan, BangladesU and Sri Lanka. TUe Rest of tUe World is tUe most diverse region 
- comprising Western European countries not in tUe EU12, SoutU Africa, Turkey, 
Israel, and smaller countries from around tUe world. 
4.2 ACCOUNTING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE GTAP 
DATABASE 
Accounting relationsUips are necessary in any model to provide a basis for tUe data 
and as a starting point for describing tUe equations of tUe model. Two areas tUat must 
first be addressed are tUe sets used in tUe model, and tUe definUion of parameter 
names. 
Sets used in the GTAP model 
The following sets are used in tUe GTAP model. Included is an example of wUat eacU 
set would comprise if a particular tUree-region, tliree-commodity aggregation were 
chosen. 
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Table 4-2: GTAP Sets 
r or s Regions in the aggregation. 
j Traded commodities 
f Endowment commodities 
j Produced cominodities 
k Non-savings commodities 
lUSA, EU, ROW! 
jFood, Manufactures, Services! 
jLand, Labour, Capital} 
[Food, Manufactures, Services, cgds', 
I Land, Labour, Capital, Food, Manufactures, Services, cgds} 
where "cgds" refers to newly produced capital goods. 
Definition of parameter names 
Most GTAP parameters have a two- or three- character name, and some attention has 
been paid to making these parameter names consistent. The following conventions are 
used for most parameter names: 
Table 4-3: Key to Parameter Names 
Letter 
Values 
E 
V 
X 
l'()luine.s 
D 
I 
O 
F 
P 
G 
T 
IMeans that the variable is... 
The value of an endowment supply or demand 
A value (in 1992 US$ millions) 
An export value 
A domestic supply or demand (when not the last identifier) 
An imported supply or demand 
An output 
A demand by firms 
A private demand 
A government demand 
A demand for transport services 
Evaluation Prices 
A Evaluated at agent's prices 
M Evaluated at market prices 
W Evaluated at world prices 
Evaluation Region 
S By region of source 
D By region of destination (when appearing as the last identifier) 
Para/neters 
PAR A private demand CDE parameter 
ESUB An elasticity of substitution ^ 
Using this convention. tUe Value of Output at Agents prices of any non-savings 
coinmodity in any region is VOA(k,r). VXWD(i,r,s) is tUe Value of eXports, at World 
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prices and by Destination, of good i exported from source region r to destination 
region s. 
4.2.2 GTAP database terms 
Value Flows at Domestic Market Prices 
VFM (f,j,r) Value of Factor demand at Market prices, by factor, sector and 
region 
VDFM(i,j,r) Value of Domestic purcUases by Firms at Market prices, by 
commodity, sector and region. 
VlFM(i,j,r) Value of hnport purcUases by Firms at Market prices, by 
commodity, sector and region. 
VDPM(i.r) Value of Domestic purcUases by Private households at Market 
prices, by coinmodity and region. 
VlPM(i.r) Value of Import purcUases by Private Uouseholds at Market prices, 
by commodity and region. 
VDGM(i,r) Value of Domestic purchases by Governments at Market prices, by 
commodity and region. 
VlGM(i,r) Value of Import purchases by Governments at Market prices, by 
commodity and region. 
VXMD(i.r.s) Value of eXports at Market prices of exporting region, by 
commodity, source region r and destination region s. 
VIMS(i,r,s) Value of Imports at Market prices of importing region, by 
commodity, source region r and destination region s. 
VST(i.r) Value of Sales to international Transport, by commodity and region. 
Value Flows Evaluated at World Market Prices 
VXWD(i.r,s) Value of eXpoits at World (fob) prices, by commodity, source 
region r and destination region s. 
VlWS(i.r.s) Value of Imports at World (c.i.f.) prices, by commodity, source 
region r and destination region s. 
Value Flows Evaluated at Agents' Prices 
EVOA(f,r) Endowment commodity Value of Output at Agents" prices, by factor 
and region. 
EVFA(f,j,r) Endowment commodity Value of purcUases by Firms at Agents" 
prices, by factor, sector and region. 
VDFA(i,j,r) Value of Domestic purcUases by Firms at Agents" prices, by 
commodity, sector and region. 
VIFA(i,j,r) Value of Imported purcUases by Firms at Agents" prices, by 
commodity, sector and region. 
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VDPA(i,r) Value of Domestic purcUases by Private households at Agents' 
prices, by commodity and region. 
VIPA(i.r) Value of linported purchases by Private households at Agents' 
prices, by commodity and region. 
VDGA(i,r) Value of Domestic purchases by Governments at Agents" prices, by 
commodity and region. 
VIGA(i,r) Value of Imported purchases by Governments at Agents" prices, by 
commodity and region. 
SAVE(r) Value of net savings, by region. 
VDEP(r) Value of capital depreciafion, by region. 
VKB(r) Value of beginning-of-period capital stock, by region. 
Elasticities 
Several elasticities are defined in the GTAP database. The elasticities use here are: 
SIGV(i) Elasficity of substitution between factors of production in the value-
added nest. 
SlGD(i) Elasticity of substitution between domestic and import goods. 
SIGiVl(i) Elasticity of substitution between imports from different source 
regions. 
4.2.3 Derived Parameters 
Many parameters that are used in GTAP modelling are not included in tlie database, 
but are easily calculated from database parameters. 
Aggregate Parameters 
Some OtUer parameters are convenient for expressing sums of values. 
VDM(i,r) Value of Domestic sales at Market prices, by cominodity and region. 
= VDPM(i.r) + VDGM(i,r) + I ,VDFM(i,j,r) 
VIM(i,r) Value of Imports at Market prices, by commodity and region. 
= S, VIMS(i.s,r) 
VPM(i,r) Value of Private Demand for goods at market prices, by coinmodity 
and region. 
= VDPM(i,r) + VIPM(i,r) 
VGM(i,r) Value of Government Demand for goods at market prices, by 
commodity and region. 
= VDGM(i,r) + VIGM(i,r) 
VFIM(i,j,r) Value of Firms' Demand for goods at market prices, by commodity, 
sector and region. Note tUat VFM (tUe logical cUoice of name) is 
already defined as a parameter. 
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= VDGM(i,j.r) + VlGM(i.j,r) 
VPA(i,r) Value of Private demand at Agents" prices, by commodity and 
region. 
= VDPA(i.r) + VlPA(i,r) 
VGA(i,r) Value of Government demand at Agents" prices, by commodity and 
region. 
= VDGA(i.r) + VIGA(i,r) 
VFA(i,j,r) Value of Firms" demand at Agents" prices, by coinmodity, sector 
and region. 
= VDFA(i,j,r) + VIFA(i.j,r) 
VTWR(i,r,s) Value of Transport services used in tUe transport of goods from 
source region r to destination region s. 
= VIWS(i,r,s) - VXWD(i,r,s) 
VVA(j,r) Value of Value-Added use, by commodity and region 
VVA(i,r) = I,VFM(f,i,r) 
VVA("cgds"",r) = 0 
VOA(j,r) Value of Output at Agents" prices, by commodity and region. 
= VVA(j,r) + Z, VFA(i,j,r) 
VOM(j.r) Value of Output at Market prices, by commodity and region. 
VOM(i.r) = VDM(i.r) + VST(i,r) + Z, VXMD(i,r,s) 
VOM("cgds"",r) = VOA("cgds",r) 
INCOME(r) Regional Income. b\' region (calculated in section 4.2.7). 
EXPENDITURE(r) Regional Expenditure, by region (calculated in secfion 4.2.6) 
GLOBTRAN Value of Transport services (globally). 
= ZiI,VST(i.r) 
GLOBINV Value of Global investment. 
= I, SAVE(r) 
REGINV(r) Regional investment, by region. 
= VOM("cgds".r) 
Tax Revenues 
Taxes are not included explicitly in tUe database (tUey may be calculated from tax-
inclusive and tax-exclusive values). The following tax revenues are therefore implicit, 
and are negative where there are subsidies. 
OTAX(i,r) Output tax on the production of good i in region r. 
= VOM(i,r) - VOA(i.r) 
XTAX(i,r,s) Export tax by commodity, exporting region r and importing region 
s. 
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= VXWD(i,r,s) - VXMD(i,r,s) 
MTAX(i,r,s) Import tax by commodity, exporting region r and importing region 
s. 
= VIMS(i,r.s)-VIWS(i,r,s) 
ETAX(f,j,r) Endowment (factor) tax by factor, sector of use and region. TUis 
parameter Uas been included by GTAP for compatibility with future 
versions even though all values are zero in version 2. 
- 0 
DPTAX(i,r) Tax on private consumption of domestically produced goods, by 
commodity and region. 
- VDPA(i,r) - VDPM(i,r) 
IPTAX(i,r) Tax on private consumption of imported goods, by commodity and 
region. 
= VIPA(i,r)-VIPM(i,r) 
DGTAX(i,r) Tax on government consumption of domestically produced goods, 
by commodity and region. 
= VDGA(i,r) - VDGA(i,r) 
IGTAX(i,r) Tax on government consumption of imported goods, by commodity 
and region. 
= VIGA(i.r)-VIGM(i,r) 
DFTAX(i,j,r) Tax on firms" use of domestically produced goods, by commodity, 
sector and region. 
= VDFA(i,j,r) - VDFM(i,j,r) 
IFTAX(i,j,r) Tax on firms" use of imported goods, by commodity, sector and 
region. 
= VIFA(i,j,r)-VIFM(i,j,r) 
Later, it will be convenient to define consumption/use taxes for aggregate (import + 
domestic) consumption and use. The value of revenues for these parameters are: 
PTAX(i,r) Tax on private consumpfion of all goods, by commodity and region. 
= DPTAX(i,r) + IPTAX(i,r) 
GTAX(i,r) Tax on government consumption of all goods, by commodity and 
region. 
= DGTAX(i,r) + IGTAX(i,r) 
FTAX(i,j,r) Tax on firms' use of all goods, by commodity, sector and region. 
= DFTAX(i,j,r) + IFTAX(i,j,r) 
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Tax Rates 
The following tax rates are defined. Any of these tax rates can be negative to give a 
subsidy, although the version 2 database only has subsidies for output (TO), exports 
(TX) and imports (TM). 
TO(j.r) Output tax by commodity and region 
= OTAX(j,r)/VOM0,r) 
TM(i,r,s) Import tariff by cominodity and source-destination regional pairing 
= MTAX(i,r,s) / VIWS(i,r,s) 
TX( i.r.s) Export tariff by commodity and source-destination regional pairing 
= XTAX(i,r,s) / VXMD(i,r.s) 
TFD(i,j,r) Tax on intermediate use of domestic good i used in sector] in region 
r 
= DFTAX(i,j,r) / VDFM(i,j,r) 
TFl(i.j,r) Tax on intermediate use of imports of good i used in sector j in 
region r 
= IFTAX(i.j,r)/VIFM(i,j,r) 
TPD(i.r) Tax on private use of domestic good i in region r 
= DPTAX(i.r) / VDPM(i.r) 
TPI(i.r) Tax on private use of imports of good i in region r 
= IPTAX(i.r) / VIPM(i.r) 
TGD(i.r) Tax on government use of domestic good i in region r 
= DGTAX(i.r) / VDGM(i.r) 
TGI(i.r) Tax on government use of imports of good i in region r 
= IGTAX(i,r) / VIGM(i.r) 
It will also be convenient to define aggregate tax rates for consumption taxes: 
TF(i.j.r) Average tax on intermediate use of domestic + import goods 
= FTAX(i.j,r) / VFIM(i,j.r) 
TP(i.r) Average tax on private use of domestic + import goods 
= PTAX(i.r) / VPM(i.r) 
TG(i,r) Average tax on government use of domestic + import goods 
= GTAX(i,r) / VGM(i,r) 
4.2.4 Distribution of Sales to Regional Markets 
The accounting relationships covered in this section trace tUe value flows of goods 
and services from production to consumption (or use as intermediates). 
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The Value of Output at Agent's prices (VOA) plus a Production tax (like all taxes, this 
is represented in accounting equations as tUe value of tax revenue) equals tUe Value of 
Output at Market prices (VOM): 
VOA(i,r) + PTAX(i,r) = VOM(i,r) (i) 
For the supply equal to demand condition for any good, output must equal the sum of 
demands. In GTAP, this means that the Value of Output af Market prices equals the 
Value of the Domestic Market plus the Value of Services sold to the Transport sector 
plus the total Value of eXports at Market prices by Destination: 
VOM(i,r) = VDM(i.r) + VST(i,r) + S ^ VXMD(i,r,s) (2) 
The inclusion of export tax wedges means that tUe Value of eXports at Market prices 
Demanded by anotUer region plus a bilateral export tax wedge is equal to the Value of 
eXports at World (fob) prices: 
VXMD(i,r.s) + XTAX(i.r,s) = VXWD(i,r,s) (3) 
The fob exports plus the Value of Transport services used in transportation at World 
prices is equal to tUe Value of Imports (to s) at World (c.i.f) prices: 
VXWD(i,r,s) + VTWR(i,r.s) = VIWS(i,r,s) (4) 
The Value of Imports (to s) at World (c.i.f) prices plus an import tariff wedge is equal 
to the Value of Imports at Market prices in s: 
VIWS(i,r,s) + MTAX(i,r,s) = VIMS(i,r,s) (5) 
The Total Value of Imports at Market prices is equal to the sum of Value of Imports at 
Market prices by Source. Here VIMS(i,s,r) is tUe value of imports of i from region s 
into destination region r: 
VIM(i,r) = Z , VIMS(i,s,r) (6) 
The Value of Imports at Market prices is also equal to the sum of the uses of imported 
goods: tUe Value of Imports for Private consumption plus tUe Value of Imports for 
Government consumpfion plus tUe total Value of Imports for use by Firms: 
VIM(i,r) = VIPM(i,r) + VIGM(i,r) + Z , VIFM(i,j,r) (7) 
In addition, tUe Value of tUe Domestic Market referred to in equation 2 is equal to tUe 
sum of individual domesfic uses of tUe good, tUe Value of Domestic Private 
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consumption plus tUe Value of Domestic Government consumption plus the sum of 
the Values of Domestic use by Firms: 
VDM(i,r) = VDPM(i.r) + VDGM(i.r) + E , VDFM(i.j,r) (8) 
4.2.5 Production 
Producers in the GTAP model and database use inputs of factor services and 
intermediate goods to produce each produced commodity. Since these are the only 
inputs, and a zero-profit condifion is imposed, the Value of Output at Agents' prices 
must equal the Value of Firms' uses of intermediate inputs plus the Value of Firms' 
uses of factors: 
VOA(j.r)= I,VFA(i,j,r)+ I,.EVFA(f,j,r) (9) 
Intermediate Inputs are composed of domesfic (VDFA) and imported (VIFA) 
components. For both these components, a tax exists so that values at Agents' prices 
equal Market price values plus tUe tax wedge: 
VFA(i.j,r) = VDFA(i,j,r) + VIFA(i,j,r) (10) 
VDFA(i,j.r) - VDFM(i,j,r) + DFTAX(i,j,r) (11) 
VIFA(i.j,r) = VIFMd.j.r) + IFTAX(i.j.r) (12) 
Factor Services at Agents' prices equal tUe services at Market prices used in equation 
9 above plus a tax wedge ETAX: 
EVFA(f.j,r) = VFM(f,j,r) + ETAX(f,j,r) (13) 
Factor services are collected by households, so that the Value of "Output" at (the 
households') Agents' prices of factor f is equal to the sum of tUe values of its uses in 
thej industries: 
EVOA(f,r) = S, VFM(f,j,r) (14) 
4.2.6 Regional Household Expenditure 
Regional Expenditure is distributed among tUree types of spending: private, 
government and savings. Private and government expenditure is spent on eacU 
tradable good (altUougU some elements of tUese matrices may be zero): 
EXPENDITURE(r) = I, [VPA(i,r) + VGA(i,r)] + SAVE(r) (15) 
Private expenditure on eacU good in eacU region is split between domesfically 
produced and imported products: 
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VPA(i,r) = VDPA(i.r) + VlPA(i,r) (16) 
Both these products have taxes applied to them, so that the values at agents' prices are 
the inarket prices plus a tax: 
VDPA(i,r) = VDPM(i,r) + DPTAX(i,r) (17) 
VIPA(i,r) - VIPM(i,r) + IPTAX(i,r) (18) 
Similarly, government expenditure is split between domestic and imported 
expenditure, with a tax applied to each: 
VGA(i.r) = VDGA(i,r) + VIGA(i,r) (19) 
VDGA(i,r) = VDGM(i,r) + DGTAX(i.r) (20) 
VIGA(i,r) = VIGM(i,r) + lGTAX(i,r) (21) 
4.2.7 Regional Income 
Regional income is comprised of two types of income: factor income and tax income. 
Equation 22 includes the factor income EVOA minus depreciation of capital VDEP, 
plus the revenues from the ten types of tax instrument. 
INCOME(r) = Z, EVOA(f,r) - VDEP(r) 
+ Z, PTAX(i.r) 
+ Z,ZfETAX(f,j,r) 
+ Z, IPTAX(i,r) + Z, DPTAX(i,r) 
+ Z, IGTAX(i.r) + Z, DGTAX(i.r) 
+Z, Z, IFTAX(i,j,r) +Z, Z, DFTAX(i,j.r) 
+ Z, Z, XTAX(i,r,s) 
+ Z,Z,MTAX(i,s,r) (22) 
In order to maintain balance, regional income from equation 22 must equal regional 
expenditure from equation 15: 
INCOME(r) = EXPENDITURE(r) (23) 
4.2.8 Other GTAP accounting relationships 
The International Transport Sector 
The GTAP database and model includes a treatment of international transport 
services, and as such, the payments to those services must be accounted for on both 
the expenditure (who pays for transport services?) and income (wUere do transport 
margins go?) sides. Equation 4 above included tUe value of services used in transport 
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VTWR(i.r.s), and equation 2 included a term for tUe value of .services sold to tUe 
transport sector, VST(i,r). Since the GTAP database lacks the data to link these arrays 
directly, transport services are collected in a global transport service. The value of 
global transport services is GLOBTRAN: 
GLOBTRAN = Z,Z,Z,VTWR(i,r,s) (24) 
GLOBTRAN = Z, Z, VST(i,r) (25) 
Savings and Investment 
The GTAP database includes data for regional investment and savings, but lacks data 
on the bilateral international investment, so for the purpose of the GTAP model, 
savings from all regions are assumed to be equal to global investment: 
GLOBINV = Z, [ REGINV(r) - VDEP(r) ] (26) 
GLOBINV = Z, SAVE(r) (27) 
Regional investment comprises the purchase of all tradable commodities to make a 
regional capital good, which is non-traded. 
REGINV(r) = VOM("cgds",r) (28) 
where "cgds" refers to the set element (of produced commodities]) for capital goods. 
4.3 GTAP DATABASE LIMITATIONS 
The amount of data needed in a global CGE modelling framework is extremely large, 
and it is inevitable that such an ambitious project as GTAP has its limitations. WUile 
most of tUe limitations mean tUat tUe database is not well suited to certain issues, 
others mean that even for trade studies (the use that the database was intended for, and 
is best suited for) it has some short-comings. 
4.3.1 General Limitations 
The amount of work required to construct a database that would be required for 
appropriate detail in certain areas is often prohibUive; in some cases the data are 
unavailable, and thus not covered by GTAP. The areas in question, the simplifications 
they impose and any special limitations they imply (other than a reduction in the 
accuracy of simulations) are discussed below. 
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4.3.2 Regions 
In order to make the database and model global, all countries must be included, which 
requires the inclusion of aggregate regions. TUe six aggregate regions in tUe full 
database (Rest of Lafin America. Sub SaUaran Africa, Middle East and North Africa, 
Economies In Transition, South Asia, and Rest of World) must involve inaccuracies, 
mainly because the collection of full input-output tables and expenditure data for all 
countries is prohibitively costly and often impossible. These regions are each 
extrapolated from one or two "typical" countries within the region. altUougU some 
data (trade data, macro aggregates) are available for all countries. Because of tUese 
inaccuracies, tUe GTAP data are inappropriate for examining tUe effects of policy 
experiments specific to tUe aggregate regions. 
The EU is not defined as one of the six aggregate regions because it is considered to 
be a single country with a single trade policy. Unfortunately, this means that we are 
unable to identify the effects of CAP reform and/or the Uruguay Round on individual 
members. 
Version 4 of the GTAP database used in Chapters 7 and 8 has a slightly more 
disaggregated database, with 45 regions including four EU countries (the UK, 
Germany. Denmark and Sweden) and an aggregate "Rest of the EU" group. 
4.3.3 Sectors 
As with the database regions, the main limitation tUat tUe sectors defined in tUe 
database imposes is wUen sectors pertinent to a particular issue are not defined 
separately. TUe 37 sectors tUat tUe database defines are usually sufficient for most 
analyses, but more sectoral disaggregation would always add more accuracy to tUe 
simulation and tUe simulation results. TUe version four database used in CUapters 7 
and 8 has 50 sectors. 
4.3.4 "Missing" Data 
Few databases include all data that users might need, and GTAP is no exception. 
Short-comings in the available data are: 
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• Links between the private households and government (income taxes, other taxes 
and transfers) are not included. The regional household limits the applicability of 
GTAP for fiscal reform simulations. 
• The absence of data on different households within each region limits the ability 
of GTAP to model the effects of scenarios on income distribution. 
• GTAP includes no bilateral ownership data on capital. The "global savings bank"" 
inakes GTAP unsuitable for the analysis of international capital flows, and leads 
to the inconsistency that exisfing capital in region r is owned wholly by agents in 
region r, while investment in region r comes from all regions. 
• Links between tUe use of transport services and tUeir source are not included. TUe 
global transport service may lead to some small inaccuracies in results, and 
ignores any restrictions on sourcing of transport services. 
• Bilateral trade and protection data by good and by use is not included. GTAP 
includes bilateral trade and protection data by good, but tUe full matrix is 
proUibitive in size. TUis presents problems particularly for the highly aggregate 
cominodities (i.e. Other Manufacturing) where private demand uses particular 
types of these goods while intermediate demand may be for other types. In 
developing countries for example, private demand for Other Manufacturing is 
likely to be composed of "'Luxury'" goods, often with high tariffs, while 
intermediate demand may be for office equipment and a variety of (non 
Machinery) goods that are used in production. The tariff structure of goods for 
private and intermediate demand will often be different, and the sourcing of 
imports may also be different. 
• The values specified for the elasticity parameters in the functional forms used are 
not accurately estimated. Most elasticiUes are assumed to be the same for good i 
across all regions, and are taken from parameters originally estimated from the 
Australian SALTER model in the 1970s. 
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4.4 GTAP DATABASE ADVANTAGES 
The main advantage that the GTAP database has is its sheer size and coverage. Such a 
database would take any researcher years to construct separately, so the availability of 
the database for public sale is a major bonus for modellers. 
4.4.1 Database Expertise 
Apart from the data itself, a major bonus tUat the GTAP database brings is tUe 
database-building expertise of tUe various members of tUe GTAP consortium wUo 
have contributed data to the database and have continued to work with the data. In 
particular, apart from the staff at the IMPACT project in Australia and the GTAP staff 
at Purdue, the USDA, GATT/WTO and the OECD economics division have all been 
major contributors, and have for instance developed particular techniques for 
consolidating bilateral trade and trade protection data. 
4.4.2 Input-Output Data 
The input-output data in the GTAP database are unique in that they are constructed 
using the same commodity concordances in a large-scale global setting. While tUis 
cannot be done for all countries in tUe same year, tUe years tUat tUe database I-O tables 
are derived from are close enougU to be as accurate as could be Uoped for in sucU a 
large-scale database, and are updated to 1992 (1995 in tUe case of version 4) to enable 
them to be a common database. 
4.4.3 Bilateral Trade data 
Global-wide bilateral trade data are very rare and, as noted above, certain techniques 
have already been used to consolidate them. TUe main problem with unconsolidated 
data is that countries tend not to be particularly diligent when constructing trade data 
(although some countries are better than others). This means that any two countries 
may report different volumes of trade for a particular commodity: for example, 
Brazilian statistics might say that Brazil exports 100 million tonnes of Coffee to 
Canada, but Canadian statistics migUt say tUat Canada imports 150 million tonnes 
from Brazil. SucU problems become marked in Sub-SaUaran Africa and otUer low-
income LDCs, wUicU may not report mucU trade at all. Import statistics tend to be 
more reliable on tUe wUole because governments keep records of imports for tUe 
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purpose of levying tariffs, while exports are often poorly recorded unless they are 
taxed or subsidised. Where countries give tariff exemptions, for example to some 
industries, or to Export-Processing Zones, and to imports that are exempt from tariffs 
because of Customs Union membership, even imports are often not recorded. In 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the problems of trade reporting enter 
into different realms altogether, with barter trade, non-reporting and black inarket 
activity often leading to the reporting of zero trade flows where large flows are known 
to exist. 
To attempt to obtain some meaningful data from the quagmire of under-reporting (and 
non-reporfing), GTAP data are consolidated using a table system performed 
separately for each country"s imports and exports. A 'mark' is given to each country, 
derived from the differences between its reported trade and its partners" reports of the 
same trade flows. The countries that tend to have low differences are then assumed to 
be "better" reporters of trade than countries that have high differences with their trade 
partners. A league-table is constructed, and the ten "best" export reporters and the ten 
"best" import reporters at this stage are used as a control group, and a reliability index 
is constructed by assessing what proportion of each country's reported trade flows 
with the control group are accurately reported. 
The final trade flow values that are used in the database are derived as a weighted 
average of the two partners" reported trade, with the reliability index used to obtain 
weights. Where one partner has obtained a much higher reliability score than the 
other, the unadjusted trade flow reported by the better partner is used. 
This whole procedure is conducted at a 4-digit Standard Industrial Trade 
Classification (SITC) level for each individual country and then aggregated to the 
GTAP concordances. TUe resulting trade flows tUen undergo a matrix-balancing 
procedure in order to ensure that total exports/imports for eacU region meet defined 
totals, wUh weights ensuring tUat trade flows between "good reporting" countries are 
not changed as much as trade flows between "poor reporting" countries. 
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Table 4-4 The Five Best and Worst Export Reporting Accuracy Rates. 
1 
1 
3 
4 
5 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Export Reporters 
Faeroe Islands 
Germany (united) 
Angola 
Austria 
France 
Cameroon 
Kiribati 
Ethiopia 
Oman 
Togo 
Percent .\ccurucy 
.'i2.24 
52.07 
.50.00 
45.93 
45.79 
16.82 
16.67 
16.36 
16.23 
16.07 
source: GTAP short course notes (trom Mark Gelhar. ERS of the USDA) 
4.4.4 Bilateral trade protection data 
Trade protection data are taken largely from GATT submissions - in other words, 
those tariffs and other protection instruments that countries declare to GATT. TUe 
provision of tUese data on a bilateral commodity-specitic basis is a large bonus from 
the GTAP database. Any other border protection that countries apply is not included, 
and in the case of import surcharges this may be a serious problem. Francois et al. 
(1995. p.3) outline this as follows: 
"Customs surcharges and fees are tariffs under another name (hut 
sometimes with a different justification) and can add substantially to 
protection. Indeed, examples where surcharges add 50% or more to the 
basic tariff rates arc not uncommon. " 
4.5 GTAP DATABASE PARAMETERS 
Section 4.5 examines the GTAP database, with particular attention paid to key 
parameters. TUe source for all data is tUe GTAP version 2 database. 
4.5.1 Income 
Figure 4-1 demonstrates tUe importance to tUe world economy of tUree economies -
the USA, Japan and tUe EU, wUicU togetUer account for 71% of world income. TUe 
EU is tUe world's largest single market in income terms, wUile tUe USA is the largest-
earning single country, and NAFTA is the largest trade block. Table 4-5 confirms 
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this, and gives income liiiurcs fnu-n llie GT.AP database for each of the 24 
disaggregate GT.\P rcgit)ii.s. 
4.5.2 Output 
Figure 4-2 demonstrates the importance of services, accounting for a total of 57% of 
world output. .Agriculture and food processing together account for just over one tenth 
of world output. 
Figure 4-1: World Income by Country/Region 
EU 1 
29% 
Other Pacif.c 
Rim 
5% 
NICs 
3% 
JPN 
16% 
SI aher NAFTA 
W 4% 
Other Latin 
America 
4% 
Table 4-5: Regional income (USSbn) 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
Dollar 
income 
256.89 
35.87 
525.16 
5257.06 
3166.76 
268.54 
5863.29 
1 18 93 
60.24 
48.92 
27.32 
QO.of, 
"(1 of wor ld 
income 
1.27 
O.I 8 
2.60 
26.05 
15.69 
1.33 
29.06 
0.54 
0.30 
0.24 
0.14 
0.49 
CHN 
HKG 
TWN 
ARC 
BRA 
ME.X 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
SAS 
ROW 
Dollar 
income 
447.43 
17.84 
212.17 
198.92 
334.12 
293.62 
219.69 
147.99 
512.00 
731.45 
298.94 
1035.77 
'^ 0 of world 
income 
-) T ) 
0.09 
1.05 
0.99 
1.66 
1.46 
1.09 
0.73 
2.54 
3.63 
1.48 
5.13 
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Figure 4-2: The Structure ofWorld Output 
World Output by Product Category 
Agriculture 
5% 
Food Processing 
6% 
Services 
57% 
Industry 
32% 
Table 4-6 shows the structure of value added in each region, with sectors aggregated 
into the broad categories defined in section 4.1.1. Services are the dominant sector in 
all regions, but this is of course less pronounced in developing countries, where in 
Indonesia (47.5%). Malaysia (47.4"o). China (34.2%). South .Asia (33.3"n). Argentina 
(46.9%) and Sub-Saharan .Africa (37.6"'o) serxices account for under half of total 
value added. Value added in resource-based manufactures is higher than in tlnal 
manufactures in all regions except Japan. Hong Kong and Malaysia. Similarly, value 
added in agriculture exceeds value added in food processing in all regions except the 
L'SA and EU. Five regions stand out as having large "'other'" primar\- sectors -
Indonesia (16.5% of value added). Malaysia (18.5%). Latin .America (10.1%). Sub-
Saharan Africa (18.6%) and the Middle East and North .Africa (21,2"o). Textiles and 
clothing is a minor sector in all regions: Hong Kong is the onh region where it 
contributes over 5% of total value added. 
4-21 
Table 4-6: Structure of Value Added (percentages of total regional value added) 
„^. p 1 Textiles Resource- ^. . 
^ . ,^  Other Food Final ^ All Agriculture „ and based , Services „ . 
* primary Processing manufactures Goods 
' Clothing manufactures 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
TWN 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
SAS 
ARG 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
ROW 
5.9 
6.4 
2.9 
1.6 
2.9 
10.7 
3.8 
5.2 
17.9 
10.4 
17.1 
0.7 
10.7 
30.6 
0.6 
36.0 
10.8 
9.1 
9.5 
13.3 
24.2 
7.3 
4.3 
3.6 
5.1 
3.4 
4.6 
3.1 
1.6 
3.7 
2.3 
4.3 
16.9 
18.5 
8.4 
0.3 
6.9 
7.7 
1.4 
7.1 
6.8 
3.5 
6.0 
10.1 
18.6 
21.2 
4.4 
4.0 
2.7 
5.0 
3.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
4.2 
2.3 
3.4 
2,5 
10.3 
1.2 
6.8 
3.2 
1.7 
3.7 
8.9 
4.5 
6.6 
5.8 
4.8 
3.1 
3.5 
2.7 
I.l 
0.9 
i.5 
1.0 
1.2 
2.2 
1.7 
3.2 
1.9 
I.l 
1.8 
0.7 
4.9 
4.5 
7.6 
3.9 
4.4 
2.9 
2.0 
3.2 
2.2 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
7.0 
8.9 
9.9 
8.3 , 
9.8 
12.1 
10.5 
15.9 
10.1 
7.5 
5.3 
19.3 
7.7 
11.4 
3.5 
9.5 
15.4 
14.6 
9.8 
10.5 
8.5 
7.2 
10.0 
10.5 
4.0 
3.7 
9.7 
9.4 
13.1 
10.0 
8.9 
11.4 
2.4 
12.5 
2.5 
16.8 
6.9 
8.4 
8.7 
6.5 
6.9 
8.4 
5.6 
3.9 
4.0 
J . J 
7.8 
9.7 
74,2 
71.8 
68.1 
74.3 
69.0 
59.0 
68.7 
57.6 
47.5 
47.4 
54.7 
61.0 
56.1 
34.2 
76.6 
j j . j 
46.9 
57.0 
60.5 
53.1 
37.6 
56.3 
68.2 
67.7 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
4.5.3 Global Trade and Protection 
Figure 4-1 shows net exports by region (including sales to the global transport sector). 
Three bilateral trade flows account for the largest trade surpluses and deficits: The 
large bilateral trade surpluses that Japan has with the US and the EU largely account 
for both Japan^s large overall trade surplus and the US's and EU's trade deficits. 
Similarly, a large Chinese bilateral trade surplus with Hong Kong is evident in the 
database, and accounts for both a large Chinese trade surplus and a large Hong Kong 
trade deficit. This is less of a long-term feature, and occurs because much of Chinese 
trade (particularly in textiles and clothing) passes through Hong Kong to final 
markets, particularly those in the EU and US. This happens largely because China has 
lower MFA quotas than Hong Kong, as when the MFA system was set up China 
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Fi<iurc 4-1: Net Exports 
Total Net Exports By Region (US$ bn) 
exported \'ery low quantities of clothing and textiles, and Hong Kong was a major 
exporter. 
In 1092 Hong Kong imported large quantities of clothing from China that it did not 
re-e.xport until the following year, and hence the trade that is really passing through 
Hong Kong shows up in the GTAP database as a large trade deficit. 
Table 4-7 shows more detailed figures for net trade in each region, including the trade 
balance as a percentage of income (GDP). Here it is apparent that the trade deficits of 
the USA and EU are actualh' small as a percentage of income. -0.8% and -0,7% 
respectively. Other countries, such as Singapore (-33,8%). Other Latin .America (-
7,2%) and Thailand (-6,6%) have larger trade deficits as a percentage of income. The 
Hong Kong trade deficit is not only the largest in dollar terms, but also the largest as a 
percentage of income (-382,2%). 
The "Openness" column in Table 4-7 shows imports plus exports as a percentage of 
income, an indicator widely used to assess a country's openness to trade. Larger 
countries such as the USA. Japan and EU have low openness statistics (22.7"o. 23.4% 
and 25,6% respectively) as larger economic markets tend to be more self-sufficient. 
Hong Kong has a very high (and distorted) openness statistic, because of the China-
Hong Kong trade noted above, but Singapore and Malaysia both ha\'e openness 
statistics greater than 100%, 
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Table 4-7: Trade Figures (USSbn and percentages of income) 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
TWN 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
SAS 
ARG 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
ROW 
Trade 
Balance 
USSbn 
3,3 
2,4 
19,0 
-42,5 
88,4 
-0.2 
-38.7 
29.0 
6.8 
10.6 
0.3 
-9,2 
-6,5 
53.3 
-68,2 
-3.5 
-3.0 
9.1 
-11.1 
-15.8 
-5.3 
-14.5 
-6,6 
2,9 
"/., 
1,3% 
6,8% 
3.6% 
-0.8% 
2.8^0 
-0 .1% 
-0.7% 
13.7% 
5.7% 
17.5% 
0.5% 
-33.8% 
-6.6% 
11.9% 
-382.2% 
-1.2% 
-1.5% 
2,7''o 
-3,8% 
-7,2% 
-3,6% 
-2,8% 
-0,9% 
0,3% 
Exports 
USSbn 
53,9 
14,7 
150,0 
576,3 
414,7 
97,2 
731,8 
100,5 
39,4 
49,0 
17,3 
78,2 
37,9 
141,7 
73,3 
39,4 
16,2 
42,0 
57.5 
76.4 
43.4 
167,8 
84,7 
-> 'y c -^ J J J , J 
v« 
21,0% 
40,9" 0 
28,6% 
1 1.0% 
13.1% 
36.2% 
l2.5'"o 
47.4% 
33.1% 
81.3"'o 
35,3% 
286.2% 
38.2''b 
31.7% 
410.8% 
13,2% 
8,1% 
12,6% 
19,6% 
34.8% 
29,3% 
32,8% 
11.6''o 
32.4"o 
Imports 
USSbn 
50,6 
12.2 
131.0 
618.9 
326,3 
97,4 
770,4 
71,5 
32,6 
38,4 
17,0 
87,4 
44,4 
88,4 
141,5 
42.9 
19,2 
32.9 
68.6 
92.2 
48.7 
182.3 
91.3 
332.4 
"/.. 
19,7% 
34,1% 
24.9% 
1 1,8'% 
10,3% 
36,3% 
13,1% 
33,7% 
27,4% 
63,7% 
34,8% 
320,0% 
44,8% 
19,8% 
793,0% 
14,4% 
9,6% 
9.9% 
23,4% 
41,9% 
32.9% 
35,6% 
12.5% 
32.1% 
Openness 
40.7% 
75,0% 
53,5% 
22.7% 
23.4"',, 
72.4"',, 
25,6% 
81,1% 
60,5% 
145,0% 
70,0% 
606,2% 
83,0"/o 
51.4"'o 
1203,7% 
27,6% 
17,8% 
22.4"/o 
42,9% 
76,7"'o 
62,2"'o 
68.4% 
24.1% 
64.5'''o 
Income 
USSbn 
256,9 
35,9 
525,2 
5257,1 
3166,8 
268,5 
5863,3 
212,2 
118,9 
60,2 
48,9 
27.3 
99.1 
447.4 
17.8 
298.9 
198.9 
334.1 
293.6 
219.7 
148.0 
512.0 
731.5 
1035.8 
Table 4-8 shows average protection levels. The four columns show average import 
tariffs and export taxes, both as applied by the country in question, and applied by 
trading partner countries. The EU for example, applies an average 8.32% import: tariff 
on its own imports - a level that is relatively low in comparison to other countries. 
Meanwhile the EU faces an average 9.67% import tariff in foreign markets on its own 
exports. It applies an average 3.48% export tax, and its imports bear on average a 
2.62% export tariff applied by its export suppliers. 
Eleven countries apply import tariffs between 8% and 10%, with another eleven 
countries applying higher rates than 10%. The highest average import tariff is in 
Thailand (33.10%), with China (30.35%), Korea (24.83%), Brazil (23.47%) and The 
Philippines (21.79%) also standing out as high-tariff countries. Singapore and Hong 
K-ong both apply very low tariffs. 
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Argenfina faces the highest tariffs applied by trading partners on its exports (24.20%), 
with Hong Kong (19.48%), New Zealand (17.15%) and Japan (15.15%) also facing 
high tariffs applied by partner countries on their exports. Table 4-9 shows that the 
highest levels of tariff protection in industrial countries occur in agricultural goods 
and food products, with the exceptions of Australia. New Zealand and the USA which 
applies its highest tariff to Textile and Clothing. 
There is much variation in the structure of protection in developing countries, from 
Japanese-style agricultural protection in Korea and Taiwan (with low tariffs for 
manufactures), high levels of protection in all (or most) sectors in Thailand, Argenfina 
and Brazil to low levels of protection in all sectors in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Many developing countries apply higher tariffs to textiles and clothing than do the 
developed-country MFA importers. 
Table 4-8: Average import tariffs and export taxes, by importers and exporters 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
TWN 
ARG 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
SAS 
ROW 
Import 
Applied by 
importer 
12.91 
17,69 
8,76 
8,74 
13.03 
24.83 
8.32 
13.59 
8.24 
21.79 
0.41 
33.10 
30.35 
0.00 
10.53 
18.57 
23.47 
9.80 
9.56 
8.38 
8.16 
8.39 
7,42 
8.44 
Tariffs 
Faced by 
exporter 
12.36 
17.15 
6.43 
11.46 
15.15 
8.86 
9,67 
8,44 
7,64 
12,69 
8.22 
1 1.47 
10.08 
19,48 
11,45 
24.20 
13,66 
4.94 
10,84 
8,32 
3,42 
8,08 
11,26 
6,84 
Export Taxes 
Faced by 
importer 
0,52 
0.42 
1.41 
3,04 
0,40 
0,19 
2,62 
0,80 
0,11 
-0,12 
1,99 
0,56 
-0,01 
0,36 
0,42 
0,60 
0,68 
-0,02 
0,31 
1,03 
0,74 
0.35 
2.14 
3.07 
Applied by 
exporter 
0.52 
1.30 
-0,36 
-0,18 
1,12 
1.21 
3,48 
5,16 
11,37 
5,53 
0,33 
2.58 
4,58 
2,29 
0,99 
0,00 
0,98 
0,61 
2.10 
0.16 
0,16 
2.07 
1 1.62 
0,91 
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The export tax data are dominated by two considerations: MFA voluntary export 
restraints on textiles and wearing apparel, and developed country agricultural export 
subsidies. The MFA VERs lead to high ad valorem equivalents for export taxes from 
developing countries on exports of textiles and wearing apparel to the USA, EU. 
Canada and the Rest of the World (ROW) - because the ROW group includes non-EU 
Western Europe, which for 1992 encompasses countries that are MFA importers such 
as Sweden and Austria. 
Table 4-10 shows the average export taxes applied by each region in major 
coinmodity groups, and demonstrates several features. The only regions that on 
average apply export subsidies to agriculture and food are Canada, the USA, the EU 
Table 4-9: Average import tariffs applied by importer 
Agriculture Other 
primary 
Food Textiles Resource- Final Services 
Products and based manufactures 
Clothing manufactures 
All 
Goods 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
TWN 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
SAS-
ARG 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM-
SSA-
MNA= 
EIT-
ROW= 
I 
6.8 
J.J 
23.2 
11,6 
200,3 
233,9 
55,6 
142.3 
43.5 
1.3 
21.0 
0.0 
43.2 
11.2 
0.0 
8.8 
17.5 
12.7 
8.1 
10.5 
8.5 
8.8 
9.8 
9.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.1 
0.7 
1.4 
5.4 
1,0 
1,9 
1,7 
2,5 
18,4 
0,0 
26,1 
11.4 
0,0 
4.1 
16,2 
1,0 
8,5 
9.1 
6,7 
5.2 
2,5 
3,8 
7,3 
I 1.9 
13.9 
I 1.2 
36,3 
36.5 
25,0 
26.7 
18.4 
7.7 
24.5 
0,1 
46.6 
37,9 
0,0 
11.4 
17,4 
41,6 
7,3 
12,5 
11,9 
11.9 
11,9 
11.1 
13.5 
32,6 
21,3 
18.4 
11,9 
18.3 
12.7 
6,8 
28.3 
22.3 
39.8 
0.5 
59.5 
65.9 
0.0 
13.2 
36.9 
62.4 
16.9 
14,8 
12.6 
12.9 
12.5 
12.5 
14.7 
18,0 
9,7 
7,1 
4,6 
14.3 
8,0 
3.4 
7,6 
7,0 
19,9 
1,7 
24.8 
19,7 
0,0 
8,6 
19,3 
29,5 
8,7 
9,8 
9,5 
10,2 
10,3 
10.4 
29.5 
8.5 
11.6 
3.5 
19.0 
8.7 
8.0 
16.5 
9.2 
23,6 
0,1 
38.4 
34,8 
0,0 
11,5 
24,6 
41.2 
2,5 
1.9 
1.7 
1.3 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0 
2.2' 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0,0 
0.6 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0 
12,9 
17,7 
8,8 
8,7 
13,0 
24.8 
8.3 
10.5 
13.6 
8.2 
21.8 
0.4 
33.1 
30.4 
0.0 
7.4 
18.6 
23.5 
9.8 
9.6 
8,4 
8,2 
8,4 
8,4 
The only service protection data in the database is a small import tariff on Chinese imports of electricity from f 
Kong, 
"One feature of the database is that the six aggregate regions all have broadly similar tariff structures. 
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and Brazil. These subsidies are far higher in the EU than elsewhere. Australia 
subsidises exports of food, but it taxes agriculture. Malaysia stands out as a country 
that applies significant export taxes on most sectors, including agriculture. 
Comparison of the Malaysian data in Table 4-10 and Table 4-11 shows that the 
average export tax for Malaysian textiles and clothing (75.1%) is much higher than 
the ad valorem equivalent of MFA quotas on Malaysian exports. Malaysia therefore is 
taxing exports of textiles and clothing (to all destination regions) in addition to the 
VERs. 
Table 4-10: Average export tax/subsidy applied by exporter 
AUS 
NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
KOR 
E_U 
TWN 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
SAS 
ARG 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
SSA 
MNA 
EIT 
ROW 
Agriculture 
1.2 
0.9 
-6.1 
-J , J 
0.0 
0,0 
-30,2 
0,0 
0,0 
16,2 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
-2,2 
0,0 
0,6 
0.1 
1.9 
0.8 
1.6 
Other 
primary 
1,3 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.9 
0.0 
0.0 
11.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
-0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
Food 
Processing 
-1.5 
1.6 
-1.6 
-0.9 
0,0 
0,0 
-1,5 
0,0 
0,0 
12,4 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
-0,6 
0,0 
7,2 
1.4 
2,1 
5,7 
7,1 
Textiles 
and 
Clothing 
-0,4 
6,9 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
7,6 
0,2 
7,6 
33,2 
75,1 
37,5 
8,9 
20,2 
17,9 
9,3 
35.0 
0.0 
11.0 
17.8 
19.3 
0.0 
8.5 
10.9 
5.2 
Resource-
based 
manufactures 
1.3 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.6 
0.0 
15,4 
0,2 
0,1 
13.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.4 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
2.1 
0.0 
0.4 
0.5 
1.0 
1.8 
1.3 
Final 
manufactures 
-0.5 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
1.4 
0.2 
0,9 
0,0 
0,0 
3,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
-I.l 
0.0 
-0.3 
0.1 
0.2 
1,3 
0,2 
Services 
0.1 
1.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.0 
8.2 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,9 
0,0 
All 
Goods 
0.5 
1.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
1.0 
1.2 
2.8 
1.0 
5.0 
11.3 
4.5 
0.3 
2.6 
4.5 
~i -) 
11.6 
0.0 
1.0 
0.6 
2,1 
0,2 
0,2 
2,1 
0.9 
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Table 4-11: Ad valorem export tax equivalents of MFA quotas 
Textiles 
KOR 
IDN 
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
CHN 
HKG 
TWN 
BRA 
MEX 
LAM 
MNA 
EIT 
SAS 
ROW 
CAN 
9^63 
17.50 
15.17 
11.52 
11,89 
13.71 
23,21 
7,63 
9,43 
11,61 
11,61 
11,61 
5.80 
7,74 
23.21 
4.64 
USA 
9.85 
11,95 
9,50 
8,57 
7,93 
9,07 
18,41 
7,67 
8,16 
9,21 
9,21 
9,21 
4,60 
6,14 
18,41 
3,68 
E_U 
10.09 
17,46 
11,70 
10,03 
10,10 
12,85 
27,35 
8,10 
11,64 
13.68 
13,68 
13,68 
6,84 
9,12 
27,35 
5,47 
Clothing 
CAN 
19,54 
41,13 
35,66 
27,08 
27,94 
32,23 
42,00 
15,49 
19,15 
21,00 
21,00 
21,00 
10,50 
14,11 
42,00 
8,40 
USA 
23,33 
46,74 
37,14 
33,52' 
31,01 
35,46 
40,32 
18,19 
19.35 
20,16 
20,16 
20,16 
10,08 
13,44 
40,32 
8,06 
E_U 
-|g ,^ 
48,37 
32,40 
27,79 
27.98 
35,58 
36,11 
15,55 
22,35 
18,06 
18,06 
18.06 
9,03 
12,04 
36,11 
7,22 
source: GTAP short course notes 
4.5.4 Trade and Agricultural Protection by GTAP Region 
This section concentrates on each GTAP region in turn, examining the trade position 
and agricultural protection for that region. 
Australia 
Figure 4-1 shows the Australian net trade position arranged by GTAP sector, and it is 
clear that Australia's net exporting sectors lie to the left of the graph in agricultural, 
other primary, and food processing industries. The main net importing sector is other 
machinery and equipment (OME), followed by transport industries (TRN). Australia 
exports 68% of world wool trade. 
Table 4-12 presents the structure of Australian agricultural protection, which shows a 
generally low level of protection; only milk and milk products (MIL) has rates above 
10%. Support in the main agricultural goods (the first six rows, as opposed to food 
processing) consists of small output subsidies and small import tariffs. 
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Figure 4-1: .Australian Net E.vports 
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Table 4-12: The Structure of Australian .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsid> 
E.xpenditure 
Smillion 
4.43 
70.97 
24.49 
145.13 
107.93 
93,49 
455,44 
Output 
Subsid> 
Rate 
0 / 0 
3.70 
4.00 
3.50 
2.20 
3.28 
1,30 
0.89 
E,\port 
Siibsidx 
E.xpenditure 
Smillion 
0.30 
136.08 
136.47 
E.xport 
Subsid) 
Rate 
°' o 
0.03 
16.75 
1,15 
1 in pen 
Tnritr 
Revenue 
Smillion 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
26.74 
0.60 
1.44 
0.71 
2.77 
36.03 
50.00 
27.61 
148.06 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
"o 
4.40 
0.20 
1,89 
8.70 
2,00 
1,75 
4,40 
8.04 
34.00 
4.40 
8.67 
6.68 
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/Vt'it' Zealand 
New Zealand's main net-exporting ,sccti)rs arc proccs.scd ro()d.s (meat, MET and milk 
products MIL), services (the righl-mosl six columns) and agrieallural good.s. of which 
wool (WOL) is the largest (but docs not dominate agricultural net cxport.s). While in 
dollar terms New Zealand's trade surplus ((IS$ 2,4 bn) is small compared to other 
countries, its trade surplus as a percentage of income (6.8';o| is one ot tlie largest. New 
Zealand's agricultural protection, as shown in fable 4-13. consists entireh oi low 
output subsidies and small import tariffs. Export subsidies are not used at all. 
Figure 4-1: New Zealand's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): NZL 
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Table 4-13: The Structure of Ne^ ^ Zealand's .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
E.xpenditure 
Smillion 
1,02 
2,06 
25,98 
47,47 
14.45 
90.99 
Output 
SubsidN' 
Rate 
% 
2.70 
1.00 
1.99 
1.50 
0.80 
0.62 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsid)' 
Rate 
• ^-0 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
.Smillion 
0.00 
5 06 
0.00 
2.71 
0.89 
54.70 
0.00 
66.63 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
"/o 
L3() 
4 50 
3.00 
15.20 
10.bO 
15.30 
0.00 
0.13 
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Ciinada 
Canada has an o\-erall trade surplus o\' I IS.SL^ bn, with a varietx of sectors being net 
exporters, from agricultural (wheat. Wi l l ) and pnmarx fuel industries, wood-based 
industries (lumber. LdM and pulp paper products PPP). some manuiacluring 
industries and ser\ices. The striking feature of Canada's trade pattern is the large trade 
deficit in the other machinery and equipment (OME) sector. 
Canada's agricultural protection (Table 4-14) uses a combination of all three support 
t\pes. B\ dollar \alue. output subsidies are the most extensi\e measure of support -
although it should be remembered that import tariffs can have a far greater effect than 
Figure 4-2: Canada's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): CAN 
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Table 4-14: The Structure of Canadian Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidv 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
S00.13 
232.71 
006.00 
0.07 
679.87 
2310.09 
355,51 
5297,06 
Output 
Subsid\ 
Rate 
»(> 
16.80 
7.60 
10.30 
3.47 
4.70 
2 1.90 
4.50 
5.67 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
304.(11 
1 14.01 
64.04 
123.60 
7.74 
614.89 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
7.10 
15.08 
4.99 
44.06 
0.29 
4.28 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
0.04 
14.57 
607.63 
0.10 
50.(iO 
0.07 
187.43 
177.23 
210.44 
92.05 
1360.40 
Import 
Fariff 
Rate 
"o 
28.80 
14.50 
23.78 
2.30 
2 1.00 
LOO 
2L' '0 
135.40 
7.00 
13.51 
16.01) 
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the revenue raised - a large tariff will raise incomes in the import competing sector as 
imports are brought down lo low le\eLs. which ma\ mean low levels of tariff revenue. 
The Canadian tariff rate on Milk and Milk Products (MIL) al 135.40%, is the largest 
tariff rate, and this sector also benefits from a large (44,06%) export subsidv. and a 
4.5% output subsidy. 
The USA 
The USA has an overall trade deficit of US.S 43 bn in the GT.AP database, with 
several sectors being major net importers: oil. wearing apparel (W.AP). leather goods 
(LEA) transport equipment (TRN). other machinery and equipment (OME) . other 
manufacturing (OMF) and electricity gas and water (EGW). The dominant trade 
pattern for the USA is that it is a major exporter of services, and a net importer of 
almost all goods. 
Agricultural protection in the US.A is dominated by output subsidies, with smaller 
e.xport subsidy and import tariff rates, with the exception of Milk and Milk Products 
(MIL) which has a high tariff rate and low output subsidy rate. 
Figure 4-1: The United States' Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): USA 
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Table 4-15: The Structure of American Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smil l ion 
1361,28 
5543.34 
10472,71 
3617.33 
01.32 
3268.00 
1072.92 
26326.00 
Output 
Subsids 
Rate 
1) 
57,30 
32.40 
30.60 
5.20 
63.00 
3.50 
4.30 
3.76 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smil l ion 
18.37 
845.84 
84,02 
0.28 
69.00 
212,47 
1229.98 
Export 
Subsidv 
Rate 
"o 
5.83 
16.70 
1,28 
0,00 
1,53 
34.10 
2.28 
Import 
f an f f 
Revenue 
Smil l ion 
0.19 
20.27 
0.82 
001.06 
8.84 
358.30 
5.31 
572.01 
514.30 
633.87 
330.65 
3429.02 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Rate 
' 0 
1.45 
10.10 
3 50 
10.57 
5.10 
18.20 
4.80 
18.20 
00.80 
7.20 
5,84 
9.86 
Jiipan 
.lapan has the largest trade surplus in the world (US$ <S8 bn in the GTAP database), 
and Figure 4-1 demonstrates that this is due to large net exports of manufactured 
goods. The world markets for transport goods (TRN). other machinerx' and equipment 
(OME) and other manufactures (OMF) are dominated b\ .lapan, with over 20% of 
v\orld exports in each of these goods. No other countr>' or region has a trade surplus in 
a single good of over US$ 1 OObn. 
Figure 4-1: .Japan's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): JPN 
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Table 4-16: The Structure of Japanese Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
E.xpenditure 
Smillion 
3754.95 
590,87 
991,83 
21404,68 
218,35 
1330,06 
28290,73 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
10,10 
14,80 
16,40 
48,90 
0,50 
7.20 
4,60 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
0,52 
5775,18 
14051,54 
7219,89 
919,51 
32,42 
3750,45 
2010,69 
700,95 
528,59 
35535,57 
Impoit 
Tariff 
Rate 
0 
• 1) 
352,53 
490,79 
463.38 
95,80 
57,70 
350,90 
57,70 
343,80 
9,08 
11,66 
73.30 
Table 4-16 shows that Japanese agricultural protection is characterised by very high 
import tariffs (in fact, for many products, by a very restrictive quota system that leads 
to high ad valorem equivalents). Output subsidies exist, and are high for Non-Grain 
Crops (NGC), while export subsidies are not used at all. The stringent quota system 
for grains (Paddy Rice PDR and Processed Rice PCR. Wheat WHT and Other Grains 
GRO) is a component of Japanese protection that has been severely criticised, and 
became a stumbling block in the Uruguay Round, as Japan sought to gain exemptions 
for these products. 
Korea 
Korean trade is almost balanced, with a small (-0.1% of GDP) trade deficit. Net 
imports of agricultural goods, mining and minerals (in particular. Oil) and most 
manufactured goods are offset by trade surpluses in Textiles, Wearing Apparel, 
Leather Goods, Transport Equipment. Other Manufactures and services. The structure 
of Korean agricultural protection (Table 4-17) shows a pattern similar to that of 
Japan, with large import tariffs (again, actually ad valorem equivalents of a highly 
restrictive import quota regime) for grains and Non-Grain Crops, coupled with output 
subsidies. 
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Fi"urc 4-1: Korean Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): KOR 
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Table 4-17 The Structure of Korean Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsid\ 
E.xpenditure 
Smil l ion 
4618.24 
0.00 
178.78 
4200.07 
989,08 
417.47 
10502,64 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
» 0 
50.50 
0.00 
8.10 
30.70 
14.80 
19.00 
1 1.39 
Export 
Subsidy 
E.xpenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Revenue 
Smil l ion 
0.1 1 
30.94 
3650.45 
7408.0! 
20.0! 
677.02 
22.40 
208.72 
58.25 
266.01 
325.47 
12030.28 
Import 
Tcu-i ff 
Rate 
0 
317.19 
5.00 
403.40 
382.10 
10.00 
40.50 
316.78 
40.50 
123.00 
17.10 
73.57 
140.80 
The EU 
The EU's trade deficit of US$38,7bn (0,7% of GDP) is dominated by a large surplus 
in Trade and Transport Services (T_T) which, along with smaller surpluses in some 
manufactured and service sectors, partially offsets trade deficits in a range of 
industries - principally Oil and Other Government Services ((3SG), Most agricultural 
and food processing sectors feature relatively balanced trade, with the exception of 
Non-Grain Crops, where the trade deficit is sizeable. 
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Fi"urc 4-1: Net Trade Position of the EU 
Net Exports (USSbn); E U 
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Table 4-18: The Structure of Agricultural Protection in the EU 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
152.59 
2286.02 
785.58 
65940.71 
4.38 
19456.64 
360.39 
80100.20 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
7.20 
6.30 
2.50 
71.00 
0.44 
9.20 
0.20 
7.34 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
84.77 
2644.22 
1880.80 
1333.08 
0.04 
I I . KJ 
3136.48 
4205,92 
138.09 
13532.40 
E.xport 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
76.46 
67.56 
70.66 
23.32 
0.04 
0.70 
44.79 
47.75 
1.00 
24.97 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
312.24 
130.02 
450.73 
13630.60 
1 1.02 
1710.85 
308.04 
2300.10 
1 178.83 
2170.17 
002.52 
23690.02 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
°-o 
128.70 
5 1.20 
67. (it) 
58.50 
0.70 
56.10 
128.70 
56.10 
132.00 
12.61 
18.18 
36.60 
EU agricultural protection makes use of all three policy instruments - output 
subsidies, export subsidies and import tariffs. As elsewhere, these ad valorcin rates 
include many diverse intervention mechanisms, from Variable Import Levies to 
headage payments. Domestic output subsidies are predominantly used m Non-Grain 
Urops. covering a wide range of crops and intervention mechanisms. Export subsidies 
are predominant in grains, with significant subsidies in the Meat (MET) and Milk and 
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Milk Products (MIL) food processing sectors. Import tariffs are highest in Milk and 
Milk Products and the two rice industries (paddy rice PDR and processed rice PCR). 
Table 4-18 shows sector sizes and rations for EU agricultural and food processing 
sectors. It is clear that the rice sectors. PDR and PCR. and Wool (WOL) are not 
significantly large in either production or consumption. Other Livestock (OLP) is the 
largest agricultural sector in terms of output, consumption and value-added. Other 
Food Products (OFP) is the largest food processing sector. 
Low trade shares are typical in agricultural sectors, and there are several EU 
agricultural sectors with very low import penetration shares, and with of these sectors 
(WHT, GRO, OLP, MET and MIL) the Uruguay Round commitment to ensuring that 
import penetration ratios are at least 5% by the end of the implementation period may 
pose serious problems. 
Table 4-19: EU Agricultural Sector Sizes and Ratios 
Output 
USSmn 
Exports 
USSmn 
Imports 
USSmn 
Consumption 
(final + intermediate) 
USSmn 
Value 
Added 
USSmn 
E.xports as 
%o f 
production 
Import 
Penetration 
% 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B T 
2119 
36286 
31425 
92874 
1000 
211487 
4721 
179002 
113413 
352684 
143304 
26 
1270 
783 
4383 
110 
1576 
217 
3866 
4701 
13726 
10987 
243 
256 
667 
23300 
1703 
3066 
239 
4100 
887 
17286 
4965 
2336 
35272 
31309 
1I I79I 
2593 
212977 
4743 
179236 
109599 
356244 
137282 
1151 
19493 
16185 
84898 
518 
118605 
1476 
38114 
43226 
100028 
86545 
1% 
3% 
TO 0 
11% 
1% 
0 
4% 
4^0 
8% 
10% 
1% 
2% 
21% 
66% 
1% 
5% 
2% 
1% 
5% 
4% 
Taiwan 
Taiwan's large trade surplus ($29bn. 13.7% of GDP) is a result of net exports in a 
number of manufacturing industries - the Textiles, Wearing Apparel, Leather and 
Lumber 'Tight manufacturing" industries as well as heavy manufacturing - Fabricated 
Metal Products, Other Machinery and Equipment and Other Manufactures. Service 
sectors are also in surplus, with the main deficit sectors being several manufacturing 
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industries. While Taiwan's net-e.xporting hea\\ induslries ma\ look superficialh' like 
the .lapanese model. .lapan is not a large net exporter of ihe light manufactures, and 
unlike Taiwan, is a major net-importer of natural resources, 
Taiwanese agricultural protection lollow.s a similar patlern to .lapanese protection 
insofar as grains are prtttected by stringent quotas, with high ULI va/oi-cni tariff 
equi\'alents, Taiwan does not. howe\er have such an output suhsidx regime, except 
for a small subsidy' to Forestr>' (FRS), 
Figure 4-1: Taiwanese Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): TWN 
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Table 4-20: The Structure of Taiwanese .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
FRS 
FSH 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
E.xpenditure 
Smil l ion 
53.06 
53,06 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
5.01 
0,08 
E.xpon 
Subsidy 
Expeiiditiu'e 
Smil l ion 
E.xport 
Subsidx 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Revenue 
Smil l ion 
0.01 
438.20 
2214.54 
0 12.50 
14.7(1 
28.30 
1.31 
30.7b 
170,78 
141.03 
271.27 
~4223.74 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
(J 
(1 
8100 
307,(i() 
325.60 
72.00 
5.00 
0.17 
81,00 
lh.3() 
72.10 
12.43 
36.38 
78.06 
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Indonesia 
Indonesia's trade structure is txpical of a resource-rich de\elopmg countrx. in that Oil. 
Gas. and Lumber are the three largest nel-exportmg sectors, with fextiles. Wearing 
Apparel and Leather Goods also hemg net exporters, Nleanwhile heavy 
manufacturing, and particularix' Machmery and Equipment, are hea\ily imported, 
Indonesian agricultural protection is characterised hx import larilfs. particularly in 
Non-Grain Crops (a net export), with small lexels of subsidy support in grains (Paddy 
Rice and Other Grains) and Non-Grain Crops, 
Figure 4-1: Indonesian Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): IDN 
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Table 4-21: The Structure of Indonesian Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidv 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
324,80 
93,65 
275.64 
694.09 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
4.70 
10.60 
1.00 
1.29 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
- -- -
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
3.35 
607.60 
0.05 
4,84 
6,84 
34.74 
123.71 
23.46 
903.62 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
1) 
0 
7.82 
66.50 
5.00 
7.60 
30.00 
27.70 
20.00 
24.05 
33.54 
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Malaysia 
Like Indonesia. Malaysia is a large net exporter of Oil. (.ias. Wearini; ,'\pparel and 
Lumber, and a net importer of most manufactures, Malaysia does however have some 
manufacturing exports ((Jther Manufactures) and large Trade and fransport Services 
exports, Malaysia is also a net exporter of Non-Grain Crops and Forestry, with most 
agricultural and food sectors either in small surplus or small deficit, 
Malaysian agricultural protection is at \er> low levels - e\en the I3,56"n tariff on 
Other Food Products would be considered low in many countries. 
Figure 4-1: Malaysian Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): MYS 
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Table 4-22: The Structure of Malaysian Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
0,01 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
0 0 
0,00 
E,xport 
Subsidy 
ExpenditLire 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
1,58 
0,61 
10,66 
1.15 
0.70 
0.11 
1.16 
3.52 
1 17.08 
2.76 
147.05 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
% 
0.85 
0.21 
1.03 
2.00 
2.15 
0.00 
1.03 
1.41 
13.5(1 
(1.00 
5.10 
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The Philippines 
The Philippines" main net exporting sectors are Trade and Transport Ser\ ices. Other 
Prixate Services, and Wearing .Apparel, ,\s with man> de\elopmg countries, most 
hea\\ manufacturing sectors are net importing sectors, and a large Oil deficit exists. 
Filipino agricultural protection rests on a moderate import tariff regime, with no 
otitptit or export subsidies. 
Figure 4-1: The Philippines' Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): PHL 
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Table 4-23: The Structure of The Philippines' .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
OL tput 
Subsidy 
E,xpe 
Sm 
nditure 
llion 
Output 
Subsidx 
Rate 
"o 
Export 
Subsidx 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
E.xport 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
0.03 
27.18 
2.08 
67.62 
025 
7 02 
11.10 
44.88 
1 18.65 
84.12 
380.81 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
0 
50 (10 
10.00 
20.33 
37.67 
20,00 
20.()3 
34.40 
15.73 
22.13 
44.00 
22,65 
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Singapore 
Singapore's trade structure suggests it is in .some wa.ws the most de\eloped of the 
Asian Newly Industrialising Countries; there is no reliance on textiles and clothing, 
and although small U'ade deticils are incurred in hea\y manufacturinii sectors, 
Singapore is a net exporter of in traded service sectors. There is also evidence that 
Singapore's position as an oil refiner plays a major role in its trade structure (large Oil 
imports, and large Petroleum and Coal exports), Singapore is a food importer -
\ irtuall> \^o agricultural or food production exists. 
Figure 4-1: Singapore's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): SGP 
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Table 4-24 The Structure of Singapore's Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"b 
Export 
Subsid} 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
2,71 
2,71 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
"o 
0,17 
0,05 
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Thailand 
Thailand's trade position, as shcnvn in Figure 4-1. demonstrates a heavv reliance on 
manufacturing imports, with surplus sectors in ser\ices. Wearing .Apparel. Leather 
(ioods. and food products. 
As Table 4-25 shows. Thailand has a m(,)derately high level of agricultural protection, 
with tariffs being used as the mam instrument of protection, Non-(jrain Crops. Meat 
Products. Other Food Products and Beverages and Tobacco are all protected bv tariffs 
around 55-60%, with smaller tariffs in other sectors. Rice production is unprotected 
by tariffs, with a small output subsidy in Paddx' Rice production. 
Figure 4-1: Thailand's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): THA 
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Table 4-25: The Structure of Thailand's Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
XLL~ 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
82.56 
26.94 
(Jutput 
Subsidy 
Rate 
2.30 
0.40 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidx 
Rate 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
109.50 0.26 
14.58 
407.0(1 
8.52 
26.33 
7.51 
51.34 
303.67 
145.68 
1700.47 
10 40 
()0,4() 
2 0 Oi.) 
10.81 
54 14 
23,11 
40.71 
50.53 
46,1 1 
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China 
As noted earlier, China's trade surplus is \cr> large as a consequence of exports of 
Wearing ,\pparel to llong Kong for re-export to third markets, China has smaller 
trade surpluses in many other sectors, with Leather Goods and Other .Vlanufactures 
being the next largest net-exporting sectors, China's net-importing sectors are mainly 
manufacturing sectors, with some agricultural net-imports (Wheat and Wool), 
Figure 4-1: Chinese Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): CHN 
P W G N W O F F C O G O P M M O B T W L L P P C N I N F T O O E C T O O D 
D H R G O L R S O l A M C E I F _ E A E U P _ R M _ F M R M M G N _ S S W 
R T O C L P S H L L S N R T L P T X P A M P C P M S M P N E F W S T P G E 
Table 4-26: The Structure of Chinese .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
BJ 
ALL 
Ol tput 
Subsidy 
Expe 
Sm 
nditure 
l l ion 
(3utput 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Ex 
Sub 
Ex pel 
Smi 
Dort 
sidy 
diture 
lion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Revenue 
Smil l ion 
14.87 
250.40 
87.(33 
77.30 
30.30 
26.60 
486.00 
260.60 
1379.60 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Rate 
"o 
10.10 
24.21 
15.00 
34.0(1 
45.37 
35.52 
20.41 
06.75 
20.22 
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Table 4-2b show's that China's agricultural protection is al a moderateh high level, 
with a particularly high tariff applied to Beverages and Tobacco. Rice is unprotected. 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong's $68,2bn trade deficit is spread amongst most (with the single exception 
of Wearing Apparel) manufacturing sectors, with Other Machiner\' and Equipment 
showing the largest trade deficit. Service sectors show small trade siirplu,ses, while 
agricultural sectors are importing sectors - very little agricultural production occurs in 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong has no agricultural protection. 
Figure 4-1: Hong Kong's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): HKG 
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South Asia 
South ,\sia. dominated b\ India. deri\es trade surpluses from fextiles. Wearing 
Apparel, and Leather (ioods. and is a net importer in the hea\ \ manulacturn-m sectors. 
South .Asia IS a net agricultural exporter, with Non-Grain Crops beiim the most 
significant net export. 
Table 4-27 shows that South Asian agricultural protection is comparativelv low. with 
tariffs being used as the main protective instrument. 
Figure 4-1: South-Asia's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): SAS 
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Table 4-27: The Structure of South-.Asian .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
1435.32 
1326.40 
361.1 1 
58.89 
3181.72 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
6.20 
2.00 
1.00 
12.70 
1.43 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
0.00 
64.18 
0,6(1 
85.0 1 
8.51 
13.48 
4.47 
0.53 
24.48 
160.07 
4.53 
368.65 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
"o 
2.08 
7.08 
3.80 
10.32 
5.15 
8.85 
10.01 
(v57 
1 1.05 
12,32 
3,05 
0.57 
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Argentina 
Argentina's $3hn trade deficit (1.5"(. or (][W) is a consequence o\' net imports in the 
manufacturing sectors, while .Argentina's exports are predominanth of agricultural 
and food products, Argentina's agricultural protection consists of relativeh' low tariff 
rates and \er\- low output subsidies. 
Figure 4-1: .Argentina's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): ARG 
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Table 4-28: The Structure of Argentinean Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
0,02 
0,01 
0,02 
0.06 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
0.00 
1.40 
0.(18 
41.68 
0.44 
10.53 
16.45 
29.24 
50.60 
25.05 
184.10 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
% 
12.00 
20.07 
14.87 
17.37 
21.00 
17.03 
12.00 
2 1.05 
16.58 
20.00 
17.52 
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Brazil 
B\ de\eloping country standards Bra/il is \er\ industrialised. Figure 4-1 shows that 
Brazil's mam net-exporting sector is Ferrous Metals (I^S), with several other 
manufacturing sectors in net surplus. Brazil is also a net food exporter, with 
significant exports o\' N(Mv(ii-ain Crops, Meat, and Other Food Products. Brazil's 
mam net-importing sector is (3il. 
Brazilian agricultural protection consists of import tariffs and output subsidies on 
most goods, with small export subsidies on some got)ds - (.)ther Grains and Non-Grain 
Crops have the largest export subsidy rates. 
Figure 4-1: Brazil's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): BFIA 
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Table 4-29 The Structure of Brazilian .Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
706.00 
417,52 
1701.51 
96.44 
2,46 
1031.63 
132.47 
4304.84 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
45.60 
24.00 
28.1 1 
0.47 
0.52 
5.00 
0.44 
3.68 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
0.08 
(i8.20 
12.41 
0.10 
30.78 
0.31 
1 1 1.00 
Export 
Subsidx' 
Rate 
% 
3.83 
2.48 
0,89 
1.75 
0.66 
0.03 
I.IO 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
21.83 
31.88 
166.67 
o.os 
0.0 1 
40.78 
57.55 
75.04 
604.70 
20.38 
1060.53 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
" o 
10 66 
22.05 
21.31 
25 41 
10.75 
20.00 
20.56 
36.10 
48.82 
30.57 
27,80 
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Mexico 
Mexican net-expoi1s are dominated h> Oil. .\part from (Jil. onh three small surpluses 
in .serMces sectors prevent the .Vlexican trade deficit of ,1)1 1,1 hn (3,,S"., of CiDP) being 
larger. Most manufactured goods are imported more than thex are exported, with 
Other Machinery and Equipment ha\ ing the largest deficit. 
Table 4-30 shows that Mexican protection of .Agriculture is relati\el\ low. with most 
agricultural and food goods ha\ing applied tariffs belov\ 2()"o, Small output subsidies 
exist, predominantly in the grains sectors. 
Figure 4-1: Mexico's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): MEX 
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Table 4-30: The Structure of Mexican Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
3,06 
21.00 
315.01 
145.17 
1,07 
1079.88 
1567.88 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
1.30 
2,73 
4.20 
1 OO 
3.93 
3.80 
1.54 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
2.31 
16.70 
150.72 
34.14 
0.70 
15.68 
6.37 
64,01 
40.25 
78.70 
5 1.44 
486.35 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
"o 
10.00 
o.(.2 
20.30 
2.48 
3.00 
3.41 
iO.OO 
7.10 
8.25 
5.12 
I4(i0 
7.(i8 
4-40 
Other Latin .America 
Other Latin American countries (Figure 4-1 ) are major net-importers of manufactured 
goods; Transport Goods and Other Machinery and Fquipment together account for a 
trade deficit of around ,S3()bn. while the overall trade deficit is SI5.<Sbn (7.2"u of 
GDP). Other Latin America's main exports are Non-Gram Crops and (Jil. .Agricultural 
protection consists of comparatively moderate import tariffs and very large output 
subsidies m grain sectors. 
Figure 4-1: Other Latin America's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): LAM 
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Table 4-31: The Structure of .Agricultural Protection in Other Latin .America 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidv 
Expenditure 
Smill ion 
4862,58 
90,73 
1698.38 
1 14.79 
6766,47 
Otitput 
Subsidy 
Rate 
u 
152,05 
47,76 
161,28 
1,03 
6,27 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smil l ion 
0,57 
0,57 
Export 
Subsid> 
Rate 
0 0 
0,60 
0.00 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Revenue 
Smil l ion 
5,79 
81,06 
73.23 
I I 0 1 1 
1.40 
14.(i2 
34.88 
81.16 
100.43 
407.21 
79,97 
1019,65 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Rate 
n 
0 
12,05 
8,88 
13,16 
10,50 
7,07 
0.10 
13.20 
1 3.05 
14.4(1 
13,62 
7,09 
11,78 
LAM tariffs are derived from: Bolivia. Chile, Paratiuay. Columbia. Ecuador, Peru. 
LAM subsidies are derived from: Chile, Cokimbia. Jamaica, Venezuela, 
[source: Hertel 1997. p,l28] 
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Siih-Saharan .Africa 
Sub-Saharan .Africa's trade deticil of S5.3bn (3.()"o of CAW) occurs mainly from 
deficits in manufacturing sectors being only partially offset bv the tew net exporting 
sectors. Oil is the dominant net-export, with Non-(jram Crops. (Jther Minerals, and 
Non-Ferrous Metals being m smaller surpluses. It is interesting to note that Sub-
Saharan .Africa is a net exporlci- of agricultural and food products (a Sl,4bn surplus) 
mainl\ because of a $3,4bn surplus tor Non-Grain Crops (exports of which include 
cash crops such as coffee and cocoa). 
Figure 4-1: Sub-Saharan Africa's iNet Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): SSA 
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Table 4-32: The Structure of Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Protection 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
1606,68 
1606,68 
CJutput 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
0,75 
1,28 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
Import 
Taritr 
Reventie 
Smillion 
1,07 
39,38 
53,60 
68.70 
0,85 
3.78 
55,18 
47.6(1 
71.64 
327.14 
36.82 
726.3 1 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
% 
2,80 
5.53 
1 1.17 
0.05 
5.00 
0 3'' 
1 1 82 
12.83 
14.1 1 
12.50 
6,42 
10,73 
SSA tariffs are derived from: Kenya. Nigeria. 
SSA subsidies are derived froin: Kenva. Nmeria. SencLial, Zimbabwe. 
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The Middle East and North .{frica 
The Middle East and North ,Africa's trade is dominated b\ i)\\ exports, Gnen the size 
of net exports o\: Oil, it is surprising that the Middle Fast and North Africa has a 
$14,5bn overall trade deficit, 2,8"',) o[' GDP, The $92,5bn (Jil surplus is almost 
completely offset by trade delicits m li\e sectors: Other Machinery and Fquipnient 
(S36,3bn), Transport Goods ($2(),4bn). Trade and Transport ,Ser\ ices (.Sl^.Sbn), 
Ferrous Metals ($6.2bn) and fextiles ($6.0bn). Smaller trade delicits in other .sectors 
Figure 4-1: Middle East and North Africa's Net Trade Position 
Net Exports (USSbn): MNA 
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Table 4-33: Agricultural Protection in Middle East and North Africa 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
ALL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
439,00 
414.06 
6473.07 
7328,03 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
0 0 
145.00 
42.71 
36.02 
5.08 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
1.63 
1.63 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
"o 
4,59 
0,03 
Import 
Tariff 
Rev en Lie 
Smillion 
"""^,77" 
1 10.1 1 
157.80 
262,5(1 
3.68 
05.82 
100.4(1 
178.08 
250.08 
800.20 
93.83 
2050.14 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
U 
2.47 
5.03 
1 1.37 
10.05 
(1.22 
0,35 
12.36 
12.24 
13.00 
12.83 
5.55 
10.61 
MNA tariffs are derived from: Tunisia, Akeria. Oman, Saudi Arabia 
MNA subsidies are derived from: Algeria, Eg\ pt. 
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contribute to the overall trade deficit. 
Agricultural tariffs in the Middle East and North Africa are fairly low, but (.uitput 
subsidies are very high m Wheat, with other substantial output subsidies in Other 
Grains and Non-Grain Crops which as they include all producer subsidies, include 
input subsidies on water and energy in many countries of the region. 
Economies in Transition 
The Economies in Transition region comprises the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, It has a total trade deficit of $6,6bn (0,9% of GDP) which, as Figure 4-1 
shows, is largely because of a large deficit in Other Machinery and equipment. 
Although the region includes some net agricultural exporting countries such as 
Hungar>'. the region as a whole is a significant net agricultural importer, EIT net-
exporting sectors are the primary resource industries and some manufacturing sectors. 
Agricultural protection in the Economies in Transition consists of low tariff rates on 
all agricultural and food goods, significant output subsidies, and small export 
subsidies on just a few goods, Paddy Rice, Non-Grain Crops and Other Livestock 
Products are heavily subsidised; subsidy expenditure on each of these goods exceeds 
tariff revenue for all agricultural and food goods combined. 
Figure 4-1: The Net Trade Position of Economies in Transition 
Net Exports (USSbn): EIT 
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Table 4-34: The Structure of .Agricultural Protection in Economies in Transition 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B T 
ALL 
(Output 
Subsidx' 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
2940,06 
921,85 
6640.04 
5386,02 
1080,68 
16978,25 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
1) 
0 
127,05 
2 1.26 
40.81 
28,59 
13,46 
1 1,85 
Export 
Subsidx 
Expenditure 
Smil l ion 
0,04 
10.64 
38,61 
58,28 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
0 
0 
0.00 
1.73 
9,20 
0,75 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Reventie 
Smil l ion 
0,06 
163,18 
220,44 
251,25 
23.61 
20,63 
16,54 
207,12 
1 14,20 
381.08 
84.45 
1512,85 
Import 
Tar i f f 
Rate 
' 0 
0,26 
800 
1 1.30 
10.13 
8,50 
0.81 
8.05 
12.03 
14.27 
12.80 
7.02 
10.74 
EIT tariffs are derived from: Poland, Hunuarx. 
EIT subsidies are derived from: Huniiarx, Poland, Eormer Soviet Union, Yuuoslavia. Czechoslovakia, 
The Rest of the World 
The Rest of the World is by far the most diverse regional grouping in the GTAP 
database. It includes Western European countries that were not part of the EC in 1992 
(Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria and Iceland), South Africa, Turkey. 
Israel, Cuba, North Korea. Mongolia, other South-East Asian countries (Vietnam, 
Laos. Cambodia. Mynamar). and small countries not included elsewhere (south 
Figure 4-1: The Net Trade Position of the Rest of the World 
Net Exports (US$bn): ROW 
15 
10 
5 
0 
-5 
-10 
-15 
-20 
"ET 
P W G N W O F F C O G O P M M O B T W L L P P C N I N F T O O E C T O O D 
D H R G O L R S O I A M C E I F E A E U P . R M ^ F M R M M G N _ S S W 
R T O C L P S H L L S N R T L P T X P A M P C P M S M P N E F W S T P G E 
4-54 
Pacific nations, Cyprus, Malta, etc.). While Turkey and South Africa are large in 
population terms, in GDP and trade terms, the Western European countries make up 
most of the grouping. Harrison el al. (1995) rename the ROW group -EFTA". 
The group has a trade surplus of $2.9bn (0.3% of income) which as Figure 4-1 shows, 
comes from surpluses in services sectors, resource sectors and some manufacturing 
sectors (Lumber and Pulp Paper Products are dependant on resource inputs). 
Manufacturing goods are the largest net-surplus sectors - particularly Transport 
Goods, Other Machinery and Equipment and Other Manufactures. 
The structure of agricultural protection in this region (Table 4-35) is made up of low 
tariff rates, low Grain subsidy rates, and a high output subsidy rate for Non-Grain 
Crops. Note that the subsidy data are taken from South Africa and Turkey and 
extrapolated for the whole region while the tariff data are based on the Western 
European countries. As Western European countries are the largest in the group in 
GDP and trade terms, it is unfortunate that subsidy data were not available for them -
the subsidies are clearly the main form of protection, but are taken from data for two 
of the smaller countries in the group. 
Table 4-35: The Structure of Agricultural Protection in the Rest of the World 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
TfL 
Output 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
197.09 
1103.98 
16630,69 
17931.76 
Output 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
12.71 
26.11 
142.37 
9,06 
Export 
Subsidy 
Expenditure 
Smillion 
Export 
Subsidy 
Rate 
% 
Import 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Smillion 
1,26 
14,21 
87,16 
498,26 
8,80 
95,56 
35.28 
117.25 
99.89 
871,70 
211,07 
2162.90 
Import 
Tariff 
Rate 
% 
3,35 
5,17 
11,15 
9,31 
7,07 
9,74 
11,55 
10,76 
13,80 
12,81 
6.73 
9,93 
ROW tariffs are derived from: Sweden. Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, 
ROW subsidies are derived from: South Africa, Turkey, 
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4.5.5 Elasticities 
Table 4-36 shows the GTAP elasticities of substitution - factor demand elasticities 
SIGV and the Armington elasticities SIGM, the elasticity of substitution between 
imports from different sources, and SIGD. the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic goods and imports. Data for these elasticities comes originally from the 
SALTER database, and much of the estimation was performed on data from the 1970s 
and 1980s. Where different sectors are given the same elasticity, they were originally 
part of the same SALTER sector. 
The elasticities of substitution between factors of production are low for agricultural 
goods (0.56) and mining and minerals and food (1.12). Most manufacturing and 
services have an elasticity of 1.26. with Construction (1.40) and Trade and Transport 
Services (1.68) having the highest elasticides. 
The Armington elasticities reflect the assumption that imports from different regions 
(with elasticity SIGM) should always be more substitutable between themselves than 
they are with domestic products. For this reason. SIGM is always set to twice the 
value of SIGD. The lowest Armington elasticities occur in Pulp Paper Products (PPP). 
Petroleum and Coal (P_C). Chemicals Rubber and Plastics (CRP) and service sectors. 
The highest values are in the Transport Equipment (TRN), Wearing Apparel (WAP) 
and Leather Goods (LEA) sectors. 
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Table 4-36: GTAP Elasticities 
PDR 
WHT 
GRO 
NGC 
WOL 
OLP 
FRS 
FSH 
COL 
OIL 
GAS 
OMN 
PCR 
MET 
MIL 
OFP 
B_T 
TEX 
WAP 
LEA 
LUM 
PPP 
P_C 
CRP 
NMM 
1_S 
NFM 
FMP 
TRN 
OME 
OMF 
EGW 
CNS 
T_T 
OSP 
OSG 
DWE 
SlGV(i) 
Elasticity of substitution 
between factors of 
production in value-added 
nest 
0.56 
0.56 
0.56 
0.56 
0,56 
0,56 
0,56 
0.56 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.12 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
1.40 
1.68 
1.26 
1.26 
1.26 
SIG!Vl(i) 
Elasticity of substitution 
between imports from 
different regions of origin 
4.40 
4.40 
4.40 
4,40 
4,40 
5,60 
5,60 
5,60 
5,60 
5,60 
5,60 
5.60 
4,40 
4,40 
4,40 
4,40 
6,20 
4,40 
8,80 
8,80 
5,60 
3,60 
3,80 
3.80 
5.60 
5,60 
5,60 
5,60 
10.40 
5.60 
5.60 
5,60 
3,80 
3.80 
3,80 
3,80 
3,80 
SIGD(i) 
Elasticity of substitution 
between imports and 
domestically produced goods 
2,20 
2,20 
2,20 
2,20 
2,20 
2,80 
2,80 
2.80 
2,80 
2.80 
2,80 
2,80 
2,20 
2,20 
2,20 
2,20 
3,10 
2,20 
4,40 
4,40 
2,80 
1,80 
1,90 
1,90 
2,80 
2,80 
2,80 
2,80 
5.20 
2,80 
2,80 
2,80 
1,90 
1,90 
1,90 
1,90 
1,90 
4-57 
4.6 SPECIFICS OF AGGREGATION 
The thirty-seven commodities and twenty-four regions in the database allow a great 
deal of freedom in choosing the level of aggregation for modelling purposes. It must 
be made clear that aggregation is necessary: using all commodity and regions in a 37 
by 24 model gives some parameter matrices for the Armington aggregation that are 37 
X 24 X 24 in size - giving over 21,000 elements. Furthermore, such a model would 
involve 888 different goods (one commodity in each region). Since exports and 
various aggregates must be declared as different variables in a CGE model, such a 
level of disaggregation would require many thousands of variables and equations. In 
order to keep the time required to build and check a model, the solution time, and the 
time required to interpret results, to reasonable levels, a much less detailed level of 
aggregation must be chosen. However, as far as possible, commodities (and regions) 
must be aggregated together in such a way as to give as much detail as possible to the 
model's results. Thus the purpose for which the model is built must be borne in mind 
when choosing the level of aggregation. 
This section details specific points that were borne in mind when choosing an 
aggregation for the purpose of modelling agriculture in the Uruguay Round, lists the 
aggregation that will be used in chapter 6, and concludes with the rationale for this 
particular aggregation. 
4.6.1 Aggregation for modelling the Uruguay Round 
A model designed to estimate the effects of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
should have particular emphasis on the agricultural sectors. Since agriculture is a 
major component in the final agreement of the UR, a high level of disaggregation in 
the agricultural sector should be maintained. This has several implications: 
• The agricultural sectors should be as detailed as possible. 
• Agricultural goods users should be as detailed as possible. In particular, the food 
processing industries should be highly disaggregated. 
• Agricultural input goods should be disaggregated. 
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•  
Those countries of particular prominence in the UR must be fully detailed (i.e. the 
EU. USA) 
Those countries with high levels oi' agricultural protection, and/or with unique 
protection policies or structures of protection, should be fully disaggregated. Thus 
the EU, USA, Japan, and Taiwan should be included on this count. 
Countries that have a high level of reliance on the agricultural sector such as 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, should be included. 
• Other countries should be grouped (or detailed individually) according to both the 
structure of agricultural production and income category. 
Several points must also be taken into account when particular emphasis is placed on 
EU agriculture: 
• Those agricultural sectors with high levels of output and/or consumption in the 
EU should be included as separate commodities. 
• Reference should be made to the structure of agricultural protection in the EU. 
The mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy are present in GTAP food 
processing sectors just as much as in agricultural sectors, so these sectors should 
be given the same treatment of detail as agriculture. 
• The EU's main trading partners (for agricultural and food trade) should be 
included separately. 
These points indicate that most agricultural and food processing sectors should be 
included as separate goods. Paddy rice, processed rice, and wool are the only 
agricultural and food processing sectors that have low levels of production, 
consumption and protection in the EU, and could be included in aggregate 
commodity groups. 
Textiles and clothing are also important in the Uruguay Round agreement, and should 
be included as separate sectors. The MFA abolition also means that emphasis must be 
paid to the structure of textile and clothing trade, since in order to capture the level of 
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quota restrictions properly, countries should be grouped according to whether or not 
they are textile and clothing exporters or importers, and whether or not they are 
subject to VERs. MFA exporters that have large export volumes, but low ad valorem 
equivalents of the VERs should be treated separately from exporters where the ad 
valorem equivalents of VERs are high. 
The liberalisation of tariffs on manufactured goods implies that industrial 
commodities should be as disaggregated as possible. However, if the Agricultural 
Agreement is the main concern, then retaining industrial commodities as separate 
sectors must be of secondary importance. 
4.6.2 The Modelling Aggregation 
Table 4-37 and Table 4-38 define a level of aggregation that will be used in chapter 6 
to model the effects of the Uruguay Round. It may be useful to explicitly define the 
purpose of this aggregation: 
The Modelling Aggregation is intended to allow the most accurate 
portrayal of the Uruguay Round and its effects on EU agriculture as is 
possible within constraints imposed on the overall aggregation size. 
The aggregation encompasses seventeen commodities and thirteen regions. This is a 
large model aggregation, and is larger than many of the models used in studies 
discussed in chapter 3. 
Five agricultural commodities are defined in Table 4-37. from the total possible six 
commodities in the GTAP database; wool is included with 'other livestock products'. 
Four food commodities are defined from the total five GTAP commodities - the new 
group "other agricultural products" includes beverages and tobacco, other food, and 
leather products. All other primary commodities are included as a single sector. 
Textiles and clothing are included separately, and four other manufacturing 
commodities are aggregated in a way that is intended to keep input goods (the 
utilities, chemicals and machinery) distinct. Services are included as a single sector. 
The regional aggregation defines five OECD regions, five middle-income LDC 
regions, and three low-income LDC regions. 
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Table 4-37: Commodities in the Modelling Aggregation 
Code Aggregated Commodities 
Agricultural 
PDR Rice 
WHT Wheat 
GRO Grains 
NGC Non-grain crops 
LIVE Livestock 
Other Primary 
OPV Other Primary Industries 
Food Products 
PCR Processed rice 
MEAT Meat products 
MILK Milk products 
GAP Other agricultural products 
Textiles and Clothing 
TEX Textiles 
WAP Wearing Apparel 
Manufacturing 
EGY Energy 
CRP Chemicals rubbers and plastics 
OME Machinery and equipment 
OMF Other manufacturing 
Services 
SRV Services 
Disaggregated Commodities included in Group 
pdr 
wht 
gro 
ngc 
olp, vvol 
for, fsh, col, oil. gas, omn 
per 
met 
mil 
ofp, b_t, lea 
tex 
wap 
p_c. egw 
crp 
ome 
omf fmp, nmm. i s , nfm, trn. lum. ppp 
t t, ens, osp. osg, dwe 
Table 4-38: Regions in the Modelling Aggregation 
Code Aggregated Region 
OECD Regions 
ANZ Australia and New Zealand 
CAN Canada 
USA United States of America 
JPN Japan 
EU European Union 
iVliddle-lncome LDCs 
SKT Taiwan and South Korea 
SHK Hong Kong and Singapore 
EIT Economies in Transition 
BRA Brazil 
OMI Other Middle-income 
Low-income LDCs 
SSA Sub Saharan Africa 
CHN China 
J^LI Other Low Income 
Disaggregate Regions included in Croup 
AUS.NZL 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
E_U 
KOR.TWN 
HKCSGP 
EIT 
BRA 
ARG,MEX,LAM,MYS,PHL,THA.MNA,ROW 
SSA 
CHN 
SASJDN 
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4.6.3 Rationale for the Modelling Aggregation 
This section discusses the precise reasons for each part of the modelling aggregation. 
It should of course be borne in mind that choosing an aggregation is largely a matter 
of trade-offs. For every commodity or region that is added to the model, the 
advantages of the inclusion of that commodity or region must be weighed against the 
costs, either in terms of the extra solution time (and sometimes the difficulty in 
reaching a solution) or in terms of the commodity or region that must be removed to 
keep the model size unchanged. 
Agricultural Commodities 
With the exception of wool, all GTAP agricultural commodities are included, and 
wool is excluded because of its low level of production and consumption not only in 
the EU but also globally. Australia (accounting for 68% of world wool exports) is the 
only country that is likely to be effected by the exclusion of wool from the model. The 
only country that applies high levels of protection to wool is the US.A, where a large 
production subsidy exists, but even there wool output is low compared to other sectors 
(see Table 4-15 for details). Wool is therefore included in the livestock sector.' Paddy 
rice is included mainly because it is extremely important in East Asia, and much of 
the general equilibrium effects of the Uruguay Round may come from the interaction 
between textiles and clothing and agriculture in Asia. 
Primary Products 
The inclusion of other primary products in a single commodity is not ideal, but is 
justified because these sectors are unlikely to play a large part in the outcome of the 
Uruguay Round. Francois et al. (1994) include a separate simulation for the effects of 
tariff reductions on non-agricultural primary products, and find that the effects are 
negligible. 
It could be argued that because wool and sheep meat are joint products, it should be included with the livestock 
scclor. 
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Food Products 
Meat and milk products are included separately, and this is considered to be essential 
for modelling EU agriculture. Apart from the inclusion of processed rice, for which 
the same comments apply as for paddy rice, the only other food product is "other 
agricultural products", which is a heterogeneous group containing other food, 
beverages and tobacco, and leather products. While 'leather prodticts' is clearly not a 
food product, and is not subject to protecfion under the CAP, it is a relatively small 
sector (value added in the EU for this group is composed of 65% other food products, 
26% beverages and tobacco, and 9% leather products) and predominantly uses 
intermediate inputs from the livestock sector. Thus "other agricultural products" is 
best thought of as "other processed products that primarily use agricultural products". 
Textiles and Clothing, Manufacturing and Services 
There is a large degree of aggregation in the manufacturing and service sectors, but 
this is acceptable in an agriculture-focused model. Textiles and clothing are included 
as separate cominodities, and those manufactured products that are mainly used as 
intermediate products or as capital are defined,separately. The definition of the energy 
commodity uses a manufactured good (petroleum and coal) and a service (electricity, 
water and gas): ideally these would be defined separately, but in the context of the 
trade-offs associated with choosing aggregations, the inclusion of these commodities 
together is preferable to defining either as part of one of the larger aggregates. 
OECD Regions 
Each GTAP OECD region is included separately, with the exception of Australia and 
New Zealand which, mainly because of the size of New Zealand, are aggregated 
together. It should also be noted that the GTAP "Rest of the World" region includes 
non-EU Western Europe. Whether this region should be treated as an OECD region or 
not is debatable; Flertel et al. (1995) treat it as a developing country, Francois et al. 
(1995) use additional data to split the region into EFTA countries and a developing 
country ROW group, while Harrison et al. (1995) simply rename the region EFTA 
and treat it as a developed region. Here it is treated as a middle-income developing 
region. 
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Middle-Income LDCs 
The four East Asian newly industrialised countries are treated differently by different 
modellers. The importance of the MFA to some of these countries is paramount, but 
the aggregation here is primarily defined by agricultural considerations; Hong Kong 
and Singapore are both free-trade food importers with little or no agricultural 
production, while Taiwan and Korea are high-protection countries with large 
agricultural sectors. Evidently combining these countries in any other way would mix 
the opposite extremes of agricultural protectionism and entirely different agricultural 
structures. Separating all four countries is deemed unnecessary because the pairings 
do lead to a matching of similarities. 
The other middle-income LDCs involve some inevitable aggregation, in part because 
the GTAP database is (because of its Australian roots) biased towards a high level of 
detail in South East Asia - there are many other African and South Asian LDCs that 
are larger than Malaysia and the Philippines, for example. It is considered necessary 
to identify Brazil and "economies in transition" as separate regions because of their 
high levels of agricultural protection, and in that latter case because of its proximity to 
and large trade with the EU. 
Low-Income LDCs 
It is considered to be necessary to provide separate treatment for low income LDCs, 
primarily because of the possibility of a negative impact on these regions from the 
Uruguay Round, and particularly as a result of the reform of EU export subsidies. 
China is included separately because (a) it is not a WTO member, and therefore does 
not need to make tariff reductions unless it joins the WTO and (b) it is so large that it 
would dominate the results of any aggregate region that included it. Sub-Saharan 
Africa does not have to make reforms as a result of the Uruguay Round because of 
least-developed status. The inclusion of South Asia and Indonesia in a single group is 
an unfortunate result of the need to keep the size of the aggregation from being too 
large, but the extent of liberalisation in these regions as a result of the Uruguay Round 
is likely to be small. 
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4.7 MODIFYING THE GTAP DATABASE FOR USE IN 
GAMS 
The standard means of aggregating the GTAP database that is supplied with the 
GTAP database software consists of inputting the desired aggregate commodity and 
regional names and the mappings from disaggregate to aggregate sets into a text file in 
a particular format. 
The largest single problem with using the GTAP software for the aggregation that is 
proposed here is that GTAP have limited the size of the aggregation that their 
marketed software can achieve to a maximum of ten aggregate regions and ten 
aggregate commodities. To perform a larger aggregation, such as the thirteen-region, 
seventeen-commodity aggregation in mind, some other way of aggregation must be 
performed. Two main alternatives exist: using a GEMPACK source-code licence, and 
using Rutherford's routines for transferring GTAP into GAMS. 
GEMPACK software comes with two types of licence, an executable licence and a 
source code licence. The executable licence allows the running of the main programs 
in the GEMPACK software suite". The executable licence has two main limitations: 
TABLO.EXE can only write GEMSIM input files, and GEMSIM is limited to using 8 
Mb of computer memory - effectively limiting all simulations and data manipulation 
to the ten-region, ten-commodity size of the GTAP limits. A source-code licence 
enables TABLO to write FORTRAN files that, with a FORTRAN compiler, will 
produce executable programs that can then run a model of any size. Thus a source-
code licence will enable the use of GEMPACK for any size of model (limited only by 
computer memory). GEMPACK source-code licences, however, cost several 
thousands of pounds, while the executable licence costs just a few hundred pounds. 
The GEMPACK suite consists of eleven programs, the main ones being: 
TABLO.EXE checks and compiles models 
GEMSIM,EXE performs simulations from the tiles outputted by TABLO 
GEMPIE,EXE transfers GEMSIM solution tiles into text print tiles 
^IT,1IAR,EXE prints GEMPACK header arrav liles (the binary form that GEMPACK Jata is stored in) to text 
lilcs, 
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Routines developed by Thomas Rutherford of the University of Colorado enable the 
use ofSEEHAR.EXE to produce a GAMS file. These routines take advantage of new 
features of the latest versions of GEMPACK (version 5.2) and the GTAP database 
(version 3). GEMPACK 5.2 includes a feature in SEEHAR to print GAMS files, so 
that a GEMPACK data file can be easily converted to GAMS. Unfortunately, 
although an executable-licence version of GEMPACK 5.2 was used here, the version 
of GTAP used is version 2. The main reason not to upgrade to GTAP version 3 is that 
there were no new data added to the database between versions 2 and 3 (there is a 
small increase in the number of regions covered in the database, but the base year for 
the data and the number of commodities remains the same). Upgrading to version 3 
of the database would, however, allowed the use of SEEHAR to re-write the data. 
The reason that SEEHAR cannot be used with GTAP version 2 is that GTAP 2 stores 
the disaggregate data in parameters formerly used in the Australian SALTER 
modelling framework, and these parameters are much larger than the GTAP 
parameters (the conversion between SALTER parameters and GTAP parameters is 
normally done by the GTAP aggregation software for models not exceeding ten-
regions and ten-commodities). GTAP 2 thus exceeds memory limits in this exercise 
where GTAP 3, which stores the data in GTAP parameters, does not. 
4.7.1 GTAP Global Data in SALTER notation:-
As noted above, the GTAP data for version 2 of the database is held in SALTER 
notation. The form that this takes is as follows (note that ii is used as an alias for set 
i):-
DI01(i,ii,r) Intermediate usage of domestic product, by commodity, industry 
and region. 
DI02(i,ii,r,s) Intermediate usage of imports, by commodity, industry, destination 
region and source region. 
DI03(i,r) Investment usage of domestic product, by commodity and region. 
DI04(i,r,s) Investment usage of imports, by commodity, destination region and 
source region. 
DI05(i,r) Household consumpfion of domestic product, by commodity and 
region. 
Dl06(i,r,s) Private household consumpfion of imports, by commodity. 
destination region and source region. 
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DI07(i,r) Government consumption of domestic product, by coinmodity and 
region. 
DI08(i,r,s) Government consumption of imports, by commodity, desfinafion 
region and source region. 
Dll2(i,r) Non-commodity indirect taxes, by industry and region. 
DI13(i,r) Labour usage, by industry and region. 
DI14(i,r) Capital usage, by industry and region. 
DI15(i,r) Land usage, by industry and region. 
DI16(i,ii,r) Tax on intermediate usage of domestic product, by commodity, 
industry and region. 
,ii,r) Tax on intermediate usage of imports, by commodity, industry and 
importing region. 
,r) Tax on private household consumption of domestic product, by 
commodity and region. 
,r) Tax on private household consumpfion of imports, by commodity 
and importing region. 
,r) Tax on investment usage of domestic product, by commodity and 
region. 
,r) Tax on investment usage of imports, by commodity and importing 
region. 
,r) Tax on government consumption of domestic product, by 
commodity and region. 
,r) Tax on government consumption of imports, by commodity and 
importing region. 
,r,s) Export tax. by commodity, source region and destination region. 
,r,s) Import duty, by commodity, destination region and source region. 
,r,s) International trade and transport margin, by commodity, destination 
region and source region' 
DI32(i,r) Margin exports of trade and transport services. 
Dl4I(r) Capital stock, by region. 
DI42(r) Depreciation, by region. 
In all cases, the commodities and regions in the descriptions above are in the order 
that they occur in the sets over which the parameter is defined. Taxes are all given in 
value of tax payments form, so that the tax rate is found by dividing the tax by the 
relevant parameter. 
DI17( 
DI18( 
DI19( 
DI20( 
DI21( 
DI22( 
DI23( 
DI24( 
DI27( 
DI31( 
• 111 the e-mail from Rob McDougal that describes these SALTER form of parameters, this w;i.s "b) commodity, 
• wince and destination". Tests on the data proved that the source and destination were given the wrong way 
iiriHind, 
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There are several main points of difference between this form of parameters and the 
standard GTAP form:-
GTAP uses values at market and agents' prices, while the SALTER parameters use 
values (at market prices) and tax payments. The value at agents' prices is found by 
adding the tax payment to the value at market prices if the tax is paid for the 
consumption of use of a good, and (in the case of the output tax (DI12) and export tax 
(D124)) by subtracUng the tax payment from the value at market prices where the tax 
is paid by the agent selling the good. 
The SALTER data have no parameters defined over the set j, which is the 
combination of the i set and capital goods ("cgds"). Wherever a GTAP parameter is 
defined over j, it can be found from SALTER parameters for i and investment (for 
"cgds") separately. For example, VDFM(i,j,r) can be found by the following fwo 
assignments: 
VDFM(i.ii,r) = D101(i,ii.r) 
VDFM(i,"cgds",r) = DI05(i,r) 
The SALTER data do not explicitly define any trade volume, but these can be found 
by working through the import demands. Since there are four forms of demand in the 
SALTER framework - intermediate demands, investment usage, private household 
demands and government demands - the value of imports at domestic market prices 
is:-
VIMS(i,r,s) = intermediate demand from DI02 
+ investment demand from DI04 
+ private demand from DI06 
+ government demand from DI08 
The other GTAP trade parameters can be calculated from VIMS: 
VIWS(i,r,s) = VIMS(i,r,s) - import duty from DI27 
VXWD(i,r,s) = VIWS(i,r,s) - transport margin from DI31 
VXMD(i,r,s) = VXWD(i.r,s) - export duty from DI24 
The SALTER data do not define regional savings. These are calculated as the residual 
between regional income and regional expenditure on private and government 
consumption. 
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Regional income = net factor income (D113 + D114 + D115 - D142) 
+ tax income (DI12 + D116 + DI17 + DI18 + D1I9 + DI20 + DI21 
+ D122 + D123 + D124 + DI27) 
Regional Expenditure = private expenditure at agents' prices (D105 + D106 + 
D118 + D119) 
+ government expenditure at agents' prices (D107 + D108 + DI22 + 
DI23) 
Care must be taken later when performing this calculation to ensure, in the case of 
trade taxes especially, that the region receiving the tax revenue is credited correctly. 
When calculating savings as income minus expenditure, taxes on private and 
governiTient consumption cancel out, so that savings equals:-
Savings= D113 + DI14 + D115 - DI42 + DI12 + D116 + D117 + D120 + DI21 + 
D124 + DI27 
- (DI05 + DI06 + D107 + DI08) 
The SALTER parameters in some cases include more data than are necessary for use 
in GTAP. The largest parameter in this database is DI02, which is defined 
over(i,ii,r,s). With i and ii comprising 37 commodities and r and s 24 regions in the 
disaggregate database, the size of this parameter is 37x37x24x24 = 788,544 (which, 
since GEMPACK used 4 bytes of computer memory to store each point of data, uses 
just over 3 Mb of memory). The size of this parameter is the main source of problem 
when using GEMPACK software - it is simply too large. DI02 is needed to calculate 
VIMS (imports at market prices) and VIFM (intermediate usage of imports), and is 
aggregated differently for each. 
4.7.2 Transferring SALTER notation into GTAP notation 
The following assignments describe the complete system of formulas to transfer 
GTAP data from SALTER notation to GTAP notation: 
Values at Market Prices: 
VFM("Labour",j,r) = DI13(j,r) 
VFM("Capitar,j,r) = DI14(j,r) 
VFM("Land",j,r) = DI15(j,r) 
VDFM(i,j,r) =DI01(i,j,r) 
VDFM(i,"cgds",r) = DI03(i,r) 
4-69 
VIFM(i,j.r) = SUM(s. D102(i,j.r,s)) 
VlFM(i."cgds".r)= D104(i.r) 
VlPM(i.r) = SUM(s, DI06(i,r,s)) 
VDGM(i,r) =DI07(i,r) 
VIGM(i,r) = SUM(s, DI08(i,r,s)) 
VST(i.r) = DI32(i,r) 
VlMS(i,r,s) = SUM(j, DI02(i,j,s,r)) + DI04(i,s,r) + DI06(i,s,r) + DI08(i.s,r) 
Values at agents' prices (using any market price values calculated above): 
EVOA(f,r) = SUM(j, VFM(f.j,r)) 
EVFA(f,j,r) = VFM(f,j.r) 
VDFA(i,j,r) = VDFM(i,j,r) + D116(i,j,r) 
VDFA(i,"cgds",r) = VDFM(i,"cgds",r) + DI20(i,r) 
VIFA(i.j.r) = VIFM(i,j,r) + D116(i,j,r) 
VlFA(i."cgds",r) = VIFM(i,"cgds",r) + DI21(i,r) 
VDPA(i,r) =VDPM(i,r) + DI18(i.r) 
VIPA(i,r) =VIPM(i,r) + DI19(i,r) 
VDGA(i.r) = VDGM(i,r) + D122(i,r) 
VIGA(i.r) = VIGM(i,r) + D123(i.r) 
VDEP(r) = DI42(r) 
VKB(r) =D141(r) 
Trade Flows (calculated from VIWS(i,r,s) given above): 
VIWS(i,r,s) = VIMS(i.r.s) - DI27(i,s.r) 
VXWD(i,r,s) = VIWS(i,r,s) - D131(i,s.r) 
VXMD(i,r,s) = VXWD(i,r,s) - DI24(i,r,s) 
Savings (calculated as the residual of regional income - expenditure): 
SAVE(r) = SUM(i, DI13(i.r) + DI14(i,r) + DI15(i,r)) - DI42(r) 
+ SUM(i, DI12(i,r) + DI20(i,r) + DI21(i,r)) 
+ SUM((i,j), DI16(i,j,r) + DI17(i,j,r)) 
+ SUM(i,s), DI24(i,r,s) + DI27(i,r.s)) 
- SUM(i, DI05(i.r) + DI06(i,r)) 
- SUM((i,s), DI06(i,r,s) + DI08(i,r,s)) 
4.7.3 GEMPACK Header Array Files 
GEMPACK uses its own standard form for storing data, called Header Artay Files 
with the name extension of "har". The four files used to store the GTAP database are: 
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Global.har: all the SALTER notation parameters described above. 
Price94.har: price elasticities for private consumption 
lnc94.har: income elasticities for private consumption 
Subst.har: elasticities of substitution. 
The last three files will be detailed below, but the form in which they store data is 
identical to that for Global.har and any other header array file. 
The format of header array files described here was found by extensive testing of 
header array files using a hex editor."" Where necessary, some values are given in 
hexadecimal notation, prefixed by the characters &h. So, for example, the number 11 
is equal to &hB. Header array files, like any computer file, are a long series of bytes 
(numbers in the range 0 - 255. or &hO to &hFF), the interpretation of which differs 
according to how they are used. In some cases the bytes are interpreted directly as 
numbers, in other cases, pairs of bytes are interpreted as integers (numbers in the 
range -32768 to +32767). A sequence of four bytes can be interpreted as a long 
integer (numbers in the range -2.147,483,648 to 2,147,483,647) or as single precision 
real numbers (real numbers in the range 3.4E-38 to 3.4E+38). Alternatively, bytes can 
be interpreted as ASCII codes representing characters. 
A header array file consists of a number of header arrays, each of which contains a 
header containing information about the array, and the array itself, which can be either 
a series of text strings, or a series of bytes represenfing a table of single precision real 
numbers. The header arrays are stored one after another: no information at the start of 
the file describes how many header arrays are on the file - the last header is read when 
the end of the file is reached. 
A header array is always preceded by the four bytes &hl3,&hOO,&hOO,&hOO (as a 
long integer, this is interpreted as the number 19. The short name of the header 
I lie hex editor used is Hex Workshop, a shareware program. It allows the viewing of computer tiles directly as a 
^i^iicsDrnuinbers, 
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follows, which is always four bytes (or letters) long. Then follows four bytes that 
identify the array as either a text array (the bytes &h20,&h73,&h01,&h00, which can 
be interpreted as the long integer 95008), or as a real array (if the bytes are 
&h20,&hC3,&h01,&hOO, or 115488 as a long integer). These four bytes are 
sometimes followed by a null byte (&hOO), but in some cases are not - this seems to 
be in order to keep the following byte on an even-numbered position in the file, the 
reason for which is unclear. This is followed by 80 bytes giving an 80-character long 
name for the header array. 
The naming information is followed by four bytes interpreted as a long integer giving 
the number of dimensions that the array is defined over, followed by a long integer for 
each dimension giving the size of that dimension. GEMPACK allows parameters to 
have up to seven dimensions, and although the largest array in the GTAP database has 
four dimensions (for DI02), the sizing information always gives real arrays that have 
seven dimensions. An array defined over TRAD_COMM (size 37 = &h25) and REG 
(size 24 = &hl8) therefore has the eight long numbers: 
&h7.&h25,&hl8,&hl,&hl,&hl,&hl,&hl. Real arrays are then followed by 134 
bytes, text arrays are followed by 22 bytes (in both cases, the meaning of these bytes 
is unidentified). The array follows after that. An example follows, taken from 
Global.har for the header array DIOl. Here all bytes are given in their hexadecimal 
form, followed by a description. Note that text strings often contain the space 
character (=&h20) as padding. 
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Example Header Array 
13000000 Long integer = 17 
44493031 Short name = "Dior' 
2003010000 Identifies real array (+ a null byte) 
20202020524C46554C4C2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202 
0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020 
80 character long name " RLFULL 
07000000 L,ong integer = 7 (number of dimensions) 
25000000 l-ong integer = 37 (size of first dimension) 
25000000 l^ ong integer = 37 (size of second dimension) 
180000000 Long integer = 24 (size of third dimension) 
10000000 l^ ong integer = 1 (size of fourth dimension) 
10000000 Long integer = 1 (size of fifth dimension) 
10000000 Long integer = I (size of sixth dimension) 
10000000 Long integer = I (size of seventh dimension) 
ID1A3000000202020200B000000070000002500000025000000180000000100000001000000010000 
00010OOOOOBOO3010000202020200 AOOOOOOO10000002500000001000000250000000100000005000 
000010000000100000001000000010000000100000001000000010000000100000001 I 1F3 ABO 10020 
2020200900000003DBA640DB 
135 unidentified bvtes. 
Text artays in the GTAP database header array files include text for creation 
information, and descriptions of the last changes made to files. As such, they are of no 
interest when compiling the database, except that the total length of the array needs to 
be calculated in order to find the starting point for the next header array in the file. 
The exact format of text arrays will not be examined here. Each character in a text 
array is one byte long, so that an array defined as having two dimensions, the first 
dimension as 3, and the second dimension as 46, will be three strings of 46 characters. 
The size of the array is then 3 x 46 = 138 bytes. 
Real arrays are complicated by the way that GEMPACK saves data. For arrays with 
more than two dimensions (i.e. arrays with more than two dimensions of size greater 
than one), each two-dimensional table is held on the file separately. If for example, an 
an-ay is defined over i,r,s. then the array consists of 24 tables, each with 37x24 
elements (first dimension size times second dimension size). For the main part, these 
tables are held on the file one after another, but approximately e\ery five to nine 
tables 84 bytes are inserted into the file, with no apparent use. Tests showed that the 
first four bytes of this spare block of bytes can always be interpreted as a real number 
below lE-30 (lO"'"), while no actual data in the database are ever this low. This is the 
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only way of identifying the spare blocks - no indication of their presence or locafion is 
aiven in the header. 
Summary of information included in header arrays containing real data: 
Leimth Type Description 
Long Integer 17 
Characters short name 
4 bytes 
4 bytes 
4 |,ytes Long Integer identifies real array if = 115488 
or text array if =95008 
I byte(optional) Byte null byte 
SO bytes Characters long name 
4 Ijytes Long Integer Number of each dimensions 
4 bytes per dimension Long Integers Dimension sizes 
135 bytes Bytes Unidentified 
Qata Series of two-dimensional tables interspersed with the 84 byte spare block. 
4.7.4 A Visual-Basic program to convert and aggregate the GTAP database: 
With knowledge of the SALTER parameters and the form that header array files take, 
it is possible to take the data directly from the file Global.har, convert and aggregate 
it as needed. Here, a Visual-Basic program is used to do this. GTAPER.EXE has been 
written for this purpose. A complete discussion of the code used to create 
GTAPER.EXE will not be given here, since the main parts of the program are derived 
from the discussions above, and the Visual-Basic code will only be of help to those 
familiar with the syntax of Visual-Basic. 
Because the GTAP data are in the form of a large database, any program that uses it 
will always take some fime to process the data. GTAPER therefore performs the steps 
that are required separately, saving the results of each step so that the steps do not 
need to be repeated unless necessary. There are three main steps performed in the 
program: 
• Header array files are converted into Visual-Basic data types 
• An interactive grid allows the user to specify aggregation mappings 
• The aggregate data are calculated 
4-74 
When GT.APER starts, the dialog box shown in Figure 4-1 is displayed, GTAPER 
automatically checks for the liles it needs, but if it does not know the location of 
ihcm. It must prompt the user to find the files. 
Figure 4-1: GTAPER Start-up Dialog Box 
GTAP Aggregator Starting Optioiis 
H 
• . . , ; , . . ' ^S 
• • • ' • : : ': • • ' • - : •' a 
: .. 'p 
• '• "''' '-'"-id 
Global.Age is the file into which GT.APER compiles the GT.AP database. If it is 
found, the user can proceed straight to the aggregation part of the program, but if 
GTAPER has not been run before, the file will not exist and will need to be compiled 
from header array files. If the option ""Make Global,Age"" is chosen, the program will 
load the header arra\- files using the description of these files given abo\e, calculate 
the GTAP parameters from the SALTER parameters, and sa\'e the GTAP parameters 
as tlie file Global,.A,ge, Depending on computer speed. GTAPER will take 
approximately 1-3 minutes to read the header aiTay files. 1-2 minutes to do the 
calculations, and just a few seconds to save the file. 
When the database is compiled, the user can proceed to the aggregation. The 
aggregation grid is shown in Fi^ure 4-2. 
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Fi'»urc 4-2: CiTAPER .Aggregation (irid 
The aggregation grid allows regions or commodities to be assigned to aggregate 
regions and commodities b\ clicking and dragging. Aggregate regions and 
cdinnioJities can be renamed, but the disaggregate names can of course not be 
changed. The file menu allows the mappings (with no real data) to be loaded and 
saved in the standard GT.AP format (aggregation mappings written for the standard 
(iT,\P aggregator can be loaded in. and files produced b>' GTAPER can be used in the 
standard GT.AP aggregation software). When the user has finished, clicking 
"Aggregate Now" proceeds to the next dialog box. the aggregation summary dialog 
b(),\ shown in Figure 4-3, This dialog box shows the user details oi' the size of the 
aggregation, and allows set names to be changed. When the user clicks "OK", the 
program proceeds to the aggregation, which will take approximately 1-3 minutes 
depending on aggregation size and computer speed. The user is prompted for a 
tilename to save the aggregation file (with the extension ""age"). 
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Fi"urc 4-3: Aggregation SummarA Dialog Bo.x 
When GTAPER is finished it will start a second program. W1NAGE.EXE, loading the 
file created by GTAPER. WTN.AGE allows the viewing of headers and their arrays, 
and allows the export of files as GAMS files. The use of two programs in this way 
enables checking the values in the aggregation file by viewing it in WINAGE. 
WINAGE can also be used to load the disaggregate data Global„-\ge and export it to 
GAMS. 
Other Data Supplied by GTAPER and WINAGE 
In addition to the GTAP data outlined abo\e. GTAPER and WINAGE also supply a 
number of other parameters and subset information. 
Additional Parameters 
SUBV(i) 
SUBD(i) 
SUBM(i) 
The elasticity between factors of production in the xalue-added nest, 
calculated from the GTAP values given in the file Subst.Har, and 
aggregated using the total world-wide usage of factors in the given 
industry as weights. 
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, 
calculated from the GTAP values given in the file Subst.Har. and 
aggregated using the total world-wide usage of the given good as 
weights. 
The elasticitv of substitution between imported goods fiom different 
source recions. calculated from the GTAP values given m the tile 
Subst.Han and aggregated using the total world-wide imports ot the 
ui\en uood as weiizhts. 
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4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the GTAP database, version 2. Secfion 4.1 listed the 
regions and commodities in the database, and section 4.2 introduced sets and 
parameters in the database, and the accounting relationships between parameters. 
Section 4.3 discussed the disadvantages of this database, while advantages of GTAP 
over other databases were discussed in secfion 4.4. Section 4.5 examined in detail 
database values from global and regional income to trade and agricultural protection 
in each of the 24 regions, and the elasticity values provided by the database. Section 
4.6 discussed aggregation, and developed a certain aggregation that will be used in 
Chapters 5 and 6 to model the Uruguay Round. Section 4.7 showed details of the 
methods used to convert the database into a suitable format for use in GAMS. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE GTAP MODEL AND EXTENSIONS TO THE 
MODEL 
Chapter 5 examines the standard GTAP modelling framework in section 5.1, makes 
changes to this framework in section 5.2 and extends the model in section 5.3. 
5.1 THE STANDARD GTAP MODEL 
Hertel (1997) not only contains details of the GTAP database, but also a ftill 
('standard') model for use with the database, and a number of applications that use 
both the database and this standard model.' The standard model is used here as a 
starting point, and is subsequently modified for use later in this thesis. 
5.1.1 The GTAP Model 
The standard GTAP model assumes constant returns to scale in all production sectors, 
and perfect competition in all markets. Factors of production are assumed to be 
perfectly mobile between sectors in each region, but perfectly immobile 
Tnternationally'.^ Production requires the use of factor services and of intermediate 
inputs. There is one 'typical' household in each region which receives the factor 
rewards and consumes both domestic and imported goods, which are differentiated by 
region of origin.^ All policy variables are determined exogenously. with taxes and 
subsidies modelled in ad valorem terms, and non-tariff barriers to trade in terms of 
their ad valorem equivalents. 
The definitions of GTAP sets and parameters from chapter 4 are used throughout this 
chapter. Following the graphical representation of section 3,2, section 5.1.2 defines 
Hertel gives details of the model in linearised (percentage change) form, which can be solved with the 
GEMPACK software. 
Land i.s only used in agricultural sectors, and can be specified as a "sticky' factor through the use of a constant 
elasticity of transformation function. 
the standard GTAP model in the MPS/GE language syntax. Section 5.1.3 examines 
each part of the MPS/GE model in detail, and derives a series of equations, using the 
pre-calibrated functions derived in section 2-5. Section 5.1.4 discusses various details 
of the model, and section 5.1.5 concludes with a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the GTAP model. 
5.1.2 The GTAP Model' as an MPS/GE model' 
There is one important difference between the model presented in table 5-1 and the 
model presented in Hertel (1997): in table 5-1 private utility is represented as a Cobb-
Douglas function, while Hertel uses a Constant-Difference of Elasticity (CDE) 
function. The advantage of the CDE function is that it allows non-unity income-
elasticity of demand and price-elasticity of demand. It is not included here primarily 
because it cannot be represented in the MPS/GE language. 
All variables used below are multiples, so that they give a multiple of the relevant 
benchmark value. As all prices are normalised to unity, the multiple and.the price are 
identical, but for quantity and income variables, the multipliers (always in lower case) 
should be multiplied by the base value (always in upper case) to obtain the 
counterfactual quantity. For example, q(j,r) is the output multiple of sector j in region 
r. while the base output is VOM(j.r) (value of output at market prices). The 
counterfactual quantity of output is then q(j,r) * VOM(j,r). 
Vanables appear in lower case while parameters (capitalised) are as defined in chapter 
4, but are defined again here for clarity. One additional type of parameter is used: for 
tax rates a base value of the tax rate is given as a parameter with '0" after the name 
(i.e. TO0(i,r,s), TXO(i,r,s,), TMO(i,r,s)), while the parameter name without '0 ' 
indicates the value of the tax in the simulation. 
The Armington' assumption. 
^ee Chapter 3 for a graphical representation of the model, 
^ Fwiktails of the MPSGE language, see Rutherford 1993 and 1994, For details of GAMS, the programming 
v^sicni within which MPSGE is implemented, see Brooke. K.endrick and Meeraus 1988, Details are also available 
1^11 Ihe internet at htpp:/Avww,gams,coin 
Table 5-1: The Standard GTAP model as an MPS/GE model 
SSECTORS: 
q(j/r) 
va(j,r) 
fa(i,j,r) 
pa(i,r) 
ga(i,r) 
gu(r) 
pu(r) 
gt 
gs 
wel(r) 
m(i,r) 
ms (i, s, r) 
xs (i, s, r) 
$COMMODITIES: 
Plj^r) 
vap(j,r) 
w(f,r) 
fap(i,j,r) 
papli,r) 
gap(i,r) 
gp(r) 
pp(r) 
gtp 
gsp 
wpi(r) 
mp(i,r) 
cifpd, s, r) 
fobp(i,s,r) 
SCONSUMERS 
y(r) 
$PROD:q(j,r) s: 0 
0:p(j,r) Q:VOM{j, 
I:fap(i,j,r) Q:VFA(i, 
I:vap(j,r) Q:VVA(j, 
r) 
j.r) 
r) 
$PROD:va(j,r) s:SIGV(j) 
0:vap(j,r) Q:VVA{j, 
I;w(f,r) Q:EVFA(f 
r) 
" ' j ' ^ 
Output 
Value-added 
Armington output for Firms' use 
Armington output for Private use 
Armington output for Government use 
Government Utility 
Private Utility 
Global Transport 
Global Savings 
Regional Welfare 
Composite imports 
Imports by region 
Exports by region 
Price 
Aggregate value-added price 
Wage 
Armington Price for Firms' use 
Armington Price for Private use 
Armington Price for Government use 
Government Price Index 
Private Price Index 
Global Transport Price 
. Global Savings Price 
. Welfare Price Index 
. Composite import price 
. Import (cif) price by region 
. Export (fob) price by region 
. Income 
A:y(r) T:TO(j,r) P:(1-TOO(j,r)) 
) 
$PROD:fa(i, j,r) s:SIGD(i) 
0:fap(i, j,r) Q:VFA(i,j,r) , . 
I:p(i,r) Q:VDFM(i,j,r) P: (1 + TFDO(i,j,r)) A:y(r) T:TFD(i,3,r) 
I:mp{i,r) Q:VIFM(i,j,r) P:(1+TFIO(i,j,r)) A:y(r) T:TFI(i,:,r) 
$PROD:pa{i,r) 
0:pap(i,r) Q 
I:p(i,r) Q 
I:mp(i,r) Q 
$PROD:ga(i,r) 
0:gap(i,r) Q 
I:p(i,r) Q 
I:mp(i,r) Q 
s: SIGD(i) 
VPA(i,r) 
VDPM(i,r) P: (l+TPDO(i,r) 
VIPM(i,r) P: (l + TPIO(i,r) 
A:y(r) T:TPD(i,r) 
A:y(r) T:TPI(i,r) 
s:SIGD(i) 
VGA(i,r) 
VDGM{i,r) P: 
VIGM(i,r) P: 
;i+TGDO(i,r)) A:y(r) T:TGD(i,r) 
;i+TGlO(i,r)) A:y(r) T:TGI(i,r) 
$PROD:m(i,r) s:SIGM(i) 
0:rap(i,r) Q:VIM(i,r) 
I:cifp(i,s,r) Q:VIWS(i,s, r) P: (1+TMO(i,s, 
$PROD:ms(i,s,r) s:0 
•^•cifp(i,s,r) Q:VIWS(i,s,r) . 
r)) A:y(r) T:TM{i,s,r) 
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I : f o b p ( i , s , r ) Q : VXWD ( i , s , r ) -
I : g t p Q : V TWR ( i , s , r ) 
$PROD:;<s ( i , s , r ) 
O : f o b p ( i , s , r ) Q : VXWD ( i , s , r ) 
I : p ( i , s ) Q : VXMD ( i , s , r ) P : ( 1+T :<0 ( i , s , r ) ) A :Y ( s ) T : T X ( i , s , r ) 
SPROD:gu( r ) s : l 
0 : g p ( r ) Q: ( s u m ( i , V G A ( i , r ) ) ) 
I : g a p ( i , r ) Q : VGA ( i , r ) 
$PROD:pu( r ) s : l 
0 : p p ( r ) Q : ( s u m ( i , V P A ( i , r ) ) ) 
I : p a p ( i , r ) Q : V P A ( i , r ) 
$PROD:gt s : 0 
0 : g t p Q : (sum{ ( i , r ) , V S T ( i , r ) ) ) 
I : p ( i , r } Q : V S T ( i , r ) 
$PROD:gs s : l 
0 : g s p Q : ( s u m ( r , S A V E ( r ) ) ) 
I : p ( " c g d s " , r ) Q : ( ( V OM ( " c g d s " , r ) - V D E P ( r ) ) ) 
$PROD:we l ( r ) s : l 
0 ; w p i ( r ) Q 
I : g p ( r ) Q 
I : p p ( r ) Q 
I : g s p Q 
( s u m ( i , V GA ( i , r ) + V P A ( i , r ) ) + SAVE( r ) ) 
( s u m ( i , V G A ( i , r ) ) ) 
( s u m ( i , V P A ( i , r ) ) ) 
SAVE(r ) 
$DEMAND:y(r) s : l 
E : w ( f , r ) Q 
E : p ( " c g d s " , r ) Q 
D:wDi(r ) Q 
( s um [ j , EVFA ( f , j , r ) ] ) 
( - VDEP ( r ) ) 
( INCOME( r ) -VDEP ( r ) ) 
5.1.3 Details of the MPS/GE model 
This section examines each part of the MPS/GE model in turn, deriving expressions 
for output prices and input quantities. 
The production sectors: intermediate inputs and value-added 
Box 1 shows the details for the top-level production nest; the structure of this box will 
be used to define other parts of the model below. At the top of the box is the MPS/GE 
representation of the nest, identical to the relevant part of table 5-1. Below this the 
equations that correspond to this nest are defined, followed by definitions of variables 
and parameters. Each equation is labelled with the box number and equation number 
within the box, with the multiples equations that are used by MPS/GE given first (in 
this case, equations 1.1 to 1.4) Then levels equations (1.5 to 1.7) define the quantity 
(upper case) that corresponds to output and input demands in the sector. The variable 
list contains variables that are defined in the MPS/GE model (table 5-1) and additional 
variables that are defined here for convenience. MPS/GE does not use variable names 
for input demands (dfa and dva in box 1), but these will be useful when later 
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Box I: Production 
MPSGE Declaration: 
'$PROD:q(j/ r 
0: p (j , r) ^  
I:£ap(i,j f r 
I:vap(j,r) 
Equations: 
ps(j,r) = SI 
ps(j,r) 
dfa(i, j,r) 
dva(j,r) 
.•(j,r) 
DFA(i, j,r) 
DVA(j,r) 
Variables: 
q{j,r) 
p ; ] , r) 
faf(1,j, r) 
vap(j,r) 
y(r) 
dva(],r) 
dfa(i, j,r) 
ps(j,r) 
Parameters: 
VOM(j,r) 
VOA(j,r) 
VFA(i,j,r) 
VV.-. (j , r) 
TO(j,r) 
TOO {] , r) 
s:0 
Q:VOM(j,r) A:y(r) T:TO(j,r) P:(1-TOO(j,r)) 
Q:VFA(i,j,r) 
Q:VVA(j,r) 
jm[j, (VFA(i,j,r)/VOA(],r)) * fap(i,j,r)] 
+ (VVA(j,r) /VOA(j,r)) * vap(j,r) 
= p(:,r) Ml-TO(],r) )/(1-TOO (j , r) ) 
= q(j'r) 
= q(j-i^) 
= q(j,r)xVOM(j,r) 
= dfa(i,j,r)xVFA(i,j,r) 
= dva(j,r)xVVA(j,r) 
Quantity of output for sector j in region r 
Market price of sector j output in region r 
Armington Price for Firms' use 
Aggregate value-added price 
Income 
Demand for value-added in sector j in region r 
Firm demand for Armington aggregate good i in 
j in region r. 
Supply price of sector j output in region r. 
Value of Output at Market prices 
Value of Output at Agents' prices 
[1 
[1 
[1 
[1 
[1 
[1 
[1 
1] 
2] 
3] 
4] 
5] 
6] 
7] 
sector 
Value of Firm demand for intermediates at Agents' 
prices 
Value of Value-.Added demand at agents' prices 
Output ta:: 
Base output tax 
describing the market clearing conditions of the model. Parameters are defined in 
chapter 4, but are repeated in each box for convenience. 
The production sector in box I is a Leontief structure (the elasticity is given by s:0 
after the SPROD: declaration - in this nest it is zero) that takes inputs of intermediates. 
with price fap, and value-added, with price vap, to produce output of goods, with price 
p. In MPS/GE the ^name' of a good and the price of that good are represented by the 
same symbol. 
Base quamities are given in the Q: field, so that in the base data the sector q(j,r) 
produces VOM0,r) of good p(j,r). using VFA(i,j,r) of intennediates fap(i.j,r) and 
VVA(j,r) of value-added vap(j,r). 
Where taxes are applied, a tax agent (the A: field) names a household who will 
receive the tax paymem; in this case the agent is y(r). Just as a the name of a good is 
• ^ - ^ 
used as the price of that good, the name of a household is used as the income level of 
that household. y(r) is the regional household in region r, and the value y(r) also 
means the income level of that household. The agent name is followed by a tax 
parameter (T: field) and a reference price (P: field). The tax parameter defines what 
tax is applied during model simulation while the reference price defines the price that 
the sector receives for each unit of output in the base data.** In this case each unit of 
output is taxed at the rate TO(j,r), and since the base tax rate is TO0(j,r) the reference 
price is l-TO0(j,r). 
Equation 1.1 defines the supply price as a linear combination of input prices. Equation 
1.2 links the supply price and market price.' Equations 1.3 and 1.4 link the demand for 
inputs to output, which because this nest is Leontief, are equal. 
The levels equations 1.5 to 1.7 link the upper case level of output (1.5) and input 
quantities (1.6 and 1.7) to the lower case multiples. In each case the level is the 
multiple times the base quantity. 
^ When, as in most other cases in the model, the tax is applied to an input, the reference price is the price paid for 
that good by the sector in the base data. It is therefore one plus the base tax rate, 
^ If uppercase P(i,r) indicates the price level and PO(.i,r) indicates the base level then; 
P S ( j , r ) = ( 1 - T 0 ( j , r ) ) P ( j , r ) 
and PSO( j , r ) = ( l - T O 0 ( j , r ) ) PO ( j , r ) 
then p s { j , r ) = P S ( j , r ) / P SO ( j , r ) 
= [ P ( j ; r ) / P O ( j , r ) ] ( l - T O ( j , r ) ) / ( l - T O 0 ( D , r ) ) 
= p ( j , r ) ( l - T O ( j , r ) ) / ( l - T O 0 ( j , r ) ) 
where t n e ba se ma rke t p r i c e PO ( j , r ) = 1 
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Box 2: Value-Added 
MPSGE Declaration: 
ITpROD: va ( j , r) 
0:vcip{j, r) 
I: w ( f, r) 
Equations: 
vap(j / r) 
e(f, j,r) 
VA {j , r) 
E(f, j,r) 
Variables: 
va(j,r) 
vap(j,r; 
w (f, r) 
e(f,],r) 
Parameters: 
VVA{1 , r) 
EVFA(f,j,r) 
SIGV(j) 
VASHR(f, j,r) 
s:SIGV{j) 
Q:VVA(j,r) 
Q:EVFA(f,],r) 
= SUM[f, VASHR(f , j, r) xw(f) '^"•^''^ '^5'] "^ '^ -'''•""" 
= va(j,r)x[vap(j,r)/w(f,r)]-''''^''' 
= va(j,r)xVVA(j,r) 
= e(f,j,r)xEVFA{f, j,r) 
Quantity of value-added 
Aggregate value-added price 
Wage 
Employment of factor f in sector j of region r 
Value of Value-Added demand at agents' prices 
Endowment commodity Value of purchases by Firms 
Elasticity of substitution between factors of 
production 
Share of factor f m value-added in sector j in 
region r 
= EVFA(f,j,r)/VVA(j,r) 
[2 
[2 
[2 
[2 
11 
2] 
3] 
4] 
Production of value-added composites 
To add clarity, the value-added nest of the production sector is treated separately here. 
Later, it will be treated within the production sector itself Box 2 shows the value-
added nest. 
The elasticity between factors is siGV(j), indicating a CES production function. 
Equation 2.1 gives the value-added price, and equation 2.2 gives demand for factors 
(as a multiple variable). Both these equations are pre-calibrated equations from 
chapter 2 section 2.5. A new parameter. VASHR, has been declared here in order to 
make equation 2.1 clearer. Equations 2.3 and 2.4 calculate levels values to be used in 
market clearing equations. 
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Box 3: Armington goods for tlrms' use 
D e c l a r a t i o n : 
: f , 3 ( i , j , r ) s : G I GD ( i ) 
i , : , r ) Q 
r ) Q 
, r ) Q 
V F A ( i , J , r ) 
V D FM { i , j , r ) P : ( l + TFDO ( i , j , r ) ) A : y ( r ) T : T F D ( i , j , r ) 
V I F M ( i , j , r ) P : ( l + T F I Q ( i , j , r ) ) A : y ( r ) T : T F I ( i , j , r ) 
E q u a t i o n s : 
f a p ( i , j < - ) 
f d d d , j / r ) 
f dm ( i , j , r ) 
FA( i , j , r ) 
FDD(i, j , r ) 
FDM( i , j , r l 
V a r i a b l e s : 
f a p d , -], r ) 
p ( i , r ) 
rap ( i , r ) 
f a d , j , r ! 
f d d ( i , j , r ) 
dm ( 1 , j , r ) 
P a r a m e t e r s : 
VDFM(i, j , r ) 
VIFM(i,j,r) 
VFA(i,j, r) 
TFD(i,j,r) 
TFDO(i,j, r) 
TFI(i,j,r) 
TFIO(i,j,r) 
SIGD(i) 
= [VDFMd, j,r)/VFA(i, j, r) x[ p (i, r.) xt f d (i, j , r) 
+ V I F M d , j, r)/VFAd, j, r) x [mp ( i, r) xt f i (i, j , r) 
= fa (i, j, r) x[fap{i, j, r) / I p d , r)xtfd(i, j, r) }] •' '' 
= fa (i, j , r) X [fap (i, j , r) / {mp (i, r) xtfi (i, j , r! } ] • 
= fad, j, r)xVFAd, j, r) 
= fddd, j,r)xVDFM[i, j,r) 
= fdmd, j,r)xVIFM(i, j,r) 
- IGDI 
-.'A'-ib[ 
[3 
[3 
" [3 
[3 
[3 
[3 
i)) 
D ) 
1] 
2] 
3] 
4] 
5] 
6] 
Armington Price for Firms' use 
Price (for domestic good) 
Composite import price 
Armington output for Firms' use 
Firms' demand for domestically sourced goods 
Firms' demand for imports 
Value of Domestic purchases by Firms at Market 
prices, by commodity, sector and region. 
Value of Import; purchases by Firms at Market prices, 
by commodity, sector and region. 
Value of Firms' demand at Agents' prices, by 
cominodity, sector and region. 
Tax on intermediate use of domestic good i used in 
sector j in region r 
Base value of TFD(i,j,r) 
Tax on intermediate use of imports of good i used in 
sector j in region r 
Base v a l u e o f T F I ( i , j , r ) 
E l a s t i c i t y o f s u b s t i t u t i o n be tween d om e s t i c a l l y 
s o u r c e d and impo r t e d goods 
The f o l l ow ing t a x i:i\ultiples a r e u s e d : 
t f a ( i , j , r ) = ( l + T F D ( i , j , r ) ) / ( l + T F DO ( i , j , r ) ) 
t f i ( i , j , r ) = ( l + T F I d , j , r ) ) / ( l + T F l O ( i , j , r ) ) 
Production of Armington aggregate goods for intermediate use 
Armington aggregate goods are 'produced' for three different uses: intermediate use, 
private consumption, and government consumption. The same elasticities of 
substitution are used in each case, with only initial quantities and taxes varying 
between the three different uses. 
Box 3 shows the MPS/GE definition of the Armington aggregate for intermediate use, 
and the corresponding equations with a list of the variables and parameters used in 
this nest. 
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Box 4: Private Armington Goods 
MPSGE Declaration: 
$PROD:pa(i, r) s:SIGD(i) 
0:pap d, r) 
I:pd,r) 
I: ;;ic . i, r) 
VPAd, r) 
VDPM(i,r) P: (l+TPDO(i, r) ) A:y(r) T:TPDd,r; 
VIPMd, r) P: (l+TPIO(i,r) ) A:y(r) T:TPI(i,r) 
Equations: 
pap(i,r) = [VDPM(i,r)/VPAd,r)x[p(i,r)xtpdd,r) ] 
+ VIPMd, r) /VPAd,r)x[mp(i,r)xtpi(i,r) 
, : I/II-:,-:'J:M'11)) 
pdd(i,r) = pa (i, r)x [pap(i,r)/{pd, r)xtpd(i, r) } ] '^'*''' 
pdm{i,r) = pa (i, r) x [pap (i, r) / (p (i, r) xtpi (i, r) }] ••''•'•''• 
PA(i,r) = VPAd, r) xpad, r) 
PDDd,r) = VDPM(i,r)xpdd(i,r) 
PDM(i,r) = VIPMd, r) xpdmd, r) 
, 111 11 
[ 4 . 1 ] 
[ 4 . 2 ] 
[ 4 . 3 ] 
[ 4 . 4 ] 
[ 4 . 5 ] 
[ 4 . 6 ] 
V a r i a b l e s : 
p a p d , r ) 
p d , r ) 
mp {i, r ) 
p a ( i , r) 
pcia ( i , r ) 
c am( i , r ) 
Armington Price for private use 
Price (for domestic good) 
Composite import price 
Armington output for private use 
Private demand for domestically sourced goods 
Private demana for imports 
Parameters: 
VDPMd, r) 
VIPMd, r) 
VFA{i,r) 
TFD(i,r; 
TPDOd, r) 
TPId, r) 
TPlO(i,r) 
SIGDd) 
Value of Domestic purchases by private household at 
Market prices, by cominodity and region. 
Value of Import purchases by private household at 
Market prices, by commodity and region. 
Value of Private demana at Agents' prices, by 
commodit' region. 
Tax on private use of domestic good i in region r 
Base value or TPDd,r) 
Tax on private use of imports of good i in region r 
Base value of TFI(i,r) 
E l a s t i c i t y of s u b s t i t u t i o n between domes t i ca l ly 
sourced and imported goods 
The following tax multiples a re used: 
tpd ( i , r ) = (l + TPDd , r ) ) / ( l + TPDO(i,r) ) 
t p i ( i , r ) = (1+TPI ( i , r ) ) / (1 + TPlO d, r) ) 
The elasticity SIGD(i) signifies a CES function with that value, unless of course 
SIGD(i) is set to zero (Leontiet) or one (Cobb-Douglas). Equation 3.1 gives the CES 
pre-calibrated price function, with tax multiples (lower case) used to simplify the 
expression. These are defined at the bottom of the box, and are equivalent to the 
power of the taxes. 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 give the pre-calibrated input demands. Note that when a tax on 
an input is included, it is the agents' price (inclusive of tax) that must be used in these 
equations. Equations 3.4 to 3.6 give the levels values of output (3.4) and inputs (3.5 
and 3.6) 
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Box 5: Government Armington Goods 
-iPSGE D e c l a r a t i o n : 
$ P ROD : g a ( i , r ) s : S I G D ( i ) 
):>.!ap(i, r ) 
I : p ( i , r ) 
I:mp ( i , r ) 
V GA ( i , r ) 
VDGM( i , r ) P : d+TGDO ( i , r ) ) A : y ( r ) T : TGD { i , r ) 
V I GM ( i , r ) P : ( l + T G I O ( i , r ) ) A : y ( r ) T : T G I ( i , r ) 
E q u a t i o n s : 
' i a p ( i , r ) = [ V D G M d , r ) / V G A ( i , r ) x [ p ( i , r ) x t g d d , r ) ] 
+ V I G M ( i , r ) / V G A d , r ) x [ m p ( i , r ) x t g i ( i , r ) 
1 I i / ( : - , ; i ' j p ( i , , ) 
,7(T,a(i,r) = ga ( i , r ) x [ g a p d , r ) / { p ( i , r ) x t g d d , r ) } ] •-
7 ; i :n ( i , r ) = ga ( i , r ) X [ g a p d , r ) / { p d , r ) - t g i ( i , r ) I ] • •  
G A u , r ) = V GA d , r ) x g a d , r ) 
GDD( i , r ) = VDGMd, r ) x g d d d , r ) 
GDM(i , r ) = V I GMd , r ) x g d m ( i , r ) 
', i - ; . ; ib. 1,1 1 
[ 5 . 1 ] 
[ 5 . 2 ] 
[ 5 . 3 ] 
[ 5 . 4 ] 
[ 5 . 5 ] 
[ 5 . 6 ] 
V a r i a b l e s : 
g a p d , r ) 
p ( i , r ) 
n\r ' 1, r) 
gr. -,r) 
jda i,r) 
lar- i,r) 
Armington Price for government use 
Price (for domestic good) 
Composite import price 
Armi.ngton output for government use 
Government aemand for domestically sourced goods 
Government demand for imports 
? irameters: 
'/DGM (i, r) 
VIGMd, r) 
VGA(i,r) 
TGDd,r) 
TGDO{i,r) 
TGId.r) 
T:-:0(i,r) 
SIGDd) 
Value of Domestic purchases by government household 
at Market prices, by conmiodity and region. 
Value of Import purchases by government household at 
Market prices, oy commodity and region. 
Value of Govern.ment demand at Agents' prices, by 
commodity and region. 
Tax on government use of domestic good i in region r 
Base value of T3D(i,r) 
Tax on government use of imports of good i in region 
r 
Base value of TGId,r) 
Elasticity of substitution between domestically 
sourced and imported goods 
T.htr following tax multiples are used: 
tgd(i,r) = (1+TGD(i,r))/(1+TGDO(i,r)) 
tgi(i,r) = (1+TGI(i,r))/(1+TGIO(i,r)) 
Production of Armington aggregate goods for private and government use 
These sectors follow the form of the intermediate Armington above. Box 4 shows the 
MPSGE declaration, equations, variables, and parameters for private Armington 
aggregate goods, and box 5 shows the same for government Armington aggregate 
goods. 
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Box 6: Composite Imports 
(MPSGE Declara 
r$PROD:m(i, r) 
G:mp (1, r) 
I:cifp (i, s, r) 
jEq'uations : 
mp (i, r) 
dm{i,s, r) 
M(i,r) 
DM(1, s, r) 
"variables : 
m(i,r) 
mp (i, r) 
cifp(i,s,r) 
dm (i, s, r) 
y(r) 
Parameters : 
VIWS(i,s,r) 
VIMd, r) 
T''!' i , s , r) 
TMO d, s , r) 
SIGM 1) 
MSHRd,s,r) 
The following 
t-, (i, s, r) 
tion: 
s:SIGM(i) 
Q:VIM(i,r) 
Q:VIWSd,s,r) P :(1 + TMO (i, s , r) ) A:y(r) T:TM(i,s,r) 
= [S,MSHR(i, s, r) x [cifpd, s, r) xtm(i, s, r) ] '• "• • '''»''>> 
1 il/(l-,iIGM(l) ) ) r ^ 
= m(i, r) x[mp{i, r)/(cifpd, s, r) xtmd , s, r) } ]^^"^'"-' [6. 
= m(i,r)xVIM(i,r) [6. 
= dm(i,s,r)xVIWS(1, s, r) [6. 
Composite imports (quantity) 
Composite import price 
Import (cif) price by region 
Demand for imports from region s 
Income; the destination region receives tariff 
payments 
Value of Imports at World (c.i.f.) prices, by 
cominodity, source region s and destination region r 
Value of Imports at Market prices, by commodity and 
region. 
Import tariff by commodity, source and destination 
Base value of TM(i,s,r) 
Elasticity of suOstitution between imports from 
different source regions 
Share of imports of good i into region r that are 
sourced from region s .(evaluated at domestic prices 
= VIWS(i,s,r)x(l+TMO(i,s,r)) / VIM(i,r) 
tax multiple is used: 
= (l+TM(i,s,r))/(l+TMO(i,s,r)) 
1] 
2] 
3] 
4] 
) 
Composite Imports 
Composite imports are 'made" from imports from different sources. The composite 
import sector also adds the appropriate import tariff TM(i.r,s) onto the cif price of 
imports. The elasticity of substitution SIGM(i) means that the nest is CES. Equation 
6.1 in box 6 is the CES pre-calibrated price equation, with the weights MSHR 
(defined in the parameters section of box 6). Equation 6.2 gives the demand for 
imports on each bilateral route, with equations 6.3 and 6.4 converting multiples to 
levels. 
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Box 7: cif Imports 
MPSGE Declaration: 
$PROD:ms (i, s, 
0:cifp (i, 3, r) 
I:fobp(i, s, r) 
I: gtp 
Equations : 
cifp(i, s,r) 
ClFP(i,s,r) 
CIFPO(i,s,r) 
MS{i,s,r) 
DFOBd, s, r) 
DTRAN (i, s, r) 
Variables: 
ms (i, s, r) 
cifpd, s, r) 
fobpd, s, r) 
gtp 
DFOBd, s, r) 
DTRAMd, s, r) 
Parameters : 
y;.;wD d, s, r) 
VIWS(i,s,r) 
VTWRd,s, r) 
TSHR(i,s, r) 
r) s : 0 
Q:VIWS(i,s,r) 
Q:VXWD(i,s,r) 
Q:VTWR{i,s,r) 
= CIFP(i,s,r) / CIFPO(i,s,r) 
= TSHR(i,s,r)xgtp + (1-TSHR(i,s,r))xfobp(i,s,r) 
= TSHRd,s,r) + (l-TSHR(i,s,r) ) xFOBPO d , s , r ) 
= VIWS (i, s, r) xms (i, s, r) 
= VXWD (i, s, r) xms (i, s, r) 
= VTWR (i, s, r) xms (1, s, r) 
Imports by region 
Import (cif) price by source-destination region 
Export (fob) price by source-destination region 
Global transport price 
Demand for fob e;-;corts 
Demand for transport services 
[7.1] 
[7.2] 
[7.3] 
[7.4] 
[7.5] 
[7.6] 
pair 
pair 
Value of exports at World (fob) prices, oy commodity. 
source region s and aestination region r. 
Value of Imports at Worid (c.i.f.) prices, bv 
commodity, source region s and destination regie ;n r. 
Value of Transport services used in the transport of 
goods from source region s to destination region r. 
= VIWS(i,s,r) - VXWD(i,s,r) 
Transport share of cif value 
= VTWR(i,s,r) / VlWSd, s,r) 
cif Imports 
The cif imports add transport costs to the fob value of the trade flow of good i from 
source region s to destination region r. Here the convention of uppercase characters 
for levels, with '0" indicating base values, for (lowercase) multiple variables is 
extended to cifp and fobp. cifp is. like all prices, normalised to unity; this is done by 
equadon 7.1, with the 'levels" price CIFP determined in equation 7.2 and the base 
price determined by equation 7.3. Equations 8.2 and 8.3 in box 8 give the fob prices 
FOBP and FOBPO, and from these equations the normalised cif price is 
cifp{i,s,r) = TSHR{i,s,r) X gtp + (\- TSHR{i.s.r)) x (l + TX{i.s,r)) x Pji.r) 
TSHR{i,s,r) + (l - TSHR(i,s,r)) x (l + 7T0(/,.y,r)) 
which could be used in the model in place of equations 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
The conventions used in boxes 7 and 8 are for clarity only. 
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Box 8: fob Exports 
[MPSGE Declaration: 
r$PROD::-'.s (i, s. 
(i: f o b p d , s, r ) 
j I: p d . s ) 
liquations : 
fobp(1,3, r) 
FOBPd, s, r) 
FOBPO(i,s,r) 
XCd, s, r) 
DX (i , s , r) 
•',-,riaD_es : 
foop (i, s, r ) 
p i, ^ ) 
xs d, s, r) 
DX d, s, r) 
y (s/ 
J.arameters : 
v:''.MD ; -^  , s, r) 
v:-:wD d , 3, r) 
TJ: I, s, r) 
iTX; i,s,r) 
r) 
Q: VXWD d, s, r) 
>,):VXMD(i, s, r) P : d + TXO (i, s, r ) ) A:y(s) T : TX (i , 3 , r ; 
= FOBP(i,s,r) / FOBPO(i,s,r) [8.1] 
= p(i,s)x(l+TX(i,s,r)) • [8.2] 
= l+TXO(i,s,r) [8.3] 
= VXWDd, s, r) x;.;s (i, s, r) [3.4] 
= VXMDd, s, r) x.-.-.s d, s, r) [8.5] 
Export (fob) price by source-destination region pair 
Price 
Exports by source and destination 
Demand for exports in source region s 
Income; the source region receives e:-;port ta:-: 
payments 
Value of exports at Market prices of exporting 
region, by commodity, source region s and destination 
region r. 
Value of exports at World (fob) prices, by commodity. 
source region s and destination region r. 
Export tariff by commodity and source-destination 
regional pairing 
Base value of TXd,s,r) 
fob Exports 
The fob export structure adds any export tax (subsidy) TX(i,s,r) to the domestic price 
p(i,s) of good i in source region s. for export to destination region r (equation 8.2), 
with the normalised fob price given by equation 8.1. Equations 8.4 and 8.5 define 
levels values for exports at world and domestic prices. The (lower case) variable 
dx(i.s.r) is not included here for brevity; it is equal to xs(i,s,r). 
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Box 9: Government Utility 
MPSGE D e c l a r a t i o n : 
$PROD:gu(r) 
0: jp (r) 
I : g a p ( i , r l 
Equ a t i o n s : 
gp; r) 
gd : 1, r ) 
GLMr) 
GD(i , r ) 
V a r i a c i e s : 
gu (r ; 
gp(r ; 
gap d , r ) 
g a ( i , r ) 
Pa r ame te r s : 
VGA d , r ) 
Gi,"i:Xr [£ , 
:;GHRd, r) 
s:l 
Q:GOVEXP(r) 
Q:VGA(i,r) 
n, gapd,r)'^'^»'"^''* 
gu(r) xgp(r) /gapd, r) 
GOVEXP(r)xgu(r) 
gdd, r)xVGA(i,r) 
Government Utility 
Government Price Inde:-: 
Armington Price for Government use 
Government demand for goods 
[9 
[3 
[9 
[9 
1] 
2 ] 
3] 
4] 
Value of Government demand at Agents' prices, by 
cominodity and r eg ion . 
To ta l government e;--.penditure 
= I.VGAd, r ; 
Share of government expenditure spent on gcoa i 
= VGA d,r) / GOVEXP(r) 
Government UtUity 
Government utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of the government Armington 
aggregate goods. Equation 9.1 gives the Cobb-Douglas pre-calibrated function for an 
aggregate government price index. Equation 9.2 is a pre-calibrated demand function. 
Equations 9.3 and 9.4 calculate levels values. 
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Box 10: Private Utility 
MP::GE D e c l a r a t i o n : 
r^FF(^C:pu(r) 
0:pp(r) 
I:paD(i,r) 
Equations: 
pp(r) 
pd(i,r) 
pn(i) 
PD(i,r; 
""ariacl-s: 
puir, 
CD (r; 
pap(i,r) 
p:id,r; 
Parameters : 
','?A 'i, rl 
PPIVEXPfr) 
FG.HR i, r) 
s:l 
Q:PRIVEXP(r) 
Q:VPA(i,r) 
= n.pap(i,r)''"^"—] 
= pu (r) xpp (r)/papd, r) 
= pu(r)xpRIVEXP(r) 
= pd(i,r)x VPAd,r) 
Private Utility 
Private Price Inde;-: 
Armington Price for Private use 
Private demand for goods 
Value of Private demand at Agents' prices, by 
commodity and r-gion. 
Total private e;-;penditure 
= I,VPAd, r) 
Share of private expenditure spent on good i 
= VPAd, r) / PRIVEXP(r) 
[10 
[10 
[10 
[10 
1] 
2] 
3] 
4] 
Private UtUity 
The private utility function is similar to the government utility function; Equation 
10.1 calculates an aggregate private price index in the same manner that equation 9.1 
calculates an aggregate government price index. 
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Box 11: Global Transport 
MPSGE D e c l a r a t i o n : 
SPROD:gt s : 0 
0 :g tp Q:VT 
I :p ( i , r ) Q :V3T ( i , r ) 
= I , , , SHRTd, r ) < p ( i , r ) d l - l ] 
= gtxVT [ 11 . 2 ] 
TDEM d , r) = g t xVSTd , r) [ 11 -3 ] 
V a r i a b l e s : 
gt 
GT 
Glob a l T r a n s p o r t ( q u a n t i t y o f t o t a l t r a n s p o r t 
s e r v i c e s ) 
„^ (- Global Transport Price 
pf'j^ i^-) Price of good i in region r 
TDEM(i,r) Transport demand for services 
Parameters: 
(^ gip'^ r^) Value of Sales to international Transport, by 
commodity ana region. 
y- Total transport sales worldwide 
= l,,-VST(i, r) 
Share of transport services that are sourced as good 
1 in r e g i o n r 
= VST ( i , r ) / VT 
. , r ) 
Globtd Transport 
Global transport is a Leontief/fixed coefficients function of individual goods' prices. 
Equation 11.1 defines the price index for global transport, as a composite of all market 
prices in all regions. The parameter VST, value of sales to international transport, 
contains mainly zeros - only the GTAP commodity • T_T trade and transport services" 
is sold to the global transport sector. 
Demand for commodities for use in transport, TDEM(i.r). is a fixed proportion of the 
quantity of global transport services, as shown in equation 11.3. 
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Box 12: Global Savings 
MPSGE Declaration: 
^PROD:gs 
0:gsp 
I:p("cgas", 
Equations: 
gsp 
GS 
SAVDCAP(r) 
'Variables: 
gs 
gsp 
p("cgds",r) 
SAVDCAP(r) 
Parameters 
GLOBINV 
NETIXV(r) 
SHRS(r; 
r) 
s: 1 
g:GLOBIMV 
Q:NETIL]V(r) 
= n, p(~Xcgds",r) "'-'^  
= gsxGLOBINV 
= gsxgsp/p dcgds", r) xNETINV(r ) 
Global Savings quantity 
Global Savings Price 
Price of capital goods in region r 
Savings demand for capital in region r 
Value of global investment. 
Net investment in region r 
= REGINV(r) - VDEP(r) 
Share of global savings invested in reqion r 
= N!ETIMV(r) / GLOBIHV 
[12 
[12 
[12 
1] 
2] 
3] 
Global Savings 
Global savings is a Cobb-Douglas function of capital goods in different regions. Note 
that capital goods ('"cgds")** are a member of the set j (produced commodities) but not 
the set i (tradable commodities). A production sector (box 1) therefore exists for this 
commodity, although no factors are used in its creation. The parameter VFA(i,j,r) 
defines the value of firms" demands for goods (and is calculated from the value of 
firms' demand for imports at agents" prices. VIFA(i,j,r), and the value of firms' 
demand for domestic goods at agents" prices, VDFA(i,j,r) in chapter 4). Capital goods 
are just one element of the set j, so the values VFA(i,"cgds".r) give the capital 
composition matrix, which determines which goods (i) are purchased when capital is 
formed in region r. A fixed quantity of capital is purchased by the regional household 
to cover depreciation, and all other capital sales are purchased by global savings. 
** Nme that capital goods ("ccds") and (factor) capital are not the same concept. Factor capital refers to existitig 
wpitai stock while capital goods refers to new capital formation. In the static model there is no hnk hetween the 
lucv 
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Box 13: Regional Welfare 
MPSGE Declara 
5PR0D:wel(r) 
0:wDi(r) 
I: ip(r) 
I:pp{r) 
I: gsp 
Equations: 
wpi(r) 
dag(r) 
dap(r) 
das(r) 
WEL(r) 
DAG(r) 
DAP(ri 
DAS(r) 
Variables: 
wel(rJ 
wpifr) 
pp (r) 
gp(r) 
gsp 
dag(r) 
dap (r •) 
oas(r! 
Parameters: 
IMC-3ME(r) 
SAVE(r) 
VDE?(r) 
GOVEXP(r) 
PRI7EXP(r) 
RSKRP(r) 
P3KRG(r) 
RSHRS(r) 
tion: 
s: 1 
Q 
Q 
'J 
Q 
(INCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
GOVEXP(r) 
PRIVEXP{r) 
(SAVE(r)-VDEP(r) ) 
= gp(r)--"^'-'^' < pp(r)'^-™'"^' x gsp^ -^'"-'-' 
= wel(r) X wpi(r)/gp{r) 
= wel(r) X wpi(r)/pp(r) 
= wel(r) X wpi(r)/gsp 
= wel(r) X (INCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
= dag(r) x GOVEXP(r) 
= dap(r) X PRlVEXP(r) 
= das(r) X (SAVE(r)-VDEP(r)) 
Regional Welfare 
Welfare Price Inoex 
Private Price Index 
Government Price Index 
Global Savings Price 
Demand for aggregate -jovermnent goods 
Demand for aggregate private goods 
Demand for savings 
Regional Inco.me, by region 
Value of net savings, by region. 
Value of capital depreciation, by regi 
Total governm,ent expenaiture 
= I VGA(i,r) 
Total private expenditure 
= I VPAd, r) 
Share of private expenditure in total 
expenditure 
= PRIVEXP(r) / (INCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
on. 
regional 
[13 
[13 
[13 
[13 
[13 
[13 
[13 
[13. 
Share of government expenditure in total regional 
expenditure 
= GOVEXP(r) / dNCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
Share of savings in total regional exp 
= SAVE(r) / (INCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
enditure 
1] 
2] 
3] 
4] 
5] 
6] 
7] 
8] 
Regional Welfare 
Regional welfare is a Cobb-Douglas function of three different functions: private 
utility, goverrmient utility, and savings. The definition of welfare wel(r) in this 
manner allows welfare changes to be calculated easily, and makes the assumption that 
welfare is cardinal. Welfare wel(r) is a multiples variable, so the percentage change in 
welfare from the base can be found as wei%(r) = lOQ * (wei(r) - i) 
while the equivalent variation is EV(r) = WEL(r) - (INCOME (r)-VDEP (r)) 
= ( w e l ( r ) - 1) X ( INCOME( r ) -VDEP( r ) ) 
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Box 14: Regional Income 
MPSGE D e c l a r a t i o n : 
$nEMAND:y(r) s : l 
E - w ( f , r ) 0 : E VOA ( r , r ) 
E - p ( " : g c l s " , r ) Q: ( -VDEP( r ) ) 
D -wp i ( r ) Q: (INCOME ( r ) -VDEP ( r ) ) 
E q u a t i o n s : 
Y(r ) = ^ t EVOA ( f , r ) X w ( f , r ) 
- VDEP( r ) X p ( " c g d s " , r ) 
+ 1 T 0 ( j , r ) X Q ( j , r ) X p ( j , r ) 
+ 1 , , T r D ( i , j , r ) X F D D ( i , 3 , r ) x p d , r ) 
+ Z., T F I { i , j , r ) X F DM ( i , j , r ) x m p ( i , r ) 
+ X, T P D d , r ) X P DD ( i , r ) x p ( i , r ) 
• 1- 1 , T P I ( i , r ) X PDM ( i , r ) x m p ( i , r ) 
+ 1 T GD ( i , r ) X GDD ( i , r ) x p ( i , r ) 
+ S , T G I ( i , r ) X GDM( i , r ) .< m p ( i , r ) 
+ I I , . , T M ( i , s , r ) X D M ( i , s , r ) x C I F P ( i , s , r ) 
+ S / , T X ( i , r , s ) X D X ( i , r , s ) x p ( i , r ) ] [ 1 4 . 1 " 
DWEL{r) Y ( r ) / w p i ( r ) [ 1 4 . 2 ] 
-v-(.) = y ( r ) < INCOME ( r ) d 4 . 3 ] 
" a r i a o ^ e s : 
-,_,-jr', I n c ome 
;^P^(r) Welfare Price Index 
p" i, r) Price 
w n', ri Wage 
^p ^^r) Composite import price 
':ifp'd,s,r) Import (cif) price by region 
iji^EL(r) Demand for welfare good (wpi) 
Parameters: 
See boxes 1, 3, 4, 5, b,7,8,1^ 
Regional Income 
Regional income is the most complex function to give in equation form, although in 
MPS/GE form it is simpler, as MPS/GE amomatically assigns all tax revenues to the 
tax agent given in the A: field of the relevant production block. 
Income (equation 14.1) is composed of factor income and tax income. For each tax 
instrumem, the tax revenue is calculated as the tax rate multiplied by the base quantity 
multiplied by the price and output multiples of the relevant output or input. Note that 
the upper case variable names in equation 14.1 (Q,FDD,FDM,etc.) are levels values: 
MPS/GE does not use these variables, but substitutes the relevam expression from the 
producdon nests. DX(i,r,s), the quamity of exports by commodity and bilateral route, 
is equal to VXMD(i,s,r)xxs(i,s,r) [equation 8.5 in box 8], and this expression is 
automatically used by MPS/GE in the last term of equation 14.1. 
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Demand-Supply Equations 
One of the advantages of MPS/GE to the user is that it automatically calculates market 
equilibria equations, but here the equations will be presented in full. To find the 
equilibrium equations, place all supplies of a commodity on the left of the equation, 
and all demands of that commodity on the right hand side. 
Equation 15.1: Equilibrium for tradable goods markets (p(i,r)) 
Q(i,r) = PDD(i,r) + GDD(i,r) + V, FDDd,j,r) 
+ TDEM(i,r) + I DXd,s,r) [15.1] 
where [see e-ouationj 
Q':],r) Quantity of output for sector j in region r ' 1.5 
PDD(i,r) Private demand for domestically sourced :;ooas 4.5 
GDC(i,r) Government demand for domestically sourced goois 5.5 
F:.Cd,i,r) Firms' demand for domestically sourced jcoas 3.5 
TDEM(i,r) Transport demand for services 11.3 
DX d, s, r) Demand for exports in source region s 8.5 
Equation 15.1 equates supply and demand for tradable goods i in region r. In this case, 
supply is output Q(i,r), and demand is the sum of private demands (PDD), 
government demands (GDD), firms" demands (FDD), the global transport sector's 
demand for goods (TDEM) and export demand (DX). Note that the number of the 
equation where each variable is defined appears to the right of the variable 
explanation. ,/ 
Equation 15.2 equates the supply of capital goods with demand for capital goods; 
demand for capital goods comes from global savings (box 12), and a fixed amount of 
depreciation, the payment for which is deducted from regional income (box 14). 
Equation 15.2: 
Q " cgd s " , r ) 
where 
SAVDCAP(r) 
VDEP(r) 
Equilibrium for capital goods markets (p("cgds",r)) 
= SAVDCAP(r) + VDEP(r) 
[ see 
Savings demand for c a p i t a l m reg ion r 
Deprec i a t ion (database parameter) 
[15.2] 
equat ion] 
12.3 
Equation 15.3 simply equates the supply and demand for value-added in each sector. 
Equation 15.3: Equilibrium for composite value-added (vap(j,r)) 
'^ A'i,r) = DVA(j,r) 
Where [see equation] 
^^ j'J^ l Quantity of value-added 2.3 
DVA(j,r) Demand for value-added in sector j in region r. 1.7 
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Equation 15.4: Equilibrium for factor markets (w(f,r)) 
EVOAd, r ) = 1 E ( f , j , r ) 
r 1 5 . 4 
'•"^ *^ "^ , ^ , [see equation] 
E,f,D/r) Employment ot ractor f in sector j of region r 2 4 
EVOA(f,r) Endowment commodity Value of Output at Agents' prices 
(database parameter) 
The factor markets (equation 15,4) are central to the model, as many of the traditional 
general equilibrium effects that the CGE model aims to capture are transmitted 
through these markets. The supply of factors is a fixed parameter EVOA(f,r) - one of 
the original database parameters. 
The markets for Armington goods are shown in equations 15.5 to 15.7. These are 
simple one-to-one equations, linking output of the Armington nests with aggregate 
demand for products from private expenditure, government expenditure, and 
intermediate demand. 
Equations 15.5 
and gap(i,r)) 
FAd , j , r ) 
PA ( i , r ) 
GA( i , r ) 
where 
F A ( i , j , r ) 
DFAd, j , r ) 
P A d , r ) 
P D d , r ) 
GA( i , r ) 
GD( i , r ) 
to 15.7: Equilibrium for Armington markets (fap(i,j,r), pap(i,r) 
= DFAd, j , r ) [15 .51 
= PD ( i , r ) [ 15 . 6 ] 
= GD ( i , r ) [ 15 . 7 ] 
[ s ee e q u a t i o n ] 
Arming ton o u t p u t f o r F i rms ' u se 3 . 3 
Firm demand fo r Arming ton a g g r e g a t e 1.6 
Arming ton o u t p u t fo r p r i v a t e u s e 4 .4 
P r i v a t e demand fo r goods 10 .4 
Arming ton o u t p u t f o r government u s e 5.4 
Government demand f o r goods 9.4 
Equation 15.8 equates total supply of global transport with the demand for transport 
services on each bilateral trade route for each commodity. 
Equation 15.8: Equilibrium for Global Transport (gtp) 
GT = S^ 3^^ ^ DTRAN(i,s,r) [15.8] 
where [see equation] 
GT Global Transport (quantity of transport services) 11.2 
DTRAN (i, s, r) Demand for transport services 7 . 6 
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Equation 15.9: Equilibrium for Global Savings (gsp) 
GS = -. DAS(r) [15.9] 
where [see equation] 
Qr Global Savings quantity 12.2 
Q/^ S_r) Demand for savings 13.8 
Equilibrium for global savings (equation 15.9) equates the total supply of global 
savings with the demand for savings in each region. 
Equation 15.10 equates the 'supply" of welfare to the 'demand' for welfare. 
Equation 15.10: Equilibrium for aggregate welfare (wpi(r)) 
WEL'r) = DWEL(r) [15.10] 
wne^e [see equation] 
WE:L(r' Regional Welfare 13.5 
DWEL(r; Demand for welfare good (wpi) 14.2 
Equation 15.11 equates import supply and demand. Import supply M(i.r) is total 
(composite) imports of good i into region r, and is a CES aggregate of imports from 
different source regions, as detailed in box 6. Import demand is from the private, 
government and intermediate Armington nests. If the Armington structure is 
envisayed as a two stage nest, with substitution between domestic goods and import 
goods in the top nest, and substitution between imports from different source regions 
in the lower nest, then equation 15.11 occurs in between the nests.'' 
Equation 15.11: Equilibrium for aggregate imports (mp(i,r)) 
[.i:x,r,- = PDMd , r ) + GDM(i,r) + 1 FDM( i , j , r ) [ 15 . 11 ] 
where . '-=-" e q u a t i o n ] 
Md , r ) Compos i t e imp o r t s ( q u a n t i t y ) o-3 
FDM(i, j , r) F i rm s ' demand f o r im p o r t s 3 .6 
PDM(i,r) P r i v a t e demand f o r imp o r t s 4 . 6 
GDM(i,r) Government demand f o r impo r t s ^-^ 
Equation 15.12 enforces the condition that demand for imports in box 6 equals the 
supply of imports in box 7, both on a bilateral basis. 
Equation 15.12: Equilibrium for imports (cifp(i,s,r)) 
MS( . , s , r ) = DMd, s , r) 
where 
M3;i,s,r) Imports by region 
_DM(i,s,r) Demand for imports from region s 
[ 15 . 11 ] 
s e e e q u a t i o n ] 
7 .4 
6.4 
>tlescriheci diagrammatically in figures 3-2, .V3 and 3-4 of chapter .v 
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Equation 15.13: 
:-;, '(i,s, r) 
wheri:; 
DFOBd, s , r ) 
X S ( i , s , r ) 
Equilibrium for exports (fobp(i,s,r)) 
= DFOB ( i , s, r) 
Demand fo r fob - x p o r t s 
E x p o r t s by s o u r c e and d e s t i n a t i o n 
[ 15 . 13 ] 
[ s ee e q u a t i o n ] 
7 . 5 
8.4 
Similarly, the demand for exports in box 7 must equal the supply of exports in box 8, 
as ensured by equation 15.13. 
5.2 MODEL CHANGES 
There are several changes that are made to the GTAP model that are not strictly 
extensions, and they are dealt with here; extensions to the model are detailed in 
section 5.3. Changes to the model are detailed in MPS/GE only. 
5.2.1 Changes to Private Preferences 
The model presented in section 5.1 already has one change made to private 
preferences: here private preferences are Cobb-Douglas, but in the standard GTAP 
model using the GEMPACK software, preferences use the Constant Differences of 
Elasticities (CDE) function.'" 
The GTAP model uses calibrated parameters for EP (price elasticity) and EY (income 
elasticity) to apply the CDE function. The linearised demand function for privately 
demanded goods is: 
qpd%(i,r) = sum[k, EP(i,k,r) pap%(k.r)] + EY(i,r) yp%(r) 
corresponding to a levels-multiples form: 
qpd(i,r) = prod[k, pap(k,r)**EP(i,k,r)] * yp(r)**EY(i,r) 
The CDE linearised function is: 
py%(r) = sum[i, s(i,r) pap%(i,r) + s(i,r) e(i.r) pu%(r)] 
con'esponding to the levels-multiples equation: 
Cliiipier 2 contains details of this function. 
5-2 -)!. 
py(r) = sum[i. u(r)**[e(i,r)b(i,r)] * pap(i,r)**b(i,r)] 
Calibrating the CDE function 
Calibration of the CDE function is complex. Four parameters are calibrated for use in 
the GTAP model: EP(i,k,r), EY(i,r), e(i,r) and b(i,r). These parameters are not 
however independent. Once the elasticity parameters EP and EY are calibrated, they 
determine the CDE parameters e and b. Furthermore, EP and EY are not independent, 
and must conform to overall homogeneity constraints. Additionally, there is a further 
problem in that calibration does not necessarily ensure that all b, are either positive or 
all negative. Because of the last problem, the GTAP calibration procedure uses target 
own-price and income elasticities, and employs a non-linear minimisation procedure. 
The resulting elasticities are in most cases very close to the target elasticities, but can 
diverge significantly for goods with high expenditure shares. No target elasticities are 
used for cross-price elasticities, or for elasticities of substitution - it is left entirely to 
the calibration procedure to determine values that are consistent with the targeting of 
income and own-price elasticities. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the CDE fimction 
The CDE function is a more flexible functional form than functions used more 
commonly in CGE modelling - the Leontief Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES). and linear expenditure system (LES). It is also more tractable than 
other functional forms. More flexible functions, such as translog and Constant Ratios 
of Elasticities nomothetic (CRESH), are rarely used due to their complexity and data-
intensity. 
The main weakness of the CDE function in the GTAP model/database is the way it is 
calibrated. The target income and own-price elasticities are taken from the SALTER 
model, and were originally estimated in the 1970s for smaller sets of regions and 
commodities than are used in GTAP. The inability to determine target cross-price 
elasticities, and the occasional large divergences from target and calibrated values for 
income and own-price elasticities, are further drawbacks. 
Even given these drawbacks, the ability to use income and own-price elasticity targets 
is a major advantage over less flexible functional forms, although it should be noted 
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that the actual elasticities diverge even further from the target elasticities when 
income and price changes are large. This is because the relationships that the CDE 
parameters b, and e, have with the elasticity parameters are dependent on the 
expenditure shares. Thus as expenditure shares differ from their benchmark levels, the 
CDE parameters imply different elasticities than they do at the benchmark. While the 
traditional critique of less flexible functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas and CES is 
that they perform badly in simulations that involve large changes in income, any such 
simulation conducted with a CDE function will have unpredictable elasticity effects. 
5.2.2 Changes to the Armington Structure 
The Armington nesting structure of the "standard" GTAP modelling framework uses a 
two-level nest for each consuming agent (government, private demand, capital goods 
and each tradable-good industry). This approach leads to a problem with the number 
of variables that the model needs for solution: the Armington nests alone need a price 
variable and a quantity variable for each nest. The model structure of section 5.1.3 
needs 2x(nx(3+m)xm) variables for a model with n regions and m tradable 
commodities. For the 13-region, 17-commodity model used here, this would imply 
8,840 variables, which would make the solution of such a large-scale model 
prohibitive (the final model uses less than 2,000 variables for the whole model). The 
solution used here follows Harrison (1997)" in defining a single Armington aggregate 
for each commodity in each region, which is used by private, government, and 
intermediate demand in the same region. Box 16 shows each step required to make 
this change. 
'' This model, and llarnson et al. 1995 and Francois ct a/, 1994 and 1995a all use MPSOE lo model (iT/\P, Each 
>'^>;s this compression of the Armmcton structure (and incidentally, none use CDE prelerences). 
Box 16: Steps to Compress Armington Structure 
1) Create a new Armington nest a(i,r) and good ap(i,r) 
;;FROD:a(i,r) s:SIGD(i) 
0:.ipd/r) Q:VAA(i,r) 
I: P(i,r) Q:VDA(i,r) 
I:mp(i,r) Q:VIA(i,r) 
Mew Variables: 
a(i,r) Armington Aggregate Output 
ap(i,r) Armington Price 
New Parameters: 
VAA(i,r) Value of Armington Aggregate use 
= VPA(i,r) + VGA(i,r) + I, VFA(i,j,r) 
VDA(i,r) Value of Armington Domestic use 
= VDPA(i,r) ^ VDGA(i,r) + 1, VDFA{i,j,r) 
VIA(i,r) Value of Armington Import use 
= VIPA(i,r) + VIGA(i,r) + I, VIGA(i,j,r) 
2) Remove the Armington nests pa(i,r),ga(i,r),fa(i,j,r) 
and remove the goods pap(i,r),gap(i,r),fap(i,j,r) 
3) r,epiace the output nest (see oox 1) with the following: 
S?ROD:q(j,r) s:0 
0:pij,r) Q 
I:acd,],r) Q 
I:-,-ap{],r) Q 
VOM(j,r) A:y(r) T:TO(j,r) P:(1-TOO(], r) ) 
VFMd,j,r) A:y(r) T:TF(i,j,r) P : ( 1 + TFO (i , ] , r ) 
VVA(j,r) 
Parameter: 
TFii,j,r) Average tax on intermediate use of domestic + import 
goods 
4) Replace the Government Utility nest (see box 9) with the 
following: 
5?R0D:gu(r) s:l 
C:gpir) Q: (sumd, VGA(i, r) ) ) 
I:ip(i,r) Q:VGM(i,r) ?:(1+TGO(i,r)) A:Y(r) T:TG(i,r) 
Farameter: 
TG(i,r) Average tax on government use of domestic + import 
goods ^^___ 
5) Replace the Private Utility nest (see box 10) with tne following 
$PROD:pu(r) s:l 
0:pp(r) Q: (sumd, VPA(i,r))) 
I:ap(i,r) Q:VPM(i,r) P: (1+TPO(i, r)) A:Y(r) T:TP(i,r) 
Parameters: 
TP(i,r) Average tax on private use of domestic + import goods 
This structure replaces the three structures pa(i,r), ga(i,r) and fa(i.j,r). The good 
produced by this Armington structure. ap(i,r) replaces the separate Armington 
aggregates pap(i,r), gap(i,r) and fap(i,j,r). The by-use taxes TPI(i,r), TPD(i,r), TGI(i,r), 
TGD(i,r), TFI(i,j,r) and TFD(i,j,r) are not included in this nest; each user of the 
Armington product pays a by-use tax on the Armington consumption as a whole. The 
new taxes are TP(i,r) for private consumption taxes, TG(i,r) for government 
consumption taxes, and TF(i,j,r) for intermediate use taxes. The initial levels of these 
new taxes are averages of the benchmark levels of the previous taxes. Some detail is 
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thus lost, as differences in the by-use taxes for imported and domestic goods are 
ignored. 
A by-use tax for imports can be different from the corresponding by-use tax for 
domestic goods in the GTAP database, although this is mainly due to different 
compositions of the goods. As such, all the GTAP applications cited in previous 
chapters do not change the by-use taxes as a result of tariff changes. The main reason 
that these taxes would be needed separately in the Uruguay Round context is to 
change input subsidies for agricultural inputs. 
5.2.3 Compression of the Import-Export Structure 
The import structure of the model (the MPS/GE nest ms(i.s,r), detailed in box 7) and 
the export structure (the nest xs(i,s,r), detailed in box 8) need 4n"m variables in a 
model with n regions and m tradable commodities, which for the 13-region, 17-
commodity model used here, would need 11,492 variables- which would almost 
certainly render the model too large to be solved in levels form. Fortunately, the 
import and export structures of the model can be compressed to use fewer variables 
without any loss of detail in the model: 
Firstly, the two production activities ms(i,s,r) and xs(i,s,r) can be incorporated into 
one activity. The xs(i.s,r) adds transport costs to the fob price of exports, creating 
imports at cif prices. The activity ms(i.s.r) then adds the import tariff to the cif import 
price. Box 17 shows a new nesting structure for ms(i,s,r) that transforms exports at 
fob prices into imports at tariff-inclusive prices by performing both of these steps in 
one nest. 
Box 17: Transport costs and import tariffs in one nesting structure 
$PROD:ms(i,s,r) s:0 
'-':cifp(i,s,r) Q:VIWS(i,s,r) 
I: gtp Q:VTWRd,s,r) 
I:pd,s) Q:VXMD(i,s,r) P : (1 + TXO (i, s, r) ) A:Y(s) T:TX(i,s,r) 
o^te: this nest replaces the previous ms(i,s,r) and xsd,s,r). 
The second step of this compression procedure is to include this ms(i,s,r) nest inside 
the Armington import structure for the activity m(i,r) (the m(i.r) nest aggregates 
imports from different source regions in box 6), equating the output of the ms(i,s,r) 
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activity (outputting good cifp(i,s.r)) with the input demand of activit> m(i,r) for good 
cifp(i.s.r). 
This is possible because of an undocumented feature of MPS/GE which allows a sub-
nesting structure to be defined over a set. The MPS/GE nest for m(i,r) in box 18 has a 
two-stage nesting structure, with a top-level elasticity of SIGM(i). the Armington 
elasticity between goods from different regions of origin, and a series of lower-level 
nests, one for each member of the set s, with an elasticity of zero. The subscript ".TL" 
on the nesting elasticity line means "Text Label" in GAMS. The signifier "#(s)" 
following the declaration for the global trading price input gtp means that a separate 
demand for gtp is generated for each element of the set s, and since the last characters 
in the line are "s.TL:", they are placed in the nest for the corresponding element of set 
Box 18: The full Import-Export relationship in one nesting structure 
$FRCD:md,r) s :S IGM(i ) s . TL : 0 
0 : n i pd , r ) Q :V IM( i , r ) 
I : i t p # ( s ) Q: VTWRd, s, r) P : ,d-TMO ( i , s , r ) ) A:Y(r ) T : TM d , s , r ) s .TL : 
I : c d , s ) Q:VXMD(i, s, r) P: ((1+TMO.(i, s, r) ) *• ( 1 + T:-:0 ( i , s, r ) ) s .TL : 
A : Y (s ) T : TX d , s , r ) 
+ A: Y(r) T: (TMd, s, r) ' ( l - T X d , s , r ) ) 
note: t h i s n e s t r e p l a c e s t h e p r e v i o u s m ( i , r / n e s t (box 6 ) . 
A l so remove t h e m s ( i , s , r ) n e s t (box 1 7 ) . 
This formulation exposes some features of the GTAP model that are applicable in all 
the model's forms presented here (and to the real-world economy the model 
represents), but may not have been apparent earlier. Firstly, any tariff applies to 
transport services as well as the traded good, and must of course apply at the same 
rate. Secondly, any traded good may be taxed twice: first by an export tax accruing to 
the exporting region, and then by an import tariff. Also of note is that the size of the 
import tariff as a proportion of the exporter's market price p(i,s) depends on the export 
tax TX(i,s,r). This is because the import tax is an ad valorem tax after the export tax is 
applied; an increased export tax will increase the price of the good at the point where 
the import tariff is levied (the cif price), and for the same volume of trade will have 
the direct effect of increasing import tariff revenue. 
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Great care must be taken when making such changes to an MPS/GE structure, as there 
are many pitfalls (some undocumented) that could lead to the MPS/GE model 
representing a different economic interpretation to that which the modeller intends. 
One means of checking that the nest is correct is to calculate income and expenditure 
values in the benchmark, ensuring that they are equal. 
Income for this nest in the benchmark is VIM(i,r), as this is the benchmark quantity of 
the nesfs only output, mp(i,r), which has a benchmark price of unity, and is not taxed. 
The value that users expend indirectly on transport services is 
VTWR(i,s,r)*(l+TMO(i,s.r)) for each source region s. The value that users expend on 
goods is VXMD(i,s,r)*(l+TMO(i,s.r))*(l+TXO(i,s,r)). To check the total of these 
values, recall from Chapter 4 the following database relationships: 
TXO ( i , s , r ) = VXWD( i , s , r) / v : ' :MD ( i , s , r ) - 1 
VT ; vR ( i , s , r ) = V I W S ( i , s , r ) - 7 XWD d , s , r ) 
T HC ( i , s , r ) = V I M S d , s , r ) / V I W S ( i , s , r ) - 1 
VI.M(i , r ) = s u m [ s , V I M S d , s , r ) ] 
Then the expenditure on imports, is: 
sum[s, VTWRd, s, r) * (1 + TMO (i, s,r) ) 
-^VX;-!D(i,s,r) M l + TMO(i,s,r) ) * (l^TXO (i, 3, r) ) 
= sum[s, [VIWS(i,s,r) -
VXWD(i,s,r) ] * VIMSd, s,r) /VIWS(i,s,r) 
+VXMD(i, s,r)*(VIMS(i,s,r)/VIWS(i,s,r)) 
* (VXWS (i, s, r) /VXMDd, s, r) ) ] 
= sum[s, VIMS(i,s,r) -
v:-:WDd,s,r) *VIMS(i,s,r) /VIWS(i,s,r) 
+ '/XWS d , s, r) * VIMS ( i, s, r) / VIWS (i, s, r) ] 
= sum[s, VIMS(i,s,r)] 
= VIM(i,r) 
Which is identical to the income earned by the m(i,r) agent, as shown above. 
5.2.4 Compression of the production and value-added nests 
The model presented in section 5.1.2 has separate nesting structures for production 
and value-added, but this creates unnecessary variables for the composite value-added 
quantity va(j,r) and the composite value-added price pva(j,r). Production can be 
handled using fewer variables in the two-stage MPS/GE production function shown in 
box 18. 
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Box 18: Two-Stage Production 
5PR0D:q ( j . , r ) s : 0 v a : S I G - ; ( j ) 
:p d r ) 0 : VOM ( j , r ) A : y ( r ) T : T O ( j , r ) P : ( 1 -TOO ( j , r ) ) 
: : a p i , j , r ) Q : V FM ( i , ] , r ) A : y ( r ) T : T F ( i , j , r ) P - ( l + T F O ' i i r ) ) 
::w t , r ) Q :EVFA(f , j , r ) -A-J : ' ' •" 
p.ore: t h i s f u n c t i o n c o m b i n e s t h e p r e v i o u s q ( j , r ) a n d v a ( j , r ) n ^ - s t s 
!bo::es 1 a n d 2) . 
5.2.5 Other changes from the "standard" model 
While the model presented in section 5.1.2 fully depicts the standard implementation 
of the GTAP model in Hertel et al.(\991), except for the changes to the structure of 
private preferences, there are some additional parameters included in the standard 
model that are not used for the purposes of the Uruguay Round analysis conducted in 
chapter 7. 
Technical change parameters 
The standard GTAP model includes various parameters to enable the modelling of 
technical change that are not included here. These include production shift parameters, 
factor-specific technical parameters and trade efficiency parameters. 
Dummy tax parameters 
Dummy tax parameters are included in the standard GTAP model to enable the 
imposition of certain taxes, such as factor taxes and uniform tariffs. The GTAP board 
intend some of these taxes to be used in future releases of the database, and the taxes 
are included in part to lay down the modelling framework prior to the base data being 
available. These taxes are not included here. 
5.2.6 The modified GTAP model 
Table 5-2 contains the full MPS/GE listing for the modified model, incorporating all 
of the changes to the model of section 5.1.3 discussed in sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.4. This 
model has 19 equations that are defined over sets such that for a model with n regions 
and m tradable commodities, 4+l2n+6nm variables are required. For the aggregation 
size used here, where n=13 and m=17, there are 1,486 variables. The model presented 
earlier in section 5.1.2 uses 4+13n+12nm+2nm-+4n-m variables, or 21,831 variables. 
The effect that this reduction in model size will have on computing time and the 
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feasibility of the modelling effort can be seen by calculating the size of the Hessian 
matrix which the non-linear solver must calculate at each step, and is the largest use of 
computing resources in the solution process. The Hessian matrix has a column for 
each variable and a row for each equation, expanded by sets. The model of section 
5.1.2 must therefore have a Hessian matrix of 21,831 colunins and 21,831 rows, with 
each point in the matrix taking up 8 bytes of computer memory (GAMS uses 8-byte 
double precision real numbers to store all variables and parameters). The memory 
used for such a matrix is 545Mb, which is more than large enough to make the 
problem unsolvable. The modified model, however, has 1,486 columns and 1,486 
rows in its Hessian matrix, which will require 16.8 Mb of memory, making the 
problem solvable on a personal computer. 
Table S-2 Modified MPS/GE model 
$SECTORS: 
q(j'r) 
ad, r) 
gu(r) 
pu(r) 
gt 
gs 
wel(r) 
m(i,r) 
$C0MMODITIES: 
P(3/r) 
w(f,r) 
ap(i,r 
gp(r) 
PP(r) 
gtp 
gsp 
wpi(r) 
mp(i,r 
SCONSUMERS 
y(r) 
$PR0D:q(j,r) 
0:p(j,r) Q 
I:ap(i,j,r) Q 
I:w(f,r) Q 
) 
) 
s:0 va 
VOM(j,r) 
VFM(i,j,r) 
EVFA(f,j,r 
Output 
Armington output 
Government Utility 
Private Utility 
Global Transport 
Global Savings 
Regional Welfare 
Composite imports 
Price 
Wage 
Armington Price 
Government Price Index 
Private Price Index 
Global Transport Price 
Global Savings Price 
Welfare Price Index 
Composite import price 
Income 
:SIGV(j) 
A:y(r) T:TO(j,r) P: 
A:y(r) T:TF(i,j,r) P: 
) va: 
' 
(l-TO0(j,r)) 
(l+TFOd, j,r) ) 
$PR0D:a(i,r) s : S IGD( i ) 
0 : ap ( i , r ) , Q:VAA(i , r ) 
^• • P(i,r) Q :VDAd , r ) 
I--mp(i,r) Q :V IA ( i , r ) 
$PROD:m(i,r) 
0:mp(i , r ) 
I :g tp#(s) 
I : p ( i , s ) 
s :SIGM(i ) s . TL : 0 
Q :V IM( i , r ) ,, , ^T 
Q :VTWR( i , s , r ) P: (1 + TMO ( i , s, r) ) A :Y( r ) T : TM d , s , r ) s .TL: 
Q:VXMD(i , s , r ) P : ( ( 1 + TMG ( i , s , r ) ) * ( 1 +TXO ( i , s , r ) ) s .TL : 
A;Y(s) T : T X ( i , s , r ) 
A :Y( r ) T : ( TM ( i , s , r ) * ( l + TX ( i , s , r ) ) 
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$pROD:qu ( r ) s : l 
0 : ! F ( r ) Q: ( s u m d , VGA( i , r ) ) ) 
I : j p d , r ) Q :VGM( i , r ) P : (1+TGO ( i , r ) ) A : Y ( r ) T : ' : - ; ' ^ , r ) 
$PROD:pu ( r ) s : l 
0 : c p ( r ) Q: ( s u m d , V P A d , r ) ) ) 
I : a p ( i , r ) Q : V PM d , r ) P : (1+TPO ( i , r ) ) A : Y ( r ) T : ? : L , r ) 
$PROD:gt s : 0 
0: .gtp ' j : ( s umi ( i , r ) , V 3 T d , r ) ) ) 
I : p { i , r ) Q : V S T ( i , r ) 
$PROD:gs s : l 
0 : g s p Q- ( s u m ( r , S A V E ( r ) ) ) 
l : p ( " c g d s " , r ) Q: ( (VOM( " c g d s " , r ) - V D E P ( r ) ) ) 
SPROD: w e l ( r ) , s : 1 
0 : w p i ( r ) Q 
I : j p ( r ) Q 
I : p p ( r ) Q 
I : . j s p 0 
$DEMAND:y(r) 
E : w ( f , r ) Q 
E : p ( " : g d s " , r ) Q 
D:wc i ( r ) Q 
( s u m d , VGA ( i , r ) + V P A ( i , r ) ) + SAVE(r) 
( s u m d , V G A ( i , r ) ) ) 
( s u m d , V P A d , r ; ) ) 
SAVE(r ) 
( s u m [ j , E V FA d , j , r ) ] 
( - VDEP f r ; ) 
dNCCME ( r ) -VDEP ( r ) ) 
5.3 EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL 
Several extensions are made to the model developed in sections 5.1 and 5.2. With the 
emphasis here on a study of the Agricultural sectors in the Uruguax Round, section 
5.3.1 expands the model to include a degree of factor immobility in agriculture. 
Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 develop a means of modelling the particular policy 
constraints that the Uruguay Round sets on agricultural output and export subsidies, 
and section 5.3.4 introduces modelling of set-aside reforms, introduced as a reform to 
the EU's Common Agricultural Policy at around the same time as the Uruguay Round 
reforms. Section 0 extends the model to include imperfectly competitive industries 
with internal economies of scale. 
5.3.1 Factor Immobility in Agriculture 
The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect factor mobility may be 
justified for long-term analysis in most sectors, but for agricultural sectors there is 
good reason to modify them. With constant returns to scale, supply is perfectly elastic, 
with price determined purely by input costs. In partial equilibrium analysis input costs 
are treated as exogenous, but in a general equilibrium context they are endogenous, as 
in order to increase otitput firms must hire more factors and use more intermediate 
inputs. The increase in demand for factors will bid up factor wages, and intermediate 
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input prices will also rise, partly in response to the original factor wage changes, and 
partly with demand as the industries producing intermediate products must also 
increase their use of factors in order to increase output. The result is that sectors have 
upward-sloping supply curves even with constant returns to scale. 
In the standard neo-classical model the response of a sector's omput to an increase in 
the producers' price is determined by the curvature of the production possibilities 
frontier in the neighbourhood of the initial equilibrium. The tighter that curvature (the 
lower the elasticity of transformation between sectoral outputs), the smaller the 
increase in output induced by a given proportionate price increase; i.e. the lower the 
elasticity of supply. The curvature of the frontier will be stronger (the supply elasticity 
lower) the more different are the factor intensities across sectors, the lower the 
elasticities of substitution between factors, and the lower the mobilit\ of some or all 
factors between sectors. 
In one of the most simple general equilibrium models, that of the small open economy 
with all goods traded and homogeneous, the story ends there. An increase in the world 
price of one good will lead to an expansion of that sector and a contraction of the 
other sector(s) as factors are bid away to the expanding sector. In a large open 
economy, or in a small open economy with goods differentiated by country of origin, 
or economies with non-traded goods, interaction with the demand side of the economy 
will complicate the story. Nevertheless, the basic propositions about curvature of the 
production possibilities frontier are unchanged. In particular, reducing the mobility of 
some or all factors between sectors will increase curvature and reduce supply 
responsiveness to price changes. 
The elasticity of supply in any sector is therefore in part determined by how 'large' 
that sector is'- in factor markets and in household expenditure; a sector that employs 
high proportions of the supply of labour and capital will need larger increases in 
- As a trivial example, consider a closed economy with two sectors, employing one factor. If Y and Z are the 
tactor demands in each sector, which must sum to fixed factor supply, then in order to increase the use of the 
tacior by y percent in the Y sector, the Z sector must reduce its demand in percentage terms by z = y Y Z, 
It iliL- V sector employs two-thirds of the factor, then V = 2 Z and z = 2 y, 
'I llii; Y sector employs one third otthe factor, then V = ": Z and z = '/: y 
r -1 ^ 
wages (and prices) to "choke off the factor demand from other sectors than a sector 
that employs small proportions of the supply of factors. Elasticity of supply is 
therefore higher in small sectors (i.e. agriculture) than in large sectors (i.e. 
manufacturing and services). Several possible methods exist to decrease supply 
elasticity in agriculture - decreasing returns to scale could be used, imperfect factor 
mobility could be imposed, or a specific-factors model could be used. The approach 
used here is to incorporate specific-factors, which also addresses issues familiar in 
agricultural economics, where it is generally recognised that some farm factors are not 
mobile. 
The specific-factors approach used here fixes half of the land, labour and capital in 
each agricultural sector" while the remainder are perfectly mobile. This makes supply 
less elastic, because in order to increase output, the agricultural sectors must make a 
large increase in their employment of the mobile factors as employment of fixed 
factors cannot change. This induces a larger impact on the mobile factor markets than 
would otherwise be the case, with higher wages needed to enable sectors to expand 
output. 
Specific factors are introduced simply by creating new factors in each region. Each 
mobile factor (land, labour and capital) has half of its agricultural employment 
reassigned to the corresponding specific factor'^ With three new factors for each of 
the five agricultural sectors in each region, this increases the number of factors from 
three per region to eighteen per region. All factors (specific or mobile) enter the same 
CES nest - there is no attempt to put them into a more complex nesting structure. 
5.3.2 Uruguay Round Agricultural Output Subsidy Constraints 
All tax instruments in the GTAP model are ad valorem tax rates, which may be 
positive or, for a subsidy, negative. Subsidies are rare within the database with the 
exception of agricultural sectors in certain regions where either output subsidies. 
'-^  Note that this is done for each agricultural sector (or sub-sector), not for the agricultural • • sector" as a whole. 
^ kleally. the percentage of factors that are fixed would be derived from data, and could be proxied. for example. 
Iiy IIK' proportion of farm income eamt from on-farm activities. Lacking this data on a global scale, a 50% tlxed-
'Wor proportion is used here. Experiments (not reported here) that varied this percentage globall\ found that 
i«iiiis were fairK linear in the percentage used, 
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export subsidies or both are commonplace. Most of the eighteen countries and six 
composite regions use agricultural omput subsidies, the only exceptions being 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Argemina. 
The use of ad valorem tax and subsidy rates is reasonably realistic for the modelling 
most taxes, but in the current analysis of the Uruguay Round is not appropriate for 
agricultural subsidies because of the restrictions that the Uruguay Round Agricultural 
Agreement imposes on their use. The Agricultural Agreement stipulates that output 
expenditures and quantities of subsidised products must be reduced according to 
certain minimum rates. 
Expenditure on output subsidies must fall by 20% (13'/,% for LDCs) on a non-
product-specific basis. To facilitate this, the ad valorem rate for each good is reduced 
by the same percentage until the expenditure condition for all goods is met. 
Box 19 demonstrates how the agricultural output subsidy constraint is endogenised 
within the model. The constraint is an inequality, so the left hand side (actual subsidy 
expenditure) must be less than or equal to the right hand side (allowed subsidy 
expenditure) 
Equation 19.2 shows the output quantity of each good in each region. The value of 
output is therefore equation 19.2 multiplied by the price, and the export subsidy 
Box 19: The Agricultural Output Subsidy Constraint 
Cons t ra in t ( fo r e a ch r e g i o n r ) : 
I q ( i , r ) xVOMd, r ) x p ( i , r ) X max[0 , - T O 0 ( i , r ) ] x MTO(r) 
<= w p i ( r ) x m t o ( r ) x I OS aB ( i , r ) [ 19 .1 ] 
where ou t pu t q u a n t i t y i s q ( i , r ) xVOM( i , r ) [19-2] 
t h e s u b s i d y r a t e i s ma>:[0, - T O 0 ( i , r ) ] x NTO(r) [19-3] 
New Va r i a b l e : 
NTO(r) Endogenous o u t p u t s u b s i d y m u l t i p l i e r 
Mew Pa r ame t e r s : 
OSUB(i,r) Base o u t p u t s u b s i d y e x p e n d i t u r e 
OSUB( i , r ) = max[0 , VOA(agr , r ) - VOM(agr , r ) ] 
f o r i e a g r i c u l t u r a l goods 
OSUB( i , r ) = 0 f o r i e n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l goods 
"'to(r) Ou tpu t e x p e n d i t u r e t a r g e t a s a m u l t i p l e o f b a s e 
o u t p u t e x p e n d i t u r e 
= 0 . 8 f o r r G d e v e l o p e d r e g i o n s 
= 0 . 8666 f o r r € d e v e l o p i n g r e g i o n s 
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expenditure is the value of output multiplied by the subsidy rate. 
The LHS of equation 19.1 is equal to the sum over all commodities of output subsidy 
expenditure." The subsidy rate is equal to the base subsidy rate (TO()(i,r)) multiplied 
by a common endogenous output subsidy multiplier - so that all subsidies rates are 
scaled by the same factor in order to meet the constraint. 
The RHS of equation 19.1 is equal to the allowed level of subsidy expenditure, given 
by the original subsidy expenditure in region r, OSUB(r), multiplied by a common 
target multiplier, mto(r). This multiplier is set by the Uruguay Round conditions; for 
developed regions, a 20% fall in subsidy expenditure implies that mto (r) = 0.8. while 
for developing regions, a 13'/, % fall in expenditure implies that mto (r)=0.8666. The 
allowed subsidy expenditure is multiplied by the aggregate welfare price index for 
that region, wpi(r), which implies that the expenditure reductions are in real terms, not 
nominal. The Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement specifies that expenditures 
need only fall by the specified percentage in nominal terms over the implementation 
period. However, a nominal fall would not be implementable here because the CGE 
model only defines relative prices (the welfare price index of the EU is held at unity 
as the numeraire in the simulations in chapters 6). In order to make a nominal 
reduction possible in the model, a macroeconomic side to the model would have to be 
introduced that determined inflation in each region."" Very few CGE models attempt 
to incorporate inflation and, given the data limitations of parameterising such a model 
world-wide, it is considered to be beyond the scope of the current anahsis. 
The Agricultural Agreement specifies that the output subsidy commitments are to be 
implemented on a non-commodity-specific basis. A country therefore must reduce its 
expenditure on agricultural subsidies overall by a certain percentage, but there is no 
restriction on the choice that governments may make on which subsidies to reduce. 
Half of subsidies (by value) could be cut by double the required percentage and the 
other half not cut at all, for example, so long as the total expenditure cut meets the 
'• In the model, this summation is restricted to those agricultural sectors that have output subsidies in the base 
dalii, 
' I liapier 7 develops an alternative approach to modelling nominal reductions, 
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required level. There is no way of predicting within a CGE model which commodities 
will have output expenditures cut and by what percemage, so the means of 
implementing the reduction that is used here is to cut the ad valorem subsidy rate by 
the same percentage in each sector. 
5.3.3 Uruguay Round Agricultural Export Subsidy Constraints 
The Agricultural Agreement requires restrictions on export subsidies similar to those 
on output subsidies, with a specified reduction in the expenditure on subsidy 
programmes. There are two key differences, however. Firstly, the export subsidy 
restrictions are commodity-specific, so that expenditure must be reduced by a given 
percentage for each commodity, whereas the output subsidy expenditure reduction 
commitments are not commodit)-specific. Secondly, an additional restriction is 
imposed on export subsidy programmes whereby the volume of subsidised exports 
must also fall by a given percentage. 
To impose this dual constraint mechanism, ad valorem export subsidy rates for 
agricultural and food-processing goods are made endogenous within the model, with 
the following two conditions being met: 
• Expenditure on export subsidies is reduced by at least 36% (24% for LDCs), 
• The volume of subsidised exports is reduced by at least 21%. 
These conditions are implemented on a product-specific basis. They imply four 
possibilities for each good: 
I. The expenditure condition may be binding, with a 36%(24%) fall in expenditure 
and a greater than 21 % fall in export volume; 
II. The quantity commitment may be binding, with a 21% fall in export volume and a 
greater than 36% (24%) fall in export expenditure; 
III.The quantity commitment may not be binding, with subsidy rates (and thus 
expenditure) reduced to zero; 
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IV'.Both commitments may be met, with neither being binding, if the ad valorem rate 
does not need to be reduced to meet the commitments (the rate will not rise to meet 
the expenditure and quantity reductions). 
Of these four possibilities, IV is very unlikely if exports are facing reduced tariffs 
abroad as this will tend to increase both export volume and subsidy expenditure. Ill 
rnay occur where the initial ad valorem subsidy rate is small, as a 100% reduction in a 
small subsidy is unlikely to lead to a 21% fall in subsidised exports. For most EU 
(^ oods either of the first two possibilities may occur. 
These export subsidy rules are implemented in the model by the two constraints 
shown in boxes 20 and 21. In each constraint, the actual value is on the LHS, which 
must be less than or equal to the target value on the RHS. 
]Box 20: The Agricultural Export Subsidy Expenditure Constraint 
Constraint (for each i,r pair where i is agricultural or food and 
where subsidies e:-:ist i.i the base data) : 
I ;; ,i,r, s)xVXMD(i, r, s) xpd, r, s; '^ ma::[0, -TXO (i, r, s) ]xiIT:-;[i, r) 
<= wp i ( r ) xme tK ( r ) x s um [ s , XSUB ( i , r , s ) ] [ 2 0 . i ; 
New V a r i a b l e : 
MT:-;(i,r) Endogenous e x p o r t s u b s i d y m u l t i p l i e r 
Mevj P-arameters : 
XSUE(i , r ,s) Base e x p o r t s u b s i d y e : - :pendi ture on good i e x p o r t e d 
from r e g i o n r to r eg i o r . s 
= max [0 ,VXMD( i , r , s ) - VXWD(i , r , s ) ] 
met / : , i , r ) M u l t i p l i e r f o r e x p e n d i t u r e o n e x p o r t s u b s i d i e s 
= 0 . 6 4 i f r i s a d ev e l op ed c o u n t r y o r r e g i o n 
= 0 . 7 6 i f r IS an LDC c o u n t r y or r e g i o n 
The expenditure constraint in box 20 is similar to the output expenditure constraint in 
box 19; a sum (in equation 20.1 over destination regions) of quantity 
(x(i.r,s)xVXMD(i.r,s)) times price (p(i,r,s)) times base subsidy rate (TX0(i,r.s)) times 
endogenous multiplier (NTX(i,r)) gives export subsidy expenditure. The target 
expenditure is again multiplied by the aggregate welfare price index wpi(r), so the 
constraint is modelled as a real expenditure condition. 
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Box 21 shows the export quantity constraint, equation 21.1. where the export quantity 
is less than or equal to a target quantity.'' 
Box 21: The Agricultural Export Subsidy Quantity Constraint 
Constraint (for each i,r pair where 1 is agricultural or fcoa and 
where subsidies exist in the base data): 
^ Md, r, s)xVXWD(i, r, s) <= mqtx(r)x I, VXWD(i,r,s.) [21.1] 
New Paramer: 
mqtx(i,r) Multiplier for the quantity restriction on export 
subsidies 
= 0.79 
Only one of equations 20.1 and 21.1 will be binding in the solution, but we do not 
know a priori which it will be. As only one variable (ntx) is being added to the model 
for each sector, we can only add one constraint. The procedure adopted is to solve the 
model with the expenditure constraint enforced in each agricultural and food sector 
that has subsidies, check the export quantities, and then resolve the model with the 
quantity constraint enforced in regions and sectors where appropriate. Usually this 
results in both constraints being satisfied (either as a binding equality or as an 
inequality), but if not, the model is resolved as many times as is necessary to satisfy 
both equations. 
Two additional parameters are introduced to facilitate this: METX_FLAG(i,r) is a flag 
(taking either the value 0 or 1) to signify (if equal to one) that the export expenditure 
constraint is to be satisfied, but not the quantity constraint. MOTX_FLAG(i,r) is a 
flag that signifies that the quantity constraint is to be satisfied. 
Note that where a subsidy on a certain good must meet a restriction, the ad valorem 
rate is reduced by the same proportion for all destination regions where a subsidy 
already exists. In reality, the Agricultural Agreement provisions allow governments to 
vary the degree of cuts on export subsidies according to destination. 
'•^  Note that in equation 20.1 the quantity is ,x(i.r.s)xVXMD(i.r,s) while in equation 21,1 the quantity is 
x(i.r.s)xVXWD(i.r.s). This difference is because the subsidy rate TX is applied to domestic prices, while equation 
21.1 effectively uses weights determined by world value shares, VXMD(i.r.s) (implying weights determined by 
domestic value shares) could be used in equation 21.1, but world price shares are more appropriate, tquations 8,4 
»cl 8,5 ofbox 8 calculate export quantities using both VXMD(i.r.s) and VXWD(i.r.s), and tins is possible because 
prices are normalised to zero at each stage. 
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5.3.4 Set-Aside 
Set-aside is introduced in a similar way to specific factors. In order to enforce a 
certain (here 10%) cut in the land used in EU cereals sectors, the level of land used in 
these two sectors must first be controlled and then reduced. When these sectors 
employ sectorally mobile land this cannot be done, so all land used in these two 
sectors is designated as sector-specific, and then the endowment of those factors is 
cut. 
5.3.5 Internal Economies of Scale and Imperfect Competition 
Monopolistic competition is a form of market structure where there are many buyers 
and sellers, but where firms face downward-sloping demand curves. The downward-
sloping demand curve for these firms comes as a result of product heterogeneity, 
either because different consumers have a demand for different varieties of a product 
(or for different characteristics) or a demand for variety itself While monopolistic 
competition can be modelled in many forms, the model here draws on that used by 
Harrison. Rutherford and Tarr (1995). 
This model retains the Armington assumption that defines the way that goods are sold 
in the perfectly competiti\e model, introducing market-differentiating suppliers that 
sell at different prices to their domestic and to each of their foreign markets. Firms 
from each region in the multi-regional trade model produce products that are 
differentiated from each other, and the Armington structure ensures that they are also 
differentiated from products produced by firms in other regions. 
Each of the n firms in a particular industry has the following profit function:-
MC1: Profit function T, = p,ii, - C, 
11, = firm profit 
Pi = the price of firm / output 
£/, = the quantity of output 
C, = total cost. 
Differentiating with respect to q, gives the Cournot profit maximising condition:-
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iVlC2: Profit maximising condition ^ = — </ + p -c = o 
"^f/, ^v, ' ' ' 
C-, = the constant marginal cost of production rI',Av, . 
Rearrangement gives as the net mark-up over marginal costs /HA-, :-
MC3: Derived mark-up formula w/t, = EJJL^ = _£KiL = 
PI f'^ll PI 
which states that the net mark-up will equal the negative (or absolute value as the 
elasticity itself will always be negative) of the inverse elasticity of demand for the 
tinn's output. 
Inverse elasticities of demand in CES nests 
A CES nesting structure is used to characterise the differentiation of products from 
suppliers in the same region. The absolute size of the inverse elasticity of demand in 
an)- CES nest is given by:-
1V1C4: CES inverse elasticity of demand — = ( I +Q ) H 1 * -iidi (jJ a 
P, = The share of expenditure that good i has within the nest. 
- The absolute size of the inverse elasticity of demand for the 
output of the CES nest. 
cr = The elasticity of substitution between goods in the nest. 
Q. = A conjectural variation term, describing how a supplier expects 
other suppliers to react to its own actions. 
Inverse elasticities of demand in the Armington structure 
The Armington nesting structure of exports and domestic demands gives rise to three 
different inverse-elasticity terms: 
'I.r 
the inverse elasticity of demand for domestic goods of good /' in 
region r. 
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e'i the inverse elasticity of demand for imports of .^ ood / gooa / in region r. 
MM the inverse elasticity of demand for imports of good / exported 
from region /-' to region /•. 
Assuming zero conjectures in these nests, these terms are given from equation MC4 
as:-
MC5: Domestic Elasticity 
s?.. 
f . \ 
= S, 
y <yPj I / o, , 
- the share of expenditure for good / in region /• that is spent on the 
domestic good. 
= the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported 
goods for good /. 
MC5": Import Elasticity 
= (!-'>;,.) 
V CTi J CT, 
MC5": Import Elasticity by source 
,i/,u = « / ,r .r .M 
a,y,. = the share of imports from region r' in total imports of good /' in 
region r. 
Equation MC5' can be substituted into equation MC5"" to give:-
MC6: Import Elasticity by source 
..\tM = a, 0-^,.r) a?; cr, a I / " , " , .M 
Inverse elasticities of demand for firm output 
The representation of firms in a CES nest is derived from equation MC4. where the 
share in output is always equal to \ln. The inverse elasticity for firm / in region r 
selling to the domestic market |l/£,,.| and the inverse elasticity for firm /' in region r 
selling to foreign market r' li/f. ^  ^ ,1 are derived separately:-
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MC7: Domestic inverse elasticitv 
MC8: Import inverse elasticity 
(1+^..) 
= (l+"u-) 
1 
ii 
f 1 
,./J 
'• I.l-
1 ^ 
ar) 
1 
'^1 
.MM 
a Ul) I J Jil) 
Substituting equation MC5 into equation MC7 gives the equation for domestic mark-
up diiik, I. :-
MC9: J/»A,, = (l+^,,.) 
V cr, I ^1 cr, J .DD 
Substituting equation MC6 into equation MC8 gives the equation for the inverse 
import elasticity:-
MCIO: • • {\+^,.r)\ a, ( l - ' V ) 
cr, J a 
JW 
I ! 
J)D 
Equations 1V1C9 and MClO differ from those used in Harrison et al. in two respects. 
Firstly, the conjectural variation term here is the same for all markets (domestic and 
exports to all regions) whereas Harrison et al. employ a different conjectural variation 
term for each market. The assumption here is that firms" expectations as to how their 
competitors (those producing in the same region) will react do not vary according to 
where the goods are destined. The second difference is that equation MClO maintains 
that the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by firms in the same region 
CT,"" still applies if the goods are destined for export. Harrison et al. replace o-'"' with 
cr," in equation MClO, and while this simplifies the algebra a little, there does not 
seem to be any strong reason to do so. 
Trade taxes and transport prices 
Equation MClO gives the inverse elasticity of demand for imports, while exporting 
firms must use the inverse elasticity of demand for exports in their mark-up 
calculations. To calculate the inverse elasticity for exports, the equation for the import 
price ,np,^y is used:-
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MCI I: Import Price 
«7A.,,,.. = r,,,,./;;(l +/,„, , , ,.,) + (l - r,,,).xp,,./{l+,n,,,,)(\+,x,,.,) 
which can be arranged to give an expression for the export price:-
MC12: Export Price Wi,y '"Pi.i:r'-^,.,-ylp{^+tiii,,,.] 
( I - r , , , , ) ( l +m , , , . , , ) ( | + ,v,,,,,..) 
B\ differentiating with respect to mp. the elasticity of export price with respect to 
import prices can be derived:-
MC13: Export Elasticity adjustment -^  '''• '''' '"'"' ^i.r.i-'P 
^^^"Pi.rr Wi.r.r [^ ' T, ,,y).Xp, ,.,[\ + tX, ,. ,] 
Equation MCI3 can be used to obtain the inverse export elasticity by adjusting the 
inverse import elasticity, since: 
MCI4: Inverse Export Elasticity 
(Xp,^y X,^y CXp,,.y ilip,,.y fJ'ip,,.,r '", r r' ' ^'h r r ^irr' 
= ^ X —^ ^-^— 
'^,.ry Wl.r.r CWp,,.y Xp,^y (m,^.y mp,,y ( y , , y ill,,.y 
where ,\-,,,,,.and m,,.,..are real quantities of exports and imports. The first term in 
equation MC14 is the mark-up adjustment in equation MC13. The second term is the 
inverse elasticity of demand for imports calculated in equation MClO. and the final 
term is unity because export and import quantities are equal. 
The final equation for the export mark-up is then equation MC8, with the import 
elasticity by source (MC6) multiplied by the export elasticity adjustment (MCI3) 
prior to substitution: 
MC15: .v/<,, ,=(i + Q,^) 
a, 
^,.ryiP 
V a,'V c^i cr, J 
(l - T,,^)xPi,y(\ + tt, , ,.) -A/ 
;>;i J)/) 
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Calibration Procedure and modelling issues 
The model is calibrated using parameters for the number of firms and conjectural 
variations, giving base mark-ups ,vmA(),,,,„ and c/,„lcO,,.^.. This differs from other 
approaches such as Harrison et al. (1995) and Harris (1984) in that the base mark-ups 
are not calibrated to a target value (or cost-disadvantage ratio). In the absence of 
reliable data to use for these parameters, the course taken here, of calibrating to the 
number of firms, gives greater intuitive feel as to the competitive structure of the 
industries. 
The CGE model is augmented with equations MC9 and MCI5 and solved. In the 
course of solving the model, all elasticities of substitution are held constant, and the 
terms Q,,..r,,y and //»,,.,.are also exogenous, although import tariffs in particular may 
be changed from their base values. The share terms 5,,.,a,,.,., and JwA:0,,,,..are 
endogenous, as are the prices fp and xpj f /• • . Export tax rates are usually exogenous 
but can be endogenous if there is a net subsidy that must comply with export 
expenditure programme reductions. The number of firms is endogenous, but in line 
with Harrison et al., is made exogenous to the mark-up equations. 
The Full Model 
Tables 5-3 to 5-7 list the full MPS/GE model, being the modified model of Table 5-2 
extended to include factor immobility in agriculture, explicit Uruguay Round 
constraints and monopolistic competition. 
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Table 5-3: The Full MPS/GE model - Definitions 
$SECTORS: 
Q(j,r) 
A(i,r) 
GU(r) 
PU(r) 
GT 
GS 
WEL(r) 
Md,r) 
SCOMMODITIES: 
P(j,r) 
W(f,r)$ 
SSW(f,j 
AP(i,r) 
GP(r) 
PP(r) 
GTP 
GSP 
WPI(r) 
MP(i,r) 
SCONSUMERS 
Y(r) 
NFI(r) 
FC(i,r 
$AUXILIARY: 
NEX(i,r 
NQX(i,r 
NEO(r)$ 
NMK(i,r 
Output 
Armington output 
Government Utility 
Private Utility 
Global Transport 
Global Savings 
Regional Welfare 
Aggregate Imports 
(sum[j,SME(f,j,r)]) 
,r)$SSE(f,j,r) 
$VAM(i,r) 
Price 
Wage 
Sector Specific Wage 
Armington Price 
Government Price Index 
Private Price Inde.x 
Global Transport Price 
Global Savings Price 
Welfare Price Inde:: 
Aggregate Import Price 
! Net Ta;< Income 
: Net Factor Income 
$MC_FLAG(i,r) ! Fixed costs for imperfect competition 
)$NEX_FLAG(i,r) 
)$NQX_FLAG(i,r) 
(sum[i,NEO_FLAG(i,r)] and OSUBO(r)) 
, s)$(NMK FLAG(i,r) and- TXO(i,r,s) It 0) 
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Table 5-4: The Full MPS/GE Model - Production 
SPROD:Q(j,r) s:0 VAT:SIGL(j) VA(VAT):SIGV(j) 
"o-P(j,r) Q:VOM(j,r) P:(VOA(],r)/VOM(j,r)) 
+ " A:Y(r)$(NEO_FLAG(j,r) eq 0) T:T0{j,r)$(NEO_FLAG(j,r) eq 0) 
+ A:Y(r)$NEO_FLAG(j,r) N:NEO(r)$NEO_FLAG(j,r) 
^ M:TO0(j,r)$NEO_FLAG(j, r) 
I :W("Labour",r)$SMF("Labour",j,r) Q:SMF("Labour",j,r) VA 
+ ' A:Y{r) T:TF("Labour",j,r) 
I-W("Capital",r)$SMF("Capital",j,r) Q:SMF("Capital",j,r) VA 
+ A:Y(r) T:TF("Capital",j,r) 
I:W("Land",r)$SMF("Land", j,r) Q: SMF ( "Land" , j , r) V,2.T 
.^ ' A:Y(r) T : TF ( "Land", j , r i 
I-SSW("Labour",j,r)$SSF("Labour",j,r) Q:SSF("Labour",j,r) VA 
+ ' A:Y(r) T:TF("Labour",j,r) 
I •SSW("Capital",j,r)5SSF( "Capital",j,r) Q:SSF{"Capital",j,r) VA 
+ " A:Y(r) T:TF("Capital",j,r) 
I . S SW ( " L a n d " , j , r ) $ S S F ( " L a n d " , j , r ) Q : S S F ( " L a n d " , j , r ) VAT 
+ " A:Y(r ) T : T F ( " L a n d " , j , r ) 
I : A P ( i , r ) Q :VF IM ( i , j , r ) P: (1 + TIO ( i , j , r ) ) 
+ ' A :Y(r ) T : T I d , j , r ) 
SrONSTRAINT : NEO( r )$ ( sum[ i ,NEO_FLAG( i , r ) ] and OSUBO(r)) 
NEO(r) * sum[i ,NEO FLAG( i , r ) * VOM ( i, r ) M-TOO ( i , r ) ) *Q ( i, r ) - P ( i , r ) ] 
=G= MEO(r)'WPI ( r ) ' s u m d , NEO_FLAG ( i , r) *VOM ( i , r ) M-TOO d , r) ) ] ; 
SDEMAND: FC ( i , r) $MC_FLAG ( i , r) 
D : P ( i , r ) 
SCONSTRAINT:NMK(i,r,s)$(NMK_FL.AG(i,r) and TXO ( i , r , s ) I t 0 ) 
MQX(i , r) =G= X ( i , r , s ) ; 
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Table 5-5: The Full MPS/GE Model - Armington nesting and Imports 
$PROD:A(i,r) s:SIGD(i) 
0:AP(i,r) Q:VAM(i,r) 
I:Pd,r) Q: (VDM(i,r)/(l + DMKO(i,r) ) ) P : (1 + DMKO (i r) ) 
A:FC(i,r)$MC_FLAG(i,r) T:DMK(i,r)$MC FLAG(i r) 
I:MP(i,r) Q:VIM(i,r) 
$PROD:M(i,r) s:SIGM(i) S.TL:0 
0:MP(i,r) Q:VIM(i,r) 
I:P(i,s)$VIWS(i,s,r) 
+ Q: (VXMDd,s,r)/(l+XMKO(i,s,r) ) ) 
+ P: ( (l+TXOd,s,r) ) M l + TMO(i,s,r))*(l+XMKO(i,s,r) ) ) s.TL: 
* Tax vihen no special export subsidy rules are applied: 
+ A:Y(s)$(NEXS_FLAG(i,s,r) + NQXS_FLAG(i,s, r) eqO) 
+ T:(TX(i,s,r)*(l+XMK(i,s,r))) 
+ $(NEXS_FLAGd,s,r)+NQXS_FLAG(i,3,r)eq 0) 
Subsidy when export subsidy expenditure rule is applied: 
+ A:Y(s)$NEXS_FLAG(i,s,r) .N: NEX (i, s ) $NEXS_FLAG d, s, r) 
+ M: (TXO(i,s,r; •(1+XMK(i,s,r)))$NEXS_FLAG(i, s, r) 
Subsidy when export subsidy quantity rule is applied: 
+ A:Y(s)$NQXS_FLAG{i,s,r) N:NQX(i,s)$NQXS_FLAG(i,s, r) 
+ M: (TXO{i,s,r) * (1+XMK(i,s,r)))$NQXS_FLAG(i,s, r) 
* Import Tariff when no special subsidy rules are applied.: 
+ A:Y(r) T:(TM(i,s,r)*(1+TX(i,s,r))M1+XMK(i,s,r))) 
$(NEXS_FLAG(i,s,r) + NQXS_FLAG(i,s,r) eq 0) 
' Exogenous part of the Tariff with either export subsidy rule: 
A:Y(r) T:(TM(i,s,r)*(1+XMK(i,s,r))) 
S(NEXS_FLAG(i,s,r) or NQXS_FLAG(i, s, r) ) 
' Endogenous part of the Tariff when expenditure rule is applied: 
+ N:NEX(i,s)$NEXS_FLAG(i,s,r) 
+ M: (TXO(i,s,r) 'TM(i,s,r) * (l+XMKd,s,r) ) ) $NEXS_FLAG (i, s, r) 
* Endogenous part of the Tariff when quantitiy rule is applied: 
+ N:NQXd, s)$NQXS_FLAG(i,s,r) 
+ M: (TXO(i,s,r) *TM(i,s,r)-* (l+XMKd,s,r) ) ) $NQXS_FLAG ( i, s, r) 
* Endogenous m o n o p o l i s t i c c omp e t i t i o n marlcup: 
+ A:FCd , s )$MC_FLAG( i , s ) 
T :XMK(i , s , r )$MC_FLAG(i , s ) 
I:GTP# ( s ) $ (V IWS ( i , s , r ) - VXWD( i , s , r ) ) s .TL : 
•^  Q: (V IWS ( i , s , r ) -VXWD( i , s , r ) ) 
+ P : ( l + TMO ( i , s , r ) ) 
+ A :Y( r ) T : TM ( i , s , r ) 
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Table 5-6: The Full MPS/GE Model - Export Constraints 
Endogenous export (expenditure) constraint: 
SCONSTFLAINT : NEX (i, r) $NEX_FLAG (i, r) 
XSUBSO(i,r) * WPI(r) * MEX(i,r) =G= 
sum[s$(TXO(i,r,s) It 0), NEX (i, r) M-TXO (i, r, s) ) rP (i, r) *VXMD (i, r, s) 
* [(1+XMK (i,r,s)-^NMK(i,r,s) ) / (1+XMKO (i, r, s ) )] 
now multiply by * QXS(i,r,s) ]; 
> [M(i,s) * [MPd,s) *PMSO(i,r,s) / 
[ (l+TMd, r,s) ) * [TSHR(i,r,s) "GTP 
+ (l-TSHR(i,r,s)) * 
;i+XMK(i,r,s)*NMK(i,r,s))/(1+XMKO(i,r,s)) 
•*• (1+ NEX(i,r) * TXOd,r,s)) * P(i,r)] 
]]-"*SIGM(i)] ]; 
' Endogenous e x p o r t ( q u a n t i t y ) c o n s t r a i n t : 
$CONSTRAINT:NQX(i,r)$NQX_FLAG(i,r) 
s um [ s $ ( TXOd , r , s) I t 0) , 
• Va r i a b l e Q X S ( i , r , s ) : -
[M( i , s ) * [MPd , s) *PMS0(i , r , s) / 
[ ( l +TMd , r , s ) ) * [ TSHR ( i , r , s ) *GTP 
r ( l - T S H R d , r , s ) ) ' ( l +XMK( i , r , s ) ' NMK ( i , r , s ) ) / ( l +XMK0 ( i , r , s ) ) 
• ' [ l + (NEX ( i , r ) +NQXd , r ) ) * T X 0 ( i , r , s ) ] * P ( i , r ) ] 
] ]-"*SIGM(i)] 
*VXWDd,r, s) ]=G= 
MQX(i,r) -" sum[s$ ( TX 0 ( i , r , s ) I t 0 ) , VXWD ( i , r, s) ] ; 
5-49 
Table 5-7: The Full MPS/GE Model - Utility, Welfare, Income, Global 
Transport and Savings 
SPROD:GU(r) 3 : 1 
0 : G P ( r ) Q : ( s u m d , V G A ( i , r ) ) ) 
I : A P ( i , r ) Q :VGM( i , r ) 
+ P: ( l + T GO ( i , r ) ) 
+ A : Y ( r ) T : T G ( i , r ) 
$PROD:PU(r) s : l 
0 : P P ( r ) Q : ( s u m d , V P A ( i , r ) ) ) 
I : A P d , r ) Q : V PM ( i , r ) 
$PR0D:GT 
0 :GTP 
I : P ( i , r ; 
P : ( l + T P O ( i , r ) ) 
A : Y ( r ) T : T P ( i , r ) 
s : l 
Q : ( sum( d , r ) , V S T ( i , r ) ) ) 
Q : V S T ( i , r ) 
SPROD:GS s : 
0 :GSP Q : ( s u m ( r , S A V E ( r ) ) ) 
$PR0D:WEL(r) 
0 : W P I ( r 
I : G P ( r ) 
I : P P ( r ) 
I : GSP 
$DEMAND:NFI(r) 
I : P ( " c g d s " , r ) Q : ( ( V OM ( " c g d s " , r ) - V D E P ( r ) ) ) 
s : l 
( s u m d , V G A d , r ) + V P A d , r ) ) + SAVE( r ) ) 
( s u m d , V G A ( i , r ) ) ) 
( s u m d , V P A ( i , r ) ) ) 
SAVE(r ) 
s : 
E : W ( f , r ) $ ( s u m [ j , S M E ( f , j , r ) ] ) Q : ( s u m [ j , S M E ( f , j , r ) ] ) 
E : S S W ( f , j , r ) $ S S E ( f , j , r ) Q 
E : W ( " C a p i t a l " , r ) Q 
E : P ( " c g d s " , r ) Q 
E : P ( " c g d s " , r ) Q 
E : P ( j , r ) Q 
D :WP I ( r ) 
$DEMAND:Y(r) s : l 
D :WP I ( r ) 
$0FFTEXT 
S S E ( f , j , r ) 
E V OA ( " C a p i t a l " , r ) R :ECAP( r ) 
( -VDEP ( r ) ) 
( -VDEP ( r ) ) R :ECAP( r ) 
V OM ( j , r ) $ ( R T S ( j , r ) n e 1 ) 
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5.4 WELFARE DECOMPOSITION 
If wc onl\ need to know the aggregate welfare change then the equivalent variation 
can be calculated as follows: 
EV(r) = WEL(r) - ( INCOME( r ) -VDEP ( r ) ) 
= ( w e K r ) - 1) X ( INCOME( r ) -VDEP( r ) ) 
We can decompose EV changes according to the source of welfare gain by tracing 
welfare to real income, and then decomposing the sources of real income. Equations 
14,2 and 15.10 imply that 
WEL(r) = y ( r ) / w p i ( r ) 
SO that 
EV(r) = Y(r) / wpi(r) - (INCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
= [Y(r) - (INCOME-VDEP(r))]/wpi(r) 
+ [l/wpi(r) - 1] X (INCOME(r)-VDE?(r}) 
The first term in this expression is real income, while the second term is the effect that 
rising prices have on welfare (i.e. the consumer surplus). 
Equation 14.1 can then be substituted for Y(r) to obtain EV as a function of income 
sources. For clarity, take the following income function: 
Y ( r ) = I , EVOA ( f , r ) x w ( f , r ) 
- VDEP d ) • • < p d c g d s " , r ) 
- I TA:<;REVd,r! 
where TAXREV(i,r) is the net revenue from all tax instruments for good i in region r. 
The base income is 
( INCOME ( r ) -VDEP ( r ) ) = [ I : EVOA ( f , r ) ] - VDEP(r ) 
+ X. TAXREVO( i , r ) 
where tax revenues in the base are denoted TAXREVO. Then 
EV{r) = If [EVOA(f,r) •< w(f,r) - EVOA(f,r) ] /wpi(r) 
[VDEP(r)xp("cgds",r) - VDEP(r)] /wpi(r) 
+ I [TAXREV(i,r) - TAXREVO (i,r)] ./wpi(r) 
+ [l/wpi(r) - 1] ^ (INCOME(r)-VDEF(r)) 
This expression can be decomposed into four terms; producer effect (PE), 
depreciation effect (EV_DEP), tax revenue effect (TR) and a consumer effect (CE). 
EV( r ) = PE + EV_DEF + TR + CE 
P E ( r ) = I ^ [ ( w ( f , r ) - l ) X EVOA( f , r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
EV_DEP{r) = [ V D E P ( r ) , - F ( " - g d s " , r ) - VDEF ( r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
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TR(r) = I , [TAXREV(i,r) - TAXREVO(i,r)] / w p i ( r ) 
CE(r ) = [ I / w p i ( r ) - 1] x (INCOME(r)-VDEP(r)) 
Decomposing the Producer Effect 
The producer effect term can be decomposed by sector. Recall that 
EVOA(f,r) = I , E ( f , j , r ) {15. 4] 
E ( f , j , r ) = e ( f , j , r ) xEVFA(f, j , r ) [2. '4] 
Then 
PE(r) = !•, [ w ( f , r ) x I e ( f , j , r ) xEVFA( f , j , r ) - EVFA ( f , j , r ) i / w p i ( r ) 
= I , I ; ( w ( f , r ) x e ( f , j , r ) - 1 ) x EVFA ( f , j , r ) / w p i ( r ) 
Defining EV_PE(i.r) to be the producer EV effect by sector, then 
EV_PEd, r ) = S, (w(f , r ) xe ( f , j, r) - 1) xEVFA ( f, ] , r ) / w p i ; r •  
Decomposing the Consumer Effect 
As welfare is a Cobb-Douglas function of private and government consumption, and 
savings, and as private and government consumption are both Cobb-Douglas 
functions of consumption of individual goods, the welfare price index wpi(r) can be 
expressed as: 
wpi ( r ) = gsp" '" ' n_ a pd ) ; ' ' ^ ' ^ ' 
where a i r ; + 1 6 ( 1 , r ) = 1 
It can then be shown that 
CE(r) ^ d/gsp"''' - d x (INCOME (r)-VDEF (r) ) 
+ I d/ap"-"'" - 1) X (INCOME (r)-VDEP (r) ) 
Note that this expression is a first-order approximation to the true expression, which 
includes terms for prices in all pairs of sectors, all triples of sectors, all quadruples of 
sectors, and so on. 
The contribution of the consumer effect for good i to welfare in region r is therefore 
EV_CE(i,r) = d /ap-* ' ' ' " ' - 1) x (INCOME (r)-VDEP (r) ) 
And a savings term EV_SAVE shows the effect of the global savings price on welfare 
in region r: 
EV_SAVE(r) = ( 1 / g s p " ' ' ' - 1) < (INCOME (r)-VDEP (r ) ) 
A "joinf' factor EVJOINT sums the approximation errors in the consumer surplus 
decomposition: 
EV_JOlNT(r) = CE(r) - EV SAVE(r) - I , EV_CE( i , r ) 
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Decomposing Tax Revenue 
Tax revenue can be decomposed by type of tax. and by the commodity on which the 
tax is levied. Tax revenue can be found from the tax terms in equation 14.1: 
TAXREV(r) I, 
I.. 
I., 
s. 
I. 
I. 
T O ( j , r ) X Q ( j , r ) X p ( j , r ) 
T F D ( i , j , r ) X F D D ( i , j , r ) x p ( i , r ) 
X FDMd , j , r ) X m p . ( i , r ) 
P DD ( i , r ) X p ( i , r ) 
P DM ( i , r ) X 
GDD ( i , r ) X 
GDM( i , r ) X 
X D M d , s , r ) 
X D X ( i , r , s ) 
T F I d , j , r ) 
T P D ( i , r ) X 
T P I ( i , r ) X 
T GD ( i , r ) X 
T G I ( i , r ) X 
T M ( i , s , r ) 
T X d , r , s 
m p ( i , r ) 
p d , r ) 
m p ( i , r ) 
X C I F P d , s , r ) 
X P ( i , r ) 
The base tax revenue is 
TAXREVO(r) = I 
y 
I. 
I., 
I., 
T O 0 ( j , r ) X VOM( j , r ) 
T F DO d , j , r ) X VDFMd, j , r ) 
T F I O d , j , r ) 
T P D O d , r ) X 
T P I O ( i , r ) X 
TGDO ( i , r ) x 
T G I O ( i , r ) X 
TMOd , s , r ) 
T X G d , r , s ) 
X V I FM d , j , r j 
VDPM( i , r ) 
V I P M d , r ) 
VDGM( i , r ) 
V I GM d , r ) 
X V I W S ( i , s , r ) 
X V XMD d , r , s ) 
so that 
TR(r) = I l [ T O ( j , r ) x Q ( j , r ) x p ( j , r ) - T OO ( j , r ) x VOM ( j , r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
+ l u ] [ T F D d , j , r ) x F D D ( i , j , r ) x p ( i , r ) - TFDO ( i , j , r ) xVDFM ( i , j , r ) ] 
/ w p i ( r ) 
+ I i . j [TF I ( i , j , r ) x F D M ( i , j , r ) x m p ( i , r ) - TFIO ( i , j , r ) xVIFM ( i , j , r ) ] 
/ w p i ( r ) 
+ I l [ T P D ( i , r ) x p D D ( i , r ) x p ( i , r ) - TPDO ( i , r ) xVDPMd, r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
+ I l [ T P I ( i , r ) x P D M ( i , r ) x m p ( i , r ) - T P I O ( i , r ) x V I P M ( i , r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
+ I l [ T G D ( i , r ) x G D D ( i , r ) x p ( i , r ) - TGDO( i , r ) xVDGM( i , r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
+ I l [ T G I ( i , r ) x G DM ( i , r ) x m p ( i , r ) - T G I O ( i , r ) x V I GM ( i , r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
+ I i , s [ TM( i , s , r ) x DM ( i , s , r ) x C I F P ( i , s , r ) -
T M O ( i , s , r ) x V I W S ( i , s , r ) ] / w p i ( r ) 
+ I i , s [ T X ( i , r , s ) x D X ( i , r , s ) x p ( i , r ) - TXO ( i , r , s ) xVXMD ( i , r , s ) ] 
/ w p i ( r ) 
The contribution of tax revenue for good i to welfare in region r is therefore 
EV_TR(i,r) = [TO(j,r)xQ(j,r)xp(j,r) - TOO (j , r) xVOM (j , r) ] /wpi(r) 
+ Ij [TFDd, j,r)xFDD(i, j,r)xp(i,r) - TFDO (i, j , r) xVDFM (i, j, r) ] 
/wpi(r) 
+ I3 [TFId, j,r)xFDM(i, j,r)xmp(i,r) - TFIO (i, j , r) xVIFMd, j , r) ] 
/wpi(r) 
TPDO(i,r)xVDPM(i,r)) /wpi(r) 
TPlOd, r)xVIPM(i,r) ] /wpi(r) 
TGDO(i,r)xVDGM(i,r)] /wpi(r) 
TGlO(i,r)xVIGM(i,r)] /wpi(r) 
[TM(i,s,r)xDM(i,s,r)xCIFP(i,s,r) - TMO(i,s,r)xVIWS(i, s, r)] 
/wpi(r) 
+ Is [TX(i,r,s)xDX(i,r,s)xp(i,r) - TXO (i, r, s) xVXMDd, r, s) ] 
/wpi(r) 
+ [TPD(i,r)xPDD(i,r)x p(i,r) 
+ [TPI(i,r)xPDM(i,r)xmpd,r) 
+ [TGD(i,r)xGDD(i,r)x p(i,r) 
+ [TGI{i,r)xGDM{i,r)xmp(i,r) 
+ I 
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Interpreting the Welfare Decomposition 
Chapters 6 and 8 will use this decomposition of welfare to interpret simulation results. 
There are two points that are made here to clarify the use of welfare decomposition 
techniques. 
The Sources and Causes of Welfare Change 
Welfare decomposition identifies the sources of welfare change, so a positive 
producer surplus in the services sector means that real income has increased because 
the service sector is either employing more factors, or it is paying them a higher wage. 
This does not identify the cause of the welfare change, which is far harder to assess. If 
the only change that is made to policy variables for a simulation is a reduction in a 
single tariff then we can say that the reduction in that tariff cau.ses the welfare 
changes measured by the simulation, and using welfare decomposition we can identify 
the .sources of gain. In partial equilibrium the sources and causes must be the same 
sector, but in general equilibrium some of the sources of welfare changes will occur in 
different sectors. 
In a simulation where many polic\' instruments are changed, welfare decomposition 
will show the sources of welfare change, but in order to measure the causes (how 
much does each policy change contribute to welfare), it would be necessary to 
conduct a separate simulation for each policy instrument that is changed. Even then, 
the welfare changes from each separate simulation would not add up to the welfare 
change in the simulation with all policy instruments changed simultaneously because 
there is interaction between policy instruments. Chapter 6 looks for the causes of 
welfare change on a broad scale: with a large global model it is infeasible to run a 
separate simulation for every tariff and tax that is changed in the Uruguay Round 
reforms, but it is possible to separate the reforms into broad categories such as 
agricultural reforms, abolition of the MFA, and industrial market access reforms.''* 
In the 13 region, 17 sector model used in Chapter 6 the MFA abolition accounts tor the removal of Voluntary 
Export Levies on 42 bilateral routes. Industrial market access reforms involve tariff liberalisation on 
approximately 1000 individual tariffs, while agricultural reforms involve tariff liberalisation on approximately 
1250 tariffs, export subsidy liberalisation on around 400 .subsidies, and the reform of approximately 100 output 
siilisiilies. There are over 2500 individual policv instruments that are reformed in the complete Uruguay Round 
'iinwlmion, 
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Price Non-Homogeneity 
The welfare decomposition is not -pnce homogeneous" i.e. homogeneous of degree 
zero in prices, but welfare is. To explain this, recall the expression for EV: 
EV( r ) = Y ( r ) / w p i ( r ) - ( INCOME( r ) -VDEP ( r ) ) 
Here both income Y(r) and the aggregate price index wpi(r) are nominal values, so the 
EV calculation is 'price homogeneous". Multiplying all nominal values by the same 
proportion will not change EV(r). 
The first step in decomposing EV was to create two terms: an income effect (this was 
later decomposed into producer surplus, depreciation, and tax revenue effects) and 
consumer surplus: 
EV:r) = [ Y ( r ) - i iriCOME-VDEP ( r ) ) j / w p i ( r ) 
+ [ l / w p i ( r ) - 1] X ( INCOME( r ) -VDEP ( r - ! 
It is immediately apparent that these two terms are not "price homogeneous': 
proportional increases in Y(r) and wpi(r) will increase the first term and reduce the 
second term. 
In chapter 6, the aggregate price index wpi(r) for the EU region is used as the 
numeraire, so that wpi("eu"") = 1; there will therefore be no overall consumer surplus 
change for the EU, although there will be consumer surplus contributions from 
individual goods, summing to zero. For regions that experience a rise in aggregate 
prices (i.e. where the simulations result in wpi(r) > 1), consumer surplus must be 
negative, and the price changes will tend to increase producer surplus and tax revenue 
(although these may still fall). The opposite will occur in regions where aggregate 
prices fall. 
No attempt to correct the price non-homogeneity is made" because (i) EV as a whole 
is price homogeneous, as are all parts of the model, and (ii) any corrections would 
necessarily mean that welfare decompositions are not comparable across regions. 
^ It would be possible (but time consuming) to solve the simulation n times, where n is the number of regions in 
'lie model, changing only the numeraire in each simulation to be wpi(r) for each region in turn and record the 
^H'lfarc decomposition only for the numeraire region, ,'\s wpi(r)=l for the numeraire region, there would be no 
'iSiyi-i-'Siiue price effect on the decomposition terms, 
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the GTAP model in more detail than the graphical 
representation given in Chapter 3. Section 5.1 introduced the standard GTAP model as 
an MPS/GE model, covering both the behavioural conditions for each sector and 
consumer and the accounting equations for market clearing in goods and factors. 
Section 5.2 examined various changes to this structure that make the model more 
tractable in the MPS/GE framework, and Section 5.3 presented extensions to this 
model to incorporate a degree of factor specificity, explicit Uruguay Round 
constraints and monopolistic competition. Section 5.4 demonstrated a means of 
decomposing welfare using this model. 
Chapter 6 will use this model to examine various aspects of the Uruguay Round, and a 
further modified model will be used in later chapters that takes advantage of the new 
release (version 4) GTAP database. 
\ii quivalent (and preferable because less time consuming) method would be to divide all nominal values in the 
wlciiiaiion of EV_PS. EV_TR. EV CS. EV_DEP, EV SAVE and EVJOIN f bv wpi(r), 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 
SIMULATIONS' 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results from CGE modelling simulations conducted with the 
GTAP-based model using the aggregation described in chapter 4 (section 4.6.2) and 
the model structure described in chapter 5 (after modifications). A range of issues will 
be examined, from the "traditional"" aspects of global CGE anahsis - equivalent 
variation by region and by reform component, to less common approaches -
decomposing welfare results by sector, for example, and to comparisons with other 
modelling structures. A limited number of sensitivity tests are performed. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 presents the main results from the 
simulation exercises, section 6.3 presents various welfare decompositions of the 
sources of gains, and section 6.4 examines simulations that are intended to show the 
causes of the gains. Section 6.5 investigates what effect various modelling assumptions 
and parameters have on the results. Section 6.6 presents the results of a model that 
includes monopolistic competition, and section 6.7 examines EU farmer welfare under 
all the scenarios presented in other sections. Section 6.8 concludes. 
6.2 THE URUGUAY ROUND AND ITS MAIN 
COMPONENTS 
The first set of experiments follows those reported in Blake et al. (1996) and other 
previous studies in estimating: (i) the consequences of the full UR reform package, and 
(ii) the impact in isolation of each of the Agricultural Agreement, the MFA reforms 
and the industrial market access provisions. 
Some of the results presented in this chapter are in a paper forthcoming in the Journal of .Agricultural l-conomics. 
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Table 6-1: Regional welfare gains (EV in Sbn and as a percentage of 1992 income) 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
EU 
SKT 
SHK 
BIT 
BRA 
OMI 
SSA 
CHN 
OLI 
OECD 
non-OECD 
Middle Income 
Lo\\ Income 
World 
Full Uruguay 
Round reforms 
1.04 
1.57 
21.46 
26.65 
24.86 
2.50 
-3.21 
-1.68 
1,57 
-8,43 
-0,49 
6,13 
6,22 
75,58 
2.61 
-9,25 
11,86 
78,20 
(0,36) 
(0,30) 
(0,41) 
(0,84) 
(0,42) 
(0,52) 
(-7.11) 
(-0,23) 
(0,47) 
(-0,34) 
(-0,33) 
(1,37) 
(1,49) 
(0,50) 
(0,05) 
(-0,23) 
(1,17) 
(0.39) 
Agricultural 
Components 
0,96 
1,03 
2,65 
5,16 
11,37 
3,93 
0,01 
-0,29 
0,70 
0,18 
0,00 
0,11 
0,15 
21,17 
4,79 
4,53 
0,26 
25,94 
(0,33) 
(0,20) 
(0,05) 
(0,16) 
(0.19) 
(0,82) 
(0,02) 
(-0,04) 
(0,21) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,02) 
(0,04) 
(0,14) 
(0,09) 
(0,11) 
(0,03) 
(0,13) 
Textiles and 
clothing 
liberalisation 
0,20 (0,07) 
1.55 . (0,30) 
15,99 (0,30) 
-1.02 (-0,03) 
11,52 (0,20) 
-1.60 (-0,33) 
-3,59 (-7,95) 
-1.13 (-0,15) 
0.04 (0,01) 
-5,13 (-0,21) 
-0,15 (-0,10) 
5,46 (1,22) 
6,12 (1,46) 
28,24 (0,19) 
0,02 (0,00) 
-1141 (-0,28) 
11,43 (1,13) 
28,25 (0,14) 
Industrial market 
access 
-0,14 
-1,06 
2.55 
22,91 
1,63 
0,35 
0,36 
-0,19 
1,04 
-2.98 
-0,32 
0,60 
0,08 
25,89 
-1.06 
-1,42 
0,36 
24,83 
(-0,05) 
(-0.20) 
(0.05) 
(0.72) 
(0.03) 
(0.07) 
(0.79) 
(-0.03) 
(0.31) 
(-0,12) 
(-0,22) 
(0.13) 
(0.02) 
(0.17) 
(-0.02) 
(-0.03) 
(0.04) 
(0.12) 
Table 6-1 shows the regional welfare effects, measured in terms of the equivalent 
variation (EV) from the full UR reforms and for three of the major components: 
agricultural reform, liberalisation in textiles and clothing trade, and improved market 
: access. The estimated global gain from the flill reforms is approximately US$ 78 bn. 
, The three largest developed 'countries", the USA, Japan and the EU, dominate the 
welfare gains, together accounting for $72.58 bn of the $78.20 bn total world gain. 
,^  Japan benefits the most, the major source of its gains being from industrial market 
access reforms, with some gains from agricultural liberalisation. The USA benefits 
mainly from textiles and clothing liberalisation, while the EU's main gains come from 
both agricultural and textile liberalisation. 
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China and the -Other Low Income" (OLI) group make the largest gains in terms of 
percent of income, and in both cases the major source of gains is from MFA reform. 
Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), Brazil (BRA) and South Korea/Taiwan (SKT) all 
make moderate gains, mamly from agricultural liberalisation, while Canada (CAN) 
makes moderate agricultural and textiles gains but an industrial market access loss. 
Singapore and Hong Kong (SHK) lose the most as a percentage of income, and this 
loss is entirely due to a large welfare loss from textile and clothing liberalisation, 
where their established market position has been protected by VERs on newer textile 
and clothing producers. Removal of these VERs opens up world competition and 
erodes the market share of the established exporters. Other losers are the Economies in 
Transition (EIT), the • Other Middle Income" (OMI) group and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). this, with the exception of the OMFs small gain from agricultural 
liberalisation, coming from small losses in all areas. The problem for these areas, and 
for Sub-Saharan Africa in particular (which does not perform any liberalisation itself 
and is also granted preferential access to de\eloped markets under the Generalised 
S}stem of Preferences), is that they make only small gains directly from tariff 
liberalisation while they lose through indirect trade-diversion effects as other exporters 
gain from larger tariff reductions. Losses from textile and clothing liberalisation 
further worsen the position of these groups. 
Table 6-2 reports on results for the EU sectors, showing the percentage change in 
various indicators. Producer prices are net of all taxes and subsidies, while the 
consumer price is the aggregate price of domestically produced goods and imports. 
The percentage change in the price of goods used as intermediate products is the same 
as the percentage change in the consumer price (the Armington elasticities are the 
same regardless of how goods are used). Using input-output coefficients, h is then 
possible to determine what role intermediate input prices play in determining output 
prices: the meat sector for example uses 0.49 units of Livestock for each unit of output. 
Table 6-2 shows that the intermediate/consumer price of Livestock falls by 0.62%. 
This contributes 0.30% (0.62% x 0.49) to the 0.48% fall in the producer price of Meat 
(the residual fall of 0.18% reflects increases in the prices of other intermediate goods 
and increases in wages) 
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As would be expected, the Uruguay Round reforms will confront all agricultural 
sectors and most food sectors (with the exception of 'Other Agricultural Products") 
with falling price and output, the major sector affected being Non-Grain Crops. Note 
that Non-Grain Crops and Milk Products are constrained by Uruguay Round export 
quantity commitments, that the small initial export subsidy in the Livestock sector is 
eradicated, and that all other sectors are constrained by export subsidy programme 
expenditure commitments. In all cases except Non-Grain Crops and Livestock, the 
change in the ad valorem subsidy rate is lower than the 36% cut usually implemented 
in models that do not specifically model the subsidy commitments. 
Table 6-3 shows the outcome for export subsidies in all regions and sectors. There are 
three possible outcomes;- The subsidies can be either eliminated, quantity-constrained, 
or expenditure-constrained. In most cases (21 of the 29 subsidies) the subsidy is 
eliminated, in four cases the subsid\' is expenditure-constrained, and in four cases the 
subsidy is quantity-constrained. Six of the eight sectors where subsidies are not 
eliminated are in the EU, with one sector (milk products) retaining subsidies in both 
the USA and Canada. In all the eight cases where subsidies are not eliminated, the 
initial ad valorem rate of the subsidy was high. In general the sectors with the highest 
initial ad valorem subsidies become constrained by the expenditure commitment, as 
for any percentage change in the ad valorem subsidy, reform in the higher-subsidy 
sectors will induce a larger change in cif price and therefore (generalh) export quantity 
than sectors with lower subsidies. This does not hold for all cases, however: in the EU 
the milk products sector has a higher ad valorem subsidy than the meat products sector 
(although not a large difference) but milk export subsidies become quantity-
constrained and those for meat expenditure-constrained. 
- Ill fact, as discussed in Chapter 5. there is a fourth possible outcome: that the commitments will be met at the 
"I'iSmal iid valorem subsidy rate, requiring no reduction. This possibility does not occur in any sector. 
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Table 6-3: Export Subsidy Outcomes 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
EU 
BRA 
EIT 
OMI 
notes: 
Sector 
Non-Grain Crops 
Milk Products 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Non-Grain Crops 
Milk Products 
Other Agricultural Products 
Paddy Rice 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Non-Grain Crops 
Meat Products 
Milk Products 
Paddy Rice 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Non-Grain Crops 
Livestock 
Meat Products 
Milk Products 
Other Grains 
Non-Grain Crops 
Meat Products 
Milk Products 
Other Agricultural Products 
Livestock 
Meat Products 
Milk Products 
Milk Products 
neg = negligible value 
Outcome 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Quantity-constrained 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Quantity-constrained 
Expenditure-constrained 
Expenditure-constrained 
Expenditure-constrained 
Quantity-constrained 
Eliminated 
Expenditure-constrained 
Quantity-constrained 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Base Value 
(Sbn) 
neu 
0,12 
0,30 
0,11 
0,06 
0,12 
0,01 
0,02 
0,85 
0,08 
0,01 
0.07 
0,21 
0,08 
2.64 
1.89 
1.33 
0,01 
3,14 
4,30 
neg 
0,07 
0,01 
neg 
0.02 
neg 
0.02 
0.04 
neg 
Initial ad 
valorem 
equivalent 
(%) 
neiz 
0,05 
7,1 
15,1 
5,0 
44,1 
0,2 
5,8 
16,7 
1,3 
0,003 
1,5 
34,1 
76,5 
67,6 
70,7 
23,3 
0,7 
44,8 
47,7 
3,8 
2,5 
0,9 
1.7 
0,2 
neg 
1.7 
9,2 
0,07 
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6.3 DECOMPOSITION OF RESULTS: THE SOURCES OF 
WELFARE CHANGES 
Table 6-4 and Table 6-5 show results from decompositions of welfare for the EU in the 
full Uruguay Round scenario. Table 6-4 gives the results for aggregate sectors. Table 
6-5 those for each sector in the model. The first three columns show the welfare 
decomposition tising the techniques discussed in Chapter 5. giving (net) tax revenue, 
consumer effect and producer effect in each sector. Note that the "Other" row refers to 
savings and joint effects (the interaction between consumer effects in different 
sectiors) and depreciation effects. The next two columns give the welfare effects of 
changes in export and import prices. The terms-of-trade column is the sum of these. 
"Domestic" effects are all those welfare effects that are not accounted for by terms-of-
trade changes. Therefore the tax revenue plus consumer effect plus producer effect sum 
to the total column, as do the terms-of-trade and domestic columns. The three 
decomposed effects (TR. CE. PE) can be regarded as resulting from either terms-of-
trade or domestic effects. 
Examining the total welfare effects b\ sector (the final column) in Table 6-4. it is 
apparent that the textiles and clothing sector is the largest source of welfare gain. 
$14bn. of which $12.4bn accrues to consumers via lower prices. Agriculture and food 
together account for a $10.Sbn welfare gain; for the food sectors there are welfare 
gains in each category (TR. CE and PE) while in agriculture there are large (net) tax 
revenue gains because of lower subsidy payments, but high losses to producers. It is 
apparent that the redistributional effect of agricultural reform is much higher than the 
overall welfare gain in these sectors. Table 6-5 shows that the redistribution takes 
place 
Table 6-4: Decomposition of welfare for EU in the full Uruguay Round (Sbn) 
Terms-
Tax Consumer Producer Export Import ^^._ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ 
Revenue Effect Effect Price Pnce j^_^^^ 
Agriculture 
Food 
Textiles and Clothing 
Manufactures and 
Services 
Total 
16.766 
2.182 
1.121 
-11.379 
8.755 
1.51 
3.723 
12.416 
-12.626 
0.000 
-15.13 
1.451 
0.52 
28.638 
16,110 
2 229 
2.622 
-0.642 
1.049 
5.267 
-1.696 
-0.825 
8.052 
-2.821 
2,703 
0.537 
1.794 
7,41 
-1.773 
7,970 
2,619 
5,568 
6,647 
6,405 
16,895 
3.156 
7.363 
14.057 
4,632 
24,865 
6-7 
o 
— r~- r i 00 o 
r^ o — i n i n 
O ' n — i n o 
O 0> O r i o 
O 
a 
o 
o r i oo i n 
- r r^ rn o 
o rn rn ^ 
O O O rn 
VO 
r i 
d 
•— Ov o r^ -T 
m l — i n - r '— 
o 00 TT i n r i 
o c> c> o o 
• 3 
e 
3 
3 
3 
U 
u 
cv r - rn c^ oo 
- r i n vo o — 
O O C rn r l 
c> o o — o 
00 vD rn r i o 
— rn — vO O 
o ov i n r- o 
o o ci c> o 
^ u 
3 
,o 
^1 
<2 
c 
9 
O 
c. 
E 
o 
u 
ii 
Q 
Of 
m i n -3- r i vo 
r i r i 1^ — ov 
— ov r^ rn Gv 
o o i o o r i 
r i i n m, oo o 
-T i ^ r i r i - r 
O O —; O r i 
d d d —^ d 
o r^ — r i vo 
o m ^ ' ^ o 
p rri (^ 00 oo 
o — o —: r i 
O^  oo — 1/-, 
CO I— o o^ 
C : r i vo rn 
o r i r i r i 
vo 
o 
o 
42
3 
— 
93
5 
—, 
10
4 
rn 
o 
O 
in 
oo 
o 
vo 
VO 
— 
i n VO o - T 
— i n vo c~ 
O — c i n 
o> o o o 
O — sG i n 
5 c r^  — 
c o 
rn — oo — 
ov vo — in 
O r i t^ vO 
— — m m 
— r i vo ov 
o oo vo r i 
C> C> — CJ 
rn 
O 
OO 
rn 
d 
o 
o 
— 
^ 00 
vo 
- t 
r 1 
r i 
ov 
OV 
OO 
oo 
o 
• o 
• o 
o^  
- r Ov 
o- r-
— oo 
O rn 
r i — 
— vd 
00 -r J^ so 
rn r 1 
d o 
o — 
00 vo 
T 
r i 
r i 
ov 
i n 
rn 
O 
00 
-* 
vo 
oo 
r^ o 
r i — 
O r i 
o o o o o 
00 o 
vo 
— 
r i 
r i 
-T 
VO 
O 
O 
O 
O 
o 
vn 
O 
^^ V.O 
oo 
o 
CO 
o 
_ 
.._ V.O 
o 
rn 'r, -o r i o 
O O O r i oo 
c i O C O O 
vO 
rn 
o 
ov 
VO 
rn 
O 
— i n 
— o 
i n 
i ^ 
i n 
— 
r--
i n 
oo 
= 
rr 
r> 
-f 
— 
rn 
r~ 
r i 
1—) 
rn 
r i 
i n 
r i 
1 ^ 
r> 
rt 
O 
r l 
O 
ov 
r I rn -^ 
- r -^ 1^ 
— ov r i o 
ri 
C/5 
a. o 
H) 
u 
Qi 
^.-^ u 
a 
ra 
<i) 
B 
ra 
CT 
1) 
U 
c 
ra 
o 
C 
(U 
u 
i 2 c« — 
^ c o 2 
o 
o 
to 
<u 
> 
T3 
3 
O 
o 
3 
-o 
o 
CL Q. 
3 
u 
L^  
Oi) 
< 
^ u 
- C 
o 
(J 
3 
-n 
o 
Q. 
o 
3 
T3 
O 
a. 
>-. 
ra 
ra 
a. 
Q. 
< 
00 
ra 
^ 
>\ 
Oi) 
LL 
wo 
ica
 
^ 
o 
I ) 
x: 
ra 
2 
L -
r-
3 
C 
ra 
^ 
— 
w 
1) 
o 
o 
o d 
0 0 
I 
vo 
~ o 
Table 6-6: EU Base Data on Agricultural Protection 
r 
Paddy Rice 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Non-Grain Crops 
Livestock 
Processed Rice 
Meat Products 
Milk Products 
Other Agricultural Products 
Output 
Rate 
(%) 
7,20 
6,30 
2,50 
71,00 
9,16 
* 
0,20 
* 
* 
Subsidy 1 
E.xpenditure 
(Sbn) 
0,15 
2.29 
0,79 
65,94 
19,46 
* 
0,36 
* 
* 
E.xport Subsidy 
Rate Expenditure 
(%) (Sbn) 
76,46 0,09 
67,56 2,64 
70.66 1,89 
23,32 1,33 
0,66 0,01 
* * 
44,79 3.14 
47.75 4,30 
* * 
Tariff 
Rate 
(%) 
128,70 
51.20 
67.60 
58,50 
39,24 
128,70 
56,10 
132.90 
10.84 
Note: *= no net subsidy 
laruely in the non-grain crops, the sector with the highest initial production subsidies, 
as shown in Table 6-6. 
Much of the welfare gains to the EU accrue to the services sector, in fact the gain in 
this sector is '/, the total EU gain, despite the fact that there is no liberalisation taking 
place in services because of the absence of GTAP data. Welfare gains occur in the 
services sector because distortions that bias production away from services are 
liberalised. This underlines one of the strong points of CGE modelling: that the general 
equilibrium effects of reforms can be large, and are completely missed by other forms 
of analysis. 
Welfare Decomposition for the USA 
Table 6-8 shows the result of decomposing welfare changes for the USA. The format 
of the table is identical to Table 6-4. Note that the large overall consumer gain and the 
losses from tax revenue and producer effects are a result of the price non-homogeneity 
discussed in chapter 5. Table 6-7 shows the percentage change in the aggregate price in 
each region, from which it can be observed that the USA experiences a small aggregate 
price fall, which will in itself transfer income from producers to consumers. The export 
price, import price, terms-of-trade, domestic and total columns are price homogeneous, 
and show that the majority of the USA's welfare gains accrue in textiles and clothing. 
50% of the gains accrue because of import prices (a welfare increase through import 
6-9 
Table 6-8: Decomposition of welfare for USA in the full Uruguay Round (Sbn) 
Aizriculture 
Food 
Te,Ktiles and Clothing 
Manufactures and 
Services 
Total 
Tax 
Revenue 
4,893 
-0,1 18 
3,215 
-15,293 
-7,385 
Consumer 
Effect 
-0,737 
-1,394 
17,052 
21,867 
35,781 
Producer 
Effect 
0,863 
-0,325 
-0,159 
-14,123 
-6,842 
Export 
Price 
1,987 
0,297 
-0,108 
-2,785 
-0,574 
Import 
Price 
-0,485 
-0,656 
9,386 
-4,625 
3,593 
Terms-
of-
Trade 
1,488 
-0,365 
9,278 
-7,409 
3,018 
Domestic 
3,502 
-1,477 
10,83 
-0,137 
18,44 
Total 
4,998 
-1,839 
20,108 
-7,547 
21,459 
price changes must mean that import prices in this sector have fallen). The benefits of 
textile and clothing liberalisation to the USA are $15.99 bn (Table 6-1). while Table 6-
8 shows that the gains in the textile and clothing sectors from the full reforms are 
$20,108 bn. This implies that the textile and clothing sector must benefit significantly 
trom the other Uruguay Round reforms. 
Welfare Decomposition for Japan 
Japanese equivalent variation (from Table 6-1) is high compared to other regions - it is 
the largest in dollar terms, and the third largest in percentage terms. Table 6-9 
decomposes Japanese welfare for the full Uruguay Round reforms, and shows that 
most of the welfare gains accrue through manufactures and services, and that the gain 
from export price rises in these sectors is almost half the total welfare gain. Note that 
Japanese prices (Table 6-7) rise, leading to consumer losses and producer gains. There 
Table 6-7: Percentage change in aggregate price level 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
CHN 
BRA 
SSA 
EIT 
ANZ 
EU 
SKT 
SHK 
OMI 
OLI 
-0.687 
-0.676 
1.889 
4,040 
0,437 
0,448 
0.071 
0,608 
0 (numeraire) 
0.867 
2,443 
0,094 
5,873 
6-10 
Table 6-9: Decomposition of welfare for Japan in the full Uruguay Round (Sbn) 
Agriculture 
Food 
Textiles and Clothing 
Manufactures and 
Services 
Total 
Tax 
Revenue 
-0,813 
-0,065 
-0,167 
4.614 
3,493 
Consumer 
Effect 
0,747 
3,369 
-1,362 
-54,721 
-58,729 
Producer 
Effect 
-5,845 
2,683 
1,236 
98,748 
83,501 
Export 
Price 
0 
-0,017 
0,167 
11.066 
1 1.21 
Import 
Price 
-2,819 
'0,849 
-0,326 
-1,845 
-5,936 
Terms-
of-
Trade 
-2,823 
-0,865 
-0,158 
9,221 
5,274 
Domestic 
-3,072 
6,852 
-0,136 
39,419 
21,377 
Total 
-5,897 
5,985 
-0,294 
48,641 
26,651 
are also large losses from the three components of the EV decomposition not shown in 
the table - the effect of rising prices on depreciation payments, the effect of rising 
prices on savings, and the • 'Joint" consumer effects.'' 
Total Welfare Change by Sector 
Table 6-10 shows the total welfare accruing to each sector in each region as a result of 
the full Uruguay Round simulation, and can be used to aid the interpretation of welfare 
results overall because, despite the fact that the sources and causes of welfare change 
differ, we can infer something about the causes of welfare change from the sources. 
This is useful because the sources of gain are a\ailable by sector. 
The economies in transition (EIT) lose from the Uruguay Round as a whole, and Table 
6-1 shows that this is caused by losses in all three main components of the reforms, but 
that textiles and clothing liberalisation is the most significant cause of welfare loss. 
Table 6-10 demonstrates that the losses to EIT accruing to the textile sector are the 
largest losses to this region, but by no means dominate the welfare results. There is 
evidence that much of the $1.13 bn welfare loss from textile and clothing liberalisation 
is borne by other sectors, as the total loss in the texfile and clothing sectors is $0,495 
bn. EIT agricultural sectors unambiguously gain from the Uruguay Round, but the 
losses in the food processing sectors outweigh these gains by $0.44 bn. The largest 
welfare losses in manufactures accrue to the other machinery and other manufactures 
sectors, with a small gain in the energy sector. 
^ i i . CSC clfects arc inckuled in the column totals hut are not shown individually. 
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The largest welfare loss from the full Uruguay Round reforms is in .Singapore and 
Hong Kong (SHK). a region that makes a large loss from textile and clothing 
liberalisation, but small gains from both the agricultural reforms and market access 
reforms. Table 6-10 shows that there are no welfare gains in any sector in this region. 
Table 6-11 presents the welfare effect of terms-of-trade changes. b> commodity and 
also in total for each region. The Singapore and Hong Kong terms-of-trade deteriorate 
in every good, with the total welfare effect of terms-of-trade deterioration exceeding 
the overall losses from the Uruguay Round scenario. The terms-of-trade deterioration 
that results from the fall in export price of the wearing apparel sector is over 4% of 
1992 income, underlying the critical importance of the abolition of the MFA to this 
region. 
In three of the four regions where welfare falls as a result of the Uruguay Round (SHK, 
EIT and OMI). the terms-of-trade effects cause this result, in that the welfare loss from 
terms-of-trade deterioration in these regions exceeds the overall welfare loss. Sub-
Saharan Africa's loss of $0,487 bn is almost accounted for by a $0,438 bn terms-of-
trade effect, implying that there must also be other (allocative inefficiency) sources for 
welfare loss in this region. 
6.4 DECOMPOSITION OF RESULTS: THE CA USES OF 
WELFARE CHANGES 
Table 6-12 shows the results for four experiments that examine the effects of the EU 
making its Uruguay Round liberalisation components in the absence of liberalisation 
elsewhere. The "EU Agriculture Reforms' column shows the effects of the CAP 
reforms preceding/concurrent with the Uruguay Round reforms, while the "EU MFA 
Reforms' column shows the effects of the elimination of VERs on exports to the EU. 
Comparison with Table 6-1 shows that one third of the global gains from the Uruguay 
Round come from the EU reforms. The gains conferred on other regions from EU 
liberalisation totals $11.38 bn, while the gain to the EU from other regions' reforms is 
$8.34 bn. The EU's gains are dominated by gains from its own reforms, particularly in 
agriculture and textiles. The industrial market access reforms give the EU a small gain 
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Table 6-12: Decomposition of regional welfare effects of EU reforms and main 
components (in Sbn and as a % of regional GDP) 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
EU 
SKT 
SHK 
EIT 
BRA 
OMI 
SSA 
CHN 
OLI 
OECD 
iioii-OECD 
Middle Income 
Low Income 
World 
Full EU Reforms 
0,47 
0.32 
-0,89 
7,88 
16,52 
-0,16 
-1,44 
-0,84 
0,44 
-0,20 
3,54 
2,15 
0,10 
24,3 
3,59 
-2,2 
5.79 
27.90 
(0,16) 
(0,06) 
(-0,02) 
(0,25) 
(0,28) 
(-0,03) 
(-3,20) 
(-0,11) 
(0,13) 
(0,00) 
(0,85) 
(0,48) 
(0,07) 
(0.16) 
(0.07) 
(-0.05) 
(0.57) 
(0.14) 
EU Agriculture 
Reforms 
0,30 
0,09 
0,08 
-0,60 
10,14 
-0,10 
-0,10 
-0,16 
0,32 
0,71 
0,06 
0,04 
0,12 
10,01 
0,89 
0,67 
0,22 
10,90 
(0,10) 
(0,02) 
(0,00) 
(-0,02) 
(0,17) 
(-0,02) 
(-0,22) 
(-0,02) 
(0,10) 
(0,03) 
(0,02) 
(0,00) 
(0,08) 
(0,07) 
(0,02) 
(0,02) 
(0,02) 
(0,05) 
EU MFA Reforms 
0,09 
0,05 
-0,48 
-0.41 
12.86 
-0.38 
-1,45 
-1,05 
0,08 
-2,72 
3,17 
1,78 
-0,09 
12.11 
-0,66 
-5,52 
4,86 
11,44 
. (0,03) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(-0,01) 
(0,22) 
(-0,08) 
(-3,21) 
(-0,14) 
(0,02) 
(-0,11) 
(0,76) 
(0,40) 
(-0,06) 
(0,08) 
(-0,01) 
(-0.14) 
(0,48) 
(0,06) 
EU Industrial 
Reforms 
0,07 
0,18 
-0,51 
8,90 
-6,98 
0,33 
0,12 
0,42 
0,22 
1,96 
0,26 
0,31 
0,08 
1,66 
3,7 
3.05 
0.65 
5.35 
(0.02) 
(0,03) 
(0,00) 
(0,28) 
(-0,12) 
(0.07) 
(0.26) 
(0.06) 
(0.07) 
(0.08) 
(0.06) 
(0.07) 
(0.05) 
(0.01) 
(0.07) 
(0.08) 
(0.06) 
(0.03) 
($1.63 bn) overall but a loss ($6.98 bn) from its own reforms. This is caused by a 
terms-of-trade deterioration in manufactured goods, and it is Japan that is the main 
beneficiary from EU industrial market access reforms. 
Table 6-13 shows the results from four experiments that break down the effects of 
(world-wide) agricultural liberalisation into the four different classes of agricultural 
reform: tariff reform, export subsidy reform, output subsidy reform, and EU set-aside 
reform. 
The EU, as the region where both export and output subsidies are largest, is the only 
region to make a large gain from their liberalisation, although the USA makes some 
gains from the liberalisation of its lower cost subsidy regime. In the EU, around two-
thirds of the welfare gain from agricultural reform come from the subsidy reforms. 
Given that the EU^s expenditure on output subsidies is much higher than its 
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Table 6-13: Decomposition of the Agricultural Reforms (in Sbn and as a % of 
regional GDP) 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
EU 
SKT 
SHK 
EIT 
BRA 
OMI 
SSA 
CHN 
Oil 
OECD 
iion-OECD 
Middle Income 
Low Income 
World 
Import Tariff 
Reforms 
0,42 
0.34 
0.81 
6.65 
3,56 
4,37 
0,22 
0,04 
0,68 
1,50 
0,17 
0,15 
0,22 
11,78 
7,35 
6,81 
0,54 
19,15 
(0,15) 
(0,07) 
(0.02) 
(0,21) 
(0,06) 
(0,91) 
(0,48) 
(0.00) 
(0.20) 
(0.06) 
(0.12) 
(0,03) 
(0,05) 
(0,08) 
(0,14) 
(0,17) 
(0,05) 
(0,09) 
E.xport Subsidy 
Reforms 
0,30 
0,39 
0,86 
-1,06 
4,52 
-0,27 
-0,09 
-0,41 
0,06 
-1,16 
-0,19 
-0,13 
-0,13 
5,01 
-2,32 
-1,87 
-0.45 
2,67 
(0,10) 
(0,07) 
(0,02) 
(-0,03) 
(0,08) 
(-0,06) 
(-0,21) 
(-0,06) 
(0,02) 
(-0,05) 
(-0,13) 
(-0,03) 
(-0,03) 
(0,03) 
(-0.05) 
(-0.05) 
(-0.04) 
(0.01) 
Output S ubsidv 
Reforms 
0,15 
0,23 
0,95 
-0,06 
2,80 
-0,13 
-0,10 
0.15 
0.15 
0.17 
0,05 
0,09 
0,07 
4,07 
0,45 
0,24 
0,21 
4,52 
(0,05) 
(0,04) 
(0,02) 
(0,00) 
(0,05) 
(-0,03) 
(-0.22) 
(0.02) 
(0,04) 
(0,00) 
(0,04) 
(0.02) 
(0.02) 
(0.03) 
(0,01) 
(0,01) 
(0,02) 
(0,02) 
Set-A side 
Reforms 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,06 
-0,18 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,09 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,24 
0,08 
0,08 
0 
-0,17 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0.03) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(-0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0,00) 
expenditure on export subsidies (see table Al). the fact that the gains to the EU from 
export subsidy reform are much greater than the gains from output subsidy reform is 
an indication of how trade-distorting and welfare-reducing are export subsidies.^ 
For the world as a whole, tariff liberalisation is the most important feature of the 
agricultural reforms although, as would be expected, the USA and agricultural 
exporters such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada make significant gains from 
subsidy liberalisation. Food importing countries/regions such as Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan (SKT) and the 'Other Middle Income' (OMI) group suffer significant 
4 
Inii 
Even though export subsidies expenditure is reduced by at least 36% and output ,subsid> expenditure by 
-""". It IS obvious that given the total expenditure on subsidies from Table AI that the toial dollar expenditure on 
"input subsidies is reduced b\ far more than for export subsidies 
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Table 6-14: Decomposition of regional welfare effects of differing assumptions ( 
Sbn and as a '/<. of regional GDP 
m 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
EU 
SKT 
SHK 
EIT 
BRA 
OMI 
SSA 
CHN 
OLI 
OECD 
non-OECD 
Middle 
Income 
Low Income 
World 
Standard GTAP 
Assumptions 
1.12 
1.35 
20.96 
30.51 
36,55 
3,29 
-3,22 
-1.78 
1.68 
-8.02 
-0.77 
6.38 
6.44 
90.49 
4 
-8.05 
12.05 
94,48 
(0,38) 
(0,26) 
(0,40) 
(0,96) 
(0,62) 
(0,68) 
(-7,12) 
(-0,24) 
(0,50) 
(-0,33) 
(-0.52) 
(1.43) 
(1,54) 
(0,60) 
(0,08) 
(-0,20) 
(1.19) 
(0,47) 
Main Model with 
no Endogenous 
Subsidy Rates 
1,08 
1,42 
20,76 
27,17 
29,06 
2,66 
-3,21 
-1,92 
1,57 
-8,47 
-0,56 
6,18 
6,27 
79,49 
2,52 
-9,37 
11,89 
82,01 
(0,37) 
(0,27) 
(0,39) 
(0,86) 
(0,50) 
(0,55) 
(-7,11) 
(-0,26) 
(0,47) 
(-0,34) 
(-0,38) 
(1,38) 
(1,50) 
(0,53) 
(0,05) 
(-0,23) 
(1.17) 
(0,41) 
Main Model with 
no Fixed Factors 
1,06 
1,56 
21,66 
29,65 
30,10 
3.09 
-3,21 
-1,42 
1,67 
-7,89 
-0,64 
6,28 
6,37 
84.03 
4,25 
-7,76 
12,01 
88,30 
(0,36) 
(0,30) 
(0,41) 
(0,94) 
(0,51) 
(0,64) 
(-7,11) 
(-0,19) 
(0,50) 
(-0,32) 
(-0,43) 
(1,40) 
(1.52) 
(0,56) 
(0,08) 
(-0,19) 
(1.19) 
(0,44) 
Main 
1.04 
1,57 
21,46 
26,65 
24,86 
2,50 
-3,21 
-1,68 
1,57 
-8,43 
-0,49 
6,13 
6,22 
75,58 
2,61 
-9,25 
11,86 
78,20 
Model 
(0,36) 
(0,30) 
(0,41) 
(0,84) 
(0,42) 
(0,52) 
(-7,11) 
(-0,23) 
(0,47) 
(-0,34) 
(-0,33) 
(1.37) 
(1,49) 
(0,50) 
(0.05) 
(-0.23) 
(1.17) 
(0.39) 
losses from the subsidy reforms (particularly export subsidies) as the price that they 
pay for agricultural imports increases when the subsidies are reduced. 
6.5 THE EFFECTS OF THE MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS 
The effects of the modelling assumptions used in deriving all the results shown above 
are examined in Table 6-14. Each column represents the full Uruguay Round reform 
scenario, and the 'Main Model' column replicates earlier results for comparison. The 
'Standard GTAP Assumptions" column removes all of the additional modelling 
features that are included in this paper but do not feature in most GTAP simulations, 
such as those employed by Harrison et al. (1995) and Francois et al. (1995). The other 
two columns each remove one model assumption from the 'Main Model". 
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There is a clear difference between the results from the -Standard" model and the one 
used here. The former -overestimates" the global welfare gain by around 20%, and the 
EU gain by around 50%. in comparison with the latter. The 'Fixed Factors-
assumption, modelling half of each agricultural factor as sectorally-specific. is the 
main source of difference, but it is clear that treating subsidy reductions purely as 
reductions in the ad valorem rates, with no account taken of the actual commitments, 
also overestimates welfare gains. 
Table 6-15 shows the sectoral effects of the Uruguay Round in the "Standard" model, 
and should be compared with Table 6-2. The 'Standard" model predicts large quantity 
changes and small price changes - a consequence of the highly elastic supply curves 
that are defined by the combination of constant returns to scale and perfect factor 
mobility. Examination of the columns for exports and export subsidy e.xpenditure 
makes it clear that the 'Standard" model incompletely represents the subsidy 
commitments entered into by Urugua\ Round signatories. 
The \ery elastic supply curves in the 'Standard" model pass virtually all price effects 
on to consumers, and result in large quantity shifts, while the ad valorem subsidy rates 
on both output subsidies and export subsidies are reduced by more than is necessary to 
meet Uruguay Round subsidy commitments. 
Table 6-16 gives an indication of the sensitivity of the model to some of the elasticities 
that must be specified before the model can be calibrated. The Armington elasticities 
define the substitutability of imports and domestic products, and also the 
SLibstitutability between imports from different regions. The \'alues for these 
elasticities are taken directly from the GTAP database. As Table 6-16 shows, the 
results are sensitive to these elasticities, with higher elasticities leading to much greater 
gains from liberalisation. In fact, the importance of the Armington elasticities 
outweighs the differences between standard and non-standard models structures. 
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Table 6-16:Decomposition of regional welfare effects for differing values of the 
Armington elasticities (in Sbn and as a % of regional GDP) 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
EU 
SKT 
SHK 
BIT 
BRA 
OMI 
SSA 
CHN 
OLI 
OECD 
non-OECD 
Middle Income 
Low Income 
World 
Half Standard Values 
0,71 
0,69 
12,00 
22,04 
19,88 
0,58 
-3,46 
-2,00 
0,78 
-11,61 
-0.67 
2,37 
1,97 
55,32 
-12,04 
-15,71 
3,67 
43,26 
(0,24) 
(0,13) 
(0,23) 
(0,70) 
(0,34) 
(0,12) 
(-7,67) 
(-0,27) 
(0,23) 
(-0,47) 
(-0,45) 
(0,53) 
(0,47) 
(0,37) 
(-0,24) 
(-0,39) 
(0,36) 
(0,21) 
Standard Values 
1.04 (0.36) 
1,57 (0,30) 
21,46 (0,41), 
26,65 (0,84) 
24,86 (0,42) 
2,50 (0,52) 
-3,21 (-7,11) 
-1,68 (-0,23) 
1,57 (0,47) 
-8,43 (-0,34) 
-0,49 (-0,33) 
6,13 (1,37) 
6,22 (1,49) 
75,58 (0,50) 
2,61 (0,05) 
-9,25 (-0,23) 
11.86 (1.17) 
78.20 (0.39) 
Double Standard Values 
1,81 
3,90 
42,79 
34.21 
41,33 
6,56 
-2,65 
-1,09 
3,57 
-3,65 
-0,33 
10,02 
1 1,00 
124.04 
23,43 
2,74 
20,69 
147,48 
(0,62) 
(0,74) 
(0,81) 
(1,08) 
(0,70) 
(1,36) 
(-5,86) 
(-0.15) 
(1.07) 
(-0,15) 
(-0,22) 
(2,24) 
(2,63) 
(0,82) 
(0,46) 
(0,07) 
(2,04) 
(0,73) 
6.6 IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
A variant of the model incorporates a version of monopolistic competition that models 
trade in differentiated products. The structure of the model follows the imperfectly 
competitive structure used in Harrison et al. (1995), with the exception that here we do 
not calibrate the model to predefined 'cost-disadvantage ratios".' Each non-agricultural 
sector is modelled as monopolistically competitive, but perfect competition prevails in 
the agricultural sectors. Table 6-17 shows the welfare results for this model calibrated 
to four different initial numbers of firms per sector (in each region). In the absence of 
any data on the firm concentration ratio at the sector/region detail of the model, we 
examine how the number of firms affects the results. 
' The conjectural variation is -0,5 in each sector so that each firm expects that for c\eiv iwo units h> which 
II iin.rc:i.vi;s output, competitors will reduce their combined output by one unit. 
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Table 6-17: Welfare effects with monopolistic competition 
ANZ 
CAN 
USA 
JPN 
EC 
SKT 
SHK 
EIT 
BRA 
OMI 
SSA 
CHN 
OLI 
OECD 
non-
OECD 
Middle 
Income 
Low 
Income 
World 
Perfect 
Competition 
1,04 
1.57 
21.46 
26.65 
24,86 
2,50 
-3,21 
-1,68 
1,57 
-8,43 
-0,49 
6,13 
6,22 
75,58 
2,61 
-9,25 
11,86 
78,20 
(0,36) 
(0,30) 
(0,41) 
(0,84) 
(0.42) 
(0.52) 
(-7.11) 
(-0.23) 
(0,47) 
(-0.34) 
(-0,33) 
(1.37) 
(1,49) 
(0,50) 
(0,05) 
(-0,23) 
(1.17) 
(0.39) 
N= 
1.17 
1.74 
22.38 
27.14 
26.08 
2.64 
-3,22 
-1,58 
1,72 
-7,61 
-0,44 
6,08 
6,31 
78,51 
3,9 
-8,05 
11,95 
82,40 
= 10 
(0,40) 
(0,33) 
(0,43) 
(0,86) 
(0,44) 
(0,55) 
(-7,13) 
(-0,22) 
(0,51) 
(-0,31) 
(-0,30) 
(1,36) 
(1.51) 
(0,52) 
(0,08) 
(-0,20) 
(1.18) 
(0,41) 
Monopolistic 
N 
1,27 
1,89 
23.23 
27.58 
Ty m 
2,76 
-3,22 
-1,47 
1,86 
-6,88 
-0,40 
6.04 
6,40 
81,19 
5,09 
-6,95 
12,04 
86,27 
=5 
(0,43) 
(0,36) 
(0,44) 
(0,87) 
(0.46) 
(0,57) 
(-7,14) 
(-0,20) 
(0,55) 
(-0.28) 
(-0.27) 
(1.35) 
(1.53) 
(0.54) 
(0.10) 
(-0.17) 
(1.19) 
(0,43) 
Competi 
N 
1,42 
2.10 
24,44 
28,22 
28,85 
2,94 
-3,23 
-1.32 
2.07 
-5,86 
-0,35 
5,99 
6,54 
85,03 
6,78 
-5,4 
12,18 
91.80 
tion 
=3 
(0,48) 
(0,40) 
(0,46) 
(0,89) 
(0,49) 
(0,61) 
(-7,15) 
(-0,18) 
(0,62) 
(-0,24) 
(-0,23) 
(1.34) 
(1,56) 
(0,56) 
(0,13) 
(-0,13) 
(1.20) 
(0,45) 
N 
1,61 
2,38 
26,08 
24,13 
31,06 
3,19 
-3,23 
-1,11 
2,36 
-4,49 
-0,27 
5,94 
6,75 
90,26 
9,14 
-3,28 
12,42 
99,39 
= -) 
(0,55) 
(0,45) 
(0,50) 
(0,92) 
(0,53) 
(0.66) 
(-7.16) 
(-0.15) 
(0.70) 
(-0.18) 
(-0,18) 
(1.33) 
(1.61) 
(0,60) 
(0,18) 
(-0,08) 
(1,23) 
(0,49) 
Table 6-17 demonstrates that the presence of monopolistic competition increases the 
returns to liberalisation, but that the increase is large only if we are prepared to accept 
\er\ concentrated sectors. The effects on agricultural sectors (not shown here) are also 
small, partly because they are not modelled as monopolistically competitive, but also 
because the effects elsewhere, including the food processing sectors, are small. 
6.7 EU FARM INCOME AND CAP COMPENSATION 
PAYMENTS 
Table 6-18 shows the EU farm income effects of all the scenarios modelled above. 
Dollar value changes and percentage changes are given for the fixed and mobile 
agricultural factors separately, and together as the total farm income. In the full 
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Table 6-18: EU farm income* under all scenarios (Sbn and % change) 
l-ull TruiiiKiN Round relorms 
Aiiriculuiral Compoiieius 
I'cvlilcs and clothing liberalisation 
Imliistrial niarlvcl access 
Ai;ritiilliiral Import Tariff Reforms 
Agricultural E,\port Subsidy Refnrnis 
Asiricullural Ouipul Subsidy Reforms 
Aiiricultural Set-Aside Reforms 
Full 1:11 Reforms 
EU Au:ricultural Reforms 
Eli i'exlile and Clothing Reforms 
Ell industrial Market Access Retbrms 
,SlaiKlard CiTAP Assumptions 
No Endogenous Subsidy Rates 
No l-iNcd factors 
Halved /Vrniington Elasticities 
Doubled .Armington Elasticities 
\l(iiio|i(ilistic Competition (N=l()) 
Monopolistic Competition (N=5) 
Monopolistic Competition (N=3) 
Monopolistic Competition (N=2) 
Fi,\cd 
-14,26 
-14 (i7 
0,76 
0,01 
-4 78 
-3,83 
-8.23 
0.37 
-15,02 
-15,57 
1)53 
0.73 
-0,53 
-19,77 
-0,03 
- I I 62 
-17,03 
-14,23 
-14,20 
-14,16 
-14,10 
(-11,65) 
(-11,99) 
(0,63) 
(0,(10) 
(-3,97) 
(-3.18) 
1-6.83) 
(0.30) 
(-12.27) 
(-12.73) 
(0.44) 
(0.61) 
(-13.48) 
(-16.15) 
(-0.71) 
(-9.49) 
(-13.92) 
(-11.63) 
(-11.60) 
(-11.57) 
(-11.52) 
M( 
-9 01 
-9,43 
0.53 
0.09 
-2.90 
-2.34 
-5.19 
-0,41 
-9,49 
-9 96 
0,41 
0,47 
-24,70 
-12,08 
-17,59 
-7,37 
-10,69 
-8,98 
-X.96 
-8,92 
-8,87 
bile 
(-7,60) 
(-7,9ti) 
(0,44) 
(0,08) 
(-2,41) 
(-1 95) 
(-4.31) 
(-0 34) 
(-8,01) 
(-8,41) 
(0,34) 
(0,39) 
(-1043) 
(-1020) 
(-7 43) 
(-6.22) 
(-9,03) 
(-7.58) 
(-7 56) 
(-7.53) 
(-7 49) 
I'olal 
-23 26 
-24.10 
1,29 
0,10 
-7 68 
-6,1 8 
-13 42 
-0 04 
-24.51 
-2553 
0.94 
1 20 
-25 23 
-3 1.8 5 
-17.62 
-IN.9S 
-27,73 
-23-21 
-23,16 
-23,08 
-2297 
(-9.(i(,) 
(-10.01) 
(0,54) 
1004) 
(-3 19) 
(-2.56) 
(-5,57) 
(-0 01) 
(-10,18) 
(-10.60) 
(0.39) 
(0.50) 
(-10.48) 
(-1322) 
(-7.32) 
(-7.88) 
l-l 1.51) 
(-9.64) 
(-9 61) 
(-9.58) 
(-9.54) 
' Excluding compensation payments 
Uruguay Round scenario, total farm income falls by $23,26 bn. of which $14,26 bn is 
a fall in the income of immobile factors. 
Compensation payments are included in this model solely as a transfer payment from 
government to "farm households'. The GTAP modelling framework employed here has 
a single household in each region that accounts for all private and government 
consumption and savings. As such, compensation payments are a transfer of income 
wiihin this regional household. The results in table 10 are therefore for farm income 
without any compensation. The compensation payments are approximately $20 bn per 
year, which we assume will be paid to sector-specific agricultural factors, adding to the 
income of the fixed agricultural factors. 
The results here show that, in net terms, the Uruguay Round will have a small, but 
positive, impact on fixed EU farm income after compensation, where the $20 bn 
compensation payments will more than offset the $14 bn loss prior to compensation, 
leading to a $6 bn gain. 
6-22 
As might be expected, the fall in agriculture-specific factor income is greater than the 
thll in payments to mobile factors in the sector," and this fall in income comes mainly 
from the Agricultural Components of reform (and therefore mainly from reductions in 
output subsidies). The textile and clothing and industrial market access componems 
increase farm income since liberalisation in other sectors increases the effective 
protection afforded to agriculture. Farm incomes are increased by $1.20 bn from EU 
industrial reforms, but only by $0.10 bn from global industrial reforms, indicating that 
the EU's own industrial tariffs afford negative protection to agriculture, while 
industrial tariffs abroad effectively protect EU agriculture. 
The alternative assumption of monopolistic competition in the non-agricultural sectors 
has very little affect on farm income, largely because none of the agricultural sectors 
are directly effected by these scenarios and changes in other sectors (as seen in the 
small overall welfare changes) are small. Farm income does howe\'er show some 
sensitivity to the Armington elasticities, such that high elasticities, inducing greater 
trade shifts, lead to a larger farm income loss (farmers here gain $3 bn after 
compensation). 
6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions from the simulations conducted in this chapter is that the 
Uruguay Round reforms increase welfare for the world as a whole by $78.2 bn, or 
0.39% of world GDP. These gains are, however, highly concentrated in the tlii-ee main 
de\'eloped economies. While the three main elements of the Uruguay Round reforms, 
agriculture, textiles and clothing, and market access, each contribute around one third 
of this global gain, the agricultural and market access reforms lead to small losses in 
only a few regions while the textiles and clothing reforms invohe major 
redistributional effects between developing countries. While agricultural tariff and 
output subsidy reforms improve welfare for almost all regions, export subsidy reforms 
also involve distributional effects that are larger than the overall welfare gains. 
'' o r the 7,6% Ihll in pas'inents to mobile factors in agriculture. 6,5"o comes Irom a fall in their 
liiiipioyniem. 
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Roughly half of the EU's welfare gains from the Uruguay Round come as a result of 
agricultural reforms, with most of the remainder coming from textile and clothing 
liberalisation. Of the agricultural reforms, the EU benefits the most from export 
subsidy liberalisation. Export subsidies are a very costly means of supporting farm 
income because of their highly distortionary nature. Farm incomes in the EU will rise 
by approximately $6 bn including compensation payments, but would fall considerably 
without compensation. 
The USA benefits mainly from textile and clothing reforms, with large terms-of-trade 
effects in the clothing sector, while Japan's welfare gains are predominantly a result of 
industrial market access reforms. It is also worth noting that reform in the EU 
contributes substantially to gains in other regions. 
.As is often the case with CGE models, varying certain central assumptions in the 
model can have a substantial effect on the results. Thus there are notable differences 
between: (i) the 'Standard GTAP' and the 'Main' models, with the former suggests 
substantially larger gains; (ii) scenarios that assume different values of the Armington 
elasticities. Different assumptions about the (outward) mobility of a propordon of 
factors initially employed in the agricultural sectors has an appreciable effect on 
predictions of the impact of agricultural reform on 'farm incomes'. The assumption of 
imperfect competition does not greatly change results, although there are other forms 
ways of modelling imperfect competition (such as that performed in Francois et al. 
(1995)) that the literature suggests would give higher welfare gains. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MODELLING THE URUGUAY ROUND COMMITMENTS, 
AGENDA 2000 AND CAP ABOLITION IN 2005 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops the model introduced in Chapter 5 with various extensions designed to take 
advantage of the recent release of the version 4 GTAP database. This new database (released July 
1998) is based in 1995, and includes a number of improvements over recent versions. The most 
significant of these are the expansion in the regional and commodity classification of the 
database, to 45 regions and 50 commodities. In particular, the EU, which has in previous versions 
of the database been a single region, is split into six regions - the UK, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden. Finland, and the Rest of the EU. Although France. Italy and other major EU countries 
are included in one aggregate "Rest" region, this does represent an improvement for modellers 
concerned with EU policy. 
The commodity classification of GTAP version 4 includes the expansion of the detail in the 
agriculture sector to 14 agricultural commodities, and 8 processed food commodities. This greatly 
increases the usefulness of the database for agricultural policy modelling. Three pairs of 
agricultural commodities and food products - Oilseeds and Vegetable Oils, Sugar cane/beet and 
Processed Sugar, and Raw Milk and Milk Products - provide explicit links between agricultural 
goods and processed food. The inclusion of certain products (Oilseeds, Milk, Sugar cane/beet) 
where particular CAP policies exist provides the opportunity for detailed modelling of the CAP. 
Therefore compensation payments and set-aside (Wheat, Other Grains and Oilseeds) can be 
modelled, and the relative impacts of reform on these tliree sectors can be assessed. Headage 
payments on cattle can be modelled, and milk and sugar production quotas can be modelled 
explicitly. 
With these additions to the ability of this database to represent the CAP more accurately, this 
chapter extends the model of Chapter 5 to enable the modelling of three 'policy scenarios' for 
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2005: the incorporation of the commitments made in the Uruguay Round (UR) agreement, the 
further policy changes to be implemented under Agenda 2000, and the abolition of the CAP. 
Table 7-1 shows how the 40 regions of the database are grouped into seven aggregate regions. 
There is some detail of the EU, with three EU regions, which will enable estimation of welfare 
impacts on each of these tliree regions separately. There is some obvious loss of detail in the 
modelling of the Cairns Group, LDCs and Rest of the World: these three regions comain 33 of 
the GTAP regions. The aggregation into the Cairns Group (agriculture and food exporters), LDCs 
(food importing LDCs), and ) the Rest of the Worid (food-importing middle/high income 
countries does pay attention to the broad structure of agricultural trade in these resions. 
Table 7-2 details the commodity aggregation, with the 50 GTAP regions aggregated into nine 
agricultural, six food products, and three other commodities. The detailed structure of agriculture 
and food in the GTAP version 4 database is retained as far as possible, although this means that 
there is inevitable lack of detail in the non-agriculture/food sectors. 
7.2 PROJECTION TO 2005 
With the modelling of Agenda 2000 in mind, and as the GTAP version 4 database is for 1995, 
this requires that this benchmark data be updated to 2005 by the use of projected growth in factor 
endowments and productivity over the intervening period. This updated data set, constructed 
using AGE modelling so that it is consistent with the constraints of general equilibrium, will be 
referred to as the Base Case, and is discussed first. 
Table 7-1: Regional aggregation of the version 4 database used in this study 
Aggregate Region GTAP vers ion 4 regions(s ) 
UK UK 
Germany Germany 
Restot'EU Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Rest of the EU 
USA USA 
Cairns Group Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand. Canada, Colombia, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay 
^^^^ China, Vietnam, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Mexico, Central America & Caribbean, 
Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Rest of South America, Morocco, Rest of North Africa, 
South Africa, Rest of Southern Africa, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Rest of the World 
Rest of the World Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, European Free Trade Area, Central 
European Associates, Former Soviet Union. Turkey. Rest of Middle East 
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Table 7-2: Commodity aggregation of the version 4 database used in this study 
Aggregate Commodity 
Agricultural 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables and Fruit 
Oil Seeds 
Sugar canc'beet 
Raw Milk 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Livestock 
Footl Products 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk & Milk Products 
Sugar 
Other Food 
Other Commodities 
Other Primary 
Manufactures 
GTAP version 4 commodities 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables and Fruit 
Oil Seeds 
Sugar cane/beet 
Raw Milk 
Paddy Rice, Plant-Based Fibres, Crops nee. Wool & Silk 
Bovine Cattle, Sheep, Goats and Horses 
Animal Products nee 
Bovine Cattle. Sheep. Goat, and Horse Meat Products 
Meat Products nee 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk& Milk Products 
Sugar 
Processed Rice, Beverages and Tobacco, Food Products nee 
Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Oil, Gas. Minerals nee 
Textiles. Wearing Apparel, Leather Products, Wood Products, Pulp Paper Products, 
Petroleum & Coal Products, Chemicals Rubber & Plastics, Mineral Products nee. Ferrous 
Metals, Non-Ferrous Metals, Fabi-icated Metal Products, Motor Vehicles & Parts, 
Transport Equipment, Electronic Equipment, Machinery and Equipment nee. Other 
Manufactures 
Services Electricity. Gas. Water. Construction, Trade & Transport Services. Other Private 
Services, Other Government Services, Dwellings 
7.2.1 Linear Expenditure System (LES) for private demand 
The CES preferences used in Chapter 5 do not lead to large inaccuracies when real income 
changes are small, but would greatly misrepresent the effects of the income increases that will 
occur when the model is projected to 2005. Therefore, LES preferences are used here in order to 
incorporate income elasticities (as supplied in the GTAP database) into the model. 
7.2.2 Modelling Scenarios 
The Umguay Round scenario is modelled as including all the Base Case factor productivity and 
productivity shocks, with the addition of tariff rate reductions and constraints on export subsidies 
and (for non-EU regions) output subsidies consistent with the UR agreements. Agenda 2000 
reforms are implemented with the Uruguay Round reforms already in place. These reforms can be 
summarised as: reductions in intervention prices, changes to compensation and headage 
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payments, changes in set-aside for arable crops, and increases in milk output quotas. The 
abolition of the CAP may not be on the policy agenda, but as a simulation it does provide an 
answer to how much the CAP costs the EU, in terms of CAP expenditure, farm income, and 
consumer welfare. All CAP instruments are fully removed. 
7.2.3 Constructing the Base Case Data Set 
The Base Case data set incorporates increases in factor endowments and productivity rates to 
model the structure of the worid economy in 2005. As is common with projected models of this 
type (e.g. Frandsen et al. 1998, Hertel et al. 1995 and 1996), factor endowment growth for each 
country/region (henceforth 'region') is included initially, and then projected regional GDP targets 
are set, and productivity rates adjusted so that GDP meets these targets. Typically this procedure 
produces low productivity growth rates, as most of the projected increase in GDP is met by factor 
endowment growth. For subsequent simulations, the non-agricultural productivity levels are set at 
the levels determined by the Base Case, and GDP in each region will be endogenous. 
The numeraire used in the model is also increased to account for inflation between 1995 and 
2005, giving (global) inflation at a rate of 2% per annum. It is not possible to model inflation in 
each region separately without greatly increasing the scope of the model and adding monetary 
sectors. Incorporating inflation does ha\e advantages, because many of the instruments of interest 
are denominated in nominal terms (e.g. Uruguay Round expenditure constraints, intervention 
prices). As the database is dollar-denominated, the GDP price deflator in the USA is used as the 
numeraire, and is increased in the Base Case by the compounded rate of 21.9%, and then kept at 
that level for all other simulations. The 2% rate of inflation does not therefore represent a 
particular inflation rate in any country, but is a general world-wide price increase. No other prices 
are fixed, but as the model works in relative prices, average prices in other regions will increase at 
approximately the same rate. 
Agricultural productivity rates are used to ensure that agricultural productivity growth is higher 
than in other sectors. This not only allows forecast productivity in agriculture to be used in the 
model, but is also necessary to ensure that agricultural prices do not rise unduly in the Base Case 
scenario. There are three principal determinants of prices in this scenario: the fact that agricultural 
factors become relatively more scarce will increase agricultural prices, low income elasficities for 
agncultural goods will lead to lower relative agricultural prices as incomes grow, and higher 
productivity growth in agriculture than elsewhere in the economy will lead to price decreases, 
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Table 7-3: Annual Growth Rates, 1995-2005 
UK 
Germany 
Rest of EU 
USA 
Cairns Group 
LDCs 
ROW 
Factor Accumulation 
Unskilled 
Labour 
-0.17 
-0.17 
-0,17 
0,97 
1,77 
1,75 
0,04 
Skilled 
Labour 
2,60 
2,60 
2,60 
4,10 
4,04 
3,46 
Capital 
3.11 
3,11 
3,11 
2,99 
5,05 
6,01 
4,19 
Real 
GDP 
2,08 
2.08 
2.08 
2.73 
5.03 
5.39 
3.03 
Productivity Growth 
Crops 
2,00' 
2,00 
2,00 
1,60 
1,98 
1.69 
1,80 
Livestock 
2,25 
2,25 
2.25 
1.85 
2.20 
2.16 
2.19 
source: c 
iilcukiled Irom Frandsen. .lensen and Vanzetti (1998) 
ceteris paribus. As a result, it is not possible a priori to say whether agricultural prices will rise 
or fall, but it would generally be accepted that prices will fall in real terms. 
All the CAP instruments detailed below will remain at their 1995 levels for the Base Case 
scenario, but it is worth noting that output quotas will become more restrictive (i.e. the 'quota-
free' output will rise), and market intervention may occur where prices fall below intervention 
prices. 
7.2.4 Base case Growth Rates 
Table 7-3 shows the annual growth rates imposed on the model for factor accumulation, GDP 
and agricultural productivity, based on those given by Frandsen et al.. Note that two other factors 
exist in the model: land and natural resources'. Neither factor undergoes growth between 1995 
and 2005. 
Frandsen et al. gives growth rates for a particular aggregation of the GTAP database; hence the 
EU regions are all given the same growth rates because Frandsen et al. has only one EU region. 
The USA growth rates con-espond exactly to those in Frandsen et ai, but the growth rates for the 
other regions are aggregated according to factor endowments, GDP and agricultural output in the 
GTAP database as appropriate. 
l-JiHl is employed in all nine agricultural sectors; natural resources are employed only in the prunary .sector. 
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Table 7-4: CAP Instruments 
Uruguay Round Agenda 2000 CAP Abolition 
Import Tariffs (MT) Uruguay Round liberalisation 
Uruguay Round 
liberalisation 
Uruguay Round 
liberalisation plus 
elimination of all 
agricultural and food 
Export subsidies 
(VEL) 
Market Intervention 
(MI) 
Set-aside (SA) 
Compensation 
Payments (AP) 
Compensatory 
Payments (CP) 
Output Quotas (OQ) 
Headage Payments 
(HP) 
Variable export levies 
Stock purchases to 
support market price at 
intervention price level 
17.5% (commercial) 
set-aside, plus 
voluntary set-aside 
Area payments based 
on reference base area 
Area payments for set-
aside land 
Set quotas for output of 
raw milk and raw sugar 
Payment of premium 
for cattle based on 
number of cattle 
Variable export levies 
As baseline, but with 
intervention price 
reductions for some 
goods 
Voluntary set-aside 
only 
Reformed area 
payments 
Reformed area 
payment 
2% increase in milk 
quotas 
Reformed premiums 
tariffs 
Elimination of all 
agricultural and food 
export levies 
Elimination of all 
market intervention 
Elimination of all set-
aside 
Elimination of all 
compensation 
payments 
Elimination of all 
compensatory 
payments 
Elimination of quotas 
Elimination of headage 
payments 
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7.3 MODELLING THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
The CAP is modelled as consisting of eight instruments: import tariffs, export subsidies, market 
intervention, set-aside, compensation payments (arable area payments), compensatory payments 
(set-aside payments), output quotas and headage payments. Table 1-A lists these CAP 
instruments, with a brief explanation of how these instruments are treated in the three scenarios to 
be modelled: a Uruguay Round scenario with full implementation of Uruguay Round reforms; an 
Agenda 2000 scenario, which will additionally include the proposed reforms to the CAP; and a 
CAP abolition scenario, which will show how the CAP shapes the EU and world economy. 
Table 7-5 shows which CAP instruments are imposed on which sectors in the Base Case. 
7.3.1 Import Tariffs 
Table 7-6 shows the average tariff rates for the sectors used in the model, derived from those in 
the GTAP database. The GTAP database contains separate tariff rates for each bilateral trade 
Table 7-5: The CAP by Model Sector 
Crops 
WHT 
GRO 
V_F 
OSD 
C B 
OAG 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables, Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Livestock 
CTL 
OAF 
RMK 
Food f 
CMT 
OMT 
SGR 
VOL 
MIL 
OFD 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
'roducts 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk and Milk Products 
Other Food 
Import 
tariffs 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
MT 
Variable 
Export 
Levies 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
VEL 
Market 
Inter-
vention 
MI 
Ml 
MI 
MI 
MI 
MI 
MI 
MI 
Ml 
MI 
Set Aside 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
Area 
Payments 
AP 
AP 
AP 
AP 
Compens 
-atory 
Payments 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
Output 
Quotas 
OQ 
OQ 
OQ 
Headage 
Payments 
HP 
HP 
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flow; i.e. the UK tariff on any import from the USA may be different from the import of a good 
from Canada. There are three reasons why tariffs differ according to the region from which 
imports are sourced, despite the Most-Favoured Nation principle of the GATT, which states that 
all trading partners should be treated equally. Firstly, the Generalised System of Preferences gives 
lower tariff rates to imports from LDCs, so that any source region partly or wholly composed of 
LDCs may face lower tariffs when entering a developed region. Secondly, the sectors are 
aggregated (in the case of manufactures, highly aggregated), and while the MFN principle applies 
to each good that has been aggregated into a sector, the aggregated good may be composed 
differently according to the source region. Thirdly, customs unions and free trade areas have zero 
tariffs internally. The calculations for Table 7-6 exclude intra-EU trade, where tariffs are zero; 
the tariffs for EU regions are therefore the average tariff on imports from outside the EU. Tariffs 
are modelled as price wedges between worid c.i.f prices and domestic prices. 
While the GTAP database contains very detailed tariff data, it only does so for 1995, while the 
base run requires that the Uruguay Round tariff reductions are implemented. It is therefore 
necessary to take tariff reduction data from elsewhere. Table 7-7 shows tariff reduction data from 
Table 7-6: Average y4</ valorem Import Tariffs in the GTAP Database ("/o) 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables. Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle. Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milkand Milk Products 
Other Food 
Primary 
Manufactures 
Services 
UK 
12,4 
44,2 
6,0 
-
76.6 
7.1 
111,2 
0,7 
-
111,2 
18.7 
-
116.3 
76.6 
10.9 
0.1 
4.2 
-
Germany 
12,4 
44,2 
5,6 
-
76,6 
5.3 
111,2 
1,2 
-
111,2 
18,7 
-
116,3 
76,6 
10.7 
0.1 
4,3 
-
Rest of EU 
12,4 
44,2 
5,4 
-
76,6 
9,8 
111,2 
0,7 
-
111,2 
18,7 
-
116,3 
76,6 
10,6 
0.2 
4.0 
0,04 
USA 
1.8 
0 
1.3 
-
63,8 
3.7 
0,01 
0.3 
-
0.01 
1.8 
-
51.8 
63.8 
7.0 
0.2 
2.8 
-
Cairns 
18.8 
66,0 
8,5 
194 
30,0 
20,8 
9,2 
32,7 
-
20,7 
21,0 
10,0 
48,5 
9,4 
14.0 
10.0 
11.8 
-
LDCs 
4,5 
4,6 
T3 n 
8,5 
12,5 
21,8 
9,0 
21,5 
-
12,2 
11,0 
25,2 
16,3 
19,7 
34.0 
5.4 
22.8 
0,2 
ROW 
190,4 
264,0 
13.6 
8.2 
64.1 
8.9 
16.4 
4.6 
-
41.6 
41.8 
21 2 
100.7 
42.9 
7,3 
I.l 
-I 2 
1.4 
-^wircv:, calculated from the GTAP database 
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Harrison et al. (1995), which have been aggregated to match the commodities and regions in this 
model. It is assumed that no tariff reductions have taken place by 1995. Note that these tariff 
reduction data takes account of "dirty- tariffication; for most agricultural products in the EU, no 
tariff reduction takes place. 
7.3.2 Modelling of Domestic Agricultural Policies Outside the EU 
Modelling of other agricultural polices explicidy is not possible because with the excepdon of the 
USA. all other countries are contained within aggregate regions. Therefore all other regions will 
be modelled using simple reduction criteria: tariff reductions are as shown in Table 7-7. Regions 
will meet AMS reductions by reducing ad valorem rate equivalents for PSE in agriculture and 
food sectors. 
The AMS reduction of 20% is applied to the Cairns Group, LDC and ROW regions, and for the 
USA is 13.3%, because of the "blue-box" exemptions for deficiency payments. 
Table 7-7: Uruguay Round tariff reductions (% reduction) from Harrison et al. 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables. Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle. Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk and Milk Products 
Other Food 
Primary 
Manufactures 
Services 
t'lineinwl taritTtf emmk ti.( i 
UK 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.6 
9.4 
9.4 
0.0 
9.4 
9.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
43.8 
38.7 
0.0 
Germany 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,3 
9,4 
9,4 
0,0 
9,4 
9,4 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
48.4 
38.3 
0,0 
Rest of EU 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
9,4 
9,4 
0,0 
9,4 
9,4 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
51.4 
39.2 
0,0 
riff cinH t_ I'c the 
USA 
69.2 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.1 
68.8 
68.8 
0.0 
68.8 
68,8 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
19.0 
31.9 
0.0 
f.nrit'freduc 
Cairns 
82.4 
70.8 
16,7 
17,8 
13,2 
18,3 
61.1 
42.6 
0,0 
58,8 
57,0 
27,4 
1,6 
24,9 
38,4 
11.8 
24.7 
0.0 
tion shown he 
LDCs 
21.5 
0,0 
13,1 
6,6 
12.2 
7,3 
3,0 
5,4 
0.0 
14,3 
16,5 
2,3 
0,0 
1.9 
8.9 
8.2 
8.1 
0,0 
• e. 
ROW 
51.2 
53.0 
8.5 
8.1 
7.7 
9.4 
26.3 
36.4 
0.0 
36,2 
34.9 
55,7 
2.4 
38.5 
48.1 
26.1 
23.9 
0.0 
source: calculated from Harrison et al. (1995) and the GTAP database 
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Table 7-8: Export Subsidy Expenditure in the GTAP Database (1995 US$ million) 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables. Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milkand Milk Products 
Other Food 
UK 
16 
56 
0 
0 
18 
1 
162 
44 
0 
135 
29 
0 
368 
158 
7 
Germany 
37 
178 
0 
0 
30 
0 
263 
58 
0 
309 
49 
0 
1,001 
362 
0 
Rest of EU 
168 
189 
0 
0 
64 
108 
418 
212 
0 
1,145 
604 
0 
4.962 
1.081 
41 
USA 
99 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0 
46 
0 
1 
58 
0 
438 
226 
0 
Cairns 
1 
44 
0 
0 
21 
0 
0 
189 
0 
83 
1,256 
0 
537 
2 
1,826 
LDCs 
0 
0 
0 
0 
361 
0 
0 
0 
0 
43 
3 
16 
1 
23 
48 
ROW 
2 
43 
7 
118 
12 
75 
136 
607 
0 
244 
534 
774 
1,696 
91 
128 
source: calculated from the GTAP database 
7.3.3 Export Subsidies 
Table 7-8 and Table 7-9 show the export subsidy data in the GTAP database, in value (Table 7-
8) and ad valorem (Table 7-9) form. Export subsidies are on the same bilateral basis as import 
tanffs (and the EU ad valorem rates exclude intra-EU trade, where subsidy rates are zero). As 
with import tariffs, there is a necessity to include data on post-Uruguay Round levels of export 
subsidies because the commitments of 21% reduction in subsidised exports and 36% reduction in 
export subsidies are reductions relative to the base period 1986-90, 
Table 7-10 contains data from USDA (1998) on the quantities of subsidised exports from the EU 
that are permitted under the Uruguay Round agreement. Column (b) lists the commodity 
categories used in USDA (1998), except where the category is in parentheses, in which case that 
row is a summary measure calculated here to match the USDA commodity categories with the 
model commodity aggregation. The corresponding model category is given in column (a). Some 
categories (e.g. Wheat and Coarse Grains) match exactly; other categories are matched one-to-one 
with model commodities even though the match is not exact (e.g. Olive Oil is matched with VOL 
• vegetable oils). In some cases the USDA categories are less aggregated than the model 
categories (e.g. the milk products) in which case the quantities are summed to match a single 
model commodity. In some cases (e.g. Sugar) the USDA categories idemify commodities that the 
model (and GTAP) commodity categorisation splits into an agricultural good (C_B, sugar cane 
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Table /-v: Att vaiore 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables, Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milkand Milk Products 
[other Food 
m tLxpor 
UK 
11,0 
30.7 
0,0 
0,0 
43,4 
0,3 
52,6 
15,7 
0,0 
52,6 
15,7 
0,0 
53,8 
43,4 
0,2 
t Subsidy 
Germany 
11,0 
30,7 
0,0 
0,0 
43,4 
0,0 
52,6 
15,7 
0,0 
52,6 
15,7 
0,0 
53,8 
43,4 
0,0 
Rates in the GTAP Database 
Rest of EU 
11,0 
30,7 
0,0 
0,0 
43,4 
3,5 
52,6 
15,7 
0,0 
52,6 
15,7 
0,0 
53,8 
43,4 
1,2 
USA 
1.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
39,0 
0,0 
0,0 
1,8 
0,0 
0,0 
1,8 
0,0 
34,1 
39,0 
0,0 
Cairns 
0,3 
2,9 
0,0 
0,0 
1,1 
0,0 
0,0 
8,3 
0,0 
1,2 
23,9 
0,0 
13,3 
0,2 
7,2 
(%) 
LDCs 
0,0 
4,0 
0,0 
0,0 
16,5 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
11,7 
14,1 
3,2 
0,6 
1,1 
0,6 
ROW 
0,9 
9.2 
0,2 
14,9 
10.8 
1,2 
13,6 
23,6 
0,0 
38,1 
13,5 
41,3 
54,2 
17,4 
1,6 
source: calculated from the GTAP database 
and beet) and a processed good (SGR, processed sugar). In these cases the resulting percentage 
data in column (g) must be used in both model sectors. 
Columns (c) to (f) are taken directly from USDA, and give the base quantity (column c), the 
schedule commitments both in 1995/6 (column d) and 2000/01 (column t), and the EU 
notification to the WTO (column e) - the quantity that the EU declared that it subsidised in 
1995/6. 
As can be seen from Table 7-10, for some commodities such as Wheat and Coarse Grains, the 
EU notification for 1995/6 is substantially below hs schedule commitment for this year, and for 
2000/01 while for other commodities, such as Olive Oil and Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, the EU 
was very close to the commitment in 1995/96, and needs large reductions in subsidised exports 
by 2000/01. 
Column (g) is calculated from columns (e) and (f), and gives the percentage increase in 
subsidised exports that is permitted under the terms of the Uruguay Round Agreement, from the 
actual quantity in 1995/96 to the 2000/01 commitment. These data will be used in the model as 
the maximum increase in exports where the Uruguay Round Agreement is in force. 
There are obvious difficulties in using these data: the matching of commodity categories is not 
perfect, but this is to be expected when using an aggregated model. Furthermore the export 
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commitmems are commodity-specific commitments, so the aggregated nature of the model will 
never capture the full detail of these commitments. The use of marketing years in reporting data 
to the WTO is unfortunate in the current context, where the rest of the model is calibrated to a 
calendar year. Table 7-11 gives similar USDA data for export subsidy e.xpenditure. in millions of 
ECU. with the same commodity categories matched to model commodities as for Table 7-10. 
Again, a percentage reduction from 1995/96 to the 2000/01 figure is calculated from the data in 
the last column. 
It should be noted that the use of percentage reductions is necessary, rather than transferring ECU 
values into dollars and using the 2000/01 value as the constraint for two reasons: firstly, the 
different base year to the data means that GTAP database values do not match directly with the 
USDA values, and secondly, because the -messy" commodity matching means that for some 
categories the GTAP data and USDA data are very different. When converted at the July 1995 
exchange rate of 1.3311 $/ECU. for example, the GTAP wheat subsidy expenditure is 221.0 m. 
ECU. corresponding relatively well to the EU notification of 118.7 m. ECU in Table 7-11, but 
the total GTAP subsidy expendhure for milk and milk products is 6.331.8 m. ECU (USDA data 
for notification is 1,562.3 m. ECU). 
These data will be used in the model to set the EU agricultural export limits, with the exception 
that, for Wheat and Other Grains, 1995 was an unusual year in that subsidies were applied to 
these e.xports for only a part of the year, accounting for the low mtio of 1995/96 notified exports 
to 1995/96 value commitment in Table 7-10. EU data for 1995 exports (22.300" for Wheat and 
15.724 for Other Grains) will be used, so that the EU must reduce the quantity of exports by 
35.3% (Wheat) and 31.0% (Other Grains) to meet the 2000/01 commitments. Table 7-12 shows 
the percentage changes in allowable exports and subsidy expenditure that will be used in the 
model. 
-From European Commission (1996), in thousands of tons. 
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Table 7-12: EU Export Subsidy Commitments: permitted changes in the model 
WHT 
GRO 
V F 
OSD 
C B 
OAG 
CTL 
OAP 
RMK 
CMT 
OMT 
SGR 
VOL 
MIL 
OFD 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables and Fruit 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk and Milk products 
Other Food 
Allowable increase in quantity 
of subsidised e.xports 
Co) 
-35,3 
-31,0 
-10,6 
0 
+48,7 
+50.6 
-19,4 
-7,1 
n/a 
-19,4 
-7,1 
+48,7 
-15,1 
-0,8 
+35,9 
— 
Allowable increase in e.xport 
subsidy expenditure 
+ 1146,0 
+238,7 
-29,7 
0 
+23,8 
+ 15,3 
-18,3 
+46,2 
n/ii 
-18,3 
+46,2 
-23,8 
-17,8 
-r40,0 
+56,8 
Modelling Export Subsidies: The Base Case 
The Base Case is intended primarily to calibrate non-agricultural productivity rates, but will also 
be compared with the other scenarios. Modelling of export policies prior to the Uruguay Round is 
not a concern here, so fixed ad valorem export subsidy rates are used. 
Modelling export subsidies: non-EU regions under Uruguay Round constraints 
Figure 7.1 gives a graphical partial equilibrium model of an export subsidy that shows both the 
volume and the cost of subsidised exports. In the top panel, export supply, XS, and demand, 
XD, would, in the absence of a subsidy, result in free-trade quantity Qf being exported. With 
subsidy SUB creating a wedge between the domestic price P^ j and world price P^ , a quantity 
Oo is exported. The export subsidy expenditure schedule XE can be derived in the lower panel 
relating the quantity of exports to the subsidy expenditure. The subsidy SUB results in a level of 
subsidy expenditure EQ . 
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Figure 7.1: Non-EU Export Subsidies 
Price 
sun 
Subsid) 
Expaulilurc 
xs 
r"\ XD 
1 Exports 
i /XE 
Q, Q^ ^ Eixports 
Figure 7.2 represents the two Uruguay Round export subsidy commitments. From an initial 
export quantity QQ , the quantity of subsidised exports must fall to at most Q . In addition, from 
the initial level of export subsidy expenditure EQ. expenditure must fall to at most Eg, 
corresponding to a quantity Qg. The subsidised quantity limit is therefore the lower of Qg and 
0 . and in the case shown the quantity commitment Q is the binding commitment: the per-unit 
subsidy must fall to Pj - P^^ ,, with a quantity Q exported and expenditure on export subsidies of 
* 
E <Ee. 
The quantity of subsidised exports is not the same as the export quantity; there are three cases 
where a sector's subsidised exports are lower than its total exports; where subsidies are applied 
on exports to some regions, where subsidies are applied on a subset of sectoral output, and where 
subsidies are applied for part of a year. The first case is the only one that can be dealt with in the 
model, and applies principally to the EU because intra-EU exports are not subsidised, with some 
minor instances for other regions. In these cases, the Uruguay Round constraints are applied to 
subsidised exports only. 
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Figure 7.2: non-EU export subsidies with Uruguay Round constraints 
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The required percentage reductions (21% cut in subsidised export quantity for developed 
countries, 14% for LDCs; 36% cut in export subsidy expenditure for developed countries, 24% 
for LDCs) are calculated prior to aggregating the database, so the required rate for the ROW and 
Cairns Group regions, which both include developed countries and LDCs. will be between the 
developed and LDC rates. 
Modelling Export Subsidies: The EU under Uruguay Round Constraints 
The EU has different arrangements to meet the Uruguay Round export constraints. Because the 
purpose of variable export subsidies in the EU is to maintain a certain level of domestic market 
price despite changes in world prices, the rates cannot be reduced. Instead, the variable export 
subsidy will be modelled as continuing to meet the difference between domestic and world prices, 
with any goods that cannot be exported under the Uruguay Round constraints held as stocks. In 
the top panel of Figure 7.3, to ensure that exports do not rise above Q , the EU intervention 
agencies will purchase Qo - Q* • Supply of goods is therefore unchanged at QQ , so the domestic 
price will remain at PJ*. The world price will still rise to P^ because Q* is to be exported, so the 
variable export levy must make up the difference P^  - Pw •  
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Figure 7.3: EU Exports under Uruguay Round constraints 
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Variable export levies change the export subsidy expenditure curve, so that the export subsidy 
expenditure is the product of the export volume and the difference between P^ and the world 
price given by XD. as shown in the top panel of Figure 7.3. Even at the "free-trade' export 
quantity Qf, the EU would still apply an export subsidy Pj - Pf . In the case shown, the limit on 
subsidy expenditure. Eg, defines a volume of exports, Qg, that is less than the volume limit, Q . 
Hence it is the subsidy expenditure commitment that is binding in this case. 
h is likely that tariff reductions and/or income growth in other countries will stimulate demand 
for EU exports, and this may shift the demand for EU exports far enough to remove the necessity 
for subsidies at all. The EU can then export above the Uruguay Round constraints, and possibly 
above the original level of exports, at the world price, with the additional exports coming either 
from the domestic market or from stocks. Because it is not possible for the model to determine 
the level of stocks that is built up between 1995 and 2005, it assumes that any extra exports come 
from purchases from the market. Thus the rules for stock purchases that apply within the model 
for EU exports are one-sided: the EU can build up stocks, but cannot run them down. 
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7,3.4 Market Intervention 
Market prices were relatively high in the EU in 1995 (relative to historical levels and to 
intervention prices), with the result that purchases of stocks occurred for only a few 
commodities.' Because the values of intervention purchases were low, and also because they 
occurred in commodities that exist in the model as part of aggregated commodity groupings, the 
model has been calibrated to zero intervention purchases for all goods. Table 7-13 shows the 
intervention price data to be used in the model. 
Table 7-14 shows EU data for the ratio of market and intervention prices, and makes it evident 
that for cereals market prices were substantially higher than intervention prices in 1995. These 
data are used in Table 7-15 to show (in the first three columns) how far the market price can fall 
before reaching the intervention price. Table 7-15 also shows the corresponding data for other 
sectors in the model; where price ratio data are unavailable (in most cases because of the highly 
aggregate nature of the commodity categories) a 5% difference between market price and 
Table 7-13: Intervention Prices (ECU/t) 
WHT 
GRO 
CTL 
RMK 
CMT 
MIL 
OFD 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Beef 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Milk and Milk 
Other Food 
products 
Intervention Price 
1995 
119,19 
119,19 
2780 
(various) 
2780 
(various) 
(various) 
Intervention Price 
Agenda 2000 
95.35 
95.35 
1950 
10% average reductions 
1950 
10% average reductions 
no reductions 
Table 7-14: Cereals Market Prices as a percentage of the Intervention prices, 1995 average 
Wheat average 
- common wheat 
- durum wheat 
Coarse Grains average 
- Barley 
-Rye 
• Maize 
UK 
127.6 
127.6 
155.1 
111.2 
111.2 
110.7 
-
Germany 
122,3 
122,2 
155.1 
111.7 
110.0 
110.7 
121,2 
Rest of EU 
126.7 
122,8 
151,9 
117.1 
114,6 
110,6 
119,8 
source: European Commission (1996), table 4,1.6.2 
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Table 7-15: Intervention Prices as a percentage of the 1995 Market Price 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Milkand Milk products 
Other Food 
UK 
78,.^ 7 
89,93 
9500 
95,00 
95,00 
95,00 
100,00 
1995 
Germany 
81,77 
H9,53 
95,00 
95,00 
95,00 
95,00 
100,00 
Rest of EU 
78,93 
85,40 
95,00 
95,00 
95,00 
95,00 
100,00 
UK 
62,f)9 
71,68 
66:64 
X5,50 
66,64 
85,50 
100,00 
Agenda 2000 
Germany 
65 41 
71,36 
66,64 
85,50 
66 64 
85,50 
100,00 
Rest of EU 
63,14 
68,07 
66,64 
85,50 
66,64 
85,50 
100,00 
intervention price is assumed, except where small stock purchases took place in 1995. in which 
case there is assumed to be no difference between the market and intervention prices. 
Table 7-15 also shows the Agenda 2000 intervention price as a percentage of the 1995 market 
price, uiven the 1995 ratio and the Agenda 2000 changes in intervention prices. 
Modelling Intervention Prices 
The modelling of intervention prices uses a simple inequality, that the market price must be equal 
to or greater than the intervention price. When the market price is equal to the intervention price, 
stocks are bought from the market, and when the market price is above the intervention price, no 
stocks are bought. Like the stock buying to meet the Uruguay Round export constraints, this is 
one-sided: stocks may be bought but are not sold. Intervention prices are modelled in all scenarios 
except the CAP abolition scenario. 
7.3.5 Compensation Payments 
Table 7-16 shows compensation paymems for cereals and oilseeds. When the model is 
subsequently calibrated to expenditure data for compensation payments, the payments will be 
paid as a subsidy to land (with the exception of set-aside compensatory paymems, which are paid 
to the land owners). The percentage rate changes from Table 7-16 can then be applied to simulate 
the Agenda 2000 compensation payment changes. 
28,1 m, ECU of fruit and vegetables. 175,6 m, ECU of wine and 21 
1, ECU of rlshery products were withdrawn 
from the market (European Commission (1996) table 3,4,4), Storage and disposal costs 
'itock lexels built up in previous years. 
were inc iirred in other sectors because ot 
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Table 7-16: Compensation Payments and Set-Aside Compensatory Payments 
Crop 1995 Agenda 2000 Percentage 
Cereals 262 ECU/ha 321 ECU/ha +22,52% 
Oilseeds 438 ECU/ha 321 ECU/ha -26,71% 
Set-aside 334 ECU/ha 321 ECU/ha -3,89% 0 
Modelling Compensation Payments 
Compensation payments are modelled as input subsidies on land, with the exception of set-aside, 
which is modelled as a direct transfer of income between the government in each EU region and 
farmers in each region. Arable land in EU regions is modelled as a CET function to prevent large 
shifts of land between arable and non-arable sectors,^ which prevents large changes in the total 
value of compensation payments. The elasticity of transformation (set to unity in the model) 
determines the ability of farmers to transfer land between arable sectors. 
7.3.6 Set-Aside 
Table 7-17 shows set-aside areas. In 1995 the set-aside areas were comprised of compulsory set-
aside (17.5% of commercial farm land^) and voluntary Five-year set-aside. Agenda 2000 
abolishes compulsory set-aside, but retains voluntary set-aside. We use a EC projection that, 
under Agenda 2000, total voluntary set-aside will be 3 m. ha., and assign this to countries in the 
same proportions as was the take-up of voluntary set-aside in 1995. 
Modelling Set-Aside 
Set-aside is modelled by the withdrawal of land. The GTAP database holds data on the 1995 
dollar value of land used by sectors. The endowment of arable land in each region (as noted 
above, arable land is held in a CET nest, and is separate from other land) is increased, as in 1995 
endowments of land were 13.6% higher than land use. An average'' of 13.6% of land is then 
4 
h 
The • sticky factors' approach. 
i.e, allowing for small farm exemption, 
Kates differ between EU regions as shown m Table 7-17, 
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Table 7-17: Set-Aside Areas {'000 ha) 
Total Base Area 
Compulsory Set-Aside 
Five-year Set-Aside 
Total Set-Aside 
Agenda 2000: Voluntary Set-Aside 
UK 
4461 
597 
13,4% 
37 
0,8% 
634 
14,2% 
131 
2.9% 
Germany 
10156 
1321 
13,0% 
151 
1,5% 
1472 
14,5% 
534 
5,3% 
EU-15 
53561 
641 1 
12.0% 
848 
1,6° 0 
7259 
13,6% 
3000 
5,6% 
EU-13 
38944 
4493 
11,5% 
660 
1,7% 
5153 
13,2% 
2335 
6,0"'o 
source: European Commission (1996) table 3.5.7,1 
withdrawn in the Base Case and Uruguay Round simulations; only 6% of land is withdrawn in 
the Agenda 2000 simulation, and no land is withdrawn in the CAP abolition scenario. 
7.3.7 Headage Payments 
As a direct income support, headage payments operate in a similar method to compensation 
payments, except that they are treated as a subsidy to capital in the livestock sector rather than a 
subsidy to land. 
Table 7-18 shows the changes in headage payments under Agenda 2000, and Table 7-19 reports 
the changes to payment ceilings. Given that expenditures on suckler cow and male bovine 
headage payments are roughly equal, the average percentage change in payment would be the 
direct average of the percentage change by cattle type. With the addition of the dairy cow 
payment, the effective average rate could increase by some 100-120°'o. Therefore an average 
increase of 110% has been used to model the effects of Agenda 2000 on headage payments. 
Modelling Headage Payments 
Headage payments are treated as a subsidy to capital in the Cattle, Sheep & Goats sector (CTL), 
and capital in this sector is held constant. 
7.3.8 Output Quotas 
Output quotas exist in the raw sugar cane and beet (C_B) and raw milk (RMK) sectors. Output of 
these sectors in each EU region is fixed at 1995 levels during the Base Case and Uruguay Round 
scenarios. A 2% increase in milk quota is accounted for in the Agenda 2000 scenario, and all 
quotas are removed in the CAP abolition scenario. 
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Table 7-18: Headage payments (ECU/head) 
Suckler Cow 
Male bovine -
Dair\ cow 
Table 7-19: 
Suckler Cow 
Male bovine 
Dairy cow 
bull 
steer 
1995 
145 
135 
109 
0 
Headage payment cei 
1995 
9.976 
9.038 
0 
Agenda 2000 
215 
368 
232 
70 
lings (million animals) 
Agenda 2000 
10,285 
9,095 
20.250 
Percentage 
Change 
3,1% 
0,6°o 
n/a 
Percentage Change 
48"'o 
173% 
1 1 3" a 
n/a 
1995 Expenditure 
(m ECU) 
1046,7 
957,1 
0 
7.4 PRODUCER SUBSIDY EQUIVALENTS 
The GTAP database assigns all domestic support to a single output subsidy, taken from OECD 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) calculations as an average over a number of years. As a 
result, the values in the database do not correspond with 1995 support levels. Table 7-20 shows 
the producer subsidies in the data, and Table 7-21 gives these subsidies as a percentage of output. 
The total value of producer subsidies in the EU. from Table 7-20, is $49,014 m., corresponding 
closely to the total CAP budgetary expenditure in 1995 of $49,657 m'. 
The similarities between these total figures do however hide the fact that they are compiled in 
different ways (the GTAP data for example, are on the total domestic support; CAP budgetary 
expenditure includes expenditure on export refunds) and with different base periods (the OECD 
data from which the GTAP data are derived are taken as averages over several years). 
After the deduction of export refimds from CAP budgetary expenditure, expenditure on other 
measures is $40,514 m., 12% of which ($4,804 m.) is expenditure on EAGGF Guidance., and a 
further 2.1% ($852 m.) is EAGGF Guarantee expenditure not related to coinmodity, such as food 
aid refunds, rural development schemes linked to market operation, and accompanying measures. 
fhcse. and the other CAP e.xpenditure data used here, are taken from European Commission (1996) Utbles 3,4,1, 3,4,2, 
• ^JI aiul .V4,4. converted at the ,lulv 1995 exchange rate of 1,3311 $/ECU, 
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Table 7-20: Producer Subsidies from the GTAP Database (1995 USS million) 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Veizetables. Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milkand Milk Products 
Other Food 
Primar\ 
Manufactures 
Services 
UK 
1,527 
841 
0 
536 
0 
101 
1,813 
709 
727 
246 
396 
52 
542 
116 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Germany 
1,787 
1.983 
412 
734 
0 
183 
1.393 
2,559 
1,171 
6 
8 
12 
154 
8 
0 
2.120 
0 
0 
Rest of EU 
6,212 
6,361 
191 
3,906 
0 
854 
5,094 
3.682 
3,234 
232 
323 
127 
595 
187 
0 
0 
0 
0 
USA 
2,166 
4,248 
0 
1,270 
213 
478 
3,433 
1,057 
931 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Cairns 
930 
263 
0 
t^i~i 
172 
170 
734 
688 
401 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
LDCs 
836 
1,177 
0 
591 
51 1 
641 
106 
0 
0 
12 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ROW 
1,121 
848 
0 
304 
754 
9,129 
1,527 
2,573 
4,436 
87 
215 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
source: calculated from GTAP database 
Table 7-21: Producer Subsidies from the GTAP Database as a Percentage of Output 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables, Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk and Milk Products 
Other Food 
Primary 
Manufactures 
Services 
UK 
58,0 
53,1 
0,0 
109,5 
0,0 
3,1 
22.0 
9.0 
8.9 
2,9 
3,1 
4,2 
3,8 
3.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0.0 
Germany 
58,0 
53,1 
4,9 
109,5 
0,0 
4,9 
22,0 
9,0 
8,9 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
5.4 
0.0 
0.0 
Rest of EU 
58.0 
53.1 
0.4 
109,5 
0,0 
2,4 
22,0 
9.0 
8.9 
0,5 
0,5 
0,7 
0,7 
1,2 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
USA 
17,6 
8,5 
0,0 
7.6 
8.2 
1.7 
4,9 
4,2 
4,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Cairns 
7,2 
1,7 
0,0 
2,9 
0,8 
0.2 
2,2 
2,0 
2,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
LDCs 
2,4 
3,6 
0,0 
1,7 
1,6 
0,4 
0,3 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0 
ROW 
8,3 
5,5 
0.0 
7,2 
9,6 
8,9 
5,1 
3,3 
11,1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
source: calculated from GTAP database 
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7.5 CALIBRATION 
The EU agricultural sectors are calibrated to various data. After calibration, a residual factor will 
be accounted for by EAGGF Guidance, EAGGF Guamntee expenditure not related to 
commodity, and miscellaneous commodity costs such as storage and disposal costs. 
Arable Sectors Calibration 
The arable sectors are calibrated to the target area payments and set-aside compensation payments 
in Table 7-22. 
Cereals area payments are divided into Wheat and Other Grains in direct proportion to the GTAP 
subsidies in those sectors in the whole EU-15 (50.9% and 49.1%), so that Wheat area payments 
are 5,987 m. ECU, and Other Grains area payments are 5,773 m. ECU. Oilseeds area payments 
are set at 2,010 m. ECU. The set-aside target is divided into the PSE figures for wheat, other 
grains and oilseeds in direct proportion to the GTAP subsidies in those sectors (39.9%, 38.5% 
and 21,7"'o respectively). 
Set-aside payments are made to land owners not production sectors, but in order for the database 
to represent an initial equilibrium, any value deducted from production subsidy must in some way 
also be deducted from firms" costs, so the set-aside payments are deducted from factor payments 
in the arable sectors. 
Table 7-22: Area and Compensation Payments (1995) 
Cereals Area Payments 
Oilseeds Area Payments 
Set-aside Compensation Payments 
Table 7-23 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
Total 
: Arable Sector Calib 
Area 
Payments 
m. ECU 
5,987 
5,773 
2,010 
13,770 
Area 
Payments 
Sm. 
7,970 
7,684 
2,676 
18,329 
ration 
Set-aside 
compensation 
m. ECU 
945 
911 
514 
2,370 
1995 Value (m. 
Set-aside 
compensation 
$m. 
1,258 
1,213 
684 
3,155 
11,760 
2,010 
2,370 
Total 
Payments 
Sm. 
9,526 
9,185 
5,176 
23,887 
ECU) 
Residual 
S m. 
298 
288 
1,817 
2,403 
PSE 
$ m. 
9,526 
9,185 
5,176 
23,887 
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Table 7-23 shows the arable sector calculations, with a residual value of subsidy to ensure that 
the total subsidies accounted for match PSE data in the GTAP database. 
Sugar Sector Calibration 
Raw sugar cane and beet (C_B) has no subsidy in the GTAP database, but has an output tax of 
8%. Following Frandsen et al. (1998). the data have been recalibrated to include a 20% ad 
valorem equivalent tax to represent the sugar quota regime in addition to the existing 8% output 
tax. 
Raw Milk Sector Calibration 
Milk quotas are also modelled, again following Frandsen et al.. by calibrating the ad valorem 
equivalent of the quota to 20%. The subsidy in the GTAP database is retained in addition to the 
quota. 
Livestock Sectors Calibration 
The beef and veal sector headage payment is calibrated to 1995 expenditures on cow premiums 
(1.046.7 m. ECU) plus special premiums (957.1 m. ECU) 
Table 7-24: Recalibrated Subsidy Data, S million 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Vegetables, Fruit & Nuts 
Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats 
Other Animal Products 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Processed Sugar 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk and Milk Products 
Other Food 
Totals 
Area / Headage 
Payments 
7,970 
7,684 
2.676 
2,667 
20,997 
(42.8%) 
Set-aside 
Compensation 
1,258 
1,213 
684 
3,155 
(6,4'"o) 
EAGGF 
Guidance 
43 
42 
87 
262 
0 
164 
713 
1,003 
741 
70 
105 
45 
27 
186 
0 
3,589 
(7,3%) 
Storage, etc. 
255 
246 
516 
2.656 
0 
974 
4.819 
5.946 
4.391 
415 
622 
266 
163 
1,104 
0 
21,273 
(43,4" o) 
GTAP 
PSE 
9,526 
9.185 
603 
5.176 
0 
1,138 
8,300 
6,950 
5,132 
484 
727 
311 
191 
1,291 
0 
49,014 
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Residual Calibration 
The remainders after these calibrations, and the subsidies on other sectors, are counted as 
residuals. EAGGF Guarantee expenditure is divided amongst sectors in proportion to the size of 
the residual, with the remaining subsidy being treated as a PSE equivalent of all other forms of 
subsidy expenditure from storage costs, aids for private storage, disposal costs, food aid refunds, 
accompanying measures, and all other forms of CAP expenditure not accounted for elsewhere. 
Table 7-24 shows the recalibrated protection data for the whole EU. The implied rates from this 
table are applied to each EU region (note that in Table 7-21 there is very little difference in EU 
subsidy rates between EU regions). 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has outlined extensions to the model of Chapter 5. The purpose of these extensions 
is to enable full use of the additional features of the version 4 GTAP database. The inclusion of 
more agricultural sectors in this database allovvs various CAP programmes to be modelled, such 
as milk and sugar quotas, and arable sector programmes. This in turn allows further analysis of 
Agenda 2000 reforms, necessitating the use of a projected model and therefore modification of 
consumer preferences to include income elasticities. In addition, EU export subsidy limits have 
been included in a more detailed form: rather than 21% (quantity) and 36% (expenditure) 
reductions which are the rates applicable on the base period (1986-90) values, the appropriate 
limits have been imposed relative to 1995 values of subsidised exports and subsidy expenditures. 
Import tariff reductions have been taken from Harrison et al. (1995), accounting for 'dirty 
tanification". In all product groups, the EU is committed to lower levels of liberalisation with 
these Uruguay Round limits than in the model of Chapter 5. Chapter 8 will use this model to 
provide updated estimates of the effects of the Uruguay Round, and examine Agenda 2000 and 
CAP abolition. 
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CHAPTER 8 
APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS FOR THE 
URUGUAY ROUND COMMITMENTS, AGENDA 2000 AND CAP 
ABOLITION IN 2005 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a set of the results from three policy simulations: (i) meeting the Uruguay 
Round commitments, (ii) Agenda 2000 reforms, and (iii) abolition of the CAP. These are 
identified in the tables as 'UR', "Agenda 2000" and "CAP' respectively. We report on changes in 
welfare, the prices and volumes of commodities, agricultural incomes, land use, CAP 
expenditure, the CAP budget. Welfare changes are decomposed according to consumer effect, 
producer effect and net tax revenue, and also by product. 
8.2 MAIN WELFARE RESULTS 
Table 8-1 reports the main welfare results for the Uruguay Round. Agenda 2000 and CAP 
Removal scenarios, showing the changes in equivalent variation in real 1995 billions of dollars, 
and as a proportion of the original EV. compared to the Base Case scenario. 
Table 8-1: Welfare - Changes in Equivalent Variation Relative to Base Case 
Regions 
UK 
German\ 
Rest of EU 
EU 
USA 
Cairns Group 
LDCs 
Rest of World 
UR 
EV 
(Sbn) 
-0.479 
-1.799 
-4,163 
-6,441 
0,439 
2,859 
7,287 
21,129 
(%) 
(-0,04) 
(-0,07) 
(-0,08) 
(-0,07) 
(0,01) 
(0,07) 
(0,20) 
(0,23) 
Agenda 2000 
EV 
(Sbn) 
0,105 
-1,520 
-3,147 
-4,562 
0,418 
2,718 
7,506 
21,501 
{%) 
(0,01) 
(-0,06) 
(-0,06) 
(-0,05) 
(0,00) 
(0,07) 
(0,20) 
(0,23) 
From 
UR 
0,583 
0,279 
1,016 
1,879 
-0,021 
-0,141 
0.220 
0,372 
CAP Removal 
EV 
(Sbn) 
1,905 
0,930 
6,417 
9,251 
3,008 
6,921 
7,608 
19,699 
{%) 
(0,16) 
(0.04) 
(0,13) 
(0,10) 
(0,04) 
(0,18) 
(0,21) 
(0,21) 
From 
Agenda 
2000 
1,800 
2,450 
9,564 
13,814 
2,590 
4,203 
0,102 
-1,801 
8.2.1 The Uruguay Round 
Welfare changes for the Uruguay Round are low compared to other studies, and the EU has a 
welfare loss in each region. With very little tariff liberalisation in the EU. and relatively modest 
reductions from 1995 needed to meet the Uruguay Round export subsidy constraints, the EU 
makes \ ery little in the way of gains from its own liberalisation. It could possibly make gains 
from liberalisation in other regions, but the EU is a high-cost producer, and v\ith the Uruguay 
Round limits on agricultural and food exports is unable to make gains from exporting to other 
regions. Two main sources of loss exist for the EU: third-country diversion effects and stock 
buying effects. As other regions liberalise tariffs both in agricultural and manufactured goods, 
they will draw imports away from the EU, leading to fewer EU imports of these goods at higher 
prices. Purchases of stocks will be necessary to meet the Uruguay Round commitments for many 
agricultural goods, and these will lead to welfare losses in this model, which measures welfare 
and equivalent variation in a static framework, and therefore does not allow for the fact that 
stocks purchased will be released and consumed at a later date. 
Of the non-EU regions, only the Rest of the World group makes a significant gain from the 
Urugua\ Round. This group, which includes Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrialised 
Countries, makes large gains from liberalisation in manufactures, particularly from Cairns Group 
and LDC liberalisation. Both the USA and the Cairns Group might hope to benefit from EU 
agricultural liberalisation, both in terms of improved access to EU markets through tariff 
reduction, and increased competitiveness in third markets through the liberalisation of EU export 
subsidies. Neither effect is large because the EU does not liberalise significantly. The LDC group 
makes significant gains, and this is again in part due to the minor nature of EU liberalisation, 
because the increase in food import prices that would lead to welfare losses does not materialise. 
8.2.2 Agenda 2000 
The welfare results from the Agenda 2000 scenario show that the EU will make small welfare 
gains from Agenda 2000 compared to the Uruguay Round scenario. It will become apparent from 
later tables that the main welfare effects of Agenda 2000 come from the reduction in intervention 
prices for beef (the Cattle. Sheep & Goats sector in this model), which reduces the need to 
purchase stocks to support the domestic market price, and the small (two percent) increase in milk 
quotas that allow a small reduction in the welfare costs of this quota. 
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The small welfare losses for the USA and Cairns Group from Agenda 2000 are a direct resuh of 
these reforms: the USA's exports of Cattle, Sheep & Goats fall because the EU no longer buys 
stocks to support the market price, allowing EU consumption to use these resources. The Cairns 
Group's exports of Milk and Milk Products decline as the EU quota increases. 
8.2.3 CAP Removal 
The CAP Removal scenario shows EU gains that are low in comparison to most estimates, but are 
similar to those in some recent studies (i.e. Harrison et al. 1995. Weyerbrock 1998). The 
equivalent variation of moving from the Uruguay Round without Agenda 2000 to complete 
removal of the CAP is $15.7bn (0.17% of GDP). With the Uruguay Round results being low in 
terms of EU equivalent variation because of the low level of EU liberalisation, it might be 
expected that the complete removal of the CAP would have a larger effect. When comparing the 
results of CAP removal in Table 8-1 with other studies, it must be noted that the CAP is 
characterised here as using compensation payments, set-aside payments and headage payments. 
Most other studies treat all CAP instruments as ad valorem output subsidies, which are less 
"removed from production". The benefit from removing a subsidy that is in part decoupled from 
production will be lower than the benefit of removing output subsidies. In this model, 49.2%) of 
EU domestic support is modelled as a decoupled or partially decoupled payment. 
8.3 THE BASE CASE: PROJECTING THE WORLD ECONOMY 
FORWARD TO 2005 
Table 8-2 shows some indicators of how the Base Case projections detailed in Chapter 6 affect 
the world economy. The equivalent variation in the Base Case is set by the GDP projection, and 
the USA aggregate price is the numeraire, as noted in Chapter 7. Aggregate prices are equivalent 
to GDP deflator inflation, and show higher aggregate prices in the EU than in the USA. 
Market prices and output for agricultural goods are largely determined by three factors. Firstly, 
the factors of production used in agriculture (land, and unskilled labour') become more scarce, 
which will lead to price increases. Secondly, low income elasticides of demand depress 
' The scarcity of unskilled labour applies to the FU. where a small fall is projected for this tactor. Outside the EU, factor 
grinvili is pmjecied for unskilled labour. 
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Table 8-2: Base Case Summary 
i:v (Shii) 
("") 
Aggrcgaic Prices 
Market Prices 
Wheal 
Other (liaiiis 
Vegelahk's & Fruit 
Oil Seals 
Sugar cane/beet 
Other .Agriculture 
Cattle. Sheep & Goats 
Other Livestock 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
VegeUihleOils 
Milkct Milk Prods 
Sugar 
Other Food 
Other l'nmar\ 
Manufactures 
Scr\ lees 
UK 
223,454 
22,86 
24,2(1 
0,12 
0,31 
2,99 
-0.95 
35,11 
-0,77 
-5,00 
-3,95 
56,89 
12,79 
13,14 
17.36 
34,76 
21,87 
23,30 
134,29 
29,91 
23,76 
Germany 
469.622 
22,86 
26.S4 
Rest EU 
953,696 
22,86 
22,62 
USA 
2006,971 
30,9! 
21,90 
5,06 
5,82 
5,09 
4,09 
44,55 
2,40 
-4 90 
-1,19 
40,67 
19,76 
17,74 
20, .S3 
28,46 
25,03 
22,51 
125,27 
2S.49 
27.49 
2,11 
2.62 
4.36 
0,70 
30,38 
1,44 
-2,98 
-3,21 
35,68 
9,02 
8,55 
15,58 
28,64 
25.82 
22.94 
127,08 
28,91 
21,12 
3,19 
3,55 
4.23 
3,23 
4.22 
1,08 
-10,69 
-1,21 
-5,89 
-4 12 
6,33 
10,09 
8,59 
12,65 
18,06 
138,80 
27,23 
20,90 
Cairns 
1495,768 
63,42 
18,65 
5,56 
10,16 
10,20 
8,74 
5,79 
10,30 
4,35 
1,84 
0,64 
6,24 
6,18 
10,46 
5,59 
6,45 
13,13 
140,85 
23,25 
15,59 
LDCs 
1507,442 
69 1 1 
17,66 
20,96 
23.31 
23,61 
28,20 
25,58 
18,01 
14,25 
12.76 
15,22 
7.76 
7.32 
15,22 
9,1 9 
14,01 
12,54 
147 96 
20,74 
11.33 
ROW 
2365,886 
34,78 
22,56 
5,92 
7,52 
7,84 
6,93 
7,13 
3,36 
-0,35 
0,40 
-1,00 
9,05 
7,75 
16,43 
11,94 
15,35 
23,89 
136,58 
27,63 
21,49 
Output 
Wlieat 
Other (iraiiis 
Vegetahles & Fruit 
Oil Seeds 
Sugar cane,'beet 
Other Agriculture 
Cattle. Sheep & Goats 
Other Livestock 
Raw Milk 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk & Milk Prods 
Sugar 
Other Food 
Other Primary 
Manufactures 
Sei-viccs 
-
9,54 
12,16 
17 95 
16,05 
0,00 
31,31 
14,26 
10,62 
0,00 
5,95 
7,74 
9,54 
-0,15 
3,00 
8,60 
18,15 
10,46 
20,10 
7,64 
0,86 
11,37 
8,49 
0,00 
22,42 
5,48 
6 99 
0,00 
3,65 
5,57 
1,56 
-0,27 
1,70 
11,23 
14,38 
11,45 
14,60 
12,86 
1.78 
18,25 
22,86 
0,00 
26,51 
13,87 
17,40 
0,00 
12,71 
14,35 
11,14 
1,71 
1,80 
10,05 
24,24 
14,82 
22,47 
29 88 
6,00 
18,52 
24,95 
16,79 
32,25 
10,64 
15,66 
12,59 
17,72 
11,01 
15,17 
13,41 
11,87 
15,00 
20,30 
21,16 
27,39 
27,23 
20,89 
34,41 
28,32 
41,08 
27,27 
22,40 
35,72 
25,46 
25,50 
30,93 
34.27 
27,07 
36,95 
35,24 
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agricultural prices as demand for agricultural products falls in relation to other goods. Thirdly, 
high productivity rates in agricultural sectors depress prices, and lead to the situation evidem in 
many sectors in Table 8-2 of falling real prices and increasing output. 
EU milk and sugar sectors are special cases, where the raw products are subject to quotas. This 
leads to real price increases in these sectors, and price increases above or only slightly under 
aggregate prices for the final sugar and milk produced products. 
Cattle, Sheep &. Goats in the UK is the only sector where the Base Case projections lead to 
intervention buying, with the price being supported at 5% below the 1995 market price. Chapter 6 
discussed the intervention prices used in the model, and where the 1995 market price was above 
the intervention price a 5% difference was assumed, except for the cereals sectors where data on 
market price to intervention price ratios were available. The choice of a 5% difference between 
intervention price and market price is critical when determining whether the intervention price is 
reached or not: for the UK the price of Cattle, Sheep & Goats falls 5% to the intervention price 
and intervemion purchases are triggered, but in Germany the price falls by only 4.90% so that 
intervention purchases are not triggered. 
8.4 DETAILED RESULTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD 
SECTORS 
Tables 8-3 ,8-4 and 8-5 show details for market prices, quantities, and aggregate consumer prices; 
in each case the figures are percentage changes relative to the Base Case. The results are for the 
Uruguay Round, Agenda 2000 ('Ag') and CAP removal ("CAP"). (Market prices in Table 8-3 
(and the Base Case prices in Table 8-2) refer to the market prices of domestic production.) 
8.4.1 Price and output changes: quota-constrained agricultural sectors 
For most products in the EU, market prices in the Uruguay Round scenario show fairly small 
changes for most products, with price increases of less than one percent and a few instances of 
small price falls (i.e. Wheat and Other Grains in the Rest of the EU). The exceptions to this rule 
are the quota-constrained products: Sugar Cane/Beet show price increases of 8.7%, 32.1% and 
13.3% in the UK, Germany and Rest of EU respectively, and Raw Milk experiences price 
increases of 39.9%, 49.3% and 45.5%) - all from prices that were considerably higher than average 
prices in the Base Case. With factors mobile in these sectors, supply is quite elastic so that large 
increases in the ad valorem equivalent of the quota (and hence the price) are needed to restrict 
8-5 
output when demand for these products rises. This happens partly because the 1995 export levels 
were considerably within Uruguay Round limits, allowing further exports of sugar and requiring 
only a small fall for milk to reach the constraints in 2005. Price rises in the Milk and Milk 
Products and Sugar sectors are considerably above rises in other sectors as a result of their higher 
intermediate input costs. 
Output of the processed milk and sugar goods increases in the Uruguay Round in each EU region 
despite the quotas on the raw products, and the milk sector is able to do so only by purchasing 
raw products that were previously used in other sectors - raw sugar, unlike raw milk, is traded so 
that the Sugar sector is able to purchase more imports of Sugar cane/beet. 
For all the quota-constrained goods and their processed products, prices fall under Agenda 2000. 
with the falls for Raw Milk and Milk and Milk Products being larger as a result of the quota 
increase. Prices for these goods fall dramatically with the removal of the CAP, with small output 
falls (these sectors also benefit from CAP subsidies). Sugar cane/beet output falls by 12.9% with 
CAP removal. 
8.4.2 Price and output changes: other agricultural and food sectors 
Price and output effects in sectors that are not directly affected by the CAP quantity constraints 
are generally small as a result of the Uruguay Round and Agenda 2000, with significant output 
falls after the removal of the CAP. 
The Cattle. Sheep & Goats sector in the UK is a special case because intervention prices were 
binding in the Base Case. In this sector, prices remain constant at the Base Case level during the 
Uruguay Round simulation because this is the intervention price; upon the 30% reduction in 
intervention prices for this sector in Agenda 2000, a small price fall of 3.3% occurs. There are no 
intervention purchases to support the domestic market price in the Agenda 2000 scenario. Output 
falls to 11.9% below the Base Case level in Agenda 2000 because of lower prices. 
Other agricultural sectors have two main forces acting upon them. Firstly, the general but small 
fall in EU welfare in the Uruguay Round scenario, and subsequent rises in the Agenda 2000 and 
CAP removal scenarios, will have both negative and positive effects on demand for all products. 
Secondly, competition between sectors for inputs will tend to raise prices as a result of Milk and 
Milk Products expansion in the first two scenarios, and the fall in output of Cattle, Sheep & 
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Goat.s. Sectors tliat cotnpete witli tliese sectors for botli factors of production and intermediate 
inputs will experience general equilibrium effects. The clianges in aggregate consumer prices 
reported in Table 8-5 reflect changes in the prices of domestic and imported goods. They are 
presented here for completeness, but the analysis of their impact on consumers is carried out 
subsequently in terms of changes in consumer welfare 
8.4.3 Changes in EU exports and imports 
Table 8-6 reports changes in aggregate exports for commodities, again as a percentage relative to 
the Base Case. Table 8-7 reports changes in intra-EU exports and extra-EU exports separately. 
Aggregate imports are reported in Table 8-8, with Table 8-9 covering intra- and extra-EU 
imports. The discussion below focuses on sectors where there are significant proportional 
changes in aggregate exports and imports. 
EU exports 
Changes in a sector's exports tend to be of the same sign but in greater proportion than changes in 
sectoral output, a common feature in open economy models, and reflecting the same causes. The 
notable reductions in exports for the EU are in Wheat and Other Grains. Cattle. Sheep and Goats 
and Other Livestock under all three scenarios, with CAP abolition showing the largest falls for all 
these sectors. Oil Seed exports rise throughout the EU under the UR and Agenda 2000 scenarios, 
but fall sharply upon CAP abolition. Sugar Cane/Beet exports rise marginally for the UK, 
markedly for Germany but fall for the rest of the EU under the UR and Agenda 2000 regimes, but 
increase dramatically upon CAP abolition. Sugar exports changes marginally for all EU 
countries/regions under UR and Agenda 2000, but fall markedly with removal of the CAP. 
Exports of Milk and Milk Products by all EU countries rise above the Base Case levels after 
implementation of the UR commitments and of Agenda 2000, but CAP removal reduces the UK 
expansion substantially and reduces exports by the others to below the Base Case levels. 
EU imports 
Implementation of the UR commitments and of Agenda 2000 result in few significant changes in 
imports, save for rise in Sugar Cane/Beet imports by Germany and the rest of the EU, and a fall in 
imports of Cattle, Sheep and Goats by Germany. CAP abolition leads to very large increases in 
imports of Cattle, Sheep and Goats and Cattle Meat by the UK and Germany and to a lesser 
extent by the rest of the EU, and to large increase in imports of Sugar throughout the EU, but to 
roughly equivalent falls in Sugar imports by Germany and the rest of the EU. 
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8.4.4 Agricultural land use and incomes by sector 
Changes in land use 
Table 8-10 shows the percentage changes hi land use compared with the Base Case under the 
three scenarios. In the arable sectors the major change due to the UR is an increase in the area 
under (3il Seeds throughout the EU. with smaller increases for Vegetables etc. (except in 
Germany), Sugar Cane/Beet and Other Agriculture; the areas under cereals fall throughout the 
EU. Agenda 2000 sharply reverses the falls in the cereals area throughout the EU (as would be 
expected with set-aside reducions), but whereas the areas under Oil Seeds and Sugar Cane/Beet 
rise in the UK compared with the UR outcome, they fall in Germany and the Rest of the EU. 
Abandoning the CAP leads to further substantial increases in the Wheat area in all 
countries/regions and a reduction in the area under Other Grains (major in the UK and Germany, 
but marginal in the Rest of the EU), and further expansion in the Oil Seeds and Sugar Cane/Beet 
areas in the UK and Germany, but a major reduction in areas under those crops in the Rest of the 
EU, 
Table 8-10: Changes in Land Use in the EU from Base Case (per cent) 
Wheal 
Oilier grains 
Vegetables, fruit & nuts 
Oil Seals 
Sugar Cane & Beet 
Other .Agrieulture 
Cattle. Sheep & Goats 
Other Livestock 
Ran VIilk 
Set Aside 
UK 
LR 
-0,4 
-1,6 
1,2 
5,8 
1,2 
1,8 
-2,5 
0,0 
1,2 
0,0 
Agenda 
2()()() 
12,3 
11,2 
4,1 
6,9 
3,4 
5,6 
-10,4 
2,7 
5,5 
-80,0 
CAP 
20,4 
3,1 
14,6 
15,7 
15,0 
10,0 
-24,9 
2,0 
13,0 
-100,0 
Germany 
UR 
-0,3 
-1,7 
-0.2 
8,0 
0,4 
1.6 
-2.5 
0 1 
0,4 
0,0 
Agenda 
2000 
10,4 
8,7 
-0,1 
7,2 
0,2 
1,7 
-3,7 
0,0 
2,2 
-63,0 
CAP 
32,3 
-1,9 
1,5 
17,2 
6,7 
-3,2 
-25,6 
3,6 
5,7 
-100,0 
Rest of EU 
UR 
-2.5 
-0 9 
L l 
8.5 
0,6 
0,4 
-4,9 
0,0 
0,6 
(),() 
Agenda 
2000 
7,1 
8,5 
0.7 
4.6 
0,4 
0,0 
-3,5 
0,0 
2,4 
-55,0 
CAP 
35,9 
7,6 
8,2 
-23,7 
-5,9 
1,4 
-35,1 
2,6 
4,3 
-100,0 
In the other agricultural sectors, the area under Cattle, Sheep and Goats falls throughout the EU 
with the UR compared to the Base Case, while that used for Raw Milk production increases. 
Compared with the UR outcome. Agenda 2000 results in reductions for Cattle etc. in the UK and 
Germany (much larger in the UK) but a small rise for the Rest of the EU; Raw Milk area rises 
throughout the EU. Finally, abandoning the CAP reduces the area for Cattle etc. very 
substantially throughout the EU, with some minor increases in Raw Milk areas. 
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Changes in agricultural income 
Table 8-11 shows changes in agricultural factor income by sector relative to the Base Case for 
the three scenarios for the EU and for the three countries/regions. Many of the changes from 
meeting the Uruguay Round commitments are relatively minor, so attention will be focused on 
those exceeding $0.5bn for the whole EU. There are falls in income in the Wheat and Other 
Grains sectors for all countries, but the overall EU reductions of over SO.Sbn and nearly $0.7bn 
respectively are largely accounted for by the Rest of the EU. These falls in arable income are 
more than offset for the EU as a whole by the increase for the Sugar Cane/Beet sector of over 
$2.2bn, although here Germany's increase exceeds that in the Rest of the EU. 
Income for the Cattle, Sheep and Goats sector falls by nearly $l,4bn for the EU as a whole, with 
much of this occurring in the Rest of the EU. However EU-wide income from Raw Milk 
increases by over $31bn, of which the UK gets $4.38bn, Germany $7.7bn and the Rest of the EU 
$19.2bn. These increases in Raw Milk income are largely responsible for the overall increases in 
agricultural incomes in each country/region of the EU under the UR scenario. 
Agenda 2000 reduces agricultural incomes relative to the UR outcomes in all countries/regions, 
and in the case of the UK to below the Base Case income. Although there are losses for all 
countries in most arable sectors, the major source of these changes is a fall in Raw Milk income 
relative to the UR outcome. 
Abolition of the CAP reduces total agricultural incomes for the EU as a whole by nearly $79bn, 
with the falls being $11.7bn for the UK. $16.9bn for Germany and $50.3bn for the Rest of the 
EU. The Rest of the EU loses substantially in every sector (the range being from nearly $lbn in 
Vegetables, Fruit and Nuts to $24bn in Raw Milk). The major source of the fall in agricultural 
income for the UK is also in Raw Milk ($6.8bn), but there are also substantial reductions in Cattle 
etc. ($1.7bn). Wheat ($0.9bn). Other Grains and Sugar Cane/Beet (almost $0.6bn each). German 
income reductions are also dominated by those in Raw Milk ($8.Sbn), and there are also 
substantial losses in Sugar Cane/Beet (almost $2.6bn). Wheat, Other Grains arid Cattle etc. 
(around $lbn each). 
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8.5 CAP EXPENDITURES AND COUNTRY/REGION NET CAP 
BUDGETS 
Table 8-12 gives estimates of the effects of the UR. Agenda 2000 and CAP abolition on the 
net CAP budget for the UK, Germany and the Rest of the EU. Tables 8-13a and 8-13b give a 
breakdown of changes in CAP E.xpenditure by country/region compared with the Base Case, 
in $bn and ECU bn respectively, while Table 8-14 gives a breakdown by sector. The UR 
commitments result in an increase of some 5.2 bn ECU for the EU as a whole compared with 
the Base Case, largely due (as Table 8-13b shows) to increases in purchases into stock to meet 
the UR export subsidy commitments (Table 8-15 shows EU stock purchases as a percentage 
of 1995 output), but also due to an increase in other FEOGA Guarantee e.xpenditure. Agenda 
2000 more than reverses the increase in CAP expenditure due to the UR. CAP abolition, of 
course, results in a very substantial saving, estimated at over 48 bn ECU. 
Table 8-12: Net CAP Budget (Sbn, real 2005 dollars) 
UK 
CAP E.xpenditure 
Tariffs Levies Contribution 
Resource Contribution 
Net Budgetary Gain 
Germany 
CAP Expenditure 
Tariff-t- Levies Contribution 
Resource Contribution 
Net Budgetary Gain 
Rest of EU 
CAP Expenditure 
Tariff-1- Levies Contribution 
Resource Contribution 
Net Budgetary Gain 
AllEU 
CAP Expenditure 
Tariff + Levies Contribution 
Total Resource Contribution 
Net Budgetary Gain 
1995 Base Data 
8,490 
6,311 
3,000 
-0,821 
12,757 
7,717 
9,280 
-4,240 
39,956 
16.243 
21,436 
2,277 
61,203 
30,272 
30,932 
0,000 
Base Case 
10,081 
9,606 
1,591 
-1,116 
12.460 
12.199 
4,922 
-4,661 
41,436 
25,767 
11.369 
4,300 
63,977 
47,571 
16,406 
0,000 
Uruguay Round 
10,535 
7,943 
3,374 
-0,782 
14,218 
8,652 
10,436 
-4,869 
46,131 
19,503 
24,107 
2,521 
70,884 
36,098 
34,786 
0,000 
Agenda 2000 
8.623 
7,694 
2.670 
-1.742 
12,715 
8.606 
8.259 
-4,150 
41,745 
19.253 
19,079 
3,414 
63.083 
35.553 
27.531 
0.000 
In the results presented in Table 8-12, the total over the EU of resource contributions to the 
CAP budget is calculated as total CAP expenditure for the whole EU less the total of tariff 
plus levies contributions. Each region has a constant share of the total resource contribution. 
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these shares being 9.7% for the UK, 30.0% for Germany, and 60.3% for the Rest of the EU. 
The net budgetary gain for each region is calculated as regional expenditure less the regional 
tariff + levy and resource contributions. 
For the UK the national CAP expenditure is some $1.5bn higher in the Base Case than in 
1995. The tariff-i- levies contribution is higher in the Base Case by $3.3bn, but the resource 
contribution is lower by $1.4bn. so that overall the UK's net budgetary loss in the Base Case 
is just under $0.3bn higher than in 1995. National CAP expenditure would rise by $0.5bn 
compared with the Base Case under the UR scenario, largely due to the costs of meeting UR 
commitments. The tariff + levies contribution would fall by just over $1.6bn, but the resource 
contribution would rise by nearly $1.7bn. The net budgetary loss under the UR scenario 
would thus be slightly lower than in the Base Case at just under $0.8bn. Finally, comparing 
the UR scenario with Agenda 2000. the UK would see a$I.9bn reduction in its CAP 
expenditure. With a minor fall in its tariff-t- levies contribution and just over a $9.Sbn cut in its 
resource contribution, resulting in a net budgetary loss for the UK of $1.742bn. 
For Germany there are relatively small changes in its CAP expenditure and net budgetary loss 
between the Base Case and 1995, but substantial (and almost off-setting) changes in the 
pattern of its contributions. The UR scenario results in a $1.8bn increase in its CAP 
expenditure compared with the Base Case, a reduction in its tariff + levies contributions of 
S3.5bn. but a rise in its resource contribution of some $5.5bn, so that its net budgetary loss 
increases marginally, by about $0.2bn. The Agenda 2000 results show a $1.5bn fall in 
Germany's CAP expenditure compared with the UR expenditure, little change in its tariff + 
levies contribution, but a reduction of over $2bn in its resource contribution, so that its net 
budgetary loss is reduced by just over $0.7bn. 
The Rest of the EU has higher CAP expenditure in the Base Case than in 1995 but, like the 
UK and Germany, almost offsetting switches between its tariff + levies and resource 
contributions, so that its net budgetary gain increases by approximately the same amount as its 
CAP expenditure. The UR scenario shows a $4.7bn increase in CAP expenditure, a fall in 
tariff + levies contribution of over $6bn but a rise in the resource contribution of just under 
$I3bn,so that the Rest of the EU finds its net budgetary gain reduced by some $1.8bn 
compared with the Base Case. Agenda 2000 reduces the CAP expenditure by over $4.4bn 
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compared with the UR outcome, leaves the Rest of the EU tariff- levies contribution almost 
unchanged, but does result in a $5bn reduction in resource contribution, yielding a net 
budgetary gain of just under $0,9bn compared with the UR. 
As Tables 8-13a and 8-13b show, the increases in CAP expenditure due to meeting the UR 
commitments are largely due to increases in intervention buying to constrain subsidised 
exports and in "Other FEOGA Guarantees"; these are offset to a limited extent by reductions 
in expenditure on those export subsidies and in compensation and headage payments and 
intervention to support market prices. 
Table 8-l3a: Changes in CAP E.xpenditure by Country from Base Case (Sbn) 
E,\p()rt Siihsidies 
CiHiip*Hc;id;ige HaNinents 
Sei ,AMde I 'ayii iei i ts 
lnicr\ciuion (support )^ 
Intervention (eNport)^'' 
Other FEOCI.A Guarantee'^ 
FEOCiA ( i i i idanee 
TO IAL 
UK 
l lR 
-0,112 
-0.310 
0,000 
-0,1.v3 
0 46,S 
0.4X7 
0,082 
0,463 
Agenda 
2000 
-0,135 
-(1,486 
-0,226 
-0.X78 
0,303 
-0,023 
-0,004 
-1 448 
C/ \ l ' 
- i . l 08 
-2 42S 
-02X2 
-0.X7X 
0.000 
-4 6111 
-0,776 
-10.072 
c 
UR 
o.o.s.s 
-11.316 
0.000 
0,000 
1,175 
(1,727 
0,123 
1,764 
ermany 
Agenda 
200(1 
0.037 
-0,350 
-0,426 
0,000 
0,753 
0,211 
0,036 
0,261 
CAP 
-2,4Q4 
-2,633 
-0,654 
0,000 
0,000 
-5.709 
-0,963 
-12 454 
Rest of EU 
UR 
-0,3')8 
-1,126 
0,000 
0,000 
3,997 
1,901 
0.321 
4.695 
Agenda 
2000 
-0,409 
-0,653 
-1,293 
0,000 
1 X29 
0.716 
0,121 
0,310 
CAP 
-10.051 
-11,374 
-2 2'M 
0,000 
0.00(1 
-15,161 
-2,558 
-41,435 
Al l E U 
UR 
-0.454 
-1.752 
0,000 
-0.153 
5 (i4(l 
3.116 
0,526 
6.923 
Agenda 
2000 
-0,507 
-1.489 
-1 V45 
-0,878 
2,885 
0,904 
0,153 
-0,878 
CAP 
-13,652 
-16,435 
-3.227 
-0,878 
0,000 
-25,471 
-4,297 
-63,961 
a; support buyinjj;; b: purchases into stocks to ineet UR commitments on subsidised e.vports; c: miscellaneous 
Table 8-13b: Changes in CAP Expenditure by Country from Base Case (Ecu bn)* 
Export ,Siibsidies 
Comp-i-Hcadage Payments 
Set Aside Payments 
Intervention (support) ' ' 
Intervention (expor t ) ' ' 
Other FEOGA Guaranteec 
FEOGA Guidance 
TOTAL 
UK 
UR 
-0,084 
-0,233 
0,000 
-0,115 
0,352 
0,366 
0,062 
0,348 
,Agenda 
2000 
-0,101 
-0,365 
-0,1 70 
-0,660 
0,228 
-0,017 
-0,003 
-!,08X 
CAP 
-0.832 
-1,824 
-0,212 
-0,660 
0,000 
-3 457 
-0,583 
-7,567 
Germany 
UR 
0.041 
-0,237 
0.000 
0,000 
0.883 
0,546 
0,092 
1 325 
Agenda 
2000 
0.028 
-0.263 
-0,320 
0,000 
0,566 
0,159 
0,027 
0,196 
CAP 
-1.874 
-1,978 
-0,491 
0,000 
0,000 
-4289 
-0,723 
-9,356 
Rest of EU 
UR 
-0,299 
-0,846 
0,000 
0,000 
3,003 
1,428 
0,241 
3,527 
Agenda 
2000 
-0,307 
-0,491 
-(1971 
0,000 
1,374 
0,538 
0,091 
(1.233 
CAP 
-7.551 
-8,545 
-1.721 
0.000 
0.000 
-11390 
-L922 
-31,128 
A l l EU 
UR 
-0.341 
- L3 I 6 
0.000 
-0.115 
4.237 
2.341 
0.395 
5,201 
Agenda 
2000 
-0.381 
-1.119 
-1461 
-0 66(1 
2.167 
(1,679 
0.115 
-0.660 
CAP 
-10,256 
-12,347 
-2,424 
-0,660 
0,000 
-19,135 
-3,228 
-48,051 
* Derived from Table 8-13 at an exchange rate of 1 Ecu = S 1.3311. 
a: support buying; b: purchases into stocks to meet UR commitments on subsidised e.xports; c: miscellaneous 
Agenda 2000 marginally reduces CAP expenditure compared to the Base Case for the EU as a 
whole, but this is a case of a reduction in UK expenditure outweighing increases elsewhere. 
Abolition of the CAP necessarily yields large reductions everywhere. 
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Tabic 8-14:Changes in Total CAP Expenditure by Commodity from Base Case (Sbn) 
Export Subsidies 
FEOGA (JLiidance 
FEOGA Guarantee' ' 
Compensation -•- Headage 
Set Aside Payments 
Intervention (supporDt" 
Intervention (e,\port)C 
TOTAL 
UR 
-0.322 
-0.002 
-0,011 
-0,667 
0,000 
0,000 
0,147 
-0,855 
Wh i i i t 
Ag 
-0,325 
-0,002 
-0,012 
-1,225 
0,000 
0,000 
0,143 
-1,420 
CAP 
-0,365 
-0,049 
-0,291 
-6,340 
0000 
0,000 
0,000 
-7.045 
Other Grains 
UR 
-0,381 
-0,001 
-0,009 
-0,577 
0,000 
0,000 
(1.444 
-0.523 
Ag 
-0,391 
-0,002 
-0,009 
-1,055 
0,000 
0,000 
0,439 
-1,018 
CAP 
-0,618 
-0,044 
-0,260 
-5,762 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-6,684 
Oi l Seeds 
UR 
0,000 
0,016 
0,094 
-0,116 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,005 
Ag 
0,000 
0,016 
0,096 
-0,522 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0.410 
CAP 
0,001! 
-0.318 
-1.8X6 
-2.237 
0.00(1 
0,000 
0.000 
-4 442 
Set Aside 
UR 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0.000 
Ag 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-1.945 
0.000 
0.000 
-1.945 
CAP 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-3.227 
0,000 
0,000 
-3,227 
E.\pori Subsidies 
FEOGA (Juidanee 
FEOGA (3iiarantee^ 
Compensation + Headage 
Set Aside Payments 
Intervention (support ) t ' 
lntcr\ention (export)C 
TOTAL 
Vegetables, Frui t & Nuts 
UR 
0,000 
0.000 
-0,003 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,003 
Ag 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,001 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,002 
CAP 
0,000 
-0,104 
-0,614 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,717 
Sugar Cane & Beet 
UR 
0.043 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,158 
0,200 
Ag 
(1,043 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,173 
0216 
CAP 
-0,096 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,096 
Cattle, Sheep & Coals 
UR 
-0,7X1 
-0,015 
-0,089 
-0,393 
0,000 
-0,153 
0,303 
-1,127 
Ag 
-0,809 
-0-048 
-0,284 
1,313 
0,000 
-0,878 
0.296 
-0,409 
CAP 
-1,313 
-0,881 
-5,222 
-2,095 
0,000 
-0,878 
0.000 
-10,388 
Other , \ur icul ture 
UR 
0(100 
0,000 
-0,001 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0,001 
Ag 
0.000 
0.000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
CAP 
0.000 
-0,210 
-1,247 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-1,458 
E.xport Subsidies 
FEOGA ( ju idance 
FEOGA Cjuaranteei* 
Compen.sation + Headage 
Set Aside Payments 
Intervention (support)b 
Intervention (export)*^ 
TOTAL 
Other 
UR 
-0,461 
0,001 
0,007 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,119 
-0,333 
\ g r l c Products 
Ag 
-0.469 
-0.002 
-0,012 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,119 
-0,365 
CAP 
-0.503 
-1.103 
-6.539 
0.000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-8,145 
Kan Mi lk 
UR 
0,000 
0.471 
2,792 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
3.263 
Ag 
0 0(11) 
0 163 
0,965 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
1,127 
CAP 
0,000 
-1,036 
-6,140 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-7,176 
C 
UR 
-0,459 
0,00(1 
0,002 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,770 
0,314 
.ittic Meat 
Ag 
-0,459 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,712 
0,252 
CAP 
-1.757 
-0,0X5 
-0,502 
0,00(1 
0,000 
0,000 
oooo 
-2,344 
Other Me 
UR 
-0.836 
0.002 
0,009 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,298 
-0528 
Ag 
-0,840 
0,001 
0,006 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
11247 
-0,585 
It 
CAP 
-0,898 
-0,129 
-0,764 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-1,791 
Export Subsidies 
FEOGA Guidance 
FEOGA Guarantee^ 
Compensation + Headage 
Set Aside Payments 
Intervention (suppor t )^ 
Intervention (export)C 
TOTAL 
Vegetable Oils 
UR 
0,000 
0,001 
0,006 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,007^ 
Ag 
0,000 
0,001 
0,006 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,007 
CAP 
0,000 
-0,035 
-0,209 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-0.244 
Mi lk & Mi lk Products 
UR 
2,443 
0,050 
0,297 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
2,849 
5,640 
Ag 
2.443 
0.022 
0,129 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,175 
2,769 
CAP 
-6,420 
-0,246 
-1,45') 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
-8,125 
Sugar 
UR 
0,300 
0,003 
0,021 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,552 
0,876 
Ag 
0,300 
0.004 
0,022 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,579 
0,906 
CAP 
-1,682 
-0.057 
-0,338 
0,000 
0,000 
0,00(1 
0,000 
-2,077 
Other Food 
UR 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0.(100 
0.000 
0,000 
0,000 
Ag 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0.000 1 0,000 
CAP 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
0,000 
a: miscellaneous; b: support buying; c: export subsidies 
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Table 8-15: EU Stock Purchases as a percentage of 1995 output 
_ 
Wheat 
Other Cirains 
Sugar cane/beet 
Cattle, Sheep & Goats'" 
Other Livestock 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Vegetable Oils 
Milk& Milk Products 
Sugar 
Other Food 
Base Case 
2,45 
Uruguay Round 
0,87 
2,48 
0.96 
2.85 
0.16 
0.84 
0,24 
0.04 
1,42 
1,04 
0,08 
Agenda 2000 
0,86 
2,48 
1,03 
0,82 
0,16 
0,70 
0,20 
0,03 
0,10 
1,09 
0,06 
a: Cattle. Sheep & Goats includes purchases to support the intervention price in the Base Case and 
Uruguay Round scenarios. All other stock purchases are those necessary to meet the Uruguay 
Round commitments. 
8.6 THE DECOMPOSITION OF WELFARE GAINS FOR THE EU 
8.6.1 Changes in EV 
Table 8-16 gives a sectoral decomposition of the EV changes for the EU anci its member 
regions.- This (discussion will, because it is the (dominant reform as far as the UK is concerned, 
concentrate largely on the effects of abolishing the CAP. The most obvious features are that 
all the identified EU members experience a substantial net loss in the Agriculture sectors that 
dominates a substantial gain in the Food sectors. Nevertheless, all EU members enjoy a strong 
overall gain from CAP removal. For the UK the major source of gain is in the Services sector 
while for Germany it is in Manufactures, and for the Rest of the EU there are gains in both 
(although the Services sector yields the greater gain). Note that the gains and losses in the 
individual groups of sectors most affected are substantial relative to the overall gain: inter-
sectoral transfers exceed net gains by a large multiple. 
2 The decomposition is a tlrst-order approximation, hence the 'Other Terms' row in the table. A Full decomposition 
would reijuire the calculation of the effects of interactions between all possible pairs of sectors, all possible triples, all 
possible quadruples 
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8.6.2 Welfare gains and transfers in agriculture and food 
Table 8-17 and Table 8-18 provide details, for the EU, of the decomposition into producer 
effect, consumer effect and tax revenue changes of the losses and gains in EV in the 
agriculture and food sectors respectively in the EU. They should be read together with Table 
8-16 as they illustrate two of the points made earlier: that the general equilibrium effects of 
reform in one sector may dominate the gains/losses in that sector, and that transfers 
(redistributions of welfare) almost always exceed efficiency gains by a substantial multiple. 
As an initial example of the first point, note from Table 8-16 that, for the UK. the individual 
EV changes due to the abolition of the CAP in the agriculture and food sectors, though 
individually substantial (a $5.771bn loss and a $5.443bn gain respectively) they virtually 
offset one another. It may also be seen from Table 8-16 that the net gains elsewhere in the UK 
econoniN' (notably in Services) dominate the small net loss in the agricultural and food sectors. 
That is. the main gains do not come from gains in the sectors directly affect by the abolition of 
the CAP. but from changes in other sectors, and there are substantial transfers between the 
directly-affected sectors. 
As a further example of the relative dominance of transfers, consider the aggregated changes 
from Table 8-17 and Table 8-18 for the agriculture and food sectors in producer and 
consumer effects and tax revenue (the conventional partial equilibrium components of welfare 
changes). Abolition of the CAP would reduce producer prices, leading to a producer effect of 
$-I2.076bn. and would benefit consumers by $7.278bn and taxpayers by $4.470bn. All these 
transfers dominate the net loss in agriculture and food. 
8.6.3 Agenda 2000 in 2005 compared with CAP abolition in 2005 
The first of our scenarios assumes that the EU will meet its Uruguay Round commitments. 
Given that, it is interesting to ask how far that Agenda 2000 reforms of the CAP go towards 
realising some of the welfare gains to the EU countries that would come from the complete 
abolifion of the CAP. In terms of its EV (consumer) effects. Agenda 2000 does not perform 
very well. Using the data in Table 8-16, we observe that while Agenda 2000 does give EV 
gains relafive to the UR scenario ($0.58bn for the UK, $0.28bn for Germany. $l.02bn for the 
Rest of the EU), they are minimal compared to the gains from CAP abolition ($2.38bn for the 
UK, $2.63bn for Germany. $l0.6bn for the Rest of the EU). 
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8.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Table 8-1 shows a net loss relative to the Base Case for the EU (-0.07 per cent of EU GDP) and 
for all its identified members from the Uruguay Round agreement in terms of the equivalent 
variation measure of welfare for 2005; the UK loss is the smallest of the three (-0.04 per cent of 
GDP). It has been argued that one of the reasons for this is that the EU did not liberalise 
significantly, even in its agricultural policy, where relatively little reductions in its subsidised 
exports were in fact required. Indeed, all EU countries (households) gained in terms of the 
agricultural sectors, although these gains were largely offset by losses through changes in the 
food, manufactures and services sectors. There were substantial distributional changes 
(dominating the EV gains), both within agriculture itself, and between agricultural producers (the 
gainers) and food producers, consumers and taxpayers (the losers). 
The Agenda 2000 reforms would, in 2005, change the UK's loss from the Uruguay Round into a 
small gain relative to the Base Case (0.01 per cent of GDP)., and would reduce the losses for 
German) and the Rest of the EU. These changes again involve substantial redistributional effects. 
The gains are small compared with those that would come from the abolition of the CAP (0.10 
per cent of GDP for the EU as a whole relative to the Base Case. 0.16 per cent for the UK, 0.04 
per cent for Germany and 0.13 per cent for the Rest of the EU). 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has considered the evaluation of agricultural policy using computable 
general equilibrium modelling. The main focus of this study has been two 
applications, both of which are concerned with agricultural policy in the European 
Union. Chapter 6 presented the results from a model of the Uruguay Round that 
contained certain original features, and chapter 8 presented results from an updated 
model using a new database, and was concerned with the modelling of the Uruguay 
Round. Agenda 2000 agricultural reforms, and the total costs of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The consideration of the Uruguay Round reforms included the 
modelling of non-agricultural policy changes, reinforcing the need for a general 
equilibrium approach to modelling. 
There is a "standard" means of modelling trade reform in CGE models, characterised 
b\ static modelling, perfect competition with constant returns to scale, perfectly 
mobile factors within regions, and the use of ad valorem taxes and subsidies. The last 
decade has seen several major improvements in terms of the modelling of imperfect 
competition and the incorporation of projections and steady-state dynamics into CGE 
models, but all these improvements have focused on trade in manufactured goods with 
little consideration of the structure of the agricultural economy. 
This thesis has presented extensions to this framework that attempt to bring a more 
realistic characterisation of the agricultural sectors. The incorporation of factor 
immobility in agriculture is necessary unless agriculture is to be treated as simply 
another manufacturing sector, and setting a proportion of agricultural factors to be 
sub-sector specific both improves the modelling of supply response in agriculture and 
allows the income of farmer households to be measured. This treatment has 
advantages over more traditional factor immobility models where one factor is sector-
specific, because in those models the factor intensity ratios determine how far the 
immobility affects different sectors. The use of ad valorem tax and subsidy rates in 
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agriculture has been adapted to enable the modelling of Uruguay Round constraints, 
and chapter 5 introduced the modelling of set-aside. The model of chapters 7 and 8 
defined several CAP instruments explicitly - compensation and headage payments, 
output quotas, set-aside and set-aside compensation, intervention prices and support 
buying - and introduced a new means of modelling the Uruguay Round export subsidy 
commitments for the EU. 
Chapter 1 described the Uruguay Round agreement, with particular attention being 
paid to the Agricultural Agreement, of which there are three main areas of reform: 
market access, export subsidies, and domestic support commitments. The market 
access commitments involve the conversion of non-tariff barriers to tariffs, and the 
reduction of these and existing tariffs. "Dirty tariffication' and various exemptions to 
the market access commitments such as the continuation of Japanese rice import 
quotas, are likely to water down the effects of the tariff reductions, but the inclusion 
of agriculture into GATT/WTO disciplines is certainly a large step forward and lays 
the foundation for future tariff reforms. The reform of export subsidy and domestic 
support commitments will also not have as large an effect as was expected at the 
beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations, mainly because the base periods for 
reductions v^ere ones where agricultural support was at historically high levels. 
Chapter 2 examined the construction of computable general equilibrium models, from 
basic functional forms to issues of product differentiation and model closure. This 
discussion laid the foundation for chapter 3, which considered the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model, and presented the results from se\eral papers that 
use this model for the analysis of the Uruguay Round, as well as other Uruguay 
Round CGE models. The results from these models vary widely, depending on the 
commodity and regional classification of the models, the market structures, the 
approaches to dynamics and projections, and the representation of the reform package. 
The GTAP version 2 database was examined in chapter 4. The structure of trade 
patterns and of agricultural protection in each of the 24 regions of the database was 
discussed as the basis for an aggregation of the GTAP database that has the specific 
emphasis of modelling agricultural policy. Chapter 5 discussed the standard GTAP 
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model, and made modifications and extensions to this model. The modelling of 
specific-factors and endogenous subsidy rates was developed here, as was a means of 
decomposing welfare changes in the GTAP model. 
Chapter 6 presents the results from modelling the Uruguay Round with the 
aggregation and model developed in chapters 4 and 5. The main results for these 
simulations show that the global welfare gain (0.39%) and regional gains to the EU 
(0.42%). the USA (0.41%) and Japan (0.84%) are comparable to the other studies 
discussed in chapter 3. Agriculture, texdles and clothing and market access for 
industrial goods are found to each provide around one third of the global gains, but 
with a great degree of inter-regional differences. Agricultural import tariff reforms 
have far greater importance for the world as a whole than subsidy reforms, but in the 
EU export subsidy reforms are the most important aspect of the Uruguay Round. 
On the level of aggregate welfare, the modelling extensions developed here lead to 
slightly lower welfare impact from reforms, but on a sectoral level the results from 
using a "standard" model and the "main model' of chapter 6 are very different for 
agricultural sectors, and for farm income. The modelling of imperfect compefition. 
meanwhile, changes the farm income results very little. 
The recently released GTAP version 4 database provides greater commodity detail in 
agricultural sectors, which allows modelling of CAP policies on a detailed basis, and 
chapter 7 developed the framework for this, in the context of modelling the Agenda 
2000 reforms. The model developed in chapter 5 was augmented with producfion 
quotas for milk and sugar, explicit compensation and headage payment modelling, 
intervention price and support buying, and a model of the EU export subsidy 
commitments where the EU maintains the domesfic price of exports via a variable 
export levy and ensures that Uruguay Round commitments are met through support 
buying. 
Chapter 8 provided results for simulations using this updated database and CAP 
policy modelling in a projected model. The main results are that the Uruguay Round 
leads to welfare losses in the EU. which are partially reduced through Agenda 2000. 
The Agenda 2000 reforms are very small considered against the complete abolition of 
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the CAP. The main reason why the Uruguay Round results in this chapter differ from 
those in chapter 6 is that the characterisation of the Uruguay Round Agricultural 
Agreement in chapter 6 is 'optirnistic', whereas the tariff liberalisation and export 
subsidy commitments detailed in chapter 7 result in far less reform of EU agriculture. 
The MFA reforms, which could lead to overall welfare gains, were also not modelled 
in chapter 8, and the industrial sector was not disaggregated; which has probably lead 
to underestimation of the welfare gains from the Uruguay Round. In all three 
counterfactual scenarios modelled in this chapter, the redistributional impacts of 
reforms are far greater than the overall welfare results. 
Opportunities for future research exist in several areas of the work conducted here. 
Modelling of the CAP could be improved by including milk subsidies and modelling 
compensation payments as specific subsidies to land (in chapters 7 and 8 they are ad 
valorem subsidies to land). Explicit modelling of agricultural policies outside the EU 
presents many opportunities for more detail to be included into the modelling 
framework, particularly in the USA and Japan. The Uruguay Round Agricultural 
Agreement contains several areas that have not been modelled here, such as minimum 
import access commitments, and the remaining quotas on Japanese rice imports. The 
inodelling of imperfect factor mobility in agriculture could also be expanded to more 
than create a 50-50 split between perfectly mobile and immobile factors, with the 
possibility of using data on the proportion of farm owners in the agricultural 
workforce to determine the rafio of specific agricultural factors. Then there are 
possibilifies of modelling other categories of agricultural labour with varying degrees 
of mobility. 
On a wider scale, there are "new" areas of CGE modelling such as multi-period 
dynamics and the use of trade restrictiveness indices that are applicable to all forms of 
CGE modelling. Multi-period dynamics have only been used in small dimension CGE 
models because of the rapid increase in model size that they dictate, but with 
techniques similar to those used in chapter 5 to compress the model, it may be 
possible to generate mulfi-period dynamics for large scale CGE models. The trade 
restrictiveness index is a means of incorporating the effects of tariff or tax vanafions 
within an aggregated commodity grouping, and may be crucial in CGE models where 
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the level of aggregation means that tariff peaks are hidden in large commodity groups 
with low(er) average tariffs. 
There exist possibilities to augment the GTAP database with data on agricultural 
goods at a far more detailed level. It is possible to formulate a large global model 
where the commodity classification is expanded for a subset of the regions in the 
model, enabling for example grains production in. and trade between, the EU. USA 
and Canada to be disaggregated into a dozen categories, while retaining a more 
aggregate classification in other regions. This would also be of importance to the 
livestock and milk sectors in the EU and other regions, and to non-food crops (coffee, 
cocoa, etc.) in LDCs. Only when this level of detail is reached will CGE models be 
able to generate serious commodity forecasts. 
While the modelling of imperfectly competitive markets has tended to concentrate on 
manufacturing and services sectors, there are possibilities for future research to 
dexelop models that incorporate forms of imperfect competition that are more relevant 
to auriculture. Monopsonistic competition (concentration of buyers) is a feature of 
food processing sectors, where food retailers have market power over the goods that 
they purchase from the agriculture sector. The implications of this and monopolisfic 
compefition among multi-product food retailers could also be investigated in a CGE 
framework, as could market concentration in the trading sector - there is a high 
concentration of international companies trading in cereals, for example. 
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